THE HUNGARIAN CONSERVATIVE PRESENTS

The GEOSTRATEGY *of* MIGRATION



OLD WORLD GEOSTRATEGY | 2.

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

1

Geostategic Foundations

Hans Muelich, *Albrecht and Anna playing chess* (between 1552 and 1555). Bavarian State Library, Munich

SOURCE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

After the collapse of the bipolar world order in 1990, history did not come to an end. The 'West' was unable to take advantage of the historical situation to homogenize the world or reshape it in its own image, and soon the polarization of the world began—or continued. Actors who had never been granted such roles by the 'West', and who even had often been targets of the 'West', began to ask—or demand—for at least regional leadership positions and recognition.[1] As a consequence, on the geostrategic map of the Old World—on the great chessboard—several 'pieces' either received or fought for roles and opportunities that they have begun to make use of in recent decades. The Western euphoria dissipated quickly, for it had to confront the world's cultural and religious diversity. Numerous cultural and religious differences, and the divergent developmental paths arising from them, successfully disrupt the long-desired coherence. The 'West' did not notice this, or did not understand it. Therefore, it is now faced with the fact that other regions of the world, other global or regional powers, moving along different developmental trajectories, are achieving successes in the fields of economics and politics and are slowly building a reality that is alternative from the Western point of view. The 'West' has realized that if it continues to play the chess game with the current distribution of pieces, according to the traditional rules of chess, then after a few moves it will be checkmated. There are numerous challenges, even breaking points, that may pose dangers to the global influence and role of the 'West', including the EU within it—and, with far-reaching consequences for the future of the West, may also threaten the Western value system itself.[2]

The present study, employing the methodology of geostrategy, seeks primarily to map the conflicts and harmonies of interest in the Old World. Geopolitics is an art; geostrategy is a profession based on cold-headed, cold-blooded calculation. It contains no emotions, for the algorithms governing global economic and political processes likewise possess no emotions and no philosophical disposition. At this point, it is worth recalling the timeless formulation of the essence of British imperial policy—and of all imperial policy—originally attributed to Robert Walpole, the prime minister under the British monarchs George I and George II, according to which 'his Majesty has no enemies; his Majesty has no friends; his Majesty only has interests'.[3] It is this approach—free of moral categories and worldview-based philosophies—that enables us to attempt to paint an objective, emotion-free picture of the world, the processes taking place within it, and the convergences and divergences of interest that determine the actions of the actors directing global processes.

It is no coincidence that philosophians of history applying a geostrategic approach (such as SP Huntington or Z Brzezinski) compared the methodology to the game of chess and used chess as an example, since chess is perhaps the only sport that is completely emotionless. Its foundation is cold-headed calculation, emotion-free tactical and strategic planning. Anyone who plays chess based on emotion will lose. When Brzezinski set up his geostrategic framework[4] in the 1990s, four chess players could still be identified around the chessboard: the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, in point 4 of the introduction to his book *Strategic Vision*[5], wrote in 2012 that the United States could regain its global leadership role if, together with its traditional Western allies (including NATO and EU Member States), as well as Türkiye and Russia (*sic!*), it were to create a new security axis

[1] Apart from Tsarist Russia and the Japanese Empire, the rest of the world outside Europe was either a colony or the target of colonial ambitions (China).
[2] Dezső 2025.
[3] Palmerston's version reads: 'We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.' (Lord Palmerston, 1 March 1848).
[4] Brzezinski 1999.
[5] Brzezinski 2012/2020.

At this point, it is worth noting that world history knows of only one such redeeming—literally redeeming—project behind which no motive of political or economic gain can be discerned. This redeeming project is associated with the name of Jesus Christ.

capable of maintaining, even against the 'Global South', a balance of power favourable to the West. The 2014 change of government in Ukraine and the Russian–Ukrainian tensions traceable to this moment (the Russian occupation of Crimea, separatist efforts, and the war in the Donbas) led directly to Russia's attack on Ukraine. These events steered the course of history in a direction fundamentally opposed to Brzezinski's vision.

In light of this, it is unfortunately not surprising that the European Union now seems to be losing its role as an autonomous player; at best, we can assign it the role of an 'onlooker', while new emerging actors are also striving to move closer to the board (e.g., India, or the BRICS countries together forming a new pole)[6]. With the almost inevitable, predictable, and interest-driven outbreak of the Russian–Ukrainian war, this chess game has received a new distribution of pieces[7], and the cultivated West has begun to build—against itself—the great Eastern alliance that constitutes a strong and dangerous counter-pole to the 'Global West', and which will divide the nations of the world regarding the alliance system they choose to belong to. The strength of the Eastern pole and the number of its potential allies may yet bring surprises for the 'Global West'.[8]

To be one step ahead of others in acquiring knowledge and mapping out future processes, in identifying possible scenarios, provides a tactical advantage; to be two steps ahead already constitutes a strategic advantage.

World history has repeatedly demonstrated that great 'redeeming' events or projects *always take on a moral character in their presentation*; the code, the message that reaches people, is always moral and ethical in nature. Yet in their true nature, these 'redeeming' projects *always possess political and economic content*. The function of the moral and ethical code is to rally people to the project's side, to convince them that they stand on the side of good, while simultaneously concealing the real goals—political and economic gain. If we truly wish to understand the processes unfolding in the world, research of this kind must rest on the foundations of emotionless identification of interests. In geostrategy, there are no coincidences. In a world order governed by interests, there exist only facts and explanations. Here, moral coding cannot divert attention from the real economic and political causes; it is this moral coding which people must be bombarded with to distract their attention from actual processes.

Systems that, by mapping and understanding the complex network of harmonizing and conflicting interests, come to know the interests of the chess players, can identify the new distribution of pieces, and—having understood the configuration emerging on the chessboard—attempt to predict the next moves of the players, will be successful. It is at this point that the analyst's tactical advantage (being one step ahead) turns into a strategic advantage (being two or more steps ahead).

This study focuses primarily, among the general geostrategic challenges, on the geostrategic causes and consequences of the migration crisis—specifically on its two driving forces, overpopulation and water

[6] *See* Dezső 2025.

[7] In the past decade, the cultivated West has been confronted with the fact that, according to the rules of the great international chess game, it will be checkmated in the next ten moves, as international economic, demographic, etc. indicators painted an unfavourable picture of its chances and projected the strengthening of other players (China, India, and the ever-expanding BRICS world (Dezső 2025)). It has become clear that the West should not continue this chess game according to the traditional rules. In this way, the chessboard has been overturned (Russian–Ukrainian war), and the rules of chess have been altered (sanctions policy). Now all that remains is to rearrange the overturned pieces, which may not take place according to the ideas of the educated West, since the other chess players will also have a say in the development of the new balance of power.

[8] Dezső 2025.

scarcity, which, even apart from the outbreak of wars resulting from the social tensions they generate, exert and will continue to exert such profound effects on the societies concerned that they may lead to mass emigration, that is, further waves of migration.

The migration crisis that has afflicted Europe since 2015 is unfortunately not the actual problem but only its precursor. What we encountered was not the 'disease' itself but merely its 'symptom'. The fact that Western Europe is scarcely able to alleviate even the symptoms (to 'reduce the fever'), the fact that even this 'forewarning' produced such a severe crisis in Western Europe—and has by now driven relations between countries interpreting the phenomenon differently (specifically Hungary) and the EU to the breaking point—is highly diagnostic. At the same time, it has provided an excellent pretext for viewing other tensions stemming from ideological or philosophical differences through this same lens, using the refugee/migration issue as a paper whip to keep Hungary under pressure and sanction it, thus forcing it to abandon many of its typically patriotic aspirations, which run counter to the Brussels mainstream or to global liberal/globalist interests.

For the Western Member States of the European Union, the influx of refugees/migrants came as such a shock—causing serious social tensions whether in everyday life (no-go zones), in security challenges (Islamic terrorism), in the deterioration of public safety (worsening crime statistics, changes in offender demographics, the dramatic rise in sexual offenses, etc.), in demographic indicators, or in the difficulty or outright failure of integrating newcomers—that **these states are able to deal with migration only on a tactical level**. They must solve specific problems that consume nearly all the resources they allocate to the issue, leaving them no time or energy for strategic planning. By contrast, the Hungarian conservative government successfully prevented Hungary from becoming a migrant country and successfully kept Hungary away from the challenges that afflict the Western European states listed above. For this reason, the conservative Hungarian government has the opportunity **to think through and manage the entire migration issue and other global topics on a strategic level.** Conservative and patriotic Hungarian policy may or may not be liked, but no one can dispute that **it operates predominantly within the strategic domain, far beyond the limits implied by Hungary's size and economic strength.**

Geostrategic planning has two temporal horizons:

1. **Long-term forecasting.** This concerns predicting the conditions of what the world will look like in 2050 or even in 2070. In both the demographic subsystem and the 'water scarcity' or climate subsystem, the present study uses datasets produced by internationally recognized research institutes or by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division—institutions and datasets that enjoy the highest credibility and an almost complete international consensus. They represent the common denominator and the smallest common multiple. From these forecasts, we can learn how the population of individual countries—and their other demographic indicators—will change by 2050. In the case of the 'water scarcity' subsystem, we can model which countries will face severe pressure as a consequence of the global decline in available freshwater resources.

2. **Short-term, real-time impact.** This may sound surprising, but it is the most important factor. What will happen in 2050 or 2070, we will eventually see, and as time passes, the picture will become clearer. But the task of the institutions responsible for strategic planning—many of them strictly confidential governmental background organizations, in every country where strategic planning is taken seriously—is to prepare strategic plans based on the most credible data available at the present moment, and to make recommendations: war or peace. Should we prepare for war or for

If I wanted to put it very starkly, I would say that from the standpoint of strategic planning it is not what will happen in 2050 or 2070 that matters, but what is taking place now in the minds of strategic planners—how, based on processed real-time data, they design those political/strategic decisions of the present or near future that fundamentally influence our current situation, determine our strategic posture, and set the strategic direction of our path leading up to 2050 or even 2070. The question is what the final conclusion of their strategic plans will be: war or peace.

For we already know that being one step ahead of others in strategic planning is a tactical advantage, but being two steps ahead is already a strategic advantage.

peace? These questions are decided at the level of strategic planning now, not in 2050 or 2070. Concrete data must be written into the plans. We cannot write into these plans that 'everything will somehow work out', that humanity will sooner or later invent something, and that in 2050 or 2070 there will be no food crisis on an overpopulated planet because everyone will be eating algae and insects anyway. Assumptions cannot be incorporated into strategic planning; they cannot be fitted into equations or formulas. Therefore, the future is being decided at the (geo)strategic planning desks now, and not in 2050 or 2070.

Alexander von Wagner, *The Self- Sacrifice of Titusz Dugovics* (1859). Hungarian National Gallery, Budapest

SOURCE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

2

Hungary's Migration Experience — 2015

In the first half of 2015, a previously unknown phenomenon shook the countries of the Balkans, then Hungary, and subsequently the countries of Western Europe. Waves of hundreds of thousands of people arrived at Hungary's southern border one after another. At that time, several hundred thousand people marched across Hungary towards Western Europe (*Photo*: Keleti Railway Station), until the Hungarian authorities closed a significant section of Hungary's southern border with a technical border barrier (rapid-deployment wire obstacle) by 1 September 2015—putting a stop to the migrant masses that continued to arrive. Two weeks later, on 15 September 2015, the accumulated migrant crowds attempted to break through the border protection by force at the Röszke crossing. The clash with the Hungarian law enforcement forces ('Battle of Röszke') resulted in numerous injuries. Still, the border barrier held, and since then, supplemented by the legal border fences, it has become increasingly strong and effective in protecting Hungary's and Europe's southern border. This was a clear message not only to the migrants but to the entire world that Hungary will defend its sovereignty—and with it the section of Europe's southern border lying on Hungarian territory—if necessary, even by force.

Closing the border with a technical barrier also made it possible for the Hungarian authorities—until the full border closure was introduced—to register arrivals at the crossing points (*Figure 1*). In line with EU standards, the registration sought answers to three questions: 1) country of origin; 2) gender; 3) age. In the first wave, 173,947 people were successfully registered. *Figures 1–4* show the official statistics created at the time.

Figure 2. *Figure 2* groups the registered migrants/refugees by country of origin. It should be noted here that the vast majority arrived at the border without travel documents, so their country of origin was provided on a self-declaration basis. This may distort that part of the statistics which shows that arrivals from the Arab world often claimed to be from Syria, stating that the attacks of the Islamic State—that is, armed conflict, war—forced them to flee. It is perhaps most striking on this figure that even so, only 37per cent of those registered arrived from Syria, and 5 per cent from Iraq, which was likewise affected by Islamic State attacks. They were the par excellence refugees, that is, the group for whom it was reasonable to assume that war was the cause of their flight. **Together, they constituted 42 per cent of all registered individuals.**

A significant proportion of the arrivals were Afghans (26 per cent). In the case of Syrian, Iraqi, and Afghan migrants/refugees, it must also be stated that the armed conflict did not extend to the entire territory of their countries, but only to smaller or larger parts of them; therefore, even in these countries, there were safe areas where many people sought refuge as 'internally displaced persons'. There were large regions in these countries where people could live in safety, hundreds of kilometres away from the fighting.

According to the statistics, apart from the Syrian and Iraqi refugees, the other registered individuals arrived from exactly 100 other countries. Among them were 170 Cubans, two from the Solomon Islands, etc. These people—**the migrants—made up 58 per cent of those registered, and it was difficult to associate them with large-scale armed conflicts**; therefore, under international law, they were not necessarily entitled to protection (not to mention how many safe countries they had already crossed by the time they reached the Hungarian border). They were the irregular migrants. From these statistics, it is clear that the migration/refugee crisis of 2015 was not a simple refugee crisis. No matter how loudly the Western European chorus proclaimed that everyone was a refugee and that they all had to be let through, **the position of the Hungarian government was based not on the emotional/philosophical exclusion alleged in Western accusations (Islamophobia), but on simple statistics**. This objective, statistical attitude was what we followed then and what we continue to follow to this day.

Hungary's Migration Experience — 2015

It should also be noted that the statistics—given the wide variety of the countries of origin of the arrivals—did not in any way create the appearance of spontaneity; rather, they suggested that refugees/migrants arriving from 102 countries appeared suddenly and simultaneously on the busy Balkan main route of world history within the framework of a conscious, organized project, and reached the southern border of Hungary almost at the same time. It is difficult to imagine such harmony in spontaneous processes, the result of which would be that citizens of 102 countries, departing independently of one another, would happen to converge at the same time on a route they had hardly heard of before. This was clearly not a spontaneous process, but an enterprise organized on some level.

Figure 3. *Figure 3* shows **the gender distribution of those registered**. Even at the beginning of the process, it was striking that the incoming waves of migrants consisted overwhelmingly of young, single men. Among those arriving from Syria, the proportion of men was 75 per cent, and this can be extended to almost every country/country group. Thus, the migration crisis is characterized by the fact that the vast majority of migrants were young, single men, about whom—although EU directives prohibited posing this question—it could be assumed that many of them had military experience, since in many of these countries compulsory military service was in place, or they belonged to clan/tribal militias where they were trained in the use of weapons, whether they liked it or not.

