

LIMEN

Journal of the Hungarian Migration Research Institute

6 (2022/2)



mrⁱ

MIGRATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE

LIMEN

Journal of the Hungarian
Migration Research Institute

6 (2022/2)



MIGRATION
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE

Limen is a semiannual International Journal
published by the Hungarian Migration Research Institute

Articles published in the journal reflect the views of their authors and do not
represent the official positions of the Migration Research Institute.



Editorial Board:

Tamás DEZSŐ, Dominika GYÖRGYI, Sára KMECZKÓ, Viktor MARSAI,
Balázs ORBÁN, Nikolett PÉNZVÁLTÓ, Omar SAYFO,
Mészár TÁRIK, Klaudia TÓTH, Márk VARGHA

Editor-in-Chief:

Viktor MARSAI (Director, Migration Research Institute)

Publisher:

Tamás DEZSŐ (Director General, Migration Research Institute)

P. O. Box 155, H-1518 Budapest, Hungary
info@migraciokutato.hu

©Migration Research Institute

Frontispiece:

Boats of migrants floating on the sea, photo: shutterstock.com

ISSN: 2732-0200

Founders:



Table of Contents

Viktor MARSÁI Gatekeeper countries – Key to stopping illegal immigration	4
Sára KMECZKÓ Further Externalization of EU Migration Policy: The Reinforced Gatekeeping Role of North African States	25
Árpád PÁRDUCZ Mandatory or Discretionary Admission? – The Relocation Agreements of The European Union	46
Meszár TÁRIK – KLAUDIA TÓTH Europe’s Bastion: The Role of Morocco in the Migration System of the Western Mediterranean region	54
Paul MARITZ “Beefing-Up” the border: Considering the ANC’s new vigour	76
Book recommendation by Omar SAYFO Jake Bittle: The Great Displacement: Climate Change and the Next American Migration. Simon & Schuster, 2023	90
Book recommendation by Klaudia TÓTH Ingrid Boas: Climate Migration and Security: Securitisation as a Strategy in Climate Change Politics. Routledge, 2017	93
ABOUT THE AUTHORS	96

“Beefing-Up” the border: Considering the ANC’s new vigour

Paul Maritz

Abstract

The announcement of a new Border Management Authority (BMA) for the Republic of South Africa has cast a spotlight on the South African Government’s approach to border control once again. A prime target for sub-Saharan illegal immigration, South Africa is also increasingly affected by the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and other contraband. This article casts an eye over how the ANC has run the South African borders since coming to power in 1994, and critically considers the success of the newly minted BMA.

Keywords: Africa, illegal immigration, South Africa, ANC, Zimbabwe

Introduction

On the 5th of October 2023 the Republic of South Africa launched its “Border Management Agency”, the country’s first “single, integrated and efficient authority to manage and secure the borders of the Republic” in the words of its head of state, President Cyril Ramaphosa.¹ The launching of this agency begs at least two questions:

1. If the African National Congress (ANC), of which Ramaphosa is the president, has been the majority party since April 1994 when former president Nelson Mandela famously lifted the veil on a South Africa after Apartheid, how has it managed its more than 4800km of land borders since coming to power nearly three decades ago?
2. Which factors caused President Ramaphosa’s government to finally take action with regards to border control?

This essay offers a historical perspective on how the Republic of South Africa has approached borders over the last fifty years, with particular attention given to management before 1994 changes attempted and undertaken when the system of Apartheid came to an end. After this perspective has been given, the reader is introduced to the effects of the current South African government’s approach to

¹ RAMAPHOSA 2023.

border control and the relationship between this approach and the phenomenon of xenophobia. Finally, the ANC's latest moves are introduced and critically considered.

Conceptualisation

As is the case in many countries, not least in central Europe, South Africa has suffered immense emigration of highly skilled labour over the last three decades. In the Canadian province of Alberta some 6,5% of all practicing medical doctors were trained in South Africa², and as early as 2004 a study found that 14% of all the physicians trained in South Africa were working either in Canada or the USA³. This brain drain and the policies that enhanced it or at the very least failed to stop it, could of course make for an interesting essay, but the focus here is the flow of migrants into the Republic of South Africa. A second and perhaps even more important qualification is of course the kind of migration being considered. With a comparatively successful and modernised economy, South Africa has become the home of a great many legal migrants, who have followed procedure and entered the country legally, and refugees, who have had legitimate applications reviewed and approved, and who are by no means illegal.

