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Frontispiece:

A girl from the minority Yazidi sect, fleeing the violence of the ISIS in the Iraqi town of Sinjar, rests at the Iraqi-Syrian border in Fishkhabour, Dohuk province August 13, 2014. REUTERS/Youssef Boudlal/File Photo – stock.adobe.com

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How Strong is Turkey's Refugee Card? Lessons learned from the events of February–March 2020

Nikolett Pénczváltó

Abstract

The study analyses Turkey's 27 February 2020 decision to open its border with Greece for irregular migrants, as well as subsequent events, in order to answer the question of how strong Turkey's refugee card vis-à-vis the EU is. Turkey played the "migrant card" in February–March 2020, but despite European fears, it did not prove to be a breakthrough. Although the February–March 2020 crisis is over, a recurrence of the events cannot be ruled out. The paper argues that even if the departure of millions of irregular migrants from and via Turkey is not an imminent threat, the EU still has a vast interest in coming to an agreement with Ankara, and in avoiding a series of events similar to those of March 2020. It concludes that both a norm-based and an interest-based approach suggest that the EU needs to keep supporting Turkey in tackling the migration and refugee issue.

Keywords: Turkey, European Union, migration, border security, Syrian refugees

1. Introduction

At the end of February 2020, Turkey decided to no longer prevent irregular migrants from entering the European Union. This move can be interpreted as both "blackmail" and a cry for help. The study examines the Turkish border opening of February 2020. First, it introduces the context of the border opening and the factors behind the Turkish decision. Then it analyses the events that took place on the Turkish-Greek border in February–March 2020, and the responses to them from the European Union and Greece. Finally, the paper concludes with an evaluation and outlines further prospects. Based on the experience of the events of February–March 2020, the study attempts to answer the questions of how strong Turkey's refugee card vis-à-vis the EU in fact is, and what policy the EU should pursue toward Turkey in this context.

2. Turkey's role in tackling the European migration and refugee crisis

Turkey hosts the most refugees in the world. According to UN figures, there are more than 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey.¹ The vast majority of the Syrians live in the cities, while only about 63,000 of them live in refugee camps.² Since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, more than half a million Syrian children have been born in Turkey. About 45% of Syrian refugees living in Turkey are under 18 years old. The number of Syrians is supplemented by an additional approximately 400,000 asylum seekers of other nationalities. According to UN figures, in February 2020 there were 170,000 Afghan, 142,000 Iraqi and 39,000 Iranian asylum seekers in the country.³

The situation of Syrians and non-Syrians is different. Syrians are granted so-called temporary protection status, under which they have free access to health care and education, and the principle of non-refoulement is applied to them as well.⁴ Non-Syrian asylum-seekers live under more difficult conditions, as they are not covered by the temporary protection regime. Due to their vulnerable position, they are more motivated to leave Turkey toward the European Union. It is one of the reasons why only 23% of the asylum seekers arriving in Greece in 2019 were Syrians.⁵

Turkey is a key transit country, due to its geographical location. A significant proportion of migrants and refugees from the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa has been trying to reach the EU through Turkey. In 2015, at the peak of the European refugee crisis, 885,386 asylum-seekers arrived in the EU along the Western Balkan route, that is via Turkey.

The member states of the EU have recognized the need for an agreement with Ankara, resulting in the signing of the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016.⁶ Following this agreement, Ankara stepped up its efforts against illegal migration. According to official Turkish figures, in 2019 alone, 8,996 human traffickers and more than 454,000 irregular migrants were apprehended by Turkish authorities (including 201,437 Afghans, 71,645 Pakistanis, 55,236 Syrians, 12,210

¹ UNHCR 2020a.

² UNHCR 2020b.

³ UNHCR 2020c. According to unofficial estimates, there are additional hundreds of thousands unregistered migrants in Turkey.

⁴ 2014/6883 GEÇİCİ KORUMA YÖNETMELİĞİ 2014.

⁵ UNHCR 2019.

⁶ EU-TURKEY STATEMENT 2016.

Palestinians, 12,097 Iraqis, 8,753 Iranians and 2,171 Georgian nationals).⁷ The number of irregular migrants arriving in the EU via Turkey has dropped dramatically since the agreement was reached. While 885,386 asylum-seekers arrived on this route in 2015, it dropped to 182,249 in 2016, and to “only” 42,319 in 2017.⁸ It should be noted, however, that the decline in numbers after March 2016 cannot be attributed solely to Turkey’s actions, since other factors and measures have also played a significant role, such as the closure of the Balkan route.