Figure 4. *Figure 4*, showing **the distribution by gender and age**, is similarly diagnostic. It is clear that within the men who made up 70–75 per cent of all those registered, the largest group was represented by young and young adult men between the ages of 14 and 34. Obviously, they are the most dynamic and most mobile group, thus it was naturally easiest for them to set out. And since they were not coming in the form of consolidated families, where one has to work and do everything to support and ensure the safety of the family, the 'integration model' and motivation of young adult men may be fundamentally different. Their ambitions—often far removed from reality and their actual possibilities—and the non-fulfilment of these dreams, along with the resulting failures and frustrations, make them the most dangerous group. The majority of those committing common criminal offences or representing a potential terror threat come from among them. And this is true not only for newly arrived migrants, but also for migrant-background communities already born in Europe, where it is young adult men who tend to become the young people susceptible to extremism, those who largely blame their—often perceived as unsuccessful—lives on the host society.[9]

Alongside the statistical realities (42 per cent eligible for refugee procedures, 58 per cent irregular migrants), the Hungarian government also had—and still has—serious principled and philosophical reservations regarding the expected consequences of the migration crisis, consequences that are clearly identifiable in Western Europe:

During the migration crisis that began in 2015, and ever since, the position of the Hungarian government has not been based on the emotional/philosophical exclusion alleged in Western accusations (Islamophobia), but on simple statistics. According to these, 42 per cent of the 173,947 registered individuals arrived from war-torn Syria and Iraq—considered the par excellence refugees—while 58 per cent arrived from exactly 100 other countries, who could be regarded as irregular migrants.

[9] By 2017, at least 4,558 of them had joined the Islamic State, and 1,192 had returned to Europe (Dezső 2019, Dezső 2020, 51, Figure 10).

1. We do not want to turn Hungary into an immigration country. Hungary belongs to those European/EU countries that have no colonial past, have nothing to regret in this respect, nothing to make amends for, and the Hungarian people have no modern or contemporary historical experience of living together with people of other civilizational backgrounds.
2. We do not want to change Hungary's homogeneous civilizational background, which the Hungarian population considers a value to be protected. Over the past 1,100 years, Hungarians have shed much blood at the altar of independence in order to preserve Hungary's political sovereignty and the Hungarian cultural/civilizational values that belong to the Western sphere in the storms of history, and it is our clear intention to pass these on to our descendants unchanged.
3. We do not want to unleash upon the Hungarian population the curse of immigrant-background common criminality—linked to livelihood or civilizational differences—which, unfortunately, is breaking records in statistical terms in Western Europe.
4. We do not want to unleash upon Hungary the Islamic (jihadist) terrorism that poses a serious security policy risk in Western Europe.
5. We do not want the new left-wing and Muslim migration-background antisemitism—which poses an increasing danger to Western European Jewish communities—to gain ground in Hungary.
6. We do not want Western Europe, the birthplace of Western civilization, and together with it the entire European Union, to fall victim to the threats listed above.

Since the beginning of the migration crisis, particularly as a result of the American peace-making ambitions and actions linked to Donald Trump's second presidential term, the situation has—thank God—changed in a significant number of the countries considered the starting points of the migration crisis. Peace has 'broken out'. In Iraq (winter 2017) and in Syria (23 March 2019) with the 'defeat' of the Islamic State, or at least the destruction of its territorial presence; in Afghanistan in 2020 with the withdrawal of allied troops and the takeover by the Taliban; and at the end of 2024 in Syria with the takeover by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, peace 'broke out'. Weapons are no longer crackling. Many internal and external refugees have returned home. Thank God (people are no longer dying in senseless wars), the wartime conditions that, since 2013—and especially from the end of 2014 onwards—pushed wave after wave of people fleeing the fighting from their homes, no longer exist. At that time, arriving from a war-torn country almost automatically entitled a person to apply to European authorities to initiate a refugee procedure. Although we know that every asylum procedure is assessed individually, the wartime situation that generally, almost obligatorily, provided the legal basis for initiating asylum procedures—for example, for those arriving from Syria—has ceased. For new arrivals, this general legal basis has ceased to exist, and therefore, even those arriving from Syria can no longer be considered refugees automatically. Moreover, since these countries no longer carry within them the promise of an escalation of armed conflict or a new war, they can also be regarded as safe countries, and thus discussions have begun (in Germany) about the deportation of those arriving from there. This must fundamentally change the European Union's approach to migration.

	Country	Total	Men	Women
Asia	Afghanistan	45,376	37,597	7,779
	Azerbaijan	5	3	2
	Bangladesh	4,010	3,990	20
	Bhutan	1	1	0
	United Arab Emirates	9	8	1
	Philippines	1	0	1
	Georgia	24	22	2
	India	351	347	4
	Indonesia	3	3	0
	Iran	1,740	1,446	294
	Iraq	8,734	6,964	1,770
	Jemen	53	48	5
	Jordan	8	4	4
	China	8	6	2
	Kyrgyzstan	2	2	0
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1	0	1
	Kuwait	1	1	0
	Laos	4	3	1
	Lebanon	23	15	8
	Myanmar	65	64	1
	Mongolia	99	65	34
	Nepal	29	27	2
	Oman	1	0	1
	Armenia	3	2	1
	Pakistan	14,873	14,815	58
	Palestine	1,064	880	184
	Sri Lanka	87	77	10
	Saudi Arabia	2	1	1
	Singapore	1	1	0
	Syria	64,391	48,162	16,229
	Tajikistan	6	3	3
	Turkmenistan	1	0	1
	Uzbekistan	11	5	6
	Vietnam	26	26	0
	Total	**141,013**	**114,588**	**26,425**

AFRICA	Algeria	587	577	10
	Angola	5	4	1
	Benin	5	5	0
	Burkina Faso	46	43	3
	Burundi	8	5	3
	Cameroon	637	415	222
	Central African Republic	3	3	0
	Chad	1	1	0
	South Africa	2	2	0
	South Sudan	28	24	4
	Cote d'Ivoire	290	228	62
	Egypt	81	79	2
	Eritrea	538	238	300
	Ethiopia	41	19	22
	Gabon	10	6	4
	Gambia	158	150	8
	Ghana	328	295	33
	Guinea	113	105	8
	Kenya	9	2	7
	Comoros	131	89	42
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	635	402	233
	Congo	400	280	120
	Liberia	18	12	6
	Libya	51	48	3
	Mali	291	271	20
	Mauritania	83	82	1
	Mauritius	1	1	0
	Marocco	260	252	8
	Mozambique	1	1	0
	Niger	19	16	3
	Nigeria	1,076	896	180
	Western Sahara	16	16	0
	Rwanda	15	12	3
	Senegal	340	326	14
	Seychelles	1	1	0
	Sierra Leone	93	81	12
	Somalia	323	237	86
	Sudan	265	236	29
	Tanzania	2	2	0
	Togo	58	52	6
	Tunesia	72	65	7
	Uganda	84	51	33
	Zambia	1	1	0
	Zimbabwe	1	1	0
	Total	**7,127**	**5,632**	**1,495**

Albania	233	214	19
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8	5	3
Kosovo/UNSCR 1244	24,638	17,231	7,407
Macedonia FYR	18	18	0
Moldova	8	6	2
Montenegro	7	4	3
Germany	1	1	0
Russian Federation	16	12	4
Serbia	85	62	23
Türkiye	188	163	25
Ukraine	26	16	10
United States	1	1	0
Bolivia	1	1	0
Dominica	4	3	1
Dominican Republic	16	12	4
Ecuador	1	0	1
Haiti	21	16	5
Jamaica	2	2	0
Cuba	170	109	61
Venezuela	1	1	0
Solomon Islands	2	1	1
Stateless	16	13	3
Unknown	344	324	20
Total	**25,807**	**18,215**	**7,592**
Total	**173,947**	**138,435**	**35,512**

Figure 1. Number of people registered after 1 September 2015 (by country and gender)

Hungary's Migration Experience — 2015

Distribution of migrants by continent and country

Hungary's Migration Experience — 2015

Gender ratios of migrants

Hungary's Migration Experience — 2015

Distribution of migrants by gender and age

3

Demography

The Consequences of Population Explosion

Pieter Bruegel the Elder, *The Harvesters* (1565).
Metropolitan Museum of Arts, NY, USA

SOURCE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

One of the greatest challenges for the future of Europe, and within it the European Union, has been and continues to be the migration crisis. We have witnessed demographic changes—specifically, a population explosion affecting the entire Muslim world and Sub-Saharan Africa—over the past decades, the consequences of which far exceed the capacities of the governments of the countries of origin.

The population of the five most important regions from a migration perspective (Central Asia, the Middle East, the Muslim countries of South Asia, North Africa [the Maghreb], and the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa) has undergone dramatic and explosive growth over the past 75 years. This study analyzes the demographic data of the examined regions retrospectively (1950–2025), based on current data, and using projections for the period 2025–2050, calculated by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. Attention must be paid not only to the net numbers of population growth (population size) or relative proportions, but also to median age, fertility rate, and other indicators. In this chapter, we will analyze these trends and their near-term and long-term consequences. All datasets used in this study rely exclusively on data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division[10], which is the common denominator and the smallest common multiple in this field. As politically independent and professionally well-established datasets, the UN figures must be accepted by everyone.

In this chapter, we will examine the following segments of the demographic subsystem:

1. Population growth 1950–2025
2. Population growth 2025–2050
3. Annual population growth in 2025
4. Fertility rate in 2025 and 2050
5. Median age in 2025 and 2050
6. Proportion of the male population aged 15–24

[10] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects 2024, File GEN/01/REV1: Demographic indicators by region, subregion and country, annually for 1950-2100, POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2024/GEN/F01/Rev.1, WPP2024_GEN_F01_DEMOGRAPHIC_INDICATORS_FULL, https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used.

1. POPULATION GROWTH 1950–2025

Cumulative Population Growth (1950–2025)[11] (*Maps 1–2*). Over the past 75 years (within the territorial frameworks finalized after World War II), the population of the Muslim world has undergone explosive growth.[12] *Table 1* presents the most significant demographic data for every region and country worldwide, based on the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division database.

The retrospective datasets (*Table 1*) show the pace at which the populations of all regions of the Old World—and in particular the three plus one regions examined in this study that exert a direct demographic impact on Europe's future—have grown over the past 75 years. The cumulative datasets highlighted in *Figure 1* illustrate the dramatic population explosion that these regions experienced during the period in question.

Figures 5–6. As summarized in *Figures 5 and 6*, the Muslim population of **North Africa** (the Maghreb) grew from 49,458,000 in 1950 to 274,070,000 today—an increase of 554 per cent. The Muslim population of the **Middle East** grew from 46,076,000 in 1950 to 303,785,000—a 659 per cent increase. **Central Asia**'s Muslim population grew from 17,327,000 in 1950 to 82,924,000—an increase of 475 per cent. Meanwhile, the Muslim countries of **South Asia** grew from 62,413,000 in 1950 to 388,474,000 today—an increase of 622 per cent. Equally important from the perspective of migratory pressure on Europe, **Sub-Saharan Africa's** population grew from 176,844,000 in 1950 to 1,258,299,000 today—an astounding 711 per cent increase, representing a net rise of roughly 1,081,455,000 people. As a result of this demographic explosion, the combined population of the five examined regions increased by an amount equivalent to the population of an entire continent—or more than four times that of the European Union—by 1,955,434,000 people.

Figure 7. If we examine the population growth of the other regions of the Old World (*Figure 7*), we see that in neither absolute numbers nor percentages do they approach the figures of the regions that form the core subject of this study (*Figures 5–6*). In the examined regions, the pace of population growth was nearly double that of East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia (non-Muslim countries), Australia and New Zealand, or Europe. Europe's population increase of 135 per cent was merely one quarter of the growth experienced in the rest of the Old World. It should also be noted that Hungary's population grew from 9,338,000 in 1950 to 9,663,000 today; however, it declined from a historical peak of 10,754,000 in 1980 to the present figure of 9,663,000.[13]

This massive demographic explosion in the Muslim world and Sub-Saharan Africa has permanently disrupted the demographic balance that characterized the Old World in the first half of the 20th century, placing a level of pressure on these overpopulated societies that they can hardly—or not at all—manage.

Maps 1–2 illustrate the outlined trends and the reconfiguration and eventual disruption of the Old World's earlier demographic balance. They visually depict the enormous differences in population growth dynamics across the world's regions and countries, and identify the regions where growth rates reached multiples of those observed elsewhere. **The geographical overlap between regions of exceptional population growth and the major migrant-sending regions is, of course, no coincidence.**

[11] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

[12] This study does not explore the reasons for this population explosion in the context of improving health and food security, or in the many other factors.

[13] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

	Country	1950	2025	Growth(person)	Growth (%)[14]
North Africa	Algeria	8,872	47,132	38,260	531
	Egypt	20,452	117,498	97,046	574
	Libya	1,125	7,420	6,295	660
	Marocco	8,986	38,261	29,275	426
	Western Sahara	14	596	582	4,257
	Susan	5,734	50,849	45,115	887
	Tunisia	3,605	12,314	8,709	342
	Total	**49,458**	**274,070**	**224,612**	**554**
Middle East	Azerbaijan	2,928	10,368	7,440	354
	Bahrein	116	1,626	1,510	1,401
	United Arab Emirates	70	11,215	11,145	16,021
	Iraq	5,719	46,526	40,807	813
	Israel	1,258	9,452	8,194	751
	Jemen	4,661	41,179	36,518	883
	Jordan	481	11,575	11,094	241
	Kuwait	153	4,985	4,832	3,258
	Lebanon	1,335	5,826	4,491	436
	Oman	456	5,398	4,942	1,183
	Palestine	932	5,540	4,608	594
	Qatar	25	3,084	3,059	12,336
	Saudi Arabia	3,121	34,264	31,143	1,097
	Syria	3,413	25,171	21,758	737
	Türkiye	21,408	87,576	66,168	409
	Total	**46,076**	**303,785**	**257,709**	**659**
Central Asia	Kazakhstan	6,703	20,721	14,018	309
	Kyrgyzstan	1,740	7,241	5,501	416
	Tajikistan	1,532	10,690	9,158	698
	Turkmenistan	1,211	7,558	6,347	624
	Uzbekistan	6,264	36,713	30,449	549
	Total	17,327	82,924	65,473	475
South Asia	Afghanistan	7,752	43,250	35,498	558
	Iran	17,119	92,021	74,902	537
	Pakistan	37,542	253,203	215,661	674
	Total	**62,413**	**388,474**	**326,061**	**622**
	Total	**175,274**	**1,049,253**	**873,855**	**598**

Figure 5. Population growth in the countries of the Muslim world 1950–2025[15]
(The figures are expressed in thousands of persons.)

[14] This percentage shows the percentage by which the population of a given country or region will increase (above 100 per cent) or decrease (below 100 per cent).
[15] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

One of the outlets of this explosive growth materialized in the Arab Spring of 2011–2012, which was followed by civil wars and the emergence of the Islamic State. These violent developments (civil war, the territorial expansion of the Islamic State) triggered the first major waves of refugees and migrants and paved the way for the migratory flows that followed—flows that rang alarm bells and drew global attention to the deeper underlying causes of contemporary mass migration. Among these, one of the most important is precisely the demographic explosion described in these chapters of the demographic subsystem. The refugee/migration crisis was only a symptom—a dramatic discharge—of a much deeper cluster of problems. Understanding these underlying causes helps explain the processes that—in the form of a prolonged and increasingly intense migration crisis—will shape the future of Europe, including Hungary.

Region	1950	2025	Growth (person)	Growth (%)[16]
Middle East	46,076	303,785	257,709	659
Central Asia	17,327	82,924	65,597	478
South Asia	62,413	388,474	326,061	622
North Africa	49,458	274,070	224,612	554
Sub-Saharan Africa	176,844	1,258,299	1,081,455	711
Total	**352,118**	**2,307,552**	**1,955,434**	**754**

Figure 6. Population growth in the regions of origin 1950–2025[17]
(The figures are expressed in thousands of persons.)

Region	1950	2025	Growth (person)	Growth (%)[18]
East Asia	666,410	1,654,182	987,772	248
Southeast Asia	165,134	697,629	532,495	422
South Asia	459,234	2,074,646	1,615,412	451
Australia and New Zealand	10,085	31,303	21,218	310
Europe	549,065	744,787	195,722	135

Figure 7. Population growth in other regions of the Old World 2025–2050[19]
(The figures are expressed in thousands of persons.)