Before 1994: Border wars and military activity

The north-western border of South Africa was, until 21 March 1990, the border today known as the Namibia-Angola border. From 1920, when it officially came under South African control and crown rule, until the 21st of March 1990, what is now Namibia was governed by Pretoria. The implication is necessarily that an analysis of South African border control before 1990 has to consider practices between the borders of two different countries. From the 26th of March 1966 until 1990, this border was controlled through military operation known as the South African border wars. The South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), who were engaged in the Border war with the South African government of the time counted Zambia and Mozambique among its allies, meaning that military control was expanded wider than just the North-West. The end of the Cold War, which brought with it a renewed vigour from the USA and UK to end the system

² FOURNIER 2023.

³ HAGOPIAN ET AL. 2004.

of Apartheid. With this shift came the end of the Border War, and a new era in South African border control.

After 1994: A low priority

As Steinberg rightly points out,⁴ a country in a state of peace will typically delegate the task of border control to its department of home affairs, but as South Africa had been at war with various of its neighbours for so long, no centralised authority border control was in place at the dawn of the ANC's reign. The initial solution to this was the formation of a National Interdepartmental Structure (NIDS), which aimed to bring all those different departments and agencies that worked with border control together⁵. NIDS, while not ineffective, focussed on modernising the points of entry and the establishing best practices for the transport of freight instead of proposing how land borders might be controlled or how porous borders might be secured. As an instrument in the hands of Customs and Immigration, NIDS might be seen to have been rather successful – but as a border control authority, it surely was, as Steinberg describes, a square peg in a round hole.⁶

The NIDS was followed up by the Border Control Operational Coordinating Committee (BCOCC), which struggled with the same inherent struggles that faced the NIDS – uncertainty with regards to what it essentially wanted to be.

A study by Segatti and Landau in 2010 shows how little was done in terms of policy development between 2000 and 2010.⁷ In fact, between 2004 and 2010 one amendment to the Immigration act was passed (2005) and one bill for the prevention of trafficking was introduced (2007)

2008 Zimbabwe Elections and the rise of Xenophobia

Xenophobia, from the Greek words Xenos and Phobos, means fear or hatred of strangers. In South Africa this term typically refers to attacks on foreign nationals, typically accompanied by the looting of their property. In many cases, as will be

⁴ STEINBERG 2005.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ SEGATTI – LANDAU 2011.

discussed later, these attacks have caused fatalities. This section introduces the reader to various phenomena that led to the rise of xenophobia in South Africa.

Even though the first officially recorded xenophobic attacks occurred in 1994, there is a notable increase from 2008 onwards.⁸ The international economic recession might well have been a contributing factor, but for the most part these attacks were a reaction to the uncontrolled influx of Zimbabwean nationals after the bloody 2008 election in that country. Supporters of Robert Mugabe and his Zanu-PF party had, in the final days before the presidential run-off election in June 2008, killed at least 100 people, and driven fear into many more.⁹ Sanctions on the Zimbabwean economy by USA and the IMF had the Zimbabwean economy into hyperinflation, and the combination of violence and economic strife made South Africa the only viable option for a great many Zimbabweans.

Scheen¹⁰ reports that, at its height, up to 3000 Zimbabweans crossed into South Africa illegally per day and proposes that 1,5 million Zimbabweans entered into South Africa in this way from 2008 to 2009. The impact of these illegal immigrants was felt immediately, as they were willing to work for extremely low wages, thus taking many of the available agricultural jobs.¹¹

Polzer's words¹² summarise the reaction by the South African government best: "a rapid influx of hundreds of thousands of people would be treated by most countries as a serious crisis requiring immediate attention". The reaction by the South African Government to all of this was "a studied determination not to acknowledge that anything is out of the ordinary."¹³

The clear and obvious reason for this behaviour from the ANC was loyalty towards Mugabe, loyalty that shone through clearly in the efforts of then president Thabo Mbeki to prevent the publication of the damning Khampepe report on the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe, which finally concluded that these elections were both unfair and unfree.¹⁴ By recognising that millions were fleeing, the ANC would necessarily have had to publicly recognise errors of the Mugabe administration – a step it was clearly not willing to take. The first real efforts to address the Zimbabwean migration on the northern border was in 2010, when the government

⁸ SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE. 2015.

⁹ MCGREAL 2008.