Turkey complied with the EU-Turkey Statement up until 27 February 2020, when it decided to no longer detain irregular migrants trying to cross the Turkey-Greece border into the European Union. Among the reasons, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan named the EU’s failure to keep its promises formulated in the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. Ankara criticizes the slow pace of the disbursement of the promised financial support (the EU mobilized a total of €6 billion by December 2019, but only €3.4 billion has been disbursed), and the lack of free hand in the distribution of the fund (the payments are project-based, and a significant part of the projects is implemented by NGOs and UN agencies, that is the money is not handed directly to the Turkish government). The Member States of the EU have resettled only 26,135 people out of the more than 4 million refugees in Turkey.⁹ Besides, Ankara has not got substantially closer to either visa liberalization, the revision of the customs union or to accession to the European Union (even if two new negotiation chapters were opened as a result of the 2016 statement), nor has it received the expected support from its European allies in terms of shaping events in Syria. Although, it must also be seen that the European Union did not make an explicit promise in the 2016 declaration to do any of these. The declaration indicated in the case of both the visa liberalization and the accession process that progress would only be made on these issues if Turkey meet the pre-defined criteria. Meanwhile the ongoing work on the upgrading of the customs union was only “welcomed” in the text.

Although there are several voices claiming that Turkey has been blackmailing¹⁰ the EU by not preventing the departure of irregular migrants, if we look at the costs and benefits more closely, Ankara has not really got much for enabling the EU to outsource its refugee problem – and the associated responsibilities – to Turkey. According to Erdoğan, his country alone has spent \$40 billion so far on hosting refugees. While many consider this figure to be exaggerated, it is certain that the

⁷ REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY OF INTERIOR 2020.

⁸ FRONTEX 2020. In 2018 55,878, in 2019 82,564 asylum-seekers arrived on this route.

⁹ IOM 2020a.

¹⁰ See for example DENDIAS 2020, DW 2020.

costs have reached billions of dollars.¹¹ Compared to this, the €6 billion in financial aid is not that much. Even less so if we consider that it is still impossible to predict when a reassuring settlement of the Syrian war, allowing displaced Syrians to return home, will be achieved. In fact, according to the *Syrians Barometer 2019* survey, 51.8% of Syrian respondents living in Turkey under temporary protection said that they did not plan to return to Syria under any circumstances, and only 5.5% of respondents answered that they would return to Syria if the war ended, even without the formation of an administration they wanted.¹² This is an additional reason why greater solidarity is expected from the Turkish side. While the actions of Ankara could be labeled as “blackmail”, according to another interpretation they could also be interpreted as a cry for help, since at that point Turks may have felt they had nothing to lose.

3. Factors behind the timing of the February 2020 border opening

3. 1. Idlib

The opening of the Turkish-Greek border came right after the death of 36 Turkish soldiers in Syria, in a single Russian-Syrian airstrike on the afternoon of 27 February. It was the largest loss of life suffered by the Turkish Armed Forces for a long time. In the northwest Syrian province of Idlib, tensions had escalated dramatically over the previous three weeks. As a result of the intensification of the fighting, according to UN data, between 1 December 2019 and 18 February 2020 alone, 900,000 internally displaced Syrians set off for the Turkish-Syrian border.¹³ The Turkish authorities did not allow the newcomers to enter Turkey. Ankara warned Europe that it alone could not cope with another refugee wave of this size.¹⁴

Beside the refugee issue, strategic considerations also played a role in the Turkish decision. The loss of Idlib, the last territories in the hands of the Syrian opposition forces, would have meant that Ankara would lose its ability to directly shape the dynamics of events in Syria, which is of particular importance due to the “Kurdish question”. With regard to the large Kurdish minority in Turkey (about 15-20

¹¹ SÖNMEZ 2019.

¹² ERDOĞAN 2020, p 176.

¹³ UN 2020.