[16] This percentage shows the percentage by which the population of a given country or region will increase (above 100 per cent) or decrease (below 100 per cent).
[17] UN DESA Population Division 2024.
[18] This percentage shows the percentage by which the population of a given country or region will increase (above 100 per cent) or decrease (below 100 per cent).
[19] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

1. **Population Growth per Country 1950-2025**
(UN Population Division)



2. **Population Growth per Region 1950-2025**
(UN Population Division)



2. POPULATION GROWTH 2025–2050

The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, publishes not only retrospective but also prospective projections/calculations for the coming decades (up to 2100).[20] These projections are based on substantial professional foundations and methodology, and therefore represent the internationally accepted common denominator in this domain.

The prospective datasets for certain Old World countries—extending to 2050 in our case—are also included in *Table 1*. This table shows not only how the populations of various Old World countries and regions have grown in terms of the number of persons and the percentage increase over the past 75 years, but also how these populations are expected to grow in the remaining 25 years up to 2050, in terms of both the number of persons and the percentage increase. In this chapter, *Figures 8–12* contain the detailed and comparative datasets.

Figure 8. The table of *Figure 8* shows by how much the populations of the four Muslim regions will increase by 2050, i.e., over the next 25 years. The population of the seven countries of North Africa (the Maghreb) will grow by 97,259,000 persons, reaching 135 per cent of its current population size. Egypt alone will gain nearly the size of Spain's population during the examined period, while Sudan's population will expand by roughly the size of Poland's population. The 15 examined countries of the Middle East will grow by an additional 106,045,000 persons, reaching 135 per cent of their current population size over the next 25 years. The five examined countries of Central Asia are projected to grow by 30,124,000 persons, reaching 136 per cent of their current population size, while the three Muslim countries of South Asia are expected to grow by at least 159,189,000 persons (the equivalent of 2 Germanys, or 2.5 Italys, or 4 Polands).

Even the current combined population—1,049,253,000 persons (equivalent to two European Unions)—of the four Muslim regions mentioned above imposes an almost unbearable migration pressure on certain EU Member States' border protection and law enforcement systems, as well as on other Member States' interior ministries and social service structures. This situation, already barely manageable even for the typically secular governments of the local Muslim countries, will further deteriorate as the population grows by another 392,617,000 persons, reaching a total of 1,441,870,000. This population explosion, combined with the already scarce resources, will push tensions to the extreme and—aggravated by additional contributing factors—will lead to various forms of armed conflict (see *Chapter I*).

Figures 9–10. *Figures 9–10* complement the datasets of the four Muslim regions with the datasets of Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the datasets of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Sub-Saharan Africa's population will grow from 1,258,299,000 persons in 2025 to 2,077,072,000 persons by 2050. This dramatic, explosive additional increase of 818,773,000 persons (165 per cent) already presents the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa with nearly insurmountable problems. If, however, we add this to the datasets of the four Muslim regions, the combined population explosion of these five regions over the next 25 years—amounting to 1,211,390,000 persons (the equivalent of 2.5 European Unions)—poses almost unsolvable challenges not only for the local governments but also for Europe, particularly the European Union, which is the primary target region.

This increase means that the five examined regions—if we divide the additional population evenly over the 25 years—will grow by nearly 50 million persons per year (more precisely 48,455,000 persons), that is, by the population of one Spain (46,719,000 persons) every year, and by 2050, by the equivalent of 25 Spains.

[20] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

Figure 11. *Figure 11* shows only the magnitude of the Sub-Saharan African population explosion in a special comparative framework. It aims to illustrate what the population growth of individual Sub-Saharan African countries means when projected onto the population sizes of Poland (38,367,000 persons) and Hungary (9,663,000 persons). There are countries (Ethiopia, the Congo, or Nigeria) whose population growth exceeds several times (3- or 4-fold) the size of Poland's expected 2050 population of 32,939,000 persons. The populations of these same countries are projected to grow by more than tenfold compared to Hungary's current population and its UN-projected population for 2050.[21]

Figure 12. *Figure 12* models the population change of the remaining Old World regions between 2025 and 2050. It is clearly visible that the populations of East Asia and Europe will not only fail to grow, but will—according to the UN's official calculations—decline by 4 and 5 per cent, respectively. There are only three other regions of the Old World that do not pose a significant migration-related risk and whose populations will rise to 111 per cent, 120 per cent, and 123 per cent. Of these, only South Asia's 425,740,000-person increase (120 per cent) can be considered significant. East Asia's population will decline substantially, by 181,242,000 persons, falling to 89 per cent compared to today's population size, while Europe's population will—compared to the continent's size and population—decline dramatically by 40,628,000 persons, falling to 94 per cent compared to today. In any case, these demographic trends will significantly disrupt and overturn existing political and economic balances.

Maps 3–4. *Maps 3–4* illustrate visually the demographic trends outlined above. It is clearly visible that the trends of *Maps 1–2*—showing which countries and regions experienced the greatest population growth during the 75 years between 1950 and 2025—remain essentially unchanged over the coming 25 years up to 2050. The population-growth dynamics of those countries and regions that have disrupted the international demographic balance over the past 75 years will continue to be the strongest. While the rate of population growth may decline minimally year by year, as calculated by UN staff, the base (the population of the given country on which the rate is applied) grows year by year, so the two effects almost completely cancel each other out (*see* below). In any case, it is clear that the migration-related drivers derived from the demographic subsystem (population explosion) will not disappear, and **the overlap between the countries and regions marked by exceptionally high population-growth rates and the main countries of origin will continue to be no coincidence on the maps.**

	Country	2025	2050	Growth (person)	Growth (%)[22]
North Africa	Algeria	47,132	59,355	12,223	126
	Egypt	117,498	160,904	43,406	137
	Libya	7,420	9,235	1,815	124
	Marocco	38,261	43,399	5,138	113
	Western Sahara	596	775	179	130
	Sudan	50,849	84,519	33,670	166
	Tunisia	12,314	13,142	828	106
	Total	**274,070**	**371,329**	**97,259**	**135**

[21] Based on UN data cited several times in the study, Hungary's population will decrease to 8,470,000 by 2050. This calculation takes into account current trends and does not necessarily take into account the current and expected results of the Hungarian conservative government's family support policy, which is an attempt to slow down and even reverse Hungary's negative demographic trends, i.e. the rate of population decline.

[22] This percentage shows the percentage by which the population of a given country or region will increase (above 100 per cent) or decrease (below 100 per cent).

Middle East	Azerbaijan	10,368	11,225	857	108
	Bahrein	1,626	2,130	504	131
	United Arab Emirates	11,215	15,279	4,064	136
	Iraq	46,526	71,476	24,950	154
	Israel	9,452	13,016	3,564	138
	Jemen	41,179	70,388	28,209	171
	Jordan	11,575	16,283	4,708	141
	Kuwait	4,985	6,341	1,356	127
	Lebanon	5,826	6,986	1,160	120
	Oman	5,398	7,781	2,383	144
	Palestine	5,540	8,397	2,857	151
	Qatar	3,084	4,140	1,056	134
	Saudi Arabia	34,264	47,442	13,178	138
	Syria	25,171	37,635	12,464	149
	Türkiye	87,576	91,311	3,735	104
	Total	**303,785**	**409,830**	**106,045**	**135**
Central Asia	Kazakhstan	20,721	26,437	5,716	128
	Kyrgyzstan	7,241	9,603	2,362	133
	Tajikistan	10,690	15,492	4,802	145
	Turkmenistan	7,558	9,611	2,053	127
	Uzbekistan	36,713	51,905	15,192	125
	Total	**82,924**	**113,048**	**30,124**	**136**
South Asia	Afghanistan	43,250	76,239	32,989	176
	Iran	92,021	101,813	9,792	111
	Pakistan	253,203	369,611	116,408	146
	Total	**388,474**	**547,663**	**159,189**	**141**
	Total	**1,049,253**	**1,441,870**	**392,617**	**137**

Figure 8. Population growth in the countries of the Muslim world 2025–2050[23]
(The figures are expressed in thousands of persons.)

Region	2025	2050	Growth (person)	Growth (%)[24]
Middle East	303,785	409,830	106,045	135
Central Asia	82,924	113,048	30,124	136
South Asia	388,474	547,663	159,189	141
North Africa	274,070	371,329	97,259	135
Sub-Saharan Africa	1,258,299	2,077,072	818,773	165
Összesen	**2,307,552**	**3,518,942**	**1,211,390**	**152**

Figure 9. Population growth in the regions of origin 2025–2050[25]

[23] UN DESA Population Division 2024.
[24] This percentage shows the percentage by which the population of a given country or region will increase (above 100 per cent) or decrease (below 100 per cent).
[25] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

Region	1950	2025	2050
Middle East	46,076	303,785	409,830
Central Asia	17,327	82,924	113,048
South Asia (Muslim countries)	62,413	388,474	547,663
North Africa (Maghreb)	49,458	274,070	371,329
Western Africa	69,771	461,367	729,700
East Africa	66,143	507,070	848,601
Central Africa	26,509	216,272	407,435
South Africa	15,533	73,590	91,336
Total	**353,230**	**2,307,552**	**3,518,942**
Growth	**1,954,322**		**1,211,390**
Annual growth	**26,057**		**48,455**

Figure 10. Population growth in the eight regions studied 1950–2025–2050[26]
(The figures are expressed in thousands of persons.)

Country	2025	2050	Growth (person)	Poland[27]	Hungary[28]
Ethiopia	133,765	223,206	89,441	2.71	10.56
Kenya	56,981	83,161	26,180	0.79	3.09
Mozambique	35,134	62,972	27,838	0.84	3.28
Somalia	19,332	36,834	17,502	0.53	2.06
Uganda	50,698	84,784	34,086	1.03	4.02
Tanzania	69,542	128,294	58,752	1.78	6.93
Angola	38,459	73,497	35,038	1.06	4.13
Cameroon	29,500	50,651	21,151	0.64	2.49
Democratic Republic of the Congo	111,036	215,863	104,827	3.18	12.37
Burkina Faso	23,812	37,066	13,254	0.40	1.56
Cote d'Ivoire	32,321	55,241	22,920	0.69	2.70
Mali	24,835	45,716	20,881	0.63	2.46
Niger	27,472	51,998	24,526	0.74	2.89
Nigeria	235,088	357,001	121,913	3.70	14.39

Figure 11. Population growth of selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa (2025–2050) compared to the populations of Poland and Hungary[29] (The figures are expressed in thousands of persons.)

Region	2025	2050	Growth (person)	Growth (%)[30]
East Asia	1,654,182	1,472,940	-181,242	89
Southeast Asia	697,629	774,212	76,583	111
South Asia	2,074,646	2,500,386	425,740	120
Australia and New Zealand	31,303	38,564	7,261	123
Europe	744,788	704,160	-40,628	94

Figure 12. Population growth in other regions of the Old World 2025–2050[31]
(The figures are expressed in thousands of persons.

[26] UN DESA Population Division 2024.
[27] The population of Poland in 2025 is 38,367,000, but by 2050 it will decrease to 32,939,000. The table calculates with data for 2050 and shows how many times the population of a given African country will increase by 2050 compared to the country's population at that time.
[28] The population of Hungary in 2025 will be 9,663,000, but according to the current UN forecast, it will decrease to 8,470,000 by 2050. The table calculates with data for 2050 and shows how many times the population of a given African country will increase by 2050 compared to the country's population at that time.
[29] UN DESA Population Division 2024.
[30] This percentage shows the percentage by which the population of a given country or region will increase (above 100 per cent) or decrease (below 100 per cent).
[31] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

3. **Population Growth per Country 2025-2050**
(UN Population Division)



4. **Population Growth per Regin 2025-2050**
(UN Population Division)



Population Growth (%)

- 180 – 189
- 160 – 179
- 150 – 159
- 130 – 149
- 120 – 129
- 110 – 119
- 100 – 109
- 95 – 99
- 90 – 94
- 85 – 89

(UN Population Division)

3. ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH

The annual net population growth rate is perhaps the most useful and reliable indicator for comparing the population growth of individual countries/societies and for outlining trends.

Table 1, based on the repeatedly cited UN database and projections, also contains this cross-section, once again enabling global comparison within this segment. It must be pointed out, however, that in this indicator, in measuring and projecting the annual population growth of individual countries, the UN Population Division's data take into account not only natural increase but also population growth resulting from immigration (migration). This is why it can occur that a country with a fertility rate below 2 still manages to grow in population. In some Western European countries, demographic figures may also appear more favourable because the fertility indicators of their immigrant (migration-background) communities are significantly higher than those of the indigenous European population. Where the proportion of the migration-background population reaches or exceeds 10 per cent, this already has a considerable impact on the demographic indicators of the entire society.[32]

Whether derived from the data series of *Table 1* or from *Map 5*, it is clear that, naturally, it is the youngest countries/societies, those with the lowest median age (*Maps 8–9*), where the number of births is currently the highest, and therefore these countries/societies are growing at the highest rates. There are societies in Sub-Saharan Africa where annual population growth exceeds 3 per cent (Niger, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, or Somalia).

If we examine the UN Population Division's data[33] (in detail in *Table 1*), it is apparent that the annual population growth of the five regions under study is also dramatically high. This analyzed population growth already reflects the slowing pace predicted by population research institutes, but proportionally, it remains dramatically high. By now, the annual percentage rate of population growth has declined from the 3–6 per cent range of past decades to 'only' around 2 per cent, but in net terms, it still surpasses the growth of earlier periods. If we wish to illustrate this with a concrete example, in the case of Pakistan (*Figure 13*), the average annual population growth between 1980 and 1990 was well above 3 per cent, which meant an annual increase of 2.2–3 million persons. Between 2015 and 2018, the annual growth rate declined to around 2 per cent, yet this meant 3.7–3.8 million persons annually,[34] since it makes a considerable difference whether a society of 80 million grows by 3 per cent per year or a society of 200 million grows by 2 per cent per year.[35] The UN Population Division's most recent revision, used in 2025 and published in 2024,[36] already shows that Pakistan's population has meanwhile grown—from 200,813,818 persons in 2018 to 253,203,000 persons over the past seven years—despite a decline in the annual growth rate from 1.93 per cent in 2018 to 1.52 per cent in 2025. It is easy to calculate that the annual 1.52 per cent growth of a population of 253,203,000 persons means a net annual increase of 3,867,000 persons. According to UN data, Pakistan's population will grow to 369,611,000 persons by 2050.[37] Even if Pakistan's annual

[32] The best forecasting data sets for this are provided by a study by the Pew Research Center. Muslim Population Growth in Europe | Pew Research Center.
[33] UN DESA Population Division 2024.
[34] Dezső 2018, Figure 3. Based on data sets revised in 2017 by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
[35] Moreover, the population decline caused by the decreasing desire to have children is somewhat compensated by the increasing median age and life expectancy in old age.
[36] UN DESA Population Division 2024.
[37] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

population growth rate declines to only 1.05 per cent by that time, the country's population will still grow by 3,880,000 persons each year. **Pakistan's population grows by as much in 2 years and 2 months as Hungary's population, and in less than 9 years, it grows by as much as the population of Poland.**

	Population size	Annual growth rate	Annual population growth
2025	253,203,000	1.52 %	3,848,000
2022	229,489,000	1.85 %	4,245,000
2018	200,813,818	1.93 %	3,875,691
2017	197,015,955	1.97 %	3,881,195
2016	193,203,476	2.02 %	3,902,700
2015	189,380,513	2.12 %	4,014,856
1990	107,678,614	3.15 %	3,391,857
1985	92,219,488	3.39 %	3,126,224
1980	78,068,144	3.17 %	2,474,755

Figure 13. Annual population growth of Pakistan in selected years (UN Population Division, 2017 revision (2015–2018), 2019 revision (2022), and 2024 revision[38])

[38] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

5. **Population Growth per Year 2025 (%)**



(UN Population Division)

4. FERTILITY RATE

The researchers of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, also provide detailed data in their databases on the fertility rates of individual countries.[39] The fertility rate ideally shows how many children a married couple has, or more precisely, the number of live births per woman. If the fertility rate is 2.0, the society reproduces itself but does not grow. If it is above 2, say the statistical value is 2.1, then the given society will grow minimally. If the fertility rate shows a statistical number below 2.0, then the population of the society will decrease. This indicator is one of the most important demographic statistical indicators, an area in which Hungarian family policy has managed to achieve results: from the value of 1.3 a few years ago, we have approached the value of 1.6.