¹⁰ SCHEEN 2011.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² POLZER 2010, pp. 377–399.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ LOUW-VAUDRAN 2014.

introduced its Zimbabwean Documentation Project, in an effort to “regularise” undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants.¹⁵

Census data from 2011, which proposes that 3.3% of the South African population, or about 1,5 million people, were non-citizens were ironically laughed off by the South African citizenry, as it has long been clear that the South African government has no idea how many people have entered the country illegally. So badly was the auditing of South African border control managed that a 2014 UK study commented:¹⁶ “At present, there is no publicly available financial information on South Africa’s expenditure on immigration enforcement and no estimates of the potential costs of increasing immigration control.” This situation seems not to have improved much after 2014. The corresponding census figures from 2021, which proposed that there were 2,4 million¹⁷ migrants in South Africa is not even considered accurate by the government itself, with Home Affairs minister Aaron Motsoaledi in 2022 citing research by Statistics South Africa that there are an estimated 3,95 million foreign nationals in South Africa.¹⁸ These figures, and above all the disparity between its high and low marks serve as a clear indication that the South African government is not in control of the issue. The difference between 2,4 million and 3,95 million currently comes to more than 2% of the South African population.

While South Africa, has a contractual obligation to help those that seek asylum status, in 2014 the South African Department of Home Affairs reported that 95% of asylum applications were “not genuine”, essentially confirming that many migrants had illegally entered South Africa for economic reasons, not reasons sprouting from the political situation in their countries of origin. Digressing slightly, the popularity of illegal immigrants as agricultural workers and the tension caused by this phenomenon ironically means that proper border control will clearly benefit those migrant workers who have entered the country legally, because it will remove the stigma surrounding immigrants as undercutting local labour.

Returning to 2008 and 2009, the porous land border between South Africa and Zimbabwe had caused, as has been discussed, not only a massive influx of people, but had the knock-on effect of putting pressure on the agricultural labour market and additionally leading to the well documented increase in xenophobic attacks.

¹⁵ SEGATTI – LANDAU 2011.

¹⁶ MTHEMBU-SALTER ET AL. 2014.

¹⁷ CHOTIA 2023.

¹⁸ MKHWANAZI 2022.

In September of 2023 Fredson Guilengue¹⁹ reported that the 1028 xenophobic attacks since 1994 have resulted in 659 deaths, and while this figure is gruesome in and of itself, it fails to capture the damage and destruction which accompanies many of these attacks. While the flow of human beings over borders is natural in a modern economy, the lack of control and seeming lack of plan projected by the ANC on this issue is the bigger problem.

Populism in both directions

Immigration of any kind has become an issue on both the left and right of the South African political narrative. Leader of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) Julius Malema, internationally renowned for often singing “Kill the Boer” at public gatherings, identifies with the vision of the Pan-Africanist movement, and has expressed his and his party’s vision for a completely borderless Africa. On the 27th of July 2019 Malema, during a rally, said “we were divided by the colonists” and that, in the name of decolonialism, the borders of Africa should be collapsed.²⁰

Malema clearly proposes movement without visas, without passports, and sees an Africa without borders. Malema thus identified himself, at least in 2019, with the aspirations of former Libyan dictator Muammar Gadhafi, and called for “one government” and “one army”.²¹ Malema is not the first in South African politics to call for a borderless Africa, as he identifies with the vision of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) which broke away from the ANC in 1959 and had the unification of Africa on its agenda from the start.

Populism with regards to South Africa’s borders is, however, more obviously an issue to the political right than it is to the political left. While leaders such as Malema have called for the collapsing of borders, those proposing the strengthening of South Africa’s land borders have recently enjoyed more popularity. Herman Mashaba, leader of ActionSA, a new party on the South African political horizon, stated in 2019:²²

“Most people coming into our country are not criminals. They are good people, trying to find opportunity in South Africa because of difficult circumstances in their own countries. But, we are a country too that has its own challenges.”

¹⁹ GUILENGUE 2023.

²⁰ SABC 2019.

²¹ DU PLESSIS 2019.

²² MASHABA 2020.

We are unable to provide anywhere near adequately what is needed by our own South African citizens. With 39% unemployment, the highest levels of inequality, massive housing backlogs and an inability of government to meet the rising needs of healthcare and infrastructure, can we really afford to be helping so many people from other countries?"