¹⁴ BBC 2019.

million people), and the more than three-decade long fight between the Turkish security forces and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the “Kurdish question”/terrorist question is considered by Ankara as a strategic, existential security threat. And to curb that threat, it is willing to ally with essentially anyone. Turkish leaders have made it clear that according to the Turkish position, the PKK and the PYD are terrorist organizations just like the “Islamic State”, and should be handled in a similar manner.¹⁵ This is another important reason for Ankara's attempt to obtain more support from its European allies to its operations in Syria, a request which Erdoğan highlighted several times both before and after the opening of the Turkish border toward Greece.¹⁶

3. 2. Dissatisfied Turkish citizens

Domestic political considerations also played a role in the Turkish decision, as Turkish citizens are increasingly dissatisfied with the refugee situation in Turkey. This argument is supported by representative poll data. According to the results of the *Syrians Barometer 2019*,¹⁷ 75% of Turkish respondents disagreed, and only 11.4% of them agreed with the statement that “We can live together with Syrians in serenity”.¹⁸ While in 2017 57.8% of respondents described Syrians as “victims who escaped persecution/war”, in 2019 only 35% of them considered that the most appropriate expression to describe Syrians, and instead the most common answers were “They are dangerous people who will cause us a lot of troubles in the future” (42%), “They are people who were did not protect their homeland” (41.4%) and “They are burdens on us” (39.5%).¹⁹ In another survey from the Kadir Has University (KHAS)²⁰ 56% of Turkish respondents said that they were discontent with the presence of Syrian refugees in Turkey, and only 12.2% were content. 47.3% of Turkish respondents supported Turkey's Open-Border Policy for refugees introduced at the end of February 2020, which allows the refugees to go to any country they choose, and only 23.7% of the respondents assessed this policy negatively.

It is important to see, that the Turkish government's less compromising refugee policy is in line with the expectations of Turkish society. The presence of Syrian

¹⁵ HÜRRİYET DAILY NEWS 2014.

¹⁶ AL JAZEERA 2020.

¹⁷ Note that the interviews as part of the survey were conducted in April-May 2019, that is before the Turkish border opening.

¹⁸ ERDOĞAN 2020, p 101.

¹⁹ ERDOĞAN 2020, p 55.

²⁰ AYDIN ET AL 2020. Interviews were conducted in April 2020.

refugees in Turkey has not been securitized yet, which has contributed to the preserving of social peace, but the chance of it has been increasing. There are arguments that the refugee issue played a significant role in the defeat of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 2019 municipal elections and contributed to the loss of Istanbul and Ankara to the opposition.²¹ Turkish citizens have been more and more dissatisfied with the presence of the Syrians, and this has placed more and more pressure on the Turkish decision-makers to take a hard stance. Altogether, the refugee issue can be easily mobilized to increase Erdoğan's popularity, which is becoming more and more important considering the country's growing economic problems.

4. The events of the month after Turkey opened its border toward Greece

On the evening of 27 February 2020, Reuters reported that a senior Turkish official who asked for his name to be withheld announced that Turkey would no longer stop irregular migrants who wished to leave Turkey for Europe.²² Similar threats to exert pressure were expressed by Ankara on several occasions in previous years, but had never been implemented until then. Following the publication of the article on Reuters's website, the Turkish press reported that a group of 300 people set off for the Turkish-Greek border that night, and the numbers continued to increase during the day.²³

President Erdoğan stated on 29 February that it had been voiced for months that it was becoming increasingly difficult for Turkey to keep its borders closed, but no one had believed them. That was why the "gates" had been opened, and they would not be closed until the European Union began to keep its promises.²⁴

On 1 March 2020, the official assessment of the situation by Greece and Turkey differed significantly. Turkish Interior Minister Süleyman Soyly reported on Twitter that 76,358 migrants had left Turkey for Edirne by that morning.²⁵ The Greek authorities, on the other hand, claimed that 9,600 illegal border crossing attempts had taken place, but all of them had been prevented.²⁶ According to a report by

²¹ SAZAK 2019.

²² REUTERS 2020.

²³ CNN TÜRK 2020.

²⁴ HÜRRIYET 2020.

²⁵ SOYLU 2020.