Table 1 presents the most significant demographic data for nearly every country in the world, including the fertility rate. If these data are placed on a map (*Map 6*), it is clearly visible that the fertility rate is highest in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, in many cases approaching the value of 6, but nowhere below 3 except in the Republic of South Africa, and the average is between 4 and 5. In the Muslim world (North Africa, the Middle East, parts of Central Asia and South Asia), we can also find growing societies, where the fertility rate typically falls in the range between 2.5 and 3.

Based on UN data (*Table 1*), in this region, only Iran and the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye and Tunisia have fertility rates below the value of 2. In the Far East, the fertility rates of China, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and Thailand are typically below the critical value of 2. However, the biggest problem is that within the Old World, the entire Western world (including Russia, Australia, and New Zealand) has shrinking societies, and their fertility rates are well below 2. The question is whether these societies perceive this as a problem and strive to stop the population decline of the given country (as conservative Hungarian politics has set as a goal and has raised this indicator from a fertility rate of 1.3 to around 1.6), or whether they believe that by reducing Western population growth they lower the ecological footprint of Western societies, and instead maintain the productive capacity of the given societies and the high standard of services of their welfare/social systems through settlement ('admitting of refugees').

Table 1 and *Map 7* also show the fertility rate projected by the UN. It is clearly visible on *Map 7* that according to the UN, the fertility rate will decrease globally by 2050, but the societies that have so far developed dynamically will still show signs of rapid growth. As was explained in the previous chapter, demographic indicators/multipliers may be smaller by 2050, but the baseline population of 2050 to which we apply them will already be much larger. The fertility rate of Nigeria, with a population of 235,088,000 in 2025, is 4.30. By 2050, according to UN data (*Table 1*), the fertility rate will decrease to 2.66, but Nigeria's population will already be 357,100,000. Applying the fertility rate of 2.66 to this greatly swollen population (an increase of 122,012,000 people—on the order of the population of the United States!), the country still faces enormous population growth.

The fertility rate's regional differences, which clearly show characteristic patterns, largely have causes and consequences that stem from civilizational factors and from the cultural background of the given area/ethnic group. The most important of these are the following.

[39] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

Generation	Fertility rate							
1.	Century	1+1	1+1	1+1	1+1	1+1	1+1	Century
2.		**1.5**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	
3.		2.25	4	9	16	25	36	
4.		**3.375**	**8**	27	64	125	216	
5.			16	**81**	**256**	**625**	**1,296**	

Figure 14. The relationship between the fertility rate and the number of descendants to be born

Figure 14, according to an ideal-typical scenario and quantified in the form of an arithmetic progression, shows how differences in fertility rates result in differences of enormous magnitude in the number of descendants by the third and fourth generations in the case of one parent couple (father and mother). It is clearly visible that while in the case of a fertility rate of 2, the number of 5th-generation descendants is **16**, in the case of a fertility rate of 5 the number of 5th-generation descendants is **625**, and in the case of a fertility rate of 6—observable in some Sub-Saharan African countries (*Map 6*)—it is no less than **1,296**!

Clan formation. The 625 or 1,296 4th-generation descendants in these societies—living largely within traditional clan and tribal structures—are unambiguously both the cause and the sign of clan formation. Such a large number of relatives (cousins) with a homogeneous genetic makeup can maintain kinship bonds—which form the very densely woven basic fabric of these societies—only within the organizational frameworks of clans and tribes. In these societies, because of the enormous number of relatives, the concept of family extends far beyond the limits of the family model accepted in Western societies. All the 125 second cousins have a good chance of not even knowing each other personally, let alone knowing everyone by name. With a kinship group of this size, the traditional Western family concept is no longer suitable for describing the phenomenon; from a technical perspective, the category of the clan, as a 'kinship-organizing' unit, reflects the phenomenon's real nature much more accurately. Thus, the clan is not necessarily an atavistic feature of the social organization of these countries and cultures, but rather a practical response to the problem/phenomenon. The picture is further complicated by the practice of polygamy—still accepted in Muslim communities—which gives additional impetus to clan formation through the male line.

Median age. Typically, the highest fertility rates are found in societies with the lowest median age, which are the youngest societies (see *Maps 6–8*). Fertility rates of 3, 4, 5, and 6 are characteristic of the youngest societies with the lowest median age (*Maps 6–7*). In these young societies, the average age of women at childbirth falls between 15 and 25, meaning that they start having children much earlier, while in Western societies, childbirth tends to be concentrated between ages 25 and 35. An important difference is not only the differing cultural background (the respect for the family and for large families in the Muslim world and Sub-Saharan Africa), and the fact that the education of women has 'less of a tradition', but also, for example, that in the Muslim world premarital and extramarital sexual relations, as well as abortion, face almost total social (religious) rejection. Therefore, young people tend to marry relatively early and have children at a similarly young age.

Number of generations per century. The fact that women give birth much earlier in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Muslim world has a consequence of key importance for population growth: in these societies, one or even two more generations can fit into a single century (*Figure 13*). The difference that in a society with a fertility rate of 2, one can count on an average of 8 descendants (3 generations) within a century,

while in a society with a fertility rate of 5, the number of descendants per century is, if not exactly 1,250 (5 generations), at least 625 (4 generations)—which is 78 times the number of descendants of a fertility rate of 2—explains the differences between population-growth trends. This difference of multiple magnitudes—more precisely, the number of generations per century—significantly distorts the reliability of the fertility rate as a comparative indicator between different civilisations. The fertility rate is more suitable for comparison within a given civilization. Real comparison is only possible through the annual net population growth (*see* above).

These differences thus give rise to the civilizational/geographical divergence observable in global population growth, which has caused—and continues to cause—a population explosion in Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Muslim world.

During the migration crisis that began in 2015, and ever since, the position of the Hungarian government has not been based on the emotional/philosophical exclusion alleged in Western accusations (Islamophobia), but on simple statistics. According to these, 42 per cent of the 173,947 registered individuals arrived from war-torn Syria and Iraq—considered the par excellence refugees—while 58 per cent arrived from exactly 100 other countries, who could be regarded as irregular migrants.

6. **Fertility rate 2025**



7. **Fertility rate 2050**



5. MEDIAN AGE

The median ages of the societies of the Old World are shown in *Table 1* and *Maps 8–9*.[40] The source of the data is again the database of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.[41]

The median age of a given society is one of the most diagnostic indicators of how dynamically that society is developing.

1. *15–20 years*. The fertility rate is the highest in the youngest societies; this is where the most children are born, and this is where annual population growth is at its highest. On *Map 8*, it is clearly visible that the societies of the Old World with the lowest median ages are concentrated primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa. Here, the median age in nearly every country ranges between 15 and 20 years. A low median age can also be accompanied by social distortions and characteristics that may explain why these areas have become the most crisis-stricken and war-torn regions of the Old World (*see* below). The youngest societies with the lowest median ages in the Sub-Saharan region are the Central African Republic with 14.5 years, the Democratic Republic of the Congo with 15.6 years, Niger with 15.6 years, Mali with 15.7 years, Chad with 15.6 years, and Somalia also with 15.6 years. Afghanistan, belonging to South Asia, with its median age of 17.3 years, is likewise considered a very young society. What matters here is not only that a smaller society is this young, but also that we are speaking about countries with large populations: in Afghanistan, for example, the median age of the population of 43 million is 17.3 years; in Nigeria, the median age of the population of 235 million is 18.1 years (meaning that the number of people younger than 18.1 years, who make up half of society, is 117.5 million); or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the median age of the population of 111 million is 15.8 years. Societies as young as these will be the primary sources of the population explosion of the coming decades.
2. *20–35 years*. Several larger Asian societies (e.g., India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, or Malaysia), as well as almost all societies of the Muslim world, have median ages that fall within this range. Since these four regions (the Muslim countries of South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa) have been at the centre of armed conflicts in recent decades, it is worth examining in more detail what role demography has played in this. In terms of median ages, the Muslim world (not including the Far Eastern Muslim populations, only those that were primary source countries during the refugee/migration crisis) can be divided into two larger groups.
   1) The median age falls within the range of 17.3 to 26 years (*Table 1*, *Map 8*). These countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Palestine, and Sudan) have all been exposed to some form of armed conflict. Perhaps only Pakistan and Egypt are exceptions, where internal social tensions have been managed by the regime with the help of the military, allowing them to maintain stability and public order. All the other countries have been shaken by armed conflict, and to this day, they remain primary hotspots of civil war.

[40] The median is the line that divides a society by age: below the median age line, the population is equal in size to that above it. In Afghanistan, for example, the median age in 2025 is 17.3 years, which means that half of the country's 43,250,000 Afghans are younger and half are older than 17.3 years. In contrast, in Germany, the median age in 2025 is 45.5 years, meaning that half of the country's 84,490,000 citizens are younger and the other half is older than 45.5 years. The higher the median age, the more the society can be described as ageing.

[41] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

   2) The median age ranges between 26 and 35 years. It is clearly visible (*Table 1*, *Map 8*) that these countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Algeria, and Morocco) all escaped the 'Arab Spring' and emerged more or less unscathed from the armed conflicts unfolding between 2011 and the present. Moreover, three of them (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye) even successfully strengthened their status as regional powers—at the expense of other actors. In Iran, this age-cohort–related social conflict—just as Huntington cited as an example—had already taken place decades earlier, in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, when the 'Islamic Revolution' (1978–1979) and the Iran–Iraq War (22 September 1980–20 August 1988) alleviated this generational pressure through enormous loss of life (according to some estimates, with as many as 800,000 conscription-age men killed!).
3. *35–40 years*. The largest countries in the Old World fall into this category (*Table 1*, *Map 8*). Russia, with its median age of 40.3 years, China, with its median age of 40.1 years, and Australia, with its median age of 38.3 years, already belong to the group of 'ageing' societies.
4. *40–45 years*. As *Table 1* and *Map 8* clearly show, almost all Member States of Europe, including the European Union, unfortunately fall into this 'ageing' category. According to the UN database cited above, the median age of our country's population is 43.9 years. This high value prompted the Hungarian government to develop a family support system that will help restore the long-term demographic balance of society. This homogeneous picture can only change if and in countries that, in the name of improving their population data series and maintaining the functioning of their economies and social care systems, risk the integrity of their Western civilization and its many achievements and change their indicators by systematically settling migrants.[42] Within Asia, South Korea and Thailand also fall into this category.
5. *45–50 years*. Among the world's oldest and most 'aged' societies, Europe includes Bosnia and Herzegovina (45.7 years), Croatia (45.3 years), Greece (46.8 years), Italy (48.2 years), Portugal (46.9 years), Spain (45.9 years), and Germany (45.5 years), while in Asia, Japan (49.8 years) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) (45.6 years) belong to this group, where the median age exceeds 45 years.

According to UN projections,[43] the median age will rise in every society over the coming decades (*Map 9*). This will cause no perceptible problems in young societies. However, in those societies where the median age is already very high today, the further ageing of the population structure will create additional challenges. *Table 1* and *Map 9* clearly show that by 2050, in Europe—apart from Russia—almost every state will fall into the 45+ category, and several countries will even move into the 50–55 age band: Poland (51.8 years), Lithuania (50.3 years), Albania (51.1 years), Bosnia and Herzegovina (51.1 years), Italy (52.9 years), Malta (53 years), and Spain (51.8 years) will form the group of societies with the highest median ages. The societies with the highest median ages—and thus the most pronounced ageing—will, however, be found in the Far East, where we will encounter not only 50+ societies such as China (52.1 years) and Japan (52.8 years), but also 55+ societies like the Republic of Korea (South Korea) (56.7 years), Macau (China) (56.2 years), and Taiwan (56.3 years). In Hong Kong (China), the median age will even reach an astonishing 62 years.

[42] Unless—in a dramatic development—they improve their economic prospects and demographic indicators by massively accepting millions of Ukrainian refugees.

[43] UN DESA Population Division 2024.

Demography

We can analyze these data even more precisely if we take a look at the third column of *Table 1* (the percentage of young men aged 15–24 in a given society) and at *Map 10*, which shows the proportion of young adult men aged 15–24 within the male population of each country. According to a basic Huntingtonian principle, if the share of young men aged 15–24 in a society reaches a critical level (around 15–20 per cent), an armed conflict becomes inevitable (war, civil war, war of independence, tribal war, religious war, or even a military coup). When we look through the recent decades of the history of the Middle East and Central Asia, as well as the Maghreb, we can clearly identify those armed conflicts—from the Iraq–Iran war to the 'Arab Spring', and from the rise of the Islamic State to the civil wars in Yemen and Sudan—in which this factor, linked to low median age and age-structure imbalance, may have played a role. These two elements played a role in these conflicts because these age cohorts were the primary sufferers of economic hardship and unemployment, and thus, extreme ideologies and revolutionary sentiment spread most rapidly and widely among them. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of young adult men aged 15–24 is currently between 10–12 per cent, nearly double the 5–6 per cent observed in European societies. In the Muslim world (*Map 10*), this indicator clearly outlines those crisis zones (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Sudan) where armed conflicts have occurred in recent years and decades. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it also clearly reflects the pattern of military coups and civil wars of the past one or two years (Sudan, Somalia).

In (geo)strategic planning, if it appears that there is even a 5 per cent chance of an unorthodox scenario that changes or circumvents the canonical rules, that risk needs to be managed as it can cause serious surprises and problems if ignored. We must, therefore, be prepared for any scenario, even the most unlikely, in the canonical framework. Such preparation, to get ahead of the curve, could be a longer-term, medium-term process, following the gradual transformation of the environment.

8. Median Age 2025



9. **Median Age 2050**



10. Male Population between 15 and 24 years per Country 2025
(UN Population Division)



6. GEOSTRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF OVERPOPULATION

From the analyses presented in the above chapters regarding the various elements of the demographic subsystem, it is clear that the examined regions of the Old World—the four Muslim regions (Central Asia, the Muslim countries of South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa) and Sub-Saharan Africa—will undergo further dramatic population explosions in the coming decades. In what follows, we summarize the most important indicators and data series:

1. Between 2022 and 2050, the population of the four examined Muslim regions (Central Asia, the Muslim countries of South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa) **will increase by an additional 392,617,000 people** (*Figures 9–10*).
2. Between 2022 and 2050, the population of Sub-Saharan Africa **will increase by a further 818,773,000 people** (*Figures 9–10*). This increase is almost twice the population of the EU.
3. Between 2022 and 2050, the total population growth of the examined regions will be **1,211,390,000 people, which will be nearly three times the population of the EU** (*Figures 9–10*).
4. If the increase in population in the examined regions is divided into equal portions across 25 years, then on average, they will grow by 48,455,000 people per year—meaning an annual increase equivalent to the population of Spain. Therefore, these five regions, which are already struggling with a lack of resources, would need to secure every year the resources necessary to support and retain a population the size of Spain, which under current circumstances appears almost impossible.
5. *Figure 13* shows that, in the case of the fertility rate of 2—so highly desired in the Western world—the number of fifth-generation descendants is **16 (great-great-grandchildren)**, whereas with a fertility rate of 5 the number of fifth-generation descendants is **625**, and in the case of a fertility rate of 6—observed in some Sub-Saharan African countries (*Map 6*)—it is no less than **1,296**! Not to mention that in the Muslim world and in Sub-Saharan Africa women give birth much earlier than in the Western world, so the number of generations per century is on average 3 in the West, which means 8 descendants (8 great-grandchildren), whereas in the Muslim world and Sub-Saharan Africa the number of generations per century is on average 4 or even 5, which means 125 or 625 descendants. **Thus, 8 descendants must be compared with 125 or 625.** This essential difference is responsible for the explosive population growth reflected in the figures presented in the previous sections and chapters.
6. The first column of *Table 1* shows the median age of the population of the examined countries/societies. This is another demographic dimension responsible for the population explosion in the five examined regions, and for the demographic decline of the Western world. The demographic 'distortions' between the two worlds are also because, for example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the median age of individual societies is one-third of the European average.
7. The tables in the above chapters contain numerous comparisons which, for the sake of clarity, relate the population sizes of certain countries to the population of Hungary or Poland (*Figure 11*) as statistical reference units, with the intention of drawing more attention to how rapidly certain populations are growing. According to one of our highlighted examples, the population of Pakistan (*Figure 13*) grows by an amount equal to the entire population of Hungary in 2 years and 2 months, and in less than 9 years, it grows by an amount equal to the population of Poland.