After the 2021 municipal election, the first in which Mashaba's ActionSA participated, the party boasted with a massive 16,05% of the votes in Johannesburg, and more than 8% in Pretoria, the country's capital. While Mashaba's manifesto is generally focused on good service delivery and fighting corruption, his stance on national borders is very clear, and has obviously served his party well.

A more radical anti-immigrant movement, Operation Dudula, was founded in 2021 – Dudula meaning “to force out” in the Zulu language. While mostly politically insignificant, Operation Dudula has become internationally renowned for their stance on immigration. This party has been referred to as Xenophobic in international media,²³ and have hosted marches that target businesses renowned for hiring illegal immigrants.

An interesting development in recent years has been the EFF's often confusing comments on illegal immigration. While fiercely Pan-Africanist, as stated above, Malema and his party have obviously realised that a borderless Africa is not as popular with the electorate as it is with party ideologues, and in January of 2022 Malema himself started questioning the ratio of foreign nationals in the hospitality industry²⁴ – a move noted by many as an abandonment of his previous position, and an effort to score election points.

An election issue

Despite the historic ideological calls for “one Africa”, it seems clear that a stronger stance on immigration, and especially on illegal immigration, is where there is political potential at the moment. This fact has not been missed by the ANC.

²³ MYENI 2022.

²⁴ GUERANDI 2022.

What the ANC are planning to do

After its 2022 55th National Conference, the ANC published eleven different resolution documents. In the resolution document on peace and stability, among a whole host of other resolutions, the ANC noted:²⁵

9.1.1. Since 1994, the ANC branches have not had a focused opportunity to reflect and discuss migration policy framework to meet modern society challenges. The ANC need to develop a new policy framework to meet modern society challenges. The ANC must ensure that the movement develops a new policy framework on migration, which must combat all manifestations of xenophobia and respects a united Africa.

9.1.5. Demographic and migration trends in Southern Africa point to situations where there will be marked increases of migration into South Africa in the near future and the long term.

9.2.1. The latest crime statistics indicate that domestic and transnational crime are on an increase. Our uncontrolled migration and social change have also contributed to the proliferation of international criminal syndicates. The illicit mining activities is the case in point.

These conclusions, selected for relevance from a vast array, then lead to, among others, these resolutions:

9.1.15 Government should increase the Home Affairs Inspectorate officials in order to address issues of illegal migration across various parts of the country.

9.1.16 There is a need to invest in technology in order to ensure the effective implement border management responsibilities.

Upon reading these astute resolutions, one can be forgiven for being dumbfounded. For the same party that effectively sat and watched as millions crossed its borders to make such astute resolutions, the political winds must certainly blow hard. Even if it was accepted that the reaction, or at least the lack of a reaction, to the Zimbabwean influx in 2008 was not driven by ideology so much as it was driven by loyalty to Robert Mugabe, who is viewed to this day as a brother in arms by the ANC, this does not sufficiently explain the inherent schizophrenia in the ANC's current approach to border control. Accepting that there is a bona fide desire to fight crime in South Africa, it is still clear for all to see that border security only became such a great priority for the ANC after it was pushed by opposition parties.

²⁵ ANC 2023.

The new Border Management Authority

On the 5th of October 2023, the speech with which this essay opened was delivered by President Ramaphosa.²⁶ During this speech, he was blatantly honest about the mistakes that his own party had made, stating:

One of these challenges is the increase in the number of undocumented foreign nationals entering our country. This has exacerbated many of the country's social and economic problems. The movement of persons and goods at ports of entry has often not been as efficient as it should be, resulting in unnecessary delays and increased costs for individuals and companies. This in turn is harming our economy. Deficiencies in border management have also enabled corruption and organised and cross-border crime to thrive.

While it is laudable that Ramaphosa recognises the previous errors of his own party and his comrades, a thorough reading of his speech, might sound all too familiar to the trained ear.

At one point during his speech, Ramaphosa states:

The Border Management Authority will provide a sustainable solution to the structural challenges of border security, control and coordination. It will be a new model of integration of functions, roles and responsibilities in the broader law enforcement environment.

The use of the word “security” is misleading if one considers these words a mere paragraph later:

While the border guard will be conducting border law enforcement functions, including access control, the South African National Defence Force remains responsible for border protection and safeguarding. The border guard will interface with the nearest police station with regards to the occurrence of a crime at a port of entry.