²⁶ PAPADIMAS – KONSTANTINIDIS 2020.

the International Organization for Migration, at least 13,000 people had gathered along the Turkish-Greek border by that time. Two days later, Soylyu tweeted that 130,469 people had entered Greece by the morning of 3 March. These Turkish statements probably served the purpose of encouraging more irregular migrants to go towards the borders. A report of the European Commission estimated that eventually 25,000 migrants and refugees set up an informal camp at the formal border crossing point at Pazarkule.²⁷

The number of sea arrivals to the Greek islands was higher than the number of those who successfully crossed the land border. According to the UNHCR, between 28 February and 7 March, 1912 migrants arrived on the Greek islands. The climax was March 1-2, when, respectively, 736 and 571 people crossed. However, on the overcrowded islands, even this number exacerbated tensions, which were high even before the Turkish border opening. At the time of the Turkey-Greece border crisis, more than 36,000 refugees were crowded on the five most affected islands (Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos), although reception centres there were originally designed for only 5,400 people.²⁸ This event again underlined the need for the EU to find a solution to the situation on the Greek islands.

	January	February	March	April
2019	801	830	1255	1164
2020	856	848	347	39

People arriving on the land route to Greece (UNHCR)

	January	February	March	April
2019	1851	1486	1904	1856
2020	3136	2161	2255	39

People arriving on the Aegean islands by sea (UNHCR)²⁹

In response to the Turkish decision, Greece has stepped up control at the Turkish border. According to Greek data, until 8 March, a total of 40,060 illegal border crossing attempts were prevented and 293 migrants were arrested.³⁰ Tear gas, water cannons and stun grenades were also used by the Greek police. Furthermore, the army began reinforcing the border with barbed wire and conducted a military exercise with real ammunition near the border. At sea, the Greek coast guard

²⁷ EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2020.

²⁸ EGERESI – KACZIBA 2020.

²⁹ UNHCR 2020d.

³⁰ EGERESI – KACZIBA 2020.

attempted to deter the irregular arrivals with warning shots. In the midst of violence at the Greek-Turkish land border, at least two irregular migrants were killed.³¹ Additionally, on 2 March a child drowned while crossing the Aegean.³² Beside tough action against irregular migrants, Athens also announced the suspension of asylum applications acceptances for one month.

The European Union reacted faster and more decisively than in 2015, with an interest-based approach prevailing over a value-based one, and its response focused on security rather than a human rights approach.³³ The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen called Greece the “shield” of Europe.³⁴ The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has strengthened the protection of the Greek border, deployed additional assets and border guards. Additionally, the EU provided financial assistance of €700 million to Greece to cope with the emerging border crisis.³⁵ The EU wanted to make it clear that it would not give in to Turkish pressure. This was also demonstrated on Erdoğan’s trip to Brussels on 9 March. The Turkish President was received by von der Leyen and President of the European Council, Charles Michel. However, the fact that Erdoğan headed straight for the airport instead of participating in the planned joint press conference after the negotiation suggests that the meeting did not meet the Turkish President’s expectations.³⁶

The situation has gradually deescalated over time. First, Turkey and Russia agreed on a ceasefire in Idlib on 5 March. Second, due to the danger of crossing the Aegean Sea, the Turkish authorities reintroduced border controls on 7 March on the sea route to Greece. And third, on 27 March 2020, as part of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Turkey closed its land border. People were transferred from the border region as a preventive measure against the pandemic. However, the Turkish Interior Minister indicated that this move did not mean a change in Turkey’s policy: once COVID-19 precautions are lifted, migrants will be again free to approach the Greek border if they wish to leave Turkey.³⁷

³¹ AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2020.

³² MCKENZIE 2020.

³³ EGERESI – KACZIBA 2020.

³⁴ STAMOULI 2020.

³⁵ VON DER LEYEN 2020.

³⁶ EURACTIVE 2020.

³⁷ HÜRRIYET DAILY NEWS 2020.

5. Evaluation and prospects – How strong is Turkey’s refugee card?

Turkey played the “migrant card” at the end of February 2020. However, despite European fears, it did not prove to be a breakthrough. Nonetheless, it cannot be known how much the situation at the Greek border would have worsened if Turkey had not decided to take preventive measures against the COVID-19 pandemic at the end of March. Ankara could not force more active Western support (either for the hosting of refugees or for a military operation in Syria). Greek border guards have successfully handled the situation at the border, leaving Ankara to lose perhaps its most important trump card over the EU in the future negotiations, which will ultimately weaken Turkey’s bargaining position.³⁸

Although the February-March 2020 crisis is over, a recurrence of the events cannot be ruled out. The situation in Idlib is fragile, and it cannot be predicted when the conditions will enable the mass return of Syrian refugees who escaped the war. Ankara’s economic difficulties have been intensified by the pandemic,³⁹ and the revision of the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement is still awaited. At the same time, geopolitical tensions between Turkey and Greece have been increasing due to the disputes on the delimitation of their maritime borders and energy policy issues.