If we still want to understand the geostrategic effects of the demographic subsystem on the Western world—and within it, almost exclusively on Europe/the European Union, which is demographically 'ageing' and has

almost completely lost its political weight—let us take a look at *Map 11*. The five regions we have examined (the Muslim world, the Muslim countries of South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, North Africa), as well as Sub-Saharan Africa, form a geographically and geostrategically closed system. This closed system could be compared to a pressurized steam boiler in which the pressure increases by 1 bar every year. The additional +392 million people appearing in the Muslim world and the additional +818 million people appearing in the Sub-Saharan African world will stretch apart the geographical boundaries of these zones and will move, in waves of migration, toward the path of least resistance. The geographical boundaries of this zone (steam boiler) are the following:

1. Its northern neighbour is the Central Asian and Siberian border region of Russia. Russia will not allow tens or hundreds of millions of Muslim immigrants to enter its territory to populate and 'take over' Siberia, with its endless resources and the capacity to 'accommodate' roughly 1 billion more people.[44] Russia's geostrategic interest is not to let predominantly Muslim migrants into its territory, as their separatist aspirations could endanger the security of Siberia, the treasure chamber of the future, the guarantee of Russia's future great-power status.
2. Its eastern neighbour is China, which has its own Muslim minority—about 40 million Uyghurs—whom it is attempting to wean off (Muslim) separatism[45] and turn into good Chinese citizens. China will not let a single Muslim migrant enter its territory.
3. Its southeastern neighbour is India, which at the moment is not at war with its western neighbour, Pakistan—also a nuclear power and one of the leading states of the Islamic world. India has its own Muslim minority, which is typically separatist and in conflict with the Indian government. The Indian Hindu nationalist government will not allow a single Muslim migrant to enter its territory.
4. Its other borders are seas and oceans, across which it is practically impossible for millions of people to cross toward Southeast Asia, Australia, or the American continent. No one wants to go to the dramatically overpopulated Africa; people would rather want to leave it.
5. Its northern neighbour is Europe—the only exit route, the only valve capable of releasing the overpressure from the 'steam boiler' of the examined regions. Therefore, the pressure on Europe's southern borders will not decrease in the coming decades.

From the map, it is clearly visible that, for the five overpopulating regions under examination, there exists only one path and direction for releasing the pressure, stress effect, the 'overpressure' (cf. steam boiler) exerted by the surplus population that exceeds the carrying capacity of these five regions: Europe. The greatest problem is that this wave will reach a Europe that is already weakened, or indeed deliberately weakened. Europe is no longer an actor, no longer a player in the global geostrategic chess game, but rather a target.

To illustrate the magnitude of the looming threat, let us make a brief geostrategic digression. Another painful inconvenience of geostrategy is that it views the world on a global scale and excludes any distortion arising from local bias. For example, it does not accept that we Europeans see everything through a lens of European/Western superiority and remain convinced of our own global geostrategic importance. From this perspective, we overestimate our significance and still believe that the axis of the world revolves around

[44] For a more detailed analysis of Siberia's geostrategic role, *see* the next chapter.

[45] Uyghur fighters fought in large numbers in the ranks of the Islamic State. For details, *see* Tamás Dezső, 'Foreign (terrorist) fighters in the ranks of the Islamic State', Migration Research Institute, 4 November 2019, https://www.migraciokutato.hu/press/idegen-terrorista-harcosok-az-iszlam-allam-soraiban-elemzes/.

Europe and the United States. To convey the weight of these thoughts, I propose that we examine the list of the world's most populous cities.[46]

City	2023	2030
Tokyo	37,468,000	36,574,000
Delhi	28,514,000	38,939,000
Shanghai	25,582,000	32,869,000
São Paulo	21,650,000	23,824,000
Ciudad de Mexico	21,581,000	24,111,000
Cairo	20,076,000	25,517,000
Mumbai	19,980,000	24,572,000
Beijing	19,618,000	24,282,000
Dhaka	19,578,000	28,076,000
Osaka	19,281,000	
Kinshasa		21,914,000

Figure 15. The most populous cities in the world

In the world's most populous city, Tokyo, as many people live as in Poland (38,367,000). Although Tokyo does not have an army like Poland, its GDP is certainly larger than Poland's. As many people live in Tokyo as the current population of Ukraine. As many people live in Tokyo as in the entire Balkans (south of Romania).[47] In Montenegro—which is an independent state with a constitution, anthem, national museum, etc.—as many people live (638,000) as on a single larger street in Tokyo. Four times as many people live in Tokyo as in Hungary. There are 35 cities in the world where more people live than the total population of Hungary.

Viewed globally, political and economic weight is no longer centred on Europe and is beginning to shift away, even from the United States. The world observes the new economic and political centres of gravity with a completely different mindset. It must be acknowledged that the new focal points of global development have shifted outside Europe and partly outside the United States. Europe no longer sets the pace and no longer defines the directions of development. Within this global system, the weight of Europe and the European Union is declining dramatically, although the Union still behaves as if it possessed an influence over world affairs similar to that of a few decades ago. Meanwhile, the world around us, the world surrounding the Western world, has developed and continues to develop at such a pace that not only demographic, but also economic and political centres of gravity have been completely rearranged—at Europe's expense. And this world outside the 'global West', in several abstractions but primarily in the form of the ever-growing and strengthening alliance of the BRICS countries, will pose new challenges to the West-favourable global balance of the world economy.[48]

However, in examining the demographic subsystem, trends and interests can also be identified that may entail far more severe consequences for a Europe or a European Union that has lost its prestige.

[46] The World's Cities in 2018. Data Booklet, United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/urbanization/the_worlds_cities_in_2018_data_booklet.pdf. *See* also https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Countries-Regions/International-Statistics/Data-Topic/Population-Labour-Social-Issues/DemographyMigration/UrbanPopulation.html.

[47] Bulgaria 6,737,000, Albania 2,782,000, Bosnia and Herzegovina 3,150,000, Croatia 3,861,000, Greece 9,959,000, Montenegro 638,000, North Macedonia 1,819,000, Serbia 6,714,000 = 39,522,000 people.

[48] Ezső 2025.

It is clearly visible that while in the case of a fertility rate of 2 the number of fifth-generation descendants is **16,** in the case of a fertility rate of 5 the number of fifth-generation descendants is **625,** and with a fertility rate of 6 — observed in some Sub-Saharan African countries *(Map 6)* — the number reaches no fewer than **1,296.**

11. Direction of Future Migration



Dezső 2025

Table 1
Demographic data series for countries around the world

Continent/Country	Demographic characteristics							Population growth						
	Median age[49]		Fertility rate[50]		Men aged 15–24 %[51]			1950[52]	Growth %	2025	Growth %	2050	annual %[53]	annual 2024/2025
	2025	2050	2025	2050	2025	%								
AFRICA														
Sub-Saharan Africa														
East Africa	18.3	23.8	3.96	2.76	53,674	10.58		**65,031**	**766**	**507,070**	**167**	**848,601**	**2.51**	**12,732**
Burundi	16.4	22.5	4.68	2.96	1,478	10.39		2,309	616	14,221	168	23,950	2.43	346
Comoros	20.6	25.4	3.76	2.76	86	9.83		159	550	875	148	1,299	1.82	16
Djibouti	24.9	31.2	2.58	2.05	116	9.85		62	1,898	1,177	130	1,525	1.35	16
Eritrea	19.2	25.0	3.61	2.60	404	11.32		822	434	3,569	158	5,656	1.87	67
Ethiopia	19.1	24.6	3.81	2.55	14,362	10.73		18,128	738	133,765	167	223,206	2.54	3,410
Kenya	20.0	26.3	3.12	2.36	6,163	10.81		6,077	938	56,981	146	83,161	1.92	1,097
Madagascar	19.2	24.2	3.85	2.82	3,314	10.24		4,084	792	32,352	163	52,769	2.39	774
Malawi	18.1	24.6	3.53	2.55	2,396	10.92		2,954	742	21,934	169	37,062	2.54	558
Mauritius	37.8	49.1	1.21	1.31	87	6.85		493	257	1,270	0.87 (-13)	1,112	-0.02	-3
Mayotte	17.1	22.5	4.50	3.27	29	8.73		15	2,213	332	192	638	3.31	11
Mozambique	16.5	21.6	4.62	2.92	3,590	10.22		5,959	590	35,134	197	62,972	2.85	1,004
Réunion	38.1	41.5	2.13	1.91	63	7.15		248	355	881	107	942	0.45	4
Rwanda	19.9	25.8	3.59	2.61	1,499	10.40		2,186	659	14,407	157	22,560	2.08	301
Seychelles	34.3	42.5	2.08	1.83	9	6.81		36	366	132	107	142	2.27	3
Somalia	15.6	20.2	5.91	3.60	1,948	10.07		2,264	854	19,332	190	36,834	3.34	646
Sudan (South)	18.7	25.0	3.71	2.55	1,431	11.86		2,482	486	12,067	151	18,244	2.04	247
Uganda	16.9	24.0	4.06	2.61	5,513	10.87		5,158	983	50,698	167	84,784	2.69	1,366
Tanzania	17.5	21.8	4.47	3.23	7,126	10.23		7,650	909	69,542	185	128,294	2.82	1,964
Zambia	17.9	23.6	3.97	2.81	2,261	10.46		2,310	936	21,612	175	37,760	2.74	594
Zimbabwe	18.1	23.6	3.62	2.70	1,798	10.70		2,747	611	16,790	153	25,692	1.85	312
Central Africa	16.4	20.6	5.37	3.46	21,273	9.83		**26,509**	**817**	**216,272**	**188**	**407,435**	**3.10**	**6,712**
Angola	16.6	20.9	4.95	3.24	3,774	9.81		4,548	846	38,459	191	73,497	2.97	1,146
Cameroon	18.0	23.1	4.19	2.96	2,979	10.10		4,307	685	29,500	172	50,651	2.54	752

[49] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects 2024, File GEN/01/REV1: Demographic indicators by region, subregion and country, annually for 1950–2100, POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2024/GEN/F01/Rev.1,* Median Age, Medium Variant, https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used.

[50] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects 2024, File GEN/01/REV1: Demographic indicators by region, subregion and country, annually for 1950–2100, POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2024/GEN/F01/Rev.1,* Total Fertility Rate (live births per woman), Median Age, Medium Variant, https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used.

[51] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects 2024, File POP/03-2: Male population by select age group, region, subregion, and country, annually for 1950–2100 (thousands). Medium fertility variant 2023—2100, POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2024/POP/F03-2.* https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used.

[52] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects 2024, File GEN/01/REV1: Demographic indicators by region, subregion and country, annually for 1950–2100, POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2024/GEN/F01/Rev.1,* WPP2024_GEN_F01_DEMOGRAPHIC_INDICATORS_FULL https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used.

[53] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, *World Population Prospects 2024, File GEN/01/REV1: Demographic indicators by region, subregion and country, annually for 1950–2100, POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2024/GEN/F01/Rev.1,* Median Age, Medium Variant, https://population.un.org/wpp/downloads?folder=Standard%20Projections&group=Most%20used.

Central African Republic	14.5	19.2	5.81	3.36	610	11.25	1,327	408	5,421	194	10,508	3.33	181
Chad	15.8	19.8	5.94	3.85	2,101	10.13	2,502	828	20,728	186	38,470	4.13	858
Congo	18.6	23.1	4.05	3.00	637	9.94	827	775	6,408	170	10,910	2.34	150
Democratic Rep. of the Congo	15.8	20.0	5.90	3.66	10,742	9.67	12,184	911	111,036	194	215,863	3.17	3,520
Equatorial Guinea	20.9	24.4	4.04	2.69	175	9.14	226	847	1,915	163	3,121	2.34	45
Gabon	21.5	25.6	3.54	2.62	230	8.96	473	542	2,566	158	4,053	2.10	54
São Tome and Principe	19.5	24.8	3.53	2.59	25	10.50	60	397	238	152	363	2.10	5
South africa	27.9	31.8	2.27	1.94	6,210	8.43	**15,533**	**474**	**73,590**	**124**	**91,336**	**1.22**	**903**
Botswana	23.4	30.3	2.66	2.08	245	9.64	413	615	2,542	135	3,423	1.61	41
Eswatini	22.5	29.4	2.68	2.08	125	10.0	273	457	1,249	120	1,503	1.04	13
Lesotho	21.8	28.8	2.64	2.15	235	10.0	705	333	2,350	127	2,983	1.10	26
Namibia	21.3	27.9	3.17	2.43	276	9.01	514	596	3,062	146	4,486	2.09	64
South Africa	28.7	32.3	2.19	1.89	5,329	8.27	13,628	446	64,386	124	78,941	1.17	758
West Africa	18.2	23.7	4.27	2.79	48,752	10.56	**69,771**	**651**	**461,367**	**158**	**729,700**	**2.21**	**10,231**
Benin	18.0	23.0	4.42	3.06	1,478	10.09	2,255	649	14,638	166	24,237	1.70	250
Burkina Faso	17.7	24.8	4.01	2.61	2,555	10.73	4,284	556	23,812	156	37,066	2.20	526
Cabo Verde	29.0	40.8	1.50	1.50	48	9.12	178	295	526	107	566	0.38	2
Côte d'Ivoire	18.3	22.6	4.17	3.07	3,325	10.28	2,630	1,229	32,321	171	55,241	2.39	773
Gambia	18.6	26.1	3.80	2.38	291	10.42	305	915	2,791	153	4,275	2.22	62
Ghana	21.3	27.0	3.30	2.55	3,400	9.78	5,036	690	34,746	145	50,270	1.83	638
Guinea	18.3	24.2	4.04	2.70	1,547	10.36	3,013	495	14,928	156	23,248	2.31	346
Guinea-Bissau	19.4	25.7	3.68	2.56	231	10.38	535	416	2,225	153	3,416	2.15	48
Liberia	18.8	24.7	3.79	2.62	607	10.70	930	610	5,672	156	8,857	2.09	119
Mali	15.7	20.2	5.42	3.37	2,626	10.57	4,708	527	24,835	184	45,716	2.87	713
Mauritania	17.4	22.3	4.56	3.14	527	10.05	651	805	5,242	178	9,328	2.76	145
Niger	15.6	21.2	5.79	3.22	2,934	10.68	2,560	1,073	27,472	189	51,998	3.20	880
Nigeria	18.1	23.9	4.30	2.66	25,296	10.76	37,860	621	235,088	152	357,001	2.04	4,817
Senegal	19.6	25.6	3.71	2.82	2,006	10.72	2,487	752	18,716	161	30,138	2.28	428
Sierra Leone	19.7	26.3	3.61	2.45	914	10.47	2,041	428	8,731	147	12,876	2.03	178
Togo	19.1	23.3	4.07	3.04	967	10.05	1,395	689	9,618	161	15,463	2.14	206
North Africa													
North Africa	24.9	31.1	2.88	2.31	24,176	8.82	**49,458**	**562**	**274,069**	**135**	**371,329**	**1.41**	**3,867**
Algeria	28.6	34.5	2.67	2.00	3,485	7.39	8,872	531	47,132	126	59,355	1.34	635
Egypt	24.5	31.0	2.71	2.21	10,687	9.09	20,452	574	117,498	137	160,904	1.63	1,920
Libya	27.7	36.3	2.25	1.82	673	9.07	1,125	660	7,420	124	9,235	1.03	77
Morocco	29.8	37.4	2.18	1.87	3,175	8.30	8,986	426	38,261	113	43,399	0.94	360
Sudan	18.5	24.0	4.19	3.00	5,228	10.28	5,734	887	50,849	166	84,519	1.57	800
Tunisia	32.9	40.3	1.80	1.71	884	7.17	3,605	342	12,314	106	13,142	0.60	74
Western Sahara	32.6	36.6	2.15	1.85	44	7.38	14	4,257	596	130	775	1.84	11
Asia													
Western Asia	27.5	32.6	2.52	2.15	27,141	8.70	**49,357**	**606**	**311,922**	**139**	**417,511**	**1.64**	**5,143**
Armenia	36.6	45.2	1.71	1.69	186	6.27	1,354	219	2,963	84	2,504	-0.70	-21
Azerbaijan	33.6	39.7	1.67	1.63	765	7.37	2,928	354	10,368	108	11,225	0.60	63
Bahrain	33.4	35.0	1.78	1.66	116	7.13	116	1,401	1,626	131	2,130	2.33	38
Cyprus	38.6	47.6	1.37	1.42	73	5.34	494	276	1,365	110	1,508	0.95	13
Georgia	37.3	40.4	1.79	1.71	234	6.14	3,527	108	3,808	96	3,668	0	0
Iraq	20.8	27.8	3.17	2.45	4,729	10.16	5,719	813	46,526	154	71,476	2.08	968
Israel	29.2	32.2	2.75	2.31	761	8.05	1,258	751	9,452	138	13,016	1.37	130
Jordan	24.7	32.3	2.57	1.99	1,079	9.32	481	241	11,575	141	16,283	0.38	44
Kuwait	34.8	35.6	1.50	1.51	285	5.71	153	3,258	4,985	127	6,341	2.02	101
Lebanon	28.8	36.5	2.21	1.90	529	9.07	1,335	436	5,826	120	6,986	0.68	40