No one will argue that trafficking of contraband and illegal immigrants often happens at official “ports of entry” all over the world, but the nature of illegal immigration into South Africa is by means of crossing the massive porous land border. A documentary film “Open Borders” made by the human rights organisation AfriForum in 2023²⁷ tracks how illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe

²⁶ RAMAPHOSA 2023.

²⁷ AFRIFORUM 2023.

not only know the routes into South Africa and often cross it daily, but get Zimbabwean law enforcement to help. A renewed focus on ports of entry might be laudable, but it amounts to treating a heart-condition with a leg brace.

Reflecting

That the ANC has failed to maintain the integrity of its national borders over the last three decades is not really up for debate. Anyone with access to YouTube can watch videos of illegal immigrants crossing in through South Africa's northern border without so much as a bump in the road. What is up for debate, however, is why, in the last couple of years, it suddenly decided to make border control as much of a priority as it has seemingly become.

One reason might be that the trafficking of contraband into South Africa has finally made them sit up and take notice. Another might be that the world record unemployment, often worsened by cheaper, hassle-free illegal labour, finally pushed them into action. The third, and most probable answer, is that the party's prioritising of borders does not stem from a grand vision for South Africa or the prosperity of the people, but from political ambition and fear of coming elections. On the 16th of November 2023 a leading South African media outlet published a story under the telling title "Is South Africa heading for an immigration election",²⁸ asking a question on the lips of many South Africans. Of course it is not advocated that refugees should be ignored, but in its blind loyalty to Robert Mugabe meant that the ANC did not intervene when it might have prevented the ruin of the Zimbabwean economy. Furthermore, it did not react to the influx of Zimbabwean nationals in a timely and intelligent manner.

Winston Churchill, after the Battle of Britain in 1940, famously said: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few". With regards to the bruised and bloodied ANC voters, I would posit an adaptation: "Never in the history of empty political promises were so many made so quickly by so few." The ANC voter, which at one point surpassed 70% of South Africa's electorate, was promised a job, a house, and above all, a safe environment in which he or she could prosper. The reality has been increased poverty, increased criminality and increased corruption, mixed into a dish of decreased public transport and even decreasing public access to medical services.

²⁸ MARRIAN 2023.

The ANC knows that border control is a key issue for many voters, and that the creation of the Border Management Authority, despite its shortcomings, might win them some points in the short term, and might keep them in government for a little while longer. Even if they should succeed in maintaining power, the neutral observer will most probably conclude that the ANC's current vigour for border control is little more than words and ceremonies. Cross-border crime syndicates have grown strong and have entrenched themselves in societies all across the country, and the trauma left by xenophobic attacks will leave a rift between societies that might take decades to be resolved.

Finally, the newly minted Border Management Authority is not the "single, integrated" authority that the President of the Republic had promised, as its powers remain limited, and as it remains dependent on the South African National Defence Force to guard the borders, thus never coming to power in the area where South Africa needs it most. In short, the new Border Management Authority might very well be too little too late.

Bibliography

- AFRIFORUM (2023): Open Borders: South Africa / Zimbabwe | Documentary. *YouTube*. 2023. Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bAC15FoZmO0> Accessed on 15 Oct. 2023.
- ANC (2023): *Resolutions of the 55th Conference*. Source: <https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/ANC-55th-Conference-Resolutions-Peace-Stability.pdf>. Accessed on 11 Nov. 2023.
- CHOTIA, Farouk (2023): Why South Africa regrets its liberal post-apartheid asylum laws. *BBC*, 15 Nov. 2023. Source: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67405394>. Accessed on 15 Nov. 2023.
- DU PLESSIS, Carien (2019): EFF wants borderless Africa, with “one federal government, one federal army” *Daily Maverick*. 17 Dec. 2019. Source: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-12-17-eff-wants-borderless-africa-with-one-federal-government-one-federal-army/>. Accessed on 10 Nov. 2023
- FOURNIER, Ariel (2023): Why are so many of Alberta’s rural doctors from South Africa? *CBC News*. 25 Feb. 2023. Source: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/rural-alberta-doctors-south-africa-1.6757758>. Accessed on 14 Oct. 2023.
- GUERANDI, Giuseppe Rajkumar (2022): EFF’s apparent U-turn on pan-Africanism raises questions about its stance on immigrants. *Daily Maverick*. 23 Jan. 2022. Source: <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2022-01-23-effs-apparent-u-turn-on-pan-africanism-raises-questions-about-its-stance-on-immigrants/>. Accessed on 20 Nov. 2023.
- GUILENGUE, Fredson (2023): Xenophobia and Social Cohesion in South Africa. *Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung*. 29 Sep. 2023. Source: <https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/51059/xenophobia-and-social-cohesion-in-south-africa>. Accessed on 15 Nov. 2023.
- HAGOPIAN, Amy et al. (2004): The migration of physicians from sub-Saharan Africa to the United States of America: measures of the African brain drain. *Human Resources for Health*. at: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC544595/>. Accessed on 10 Nov. 2023.
- LOUW-VAUDRAN, Liesl (2014): A Freedom House report describes South Africa’s impact on human rights and democracy in Africa as ‘minimal.’ *ISS Africa*. 26 Nov. 2014. Source: <https://issafrika.org/iss-today/thabo-mbekis-quietly-destructive-policy-on-zimbabwe>. Accessed on 10 Nov. 2023.
- MARRIAN, Natasha (2023): Is South Africa heading for an immigration election? *Financial Mail*. 16 Nov. 2023. <https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2023-11-16-is-south-africa-heading-for-an-immigration-election/>. Accessed on 17 Nov. 2023.