From a European point of view, one of the main questions is to what extent the member states of the European Union should be worried about a similar scenario, and how significant the consequences of another Turkish border opening would be for the EU. Building on the experience of the events of March 2020, we can attempt to answer the question of how strong the Turkish refugee card really is.

Turkish and European political rhetoric has often raised the prospect of millions of irregular migrants living in Turkey being set in motion, but the events of March 2020 have shown that the departure of such a crowd is not an imminent threat. Only several thousand migrants set off in March, and Greece prevented most of the illegal entries. There was no significant rise in the number of either land or sea arrivals: the above tables show that fewer people arrived in Greece in February and in March than in January 2020 – that is, before the Turkish border opening.

³⁸ EGERESI 2020.

³⁹ One obvious sign of the need for change in the Turkish economy is that Erdoğan replaced both the finance minister (who is also his son-in-law) and the head of the central bank at the beginning of November 2020.

The main reason for this relatively small number is that Syrian refugees have started a new life in Turkey in recent years, and they are not willing to give it up for an uncertain future. The *Syrians Barometer 2019* asked the Syrians under temporary protection in Turkey whether they would want to move to a country other than Turkey and Syria, and 58.6% of respondents answered that they would never consider going.⁴⁰ This data also suggests that the EU's support under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey is paying off, in the sense that Syrians are less willing to leave, partly as a result of the improved living conditions the EU contributed to. Another important factor is that the EU is better prepared, more experienced, more united and communicates more clearly than in 2015. Those we interviewed during our field research in Istanbul in March 2020 also highlighted that the majority of Syrian refugees were well aware that opening the Turkish side of the border would not be enough if the EU kept its own borders closed. Tough action from the Greek security forces have shown that successfully crossing the border is highly unlikely, regardless of the Turkish decision on the opening of its border. Of those who tried to enter Greece in March illegally, most were non-Syrian citizens who felt they had nothing to lose.

However, if the situation of the refugees in Turkey worsens, either because of political or economic reasons, their attitude may change. Theoretically, it also cannot be ruled out that Ankara may decide to repeal the temporary protection regime, when it deems politically necessary. This drastic step would force Syrians to leave Turkey, which would fundamentally change the current state of affairs.

Even if the departure of millions of irregular migrants from and via Turkey is not an imminent threat, the EU still has a very clear interest in coming into an agreement with Turkey, and in avoiding future events similar to those of March 2020. The constant pressure of a few thousand to tens of thousands of migrants at its external border with Greece would put a heavy burden on the EU. It makes a difference whether illegal border crossing attempts are sporadic or continuous, mass attempts. In the latter case there would be a need to constantly keep more security capacity on standby, and because of the sheer number of attempts more migrants would likely enter the EU irregularly. Increased border control requires increased spending as well. In March, the EU provided 700 million euros to Greece to strengthen its border.

However, there are costs to weight other than the financial ones. It would be unfair to shift all responsibility to Ankara for the March 2020 events. The perception in Turkey that there is not much will in the EU to take more responsibility and

⁴⁰ ERDOĞAN 2020, p 184.

make more efforts to tackle the refugee situation cannot be considered completely false, still less the Turkish perception of unkept European promises, hypocrisy and double standards. Not just Ankara, but also the EU leaders treated asylum-seekers inhumanely. Migrants were treated as a dangerous threat which the EU must shield itself from.⁴¹ The EU was destroying its normative image every day with its actions and inaction at its border, where a de facto humanitarian crisis evolved, and at least three people even died while trying to enter.

In conclusion, both a norm-based and an interest-based approach suggest that the EU needs to keep supporting Turkey in tackling the migration and refugee issue. This applies even if EU-Turkey cooperation on migration certainly exists in a broader context. The EU's gradually developing common migration and asylum policy is one side of the story, and the different issue areas of the complex EU-Turkey relations is the other, with all their difficulties. Still, cooperation on migration management should serve as a base for both issues, for both sides. This approach is often labeled transactional, and is criticized for abandoning the normative power of the EU. However, there is a false dilemma between norms and transactionalism in this case. The international community, including the EU, has a shared responsibility in supporting refugees, even if the EU is at the same time interested in keeping the vast majority of irregular migrants outside its borders.

⁴¹ Tocci 2020.