Oman	29.7	31.5	2.48	1.91	443	8.20	456	1,183	5,398	144	7,781	4.31	233
Qatar	33.5	32.3	1.70	1.62	191	6.19	25	12,336	3,084	134	4,140	2.33	72
Saudi Arabia	29.6	32.0	2.29	1.88	2,824	8.24	3,121	1,098	34,264	138	47,442	1.75	603
State of Palestine	20.1	28.0	3.19	2.34	535	9.65	932	594	5,540	151	8,397	1.62	90
Syrian Arab Republic	23.3	32.1	2.66	2.06	3,006	11.94	3,413	737	25,171	149	37,635	3.95	996
Türkiye	33.5	44.3	1.62	1.62	6,438	7.35	21,408	409	87,576	104	91,311	0.23	204
United Arab Emirates	31.6	32.6	1.21	1.33	851	7.58	70	16,021	11,215	136	15,279	3.35	376
Yemen	18.4	24.1	4.41	2.81	4,094	9.94	4,661	883	41,179	171	70,388	2.89	1,192
Central Asia	26.7	29.4	3.14	2.43	6,308	7.60	**17,327**	**475**	**82,924**	**136**	**113,048**	**1.68**	**1,396**
Kazakhstan	29.7	31.2	2.95	2.39	1,504	7.26	6,703	309	20,721	128	26,437	1.24	257
Kyrgyzstan	25.4	30.5	2.75	2.23	598	8.26	1,740	416	7,241	133	9,603	1.51	110
Tajikistan	22.2	27.9	2.99	2.35	899	8.41	1,532	698	10,690	145	15,492	1.85	198
Turkmenistan	26.9	32.8	2.63	2.13	556	7.35	1,211	624	7,558	127	9,611	1.68	127
Uzbekistan	27.0	28.2	3.45	2.55	2,751	7.49	6,264	549	36,713	125	51,905	1.91	703
South Asia	27.5	35.8	2.18	1.95	192,633	9.28	**459,234**	**420**	**2,074,646**	**120**	**2,500,386**	**1.02**	**21,179**
Afghanistan	17.3	23.0	4.66	3.09	4,721	10.91	7,752	558	43,250	176	76,239	2.78	1,205
Bangladesh	26.0	35.6	2.11	1.81	16,361	9.36	37,895	460	174,617	122	214,180	1.20	2,110
Bhutan	30.5	42.2	1.44	1.46	73	9.19	177	449	794	111	882	0.62	5
India	28.6	38.3	1.94	1.77	134,407	9.22	376,325	387	1,457,435	115	1,677,687	0.89	12,999
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	34.0	43.5	1.67	1.63	6,336	6.88	17,119	537	92,021	111	101,813	0.98	906
Maldives	32.7	49.4	1.55	1.54	36	6.80	74	715	529	111	589	0.37	2
Nepal	25.3	35.0	1.94	1.73	2,848	9.61	8,483	349	29,628	117	34,573	0.15	-46
Pakistan	20.6	26.3	3.50	2.58	26,066	10.29	37,542	674	253,203	146	369,611	1.52	3,867
Sri Lanka	33.3	40.2	1.94	1.77	1,786	7.70	7,971	290	23,169	107	24,812	0.56	131
East Asia	41.0	52.2	1.03	1.20	100,306	6.06	**666,410**	**244**	**1,654,182**	**89**	**1,472,940**	**-0.23**	**-3,867**
China	40.1	52.1	1.02	1.18	88,212	6.22	554,419	256	1,417,734	89	1,265,452	-0.22	-3,175
China, Hong Kong SAR	47.4	62.0	0.74	0.96	273	3.69	1,974	375	7,397	83	6,131	-0.48	-36
China, Macao SAR	39.6	56.2	0.69	0.91	31	4.29	196	368	722	93	671	0.41	3
China, Taiwan Province of China	44.8	56.3	0.86	1.08	1,149	4.96	7,602	305	23,164	84	19,535	-0.43	-100
Dem. People's Republic of Korea	36.5	42.9	1.77	1.67	1,727	6.50	10,549	252	26,537	97	25,834	0.29	77
Japan	49.8	52.8	1.23	1.35	6,045	4.89	82,802	149	123,435	85	105,459	-0.51	-636
Mongolia	26.9	32.0	2.59	1.99	267	7.63	780	448	3,497	128	4,484	1.22	43
Republic of Korea	45.6	56.7	0.75	1.03	2,601	5.03	19,211	269	51,697	88	45,374	-0.08	-41
Southeast Asia	30.9	38.1	1.61	1.78	56,717	8.13	**165,134**	**422**	**697,629**	**111**	**774,212**	**0.71**	**4,959**
Brunei Darussalam	32.7	41.3	1.71	1.61	35	7.52	48	968	465	111	519	0.86	4
Cambodia	26.2	32.2	2.51	2.04	1,559	8.78	4,433	400	17,745	123	21,874	1.19	212
Indonesia	30.4	36.8	2.10	1.85	23,371	8.21	69,543	409	284,622	113	320,462	0.79	2,268
Lao People's Democratic Republic	24.9	33.0	2.36	1.89	736	9.40	1,683	465	7,822	124	9,734	1.32	104
Malaysia	31.0	40.1	1.53	1.53	3,095	8.65	6,110	585	35,771	123	44,179	1.19	427
Myanmar	30.1	36.3	2.08	1.83	4,517	8.26	17,780	307	54,680	107	58,630	0.65	360
Philippines	26.1	35.9	1.88	1.74	11,198	9.62	18,580	626	116,316	115	134,244	0.81	945
Singapore	36.2	50.9	0.96	1.15	441	7.53	1,022	573	5,852	104	6,091	0.68	40
Thailand	40.6	48.6	1.20	1.29	4,562	6.36	20,710	338	71,647	93	66,578	-0.05	-42
Timor-Leste	21.7	31.2	2.56	1.92	155	11.00	415	340	1,410	133	1,881	1.27	18
Viet Nam	33.4	40.2	1.88	1.75	7,049	6.95	24,810	408	101,300	108	110,021	0.61	625
Australia / New Zealand													
Australia	38.3	42.0	1.64	1.64	1,686	6.46	8,177	319	26,069	126	32,814	1.01	264
New Zealand	37.7	42.7	1.65	1.62	344	7.02	1,908	256	5,234	114	5,750	0.76	40
Oceania													
Melanesia	23.1	28.7	2.99	2.37	1,287	9.85	**2,055**	**635**	**13,055**	**138**	**18,007**	**1.69**	**221**
Fiji	28.1	33.3	2.25	1.93	78	8.37	289	322	931	107	1,000	0.42	4

New Caledonia	34.5	40.6	1.95	1.77	22	7.48		65	452	294	116	340	1.02	3
Papua New Guinea	22.8	28.5	3.03	2.37	1,073	10.05		2,002	533	10,670	139	14,836	1.75	187
Solomon Islands	20.7	26.4	3.47	2.61	84	10.13		90	921	829	157	1,301	2.29	19
Vanuatu	20.3	25.2	3.53	2.81	31	9.36		48	827	331	160	530	2.11	7
Micronesia	26.5	31.2	2.79	2.25	45	8.52		**160**	**330**	**528**	**113**	**598**	**0.37**	**2**
Guam	31.5	34.7	2.71	2.15	12	7.14		60	280	168	114	191	0.59	1
Kiribati	22.9	27.6	3.09	2.48	12	8.82		33	412	136	134	182	1.47	2
Micronesia (Fed. States of)	23.3	29.2	2.71	2.15	11	9.73		32	353	113	111	126	0	0
Polynesia	27.8	33.8	2.50	2.32	61	8.84		**252**	**274**	**690**	**106**	**735**	**0**	**0**
French Polynesia	36.1	47.6	1.48	1.50	22	7.80		60	470	282	100	285	0.35	1
Samoa	19.8	24.0	3.75	2.86	21	9.58		82	267	219	124	272	0.91	2
Tonga	20.8	26.5	3.07	2.45	11	10.57		47	221	104	100	105	0	0
Europe														
Eastern Europe	41.3	45.1	1.40	1.49	15,491	5.44		**220,172**	**129**	**284,661**	**90**	**256,253**	**-0.24**	**-685**
Belarus	41.3	48.1	1.23	1.38	480	5.31		7,745	117	9,027	83	7,486	-0.65	-59
Bulgaria	44.8	48.0	1.74	1.70	341	5.06		7,251	93	6,737	80	5,426	-0.60	-41
Czechia	43.8	46.0	1.47	1.57	572	5.35		8,903	120	10,680	92	9,840	-1.04	-112
Hungary	43.9	45.4	1.50	1.55	521	5.39		9,338	103	9,663	90	8,741	-0.27	-27
Poland	42.5	51.8	1.31	1.40	1,947	5.07		24,824	155	38,367	86	32,939	-0.89	-345
Republic of Moldova	38.6	40.7	1.72	1.70	169	5.60		2,341	129	3,017	78	2,362	-1.19	-36
Romania	43.2	46.2	1.71	1.68	1,073	5.65		16,236	117	18,962	85	16,087	-0.55	-106
Russian Federation	40.3	41.7	1.47	1.54	7,978	5.52		102,799	141	144,435	94	136,256	-0.53	-771
Slovakia	42.3	49.3	1.57	1.60	279	5.07		3,437	160	5,494	90	4,950	-0.47	-26
Ukraine	41.8	51.1	1.00	1.14	2,132	5.56		37,298	103	38,279	84	32,165	2.18	838
Northern Europe	40.4	43.6	1.50	1.54	6,657	6.09		**77,818**	**140**	**109,259**	**106**	**115,809**	**0.54**	**590**
Denmark	41.3	44.3	1.52	1.57	369	6.15		4,268	140	5,991	102	6,126	0.45	27
Estonia	42.8	48.4	1.38	1.51	73	5.39		1,101	123	1,354	87	1,178	-0.96	-13
Finland	43.2	46.5	1.30	1.41	327	5.81		4,008	140	5,623	95	5,359	0.19	11
Iceland	36.2	44.9	1.50	1.51	26	6.56		143	277	396	109	433	1.26	5
Ireland	39.0	42.9	1.60	1.60	367	6.94		2,913	181	5,283	113	5,968	1.06	56
Latvia	43.6	47.9	1.35	1.44	99	5.31		1,927	97	1,864	81	1,520	-0.85	-16
Lithuania	42.3	50.3	1.22	1.35	148	5.19		2,567	111	2,851	80	2,270	-0.56	-16
Norway	39.8	45.5	1.42	1.50	354	6.31		3,265	172	5,604	105	5,900	0.96	54
Sweden	40.3	44.1	1.44	1.52	643	6.04		7,010	152	10,633	106	11,300	0.48	52
United Kingdom	40.1	42.9	1.54	1.55	4,233	6.10		50,616	137	69,353	108	75,446	0.62	430
Southern Europe	46.4	51.3	1.29	1.40	8,127	5.38		**108,695**	**139**	**150,997**	**90**	**135,659**	**-0.34**	**-514**
Albania	37.3	51.1	1.33	1.40	178	6.39		1,263	220	2,782	81	2,251	-0.71	-20
Bosnia and Herzegovina	45.7	51.5	1.50	1.57	171	5.42		2,661	118	3,150	78	2,469	-0.73	-23
Croatia	45.3	49.1	1.47	1.52	207	5.36		3,850	100	3,861	84	3,247	-0.72	-28
Greece	46.8	49.9	1.34	1.41	544	5.46		7,669	130	9,959	89	8,838	-1.78	-178
Italy	48.2	52.9	1.21	1.35	3,071	5.18		46,599	127	59,251	88	52,086	-0.32	-184
Malta	41.1	53.0	1.11	1.26	26	4.78		312	174	543	99	537	-2.20	-12
Montenegro	40.0	45.1	1.80	1.73	40	6.26		395	161	638	84	535	-0.15	-1
North Macedonia	41.0	47.8	1.47	1.51	105	5.77		1,254	145	1,819	83	1,519	-0.49	-9
Portugal	46.9	48.3	1.52	1.57	550	5.27		8,417	124	10,420	94	9,788	-0.10	-11
Serbia	44.4	48.4	1.50	1.56	341	5.07		6,732	99	6,714	83	5,554	-0.65	-44
Slovenia	44.7	47.9	1.58	1.60	108	5.09		1,473	144	2,118	94	1,985	-0.04	-1
Spain	45.9	51.8	1.23	1.36	2,633	5.49		28,070	171	47,905	94	45,035	-0.02	-11
Western Europe	43.6	45.8	1.50	1.56	11,169	5.58		**142,380**	**140**	**199,870**	**98**	**196,439**	**0.07**	**15**
Austria	43.6	49.2	1.33	1.43	464	5.08		6,936	131	9,117	96	8,738	-0.08	-8
Belgium	41.9	45.2	1.39	1.49	702	5.97		8,638	136	11,750	101	11,876	0.18	22