- MASHABA, Herman (2020): A country without borders is not a country at all. *News24* 26 Jan. 2020. Source: https://www.news24.com/news24/opinions/columnists/herman_mashaba/herman-mashaba-a-country-without-borders-is-not-a-country-at-all-20200126. Accessed on 5 Nov. 2023.
- MCGREAL, Chris (2008): This is no election. This is a brutal war. *The Guardian*. 22 June 2008. Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1>. Accessed on 11 Nov. 2023.
- MKHWANAZI, Siyabonga (2022): Aaron Motsoaledi says almost 4 million foreigners live in SA. *IOLonline*. 3 Mar. 2022. Source: <https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/aaron-motsoaledi-says-almost-4-million-foreigners-live-in-sa-624e9ae6-705f-479d-aa20-b57c535235a8>. Accessed on 11 Oct. 2023.
- MTHEMBU-SALTER, Gregory – AMIT, Roni – GOULD, Chandre – LANDAU, Loren B. (2014): *Counting the Cost of Securitising South Africa's Immigration Regime*. Brighton: University of Sussex. Source: <https://www.gov.uk/research-for-development-outputs/counting-the-cost-of-securitising-south-africa-s-immigration-regime-migrating-out-of-poverty-rpc-working-paper-20>. Accessed on 23 Nov. 2023.
- MYENI, Thabi (2022): What is Operation Dudula, South Africa's anti-migration vigilante? *Al Jazeera*. 8 Apr. 2022. Source: <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2022/4/8/what-is-operation-dudula-s-africas-anti-immigration-vigilante>. Accessed on 11 Nov. 2023.
- POLZER, Tara (2010): *Silence and Fragmentation: South African Responses to Zimbabwean Migration*. In J. Crush and D. Tevera (eds.), *Zimbabwe's Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival*. Ottawa and Cape Town: IDRC and SAMP pp. 377–399.
- RAMAPHOSA, Cyril (2023): President Cyril Ramaphosa: Launch of the Border Management Authority. 5 Oct. 2023. Source: <https://www.gov.za/speeches/president-cyril-ramaphosa-launch-border-management-authority-5-oct-2023-0000>. Accessed on 14 Oct. 2023.
- SABC (2019): Julius Malema intensifies call for the collapsing of borders in Africa. *YouTube*. Source: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Afsy5mNwQD8>. Accessed on 12 Nov. 2023.
- SCHEEN, Thomas (2011): Zimbabwean migrants destabilise the north of South Africa. *Rural21*. 1/2011. Source: https://www.rural21.com/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/Zimbabwean_migrants_01.pdf. Accessed on 10 Nov. 2023.
- SEGATTI, Aurelia – LANDAU, Loren B. (2011): *Contemporary Migration to South Africa*. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. Washington DC.

SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE (2015): *Xenophobic violence in democratic South Africa timeline*. Source: <https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/xenophobic-violence-democratic-south-africa-timeline>. Accessed on 10 Nov. 2023.

STEINBERG, Jonny (2005): An overview of South African border control: 1994–2004. *ISS Online. ISS Paper 103, April 2005*. Source: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99202/103.pdf>. Accessed on 14 Oct. 2023.

*m*ⁱ