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Africans in China: The Migration-Related Consequences of China's "African Policy"

István Tarrósy

Abstract

This paper seeks to reflect upon China's "African Policy" from the perspective of both inbound and outbound migration. In particular, it offers an overview of contemporary narratives via academic literature pieces, coupled with the results of ongoing field research conducted since 2012. It addresses such issues – still under-researched – as African student mobility to China, yet another direct consequence of an accentuated and complex policy towards the African continent. All will be looked at finally through the lens of the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic, which has brought up a possible 'crack' in the firm collaborative framework in the form of several atrocities against African migrants in Chinese cities.

Keywords: China–Africa relations, African migration, Africans in China, mobility of African students, COVID-19

1. Introduction¹

The international system has been changing as far as relations of its players are concerned: we are witnessing more nuanced and complex scenarios and behaviours, behind which realism still matters and pragmatism – as the norm of the national interest – drives the foreign policies of governments all across the globe. In terms of power, in recent times, the rise of emerging actors has caught the attention of numerous scholars and policymakers. Although the USA is no longer a hegemon, it is still by far the world's most powerful state. However, from an economic-financial point of view in particular, the USA is certainly not the only 'super influence', as long as it is rivalled by the second largest economy in the world, a continuously rising China.² In addition, the European Union as a grouping of 27 member states with all its internal challenges as well as potential, together with Japan, Brazil, Russia, India, or regional middle powers such as Turkey, Indonesia

¹ This introductory part draws upon TARRÓSY 2017 and the paper presentation the author gave at the "The Migration Conference" (TCM) on June 28th, 2018, in Lisbon, Portugal.

² See among others: ERDEINÉ KÉSMÁRKI-GALLY – NESZMÉLYI 2018.

and Iran, possess major capabilities and strengths.³ All of them would surely prefer a more multipolar scenario, with more centres of gravity.

Since Deng Xiaoping's policy of opening at the end of the 1970s China has become more assertive on the international stage. First of all, it has proven to the world that it can develop its capacities to learn and adapt, as well as following a pragmatic foreign policy, which reflects how flexible China can be in the management of its relations across the globe. China has been diligent in developing an understanding of both the external context and its internal set of issues to deal with in the long run. Strategic thinking about both has always been embedded in Chinese policymaking, to "*defend national development interests while also maintaining openness to the outside world*,"⁴ as former president Hu Jintao said. China has been steadily ascending, but among many competitors, not in a vacuum. Although it is still not clearly apparent whether or not this rise will be of an 'alternative or even rival order' driven by China, the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI) strategy, proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013, demonstrates a clear Chinese intention to return to great power status.

With regard to Africa, China has already firmly surpassed the US in trade terms, and years ago overtook America as the world's largest net importer of oil,⁵ a huge part of which comes from Africa. As Zoltán Vörös highlights, "*China has come to occupy a particularly prominent position [...] in Africa. It is part of the new forces that help shape the continent.*"⁶ But it is a myth to state that it is only the natural resources that matter for China. Chinese-African linkages have been broadened, with a heavy focus on business. China is less interested in the aid industry as a policy approach (though it also operates foreign aid type of activities), but rather focuses on business, which – if managed well enough, strategically speaking, on the African side – can be mutually productive. Beijing's pragmatism uses many tactics to win the hearts and minds of its collaborating partners. As Harry Verhoeven underlines, the so-called sacred Chinese foreign policy notion of non-intervention has become "*a tactical tool rather than a deeply held value.*"⁷ As part of its 'charm offensive'⁸, there have been a widening range of activities deployed so that China can come up with the best offer. Package deals are promoted by the Chinese government's foreign policy machinery, which includes supporting

³ See among others: PÁSZTOR 2020.

⁴ HU 2012.

⁵ THE ECONOMIST 2013.

⁶ VÖRÖS 2011, p 33.

⁷ VERHOEVEN 2014, p 67.