France	42.3	43.5	1.64	1.65	4,263	6.40	41,834	159	66,601	102	68,227	0.15	105
Germany	45.5	47.9	1.46	1.54	4,120	4.88	69,966	120	84,409	93	78,417	-0.34	-287
Luxembourg	39.5	45.6	1.40	1.48	38	5.61	296	229	677	117	791	1.18	8
The Netherlands	41.5	45.5	1.44	1.52	1,115	6.09	10,042	182	18,292	104	18,969	0.68	126
Switzerland	42.9	47.8	1.44	1.52	464	5.18	4,668	192	8,946	104	9,342	0.53	48
North America													
United States	38.5	41.9	1.62	1.64	23,645	6.82	153,067	226	346,374	110	380,413	0.54	1,894
Canada	40.6	45.1	1.33	1.39	2,354	5.89	13,594	294	39,946	114	45,547	1.02	408
Caribbean	31.7	40.5	1.78	1.69	53,387	8.01	**17,025**	**261**	**44,538**	**109**	**46,020**	**0.42**	**187**
Antigua and Barbuda	36.3	45.8	1.58	1.58	7	7.44	45	209	94	100	95	0	0
Aruba	41.5	44.2	1.61	1.62	7	6.48	42	257	108	93	100	0	0
Bahamas	35.3	42.5	1.36	1.41	29	7.21	83	484	402	105	424	0.49	2
Barbados	39.4	44.3	1.71	1.68	19	6.71	208	136	283	94	265	0.35	1
British Virgin Islands	38.6	49.2	1.06	1.22	3	7.50	7	571	40	100	40	0.25	1
Cayman Islands	38.7	44.3	1.51	1.52	4	5.33	7	1.071	75	139	104	1.33	1
Cuba	42.2	49.9	1.45	1.51	626	5.71	5,866	187	10,959	86	9,423	-0.38	-42
Curaçao					12	6.45	100	186	186	93	174	0.53	1
Dominica	36.3	42.1	1.47	1.50	4	6.06	50	132	66	95	63	0	0
Dominican Republic	28.3	36.2	2.20	1.87	991	8.63	2,346	489	11,475	113	12,981	0.82	95
Grenada	34.4	44.3	1.46	1.48	9	7.69	77	152	117	97	113	0	0
Guadeloupe	47.2	45.5	2.05	1.89	23	6.14	214	175	374	88	328	-0.53	-2
Haiti	24.1	31.1	2.59	2.06	1,140	9.62	3,242	365	11.,840	124	14,668	1.14	135
Jamaica	32.8	46.0	1.34	1.41	227	7.99	1,385	205	2,839	87	2,467	-0.03	-1
Martinique	49.7	48.3	1.97	1.83	19	5.55	229	149	342	83	283	0.87	-3
Montserrat	41.6	45.0	1.45	1.51	0	0	13	31	4	100	4	0	0
Puerto Rico	45.8	54.7	0.94	1.13	199	6.14	2,219	146	3,240	78	2,522	-0.12	-4
Trinidad and Tobago	37.7	45.7	1.52	1.52	96	6.35	640	236	1,510	93	1,404	0.26	4
Central America	28.5	37.6	1.95	1.75	16,257	8.82	**37,128**	**496**	**184,297**	**117**	**215,076**	**0.96**	**1,774**
Belize	26.9	37.8	2.01	1.78	39	9.28	68	618	420	123	516	1.42	6
Costa Rica	35.2	47.0	1.31	1.38	373	7.25	911	564	5,142	104	5,359	0.46	24
El Salvador	27.9	38.9	1.75	1.66	585	9.21	2,157	295	6,352	105	6,665	0.44	28
Guatemala	23.4	33.0	2.26	1.88	1,898	10.23	3,058	606	18,548	132	24,582	1.52	283
Honduras	24.2	32.3	2.45	2.00	1,085	9.93	1,538	710	10,916	135	14,785	1.65	181
Mexico	29.6	38.7	1.89	1.70	11,257	8.56	27,232	483	131,414	113	148,820	0.80	1,106
Nicaragua	26.0	34.9	2.18	1.86	647	9.29	1,313	530	6,962	125	8,733	1.32	92
Panama	30.3	38.2	2.09	1.86	372	8.18	851	534	4,544	124	5,616	1.25	57
South America	33.1	42.0	1.69	1.63	33,677	7.70	**111,474**	**392**	**436,889**	**107**	**468,719**	**0.58**	**2,556**
Argentine	32.9	41.9	1.51	1.54	3,617	7.90	16,850	272	45,775	105	48,312	0.34	157
Bolivia	25.2	31.9	2.50	2.06	1,174	9.39	3,067	407	12,498	128	16,057	1.35	169
Brazil	34.8	43.9	1.60	1.56	15,321	7.21	52,620	404	212,423	102	217,704	0.39	849
Chile	36.9	48.9	1.13	1.24	1,281	6.46	6,567	302	19,815	103	20,344	0.50	101
Colombia	32.5	43.7	1.62	1.58	4,170	7.84	11,615	458	53,163	111	59,384	1.04	553
Ecuador	29.3	39.5	1.79	1.68	1,599	8.77	3,472	525	18,213	117	21,305	0.85	155
French Guiana	25.0	28.6	3.29	2.57	28	9.00	23	1.352	311	151	469	1.60	5
Guyana	26.2	32.3	2.37	1.98	73	8.75	413	202	834	113	939	0.59	5
Paraguay	27.0	33.5	2.40	2.02	594	8.51	1,488	468	6,972	123	8,616	1.21	85
Peru	30.2	39.1	1.94	1.74	2,882	8.37	7,571	454	34,401	118	40,516	1.06	366
Suriname	28.6	35.8	2.21	1.89	55	8.63	194	328	637	115	733	0.78	5
Uruguay	36.4	45.2	1.39	1.44	241	7.11	2,224	152	3,386	96	3,260	-0.03	-1
Venezuela	29.4	36.5	2.06	1.83	2,642	9.28	5,368	530	28,460	109	31,078	0.38	109

4

Decrease in Water Resources

The Geostrategic Implications of Climate Change/Water Scarcity

Károly Miksa Reissmann, *The Beginning of the Desert at Old Cairo* (1913). Private collection

SOURCE: VIRÁG JUDIT GALLERY, BUDAPEST

This chapter does not aim to assess all the effects of climate change, nor is its purpose the otherwise noble fight against climate change, since numerous experts, organizations, and forums are already working on possible solutions to that issue. This chapter exclusively analyzes the geostrategic situation of those regions where international organizations expect increasing water shortages. In this study, the primary geostrategic factors under analysis are the amount of available drinking water, the amount of irrigation water and the size and carrying capacity of the agricultural land that can be irrigated by it, and the water supply of hydroelectric power plants that provide electricity.

The first study I am aware of that forecasted the alarming perspective of an imminent era of water scarcity was published by the Worl Resources Institute[55] in 2014. The map accompanying that study paints a bleak picture of the decline in available freshwater resources over the upcoming period through 2040. The five maps attached to this chapter show the same phenomenon:

Map 12. This map shows the water loss of different countries around the world (red–yellow colour coding using the WRI's original colours). This is a political map, therefore the decline in available freshwater resources is projected not onto ecological zones but statistically onto countries, since it will be the countries and their leaderships who must face the decreasing water quantities. From this map one can clearly see which countries will suffer the most severe, almost intractable losses of freshwater resources by 2040, i.e., over the next 15 years.

Map 13.[56] This map is no longer a political map, so it does not show countries but geographic zones/regions/watersheds, since climate-change–derived causes play an important role among the complex reasons for water scarcity. This composite map, however, takes into account almost all relevant aspects and triggering causes. Its pattern shows the same phenomenon as *Map 12*, but it depicts the individual water-stressed regions within countries far more precisely and renders the magnitude of water scarcity in a much more nuanced way. Accordingly, the areas shaded grey already denote presently desert or very dry zones.

Map 14 (Aquaeduct Water Risk Atlas).[57] This map is also from the World Resources Institute, but like the previous one it marks ecological zones rather than countries. The projection associated with this map and study paints an even more pessimistic picture of future water shortages than the previous map (*Map 13*). However, we must keep in mind that if the decrease in available freshwater resources is shown relative to current water conditions, then for example in Siberia we will not see water disappear altogether but rather the present abundance decrease somewhat; conversely, with global warming and the thawing of the permafrost over the coming decades, huge areas may open up for agricultural cultivation—which could have enormous significance for future geostrategic balance and global food supply (*see* below). Yet in places where the environment is already water-scarce, any further loss of freshwater resources indicated on the maps could render livelihoods and settlement impossible, with unforeseeable consequences for future migration trends.

Map 15 (UNICEF Risk Analysis and Preparedness Section, Office of Emergency Programmes, 11 October 2023).[58] Similarly to the previous one, this map (and the associated study) also examines

[55] https://www.wri.org/insights/ranking-worlds-most-water-stressed-countries-2040.
[56] Projected water stress in 2040 - World Atlas of Global Issues (sciencespo.fr).
[57] https://www.wri.org/applications/aqueduct/water-risk-atlas/#/?advanced=false&basemap=hydro&indicator=w_awr_def_tot_cat&lat=30&lng=-80&mapMode=view&month=1&opacity=0.5&ponderation=DEF&predefined=false&projection=absolute&scenario=optimistic&scope=baseline&threshold&timeScale=annual&year=baseline&zoom=3.
[58] https://www.downtoearth.org.in/climate-change/nearly-a-billion-children-globally-exposed-to-extremely-high-water-stress-unicef-report-92827.

ecological zones and projects a significant, nearly dramatic decline in freshwater resources for the coming decades. Naturally, in their analytical framework, the phenomenon is viewed through the vulnerability of children, and even its current baseline is already tragic: in 2022, 739 million children worldwide were exposed to severe or extremely high water scarcity, and 436 million children lived in environments where available water resources were very or extremely vulnerable.[59] The overall picture is the same as on the other maps: certain parts of the Earth may dry out almost completely, and these regions may be left with almost no accessible freshwater capable of sustaining not even the current population, let alone the dramatically growing population of the (near) future (*see* previous chapter).

As shown by *Maps 12–15*, the most severe water losses will occur along the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn, in the zone of descending air currents. Within the Old World, in Southern Europe, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Albania, North Macedonia, and Greece will suffer the most severe freshwater losses of 40–80 per cent or even more. The desertifying belt extends through the Middle East and Central Asia all the way to China.

	20–40 %	40–80 %	80 % +
Europe	Great Britain, France, The Netherlands, Poland, Lithuania, Moldova, Kosovo, Georgia, Cyprus	Portugal, Belgium, Italy, Albania, North Macedonia, Estonia, Ukraine	Spain, Greece
Asia	Nepal, South Korea, Japan	Tajikistan, Mongolia, China, India, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia	Türkiye, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Jemen, Oman, UAE, Bahrein, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan
Africa		Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho, Eswatini, Eritrea	Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Libya
Australia		Australia	
South America	Argentine, French Guiana, Cuba, Bahamas, Jamaica	Chile, Peru, Haiti, Puerto Rico	
North America		Mexiko, United States	

Figure 16. Countries facing water shortages in 2040, based on water loss projections by the World Resources Institute

[59] Zumbish 2022.

It must be noted that enough time has passed since the World Resources Institute's 2014 forecast for its predictions to be sadly fully confirmed. In Syria and Iraq, the bed of the Euphrates almost completely dried up in September 2019 (*Figures 17–18*), and the same fate now befalls the Po River in Italy almost every year. Wildfires, which previously did not occur with such frequency and extent, now regularly affect not only the southwestern regions of the United States but also almost the entire Mediterranean every year.

At the same time, not only the World Resources Institute, but other research institutes and organizations as well paint a similarly dramatic picture of the future.[60]

The emerging—and already perceptible—water shortage may have several consequences:

This dramatic loss of water will almost completely dry out, in addition to many other areas (*Figure 15*, *Maps 12–15*), precisely those zones and regions where the primary countries of migration origin are located. In the coming years and decades, the regions that are already dramatically overpopulated (*see* previous chapter) will also dry out, thereby losing a significant portion of their drinking water base, and their remaining agriculture may easily collapse as well, which could lead to a domestic food supply crisis and to an almost complete dependence on food imports. Overpopulation and water scarcity may generate such tension that it could easily burst the structural framework of these societies, and the resulting explosion could lead to mass migration and to the large-scale security-policy and geostrategic destabilization of vast territories, specifically to wars.

However, the phenomenon also carries a risk that is hardly calculable in advance: on the WRI map and on the other maps as well, it is clearly visible that in Europe, not only the southern European, Mediterranean states will be affected by serious freshwater losses, but Ukraine will also share this fate. According to the WRI projection, by 2040 Ukraine could easily lose up to 40 per cent of its freshwater resources. The reason for this is not only that summer precipitation levels are expected to decrease, but also that a significant portion of Ukraine's rivers originate in Belarus (the Pripyat and the Dnieper) and in Russia (the Desna and the Donets), and are exposed to the danger that dams may be built on these rivers in those countries to use the impounded water for irrigation of farmland and for driving the turbines of hydroelectric power plants. In any case, the amount of water reaching Ukraine will decrease significantly. In the light of the Russian–Ukrainian war, this issue has taken on an entirely different resonance. The Russian army occupying eastern parts of Ukraine deprives the country of significant agricultural lands, and the Russian grain embargo has also caused severe damage to Ukrainian agriculture, particularly to the western agrarian conglomerates that dominate a significant part of the Ukrainian grain market, whose losses have triggered the EU's efforts to liberalize Ukrainian grain imports—even at the expense of national agricultural markets. The demolition of the massive dam near Nova Kakhovka not only turned the southwestern front section into an impassable swamp for weeks, but more water than the volume of several 'Lake Balatons' was also lost. The amount of land that could have been irrigated with this water is unknown.

From the perspective of freshwater supply, the damming of rivers may become a source of danger, or rather a strategic weapon. The question is to what extent a country dams up the river flowing through its territory (for irrigation or electricity generation purposes), and by doing so, to what degree it reduces the discharge of the river section flowing into the neighbouring country. We can observe tensions arising from

[60] The Aqueduct programme of the World Resources Institute: https://www.wri.org/aqueduct/tools. The world map derived from this: https://espace-mondial-atlas.sciencespo.fr/en/topic-resources/map-5C33-EN-projected-water-stress-in-2040.html. Maps created based on data from the GRACE satellite: https://gracefo.jpl.nasa.gov/science/water-storage/. FAO interactive map showing different aspects of water management: https://data.apps.fao.org/aquamaps/; FAO Atlas of Water Productivity: https://wapor.apps.fao.org/home/WAPOR_2/1; and the FAO water stress report for 2021: https://www.unwater.org/sites/default/files/app/uploads/2021/08/SDG6_Indicator_Report_642_Progress-on-Level-of-Water-Stress_2021_ENGLISH_pages-1.pdf.

such dam construction and water impoundment in the Middle East, where Türkiye dams the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris with dams, thereby placing the agriculture of Syria and Iraq in a difficult situation (*see Figures 17–18*); Iran has also built several dams on the eastern tributaries of the Tigris originating from the Iranian Zagros Mountains, thereby causing serious problems for Iraq; and we can witness a similarly dramatic case in the case of the Nile as well, where Ethiopia has dammed the Blue Nile with the 'Renaissance Dam'. The filling of the massive reservoir poses the danger that it may seriously restrict the water flow reaching Sudan and Egypt, thereby causing serious problems for both countries.

The reduction of the water base, therefore, may lead not only to a drinking water crisis and an agricultural crisis, but also, through the damming of rivers and the restriction of their discharge, to direct political conflicts. It may only be a matter of time before we face this problem in Europe as well.

Figures 16–17. The dried riverbed of the Euphrates River in eastern Syria, Raqqa Governorate, in July 2021 (top), and in Dhi Qar, Iraq, in July 2022 (bottom).

In Russia (in Siberia), by 2080, the disappearance of permafrost 2 million square miles (5.12 million square kilometres—that is, an area equivalent to 55 times the size of Hungary!) available for agriculture. According to the author, this increase corresponds to roughly 1.3 billion acres (525,200,000 hectares) of agricultural land, which is far more than the total area currently under cultivation in the United States, which is 'only' 897,400 acres. During the period under review, 8,753,000 hectares of land would be freed from ice each year until 2080.

Map 16. The water scarcity projected by various research institutes and the reduction and shrinking of agriculturally suitable land over significant parts of the Earth—alongside the growing level of the world's population[61] (*see* previous chapter)—will lead to a serious food crisis. *Map 16* is a recolouring of the 2014 World Resources Institute map with green (fertile) and yellow (drying) colour codes. In this colour scheme it is clearly visible which zones will remain fertile and which zones will gradually dry out, whereby their human carrying capacity (here interpreted from the perspective of agricultural production) will decline.

On the world map it is clearly visible that in addition to the smaller green (fertile) zones (Southeast Asia, certain parts of Central Europe including Hungary, and Latin America with the Caribbean region), four large green zones (fertile areas) can be seen: the Amazon Basin, the Congo Basin, Canada, and Russia with Siberia. As long as the global food supply remains grain-based, the Amazon and Congo basins will only be suitable for producing significant quantities of grain in their relatively narrow peripheral areas. The basins themselves, due to their vast extent and their climate (high humidity, constant rainfall, soil structure, and quality), are not suitable for grain cultivation and therefore cannot significantly, or at all, contribute to solving global food supply problems. Thus, only Canada and Russia may be the areas where, with warming, the size of arable land will increase dramatically in the future (*see* below), so their importance in global food supply will grow further from their already leading positions (these two countries are already the world's largest grain exporters today), and—since further population growth will place additional, unprecedented burdens on global food supply—this will approach a monopoly situation.

Since this will lead to major geostrategic shifts (the transformation of former peripheries into new centres, the further strengthening of the 'Global West' with its declining-population—or more precisely the 'Global North'—in contrast to the 'Global South', etc.) and to a fundamental reordering of the global geostrategic balance of power, a separate chapter will be devoted to a more detailed discussion of this topic in what follows.

[61] According to forecasts by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, the world's population will reach 9,644,036,000 by 2050. UN DESA Population Division 2024.

The drying up of vast regions of the world, the relative abundance of water in other areas, and the dramatic expansion of productive land in countries such as Canada and Russia are leading to major geostrategic shifts (the transformation of former peripheries into new centres, the further strengthening of the 'Global West' with its declining-population—or more precisely the 'Global North'—in contrast to the 'Global South', etc.), and to a fundamental reordering of the global geostrategic balance of power.

12. Water Stress 2040 (World Resources Institute)

(World Resources Institute)



13. Water Stress 2040 (Sciences Po)



Projected water stress by 2040

Low
Low - Medium
Medium - High
High
Very high

Arid areas or areas of little water demand

(Sciences Po)

Dezső 2025

Projection according to RCP8.5 and SSP2 „business as usual", scenarios:
- RCP8.5: world temperature rises from 2.6 to 4.8 Celsius by 2100 compared to 1986-2005.
- SSP2: socioeconomic factors (population, GDP, rate of urbanization) continue along their current trends.

14. Water Stress 2040 (Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas)



15. Water Stress 2040 (UNICEF)



https:/ /www.downtoearth.org.in/ climate-chane/ nearly-a-billion-children-globally-exposed-to-extremely-high-water-stress-unicef-report-92827

16. Water Stress 2040 (World Resources Institute)



THE CONSEQUENCES OF PERMAFROST THAWING IN SIBERIA

In 2003, Vladimir Putin responded to the dangers caused by global warming by saying that 'an increase of two or three degrees wouldn't be so bad for a northern country like Russia. We could spend less on fur coats, and the grain harvest would go up.'[62] It is a widely accepted assessment now that no country will benefit as much from climate change as Russia.[63]

Today, permafrost holds the largest part of Siberia in its grip (*Map 17*). With climate change, however, the size of the areas where frozen soil (to a depth of 1–1,000 metres!) makes agricultural activity impossible is rapidly decreasing.

According to the study by Anisimov and Reneva,[64] the area of permafrost will decrease in the following way compared to the baseline state of 2006, based on the forecasts of various research centres:

	2030		2050		2080	
	MKm^2	%	MKm^2	%	MKm^2	%
CCC[65]	24.24	89	23.64	87	21.99	81
HadCM3	24.45	90	23.07	85	21.36	78
GFDL	24.11	89	22.38	82	20.85	77
NCAR	23.72	87	21.94	81	20.66	78

Figure 19. Permafrost thaw according to different climate change models

The four models all show that the Northern Hemisphere's 27 million square kilometres permafrost-covered area in 2006 will shrink by 10–11 per cent, or 2.5–3 million square kilometres, by 2030. This decline will continue, and by 2050, the size of the permafrost-covered areas will decrease by another 5–6 per cent, or 1–1.5 million square kilometres. However, the process does not stop there: by 2080, the permafrost will shrink by an additional 1.5 million square kilometres, another 5 per cent.

Elena Parfenova and her colleagues' study not only discusses the scientific methodology for forecasting climate change (temperature rise) and permafrost thaw, but also models the simultaneous changes in human settlement patterns, land potential, and the prospects for using newly thawed areas as arable land.[66] According to their findings, the proportion of today's Siberia characterized by unfavourable (uninhabitable) climatic conditions will decrease from 80 per cent to slightly more than 40 per cent, leaving only 38 per cent uninhabitable.[67] Currently, 65 per cent of Siberia's (Asian Russia's) territory is covered by permafrost,

[62] Vladimir Putin used to make light of climate change. 'An increase of two or three degrees wouldn't be so bad for a northern country like Russia,' he said in 2003. 'We could spend less on fur coats, and the grain harvest would go up.' https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/blogs/an-urbans-rural-view/blog-post/2021/02/19/russia-dominate-world-agriculture.

[63] Lehner 2021.

[64] Anisimov – Reneva 2006.

[65] Canadian Climate Institute.

[66] Parfenova et al. 2019, Figures 3–6 and Table 4.

[67] 'Climate severity categorized as "extreme", "severe", and "unfavorable", prevailing presently on 80% of Asian Russia, is predicted to become milder as "fairly favorable" and "moderately favorable" on over 40% of the area and would remain "severe" and "unfavorable" on only 38% of the area in the warm 2080s RCP 8.5 (Figure 3).' Parfenova et al. 2019, 5.

and this share will fall to 40 per cent by 2080.[68] The remaining question is whether infrastructure can be developed to exploit these newly accessible areas.[69]

In addition, according to certain scientific forecasts, by 2050, the proportion of snow-covered periods in the Arctic region will decrease by 10–20 per cent,[70] and the spring snowmelt occurred 3.4 days earlier per decade between 1972 and 2009.[71]

The warming will shift all environmental zone boundaries northward. By 2050, for example, the boundary of the forest–tundra zone will move 100 km to the north. In parallel, soil transformation will also begin, and the accumulation and formation of humus will accelerate in the forest steppe zone. As a result of all this, the agricultural value of northern areas will increase significantly.[72]

Numerous studies and commentaries[73] have drawn attention to the fact that the thawing permafrost in Russia's Siberian territories will free up enormous areas for agricultural cultivation. According to these, by 2080, the disappearance of permafrost will make 2 million square miles (5.12 million square kilometres—that is, an area equivalent to 55 times the size of Hungary!) available for agriculture. According to the author, this increase corresponds to roughly 1.3 billion acres[74] (525,200,000 hectares)[75] of agricultural land, which is far more than the total area currently under cultivation in the United States, which is 'only' 897,400 acres. Canada and Scandinavia will also benefit from this 'beneficial' effect of global warming, but far less so than Russia.[76]

[68] 'Asian Russia would be characterized by a milder climate, with less permafrost coverage, decreasing from the contemporary 65% to 40% (RCP 8.5) of the area by the 2080s.' Parfenova et al. 2019, 12.

[69] 'In a future warmer climate, food security, in terms of crop distribution and production capability, is predicted to become more favorable for people to support settlements in what is currently an extremely cold Asian Russia. However, suitable land development is dependent on the socio-politicaleconomic policies undertaken by authorities. Lands with developed infrastructure and high agricultural potential would obviously be populated first. Vast intact Siberia and the Far East have poorly developed infrastructure.' Parfenova et al. 2019, 12.

[70] 'Climate model projections indicate decreases in the duration of snow cover of 10–20% over most of the Arctic by 2050, with the smallest decreases over Siberia (10%) and the greatest losses over Alaska and northern Scandinavia (30–40%).' Callaghan et al. 2011, 27.

[71] 'This is driving significant changes in the snow regime particularly during the spring season when snow cover disappeared earlier at an average rate of 3.4 days per decade over the pan-Arctic terrestrial region (excluding Greenland) during 1972–2009.' Callaghan et al. 2011, 27.

[72] 'The observed warming will push the boundaries of all natural zones to the north. For example, the forest-tundra will move more than a hundred kilometers by 2050. All this will lead to the transformation of soils and land resources. Due to the thawing of permafrost in the northern part, waterlogging in the tundra and taiga zone will occur. At the same time, the process of accumulation of humus, the main source of nutrients in the soil, will be intensified in the forest-steppe. Due to this, the value of the northern part of the agricultural zone will increase significantly for the agricultural production.' *Agricultural area in Siberia will expand due to climate change*, in: Federal Research Center, Krasnoyarsk Science Center of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 13 December 2019, https://ksc.krasn.ru/en/news/agricultural_area_in_siberia_will_expand/.

[73] Lustgarten 2020; New York Times Magazine 2020. 12. 16. How Russia Wins the Climate Crisis - The New York Times (nytimes.com).

[74] 1 acre = 4047 square kilometres.

[75] By 2080, this would mean 8,753,000 hectares of new agricultural land per year!

[76] On the economic effects of climate change: 'Draw a line around the planet at the latitude of the northern borders of the United States and China, and just about every place south, across five continents, stands to lose out. Productivity, Burke found, peaks at about 55 degrees average temperature and then drops as the climate warms. He projects that by 2100, the national per capita income in the United States might be a third less than it would be in a nonwarming world; India's would be nearly 92% less; and China's future growth would be cut short by nearly half. The mirror image, meanwhile, tells a different story: Incredible growth could await those places soon to enter their prime. Canada, Scandinavia, Iceland and Russia each could see as much as fivefold bursts in their per capita gross domestic products by the end of the century so long as they have enough people to power their economies at that level.' (Burke – Hsiang – Miguel 2015).

17. **Permafrost in Siberia**



Dezső 2025

Wheat production

- High
- Medium high
- Nedium low
- Low

Permafrost cover in Russia

- Continuous
- Discontinuous
- Sporadic
- Not under ice

Agricultural productivity

Wheat	78. 2 million metric tons
Barley	19.0 million metric tons
Corn	13.6 million metric tons
Oats	4.5 million metric tons
Soybean	4.2 million metric tons
Millet	344,000 metric tons

US Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, International Production Assessment Division (IPAD) https:/ /ipad.fas.usda.gov / rssiws / al / rs_cropprod.aspx

5

Conclusion

Andreas Cellarius, *Harmonia Macrocosmica* (1661).
National Library of Australia, Parkes, Canberra, ACT

SOURCE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

The forecasts of the above-quoted studies—even if not all of the land freed from beneath the permafrost can immediately be regarded as suitable for agricultural cultivation—clearly show that in a world that is otherwise drying out, Russia, with its Siberian territories, will become the world's largest feeding ground alongside Canada, even though it already tops the list of global grain exporters today. This will provide a geostrategic advantage that will be extremely difficult to compete with. Siberia is an enormous region (on its permafrost-covered area alone the whole of Australia would fit!), with unlimited amounts of water, arable land, timber, oil, natural gas, metals and precious metals, as well as practically all other mineral resources. It is a territory vast enough to accommodate hundreds of millions of people. Alongside Canada, Russia will thus become the primary source of grain in a world where the area suitable for grain cultivation in most other regions will dramatically shrink due to water scarcity (precipitation and irrigation water).[77] As long as feeding an increasingly 'overpopulated' world depends primarily on grain, this position may grant Russia—and partly Canada—a significant (geo)strategic advantage.

This process may also pose a threat to other major powers, primarily the gradually drying United States.[78] Since Canada will likewise benefit from the effects of climate change,[79] in the view of the present author, the framework of future cooperation between the United States and Canada—due to their diverging climatic futures and the (dramatic) consequences thereof—will change significantly in the coming decades, potentially even in ways that transcend the boundaries of international law.

The conclusions of the above-mentioned ideas and studies also point toward substantial, even fundamental, geostrategic shifts and the emergence of a new global balance of power. Although the main actors will continue to be the United States, China, and Russia, climate change—independent of global economic and geopolitical processes and rooted in partially 'exogenous', uncontrollable, and irreversible causes—will bring about a transformation whose key geostrategic question is how these main actors will seek to exploit the advantages (Russia) or mitigate the disadvantages (the United States, China) of the changes described above through their adaptation strategies and policy decisions. The relationship between China and Siberia (Russia), as well as between the United States and Canada, has long been part of professional geostrategic discourse.[80]

The present study has examined in relative detail only two causes and two aspects of the migration wave reaching Europe and already causing serious problems. We emphasize again that this study does not provide a detailed scientific analysis of the two major areas—**demography (population explosion) and, partly, water scarcity resulting from climate change**—but, referring to and using the results from reliable sources (international organizations, research institutes, scholars), it draws (geo-strategic) conclusions from a historian's perspective about those recent, present, and (near-)future changes (population explosion versus population decline, and water scarcity versus water abundance) that fundamentally influence and will continue to influence the world's geo-strategic balance, and which continue to provide a solid basis for the pressures exerted on Europe by migration waves arising from an overpopulated and drying world.

Whether these predictions—based on scientific methodologies and seemingly reliable and coherent due to the large number of sources and research institutes—together with the assumed effects of climate change, will come true, we do not know. At present, these scientifically grounded scenarios are the ones on the table. The idea that some unpredictable event or influence might divert climate change from the currently projected path is hard to believe, and such uncertain factors cannot be incorporated into formulas and equations. From the standpoint of strategy-making, however, it is important to note that the world's strictly confidential budgetary institutions and strategic research centres are currently calculating with these data and producing strategic scenarios based on them. Therefore, we must keep these in mind as well.

Reiterating and emphasizing once again, we can state that from the perspective of strategic planning, the essential question is not what will actually happen in 2050 or 2070, but what is happening right now in the minds of strategic planners—how they plan today's or the near future's political/strategic decisions based on real-time, processed, and the most reliable data available, decisions that fundamentally shape our present, determine our strategy, and set the strategic direction of our path toward 2050 or 2070. **The real question is what the final conclusion of their strategic planning will be today: war or peace.**

We must keep in mind that even if there is only a few per cent chance that any process or change (in this case, the two aspects analyzed: demography and water scarcity) may alter the current global geo-strategic balance, then the underlying cause is a risk that must be researched and addressed. This is why this paper was written.

We must keep in mind that even if there is only a few per cent chance that any process or change (in this case, the two aspects analyzed: demography and water scarcity) may alter the current global geo-strategic balance, then the underlying cause is a risk that must be researched and addressed. This is why this paper was written.

[77] 'Like Canada, Russia is rich in resources and land, with room to grow. Its crop production is expected to be boosted by warming temperatures over the coming decades even as farm yields in the United States, Europe and India are all forecast to decrease. And whether by accident or cunning strategy or, most likely, some combination of the two, the steps its leaders have steadily taken — planting flags in the Arctic and propping up domestic grain production among them — have increasingly positioned Russia to regain its superpower mantle in a warmer world.' Lustgarten 2020.

[78] 'To one American foreign-policy expert quoted in the article, Russia has the potential to dominate world agricultural production, which he sees as "a national security issue" that is "underappreciated as a geopolitical threat." The article says American agriculture is currently "a significant, if low-key, instrument of leverage in America's own foreign affairs," but warns that advantage could disappear as Russia's production rises and increasing temperatures hurt U.S. farm yields.' Lehner 2021.

[79] As the climate warms, Canada will move into the ecological sweet spot for civilization, benefiting from new Arctic transportation routes as well as an expanded capacity for farming. But there are only 38 million people in Canada, and Canadians are dying at a faster rate than they are being born. Burke's research suggests climate change will, by 2100, make Canadians 2½ times richer in terms of per capita GDP. than they would be if the planet were not warming. Canada may be able to seize that opportunity only if it welcomes a lot more people. Lustgarten 2020.

[80] The United States' strategic policy toward Canada—which Donald J Trump, President of the United States, has made clear with a logical superpower geostrategic proposal derived from the above analysis, proposing various forms of union—is not based solely on reasons derived from the economic effects of climate change. We will provide further insights into the analysis of the relationship between the United States and Canada, based strictly on geostrategic principles and conclusions, in the next volume of this project (Old World Geostrategy 3), which will analyze the Russian military–geostrategic advantage identifiable in the Arctic region and the American responses to it.

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