⁸ See: KURLANTZICK 2007.

higher education through scholarships⁹ and assistance projects – for instance, to African universities –, installing Confucius Institutes (and/or classrooms) with Chinese language teachers, textbooks, cultural programs, summer camps for kids, together with building infrastructure (roads, hospitals, schools) and encouraging the trade of Chinese goods. All the hard and soft approaches to power are woven into a comprehensive Africa policy, which helps China's accelerated and growing engagement with the continent. The policy is made increasingly visible in the form of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) – the triennial summit held since 2000 – and its efficient diplomatic machinery. As a direct consequences of this highly convincing policy framework, there has been a penetration of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across the continent, together with rising inbound individual migration from China. In his eminent volume *China's Second Continent*, Howard W. French shows the faces of Chinese pragmatism in the everyday context of African realities. His intention is to go against the oft-depicted, overly simplistic view of “China in Africa” dynamics. In the Sino-Zambian context, for instance, French reveals what China's migrants consider when making their decisions to travel to Africa: “*This is a good time to be in Africa*” because of the “*fabulous new markets [...] a lot of new mouths to be fed, lots more people to be clothed, devices and appliances and goods of all kinds to be sold.*”¹⁰ Africa is full of abundant opportunities, especially for many Chinese of the “lost generation” of the Cultural Revolution. Yet another direct consequence of China's accentuated Africa policy is the expanding outbound migration of Africans to China. As Castles et al. underscore: “*African migrants are also increasingly attracted to fast-growing economies beyond the traditional destinations in Europe [...] Migration from Africa to China has been growing fast.*”¹¹

Within the Sino-African realm of relations and the context of global African migrations, the aim of this paper is to draw attention to the relatively small, but intensively developing African migration to China – running parallel to the already visible Chinese migration to the various different corners of the African continent.¹² In the next part, relevant tendencies and ongoing dynamics will be explored via a review of contemporary literature. Emphasis will then be laid on young Africans studying at Chinese universities, together with the decision of many to become economic migrants in the Chinese trading sector. The analysis will be supported by evidence from the field, which covers ongoing research projects by the author

⁹ VÖRÖS 2010, p 147.

¹⁰ FRENCH 2014, p 44.

¹¹ CASTLES ET AL. 2014, p 188.

¹² According to France24: “*Recent estimates put the number of Chinese citizens currently residing in Africa at one million while some 200,000 Africans live and work in China.*”

in different cities of China and certain Sub-Saharan African countries including Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Ethiopia since 2011. Finally, before the concluding thoughts, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic with regard to Chinese-African relations will be considered.

2. Who gains what? A literature review

Since the launch of FOCAC as one of the central tools of China's African engagement, growing attention on all levels has been recorded from China towards Africa. More closely, since 2006 when the Chinese government declared "The Year of Africa" and published its "African Policy"¹³, all forms of cooperation have been unfolding in front of the eyes of the international community. Soft items – such as education, training and human resources development – have been closely knitted into the obviously hard power-focused Chinese involvement in the trading, investment and extraction sectors. Among China's many commitments, announced in its government documents, as King points out, the Chinese "*pledge to examine what are Africa's own priority needs [...] [and] China's education support will to some extent be demand-driven, a response to Africa's own priorities.*"¹⁴ This approach is originally from Japan, and for a long time it has determined the island nation's links with African actors in terms of international cooperation. As French emphasizes, however: "*One of the most important and unpredictable factors in China's relationship with Africa [...] has been oddly omitted from most of the discussions: China's export, in effect, of large numbers of its own people who are settling in as migrants and long-term residents in far-flung and hitherto unfamiliar parts of the continent.*"¹⁵ In recent years, more and more sound academic studies have addressed the issue of migration as yet another important dimension of China-Africa relations. These add significant knowledge to the already extensive literature on "China in Africa" mainly from economic, trade, security, or investment perspectives, dealing mostly with Beijing's expansion and "rise" on the continent.¹⁶ From the global rise angle, and drawing upon Brautigam's seminal research, we are also more familiar today with foreign aid as a part of the Chinese toolkit.¹⁷ Thanks to a growing circle of scholars, for over a decade it has been possible to draw a more detailed picture of African

¹³ MOFA 2006.

¹⁴ KING 2013, p 2.

¹⁵ FRENCH 2014, p 5.

¹⁶ MICHEL – BEURET 2009; ALDEN 2007; ALDEN ET AL. 2008; TAYLOR 2006; CHERU – OBI 2010; ROTBERG 2008 AND SHINN – EISENMANN 2012.

¹⁷ BRAUTIGAM 2009.

perspectives on China in Africa, too.¹⁸ From a geostrategic point of view, Africa has been elevated to a more cautious level for basically all the emerging actors of the semi-periphery as well as those in the core.¹⁹ China's heavier presence across Africa has also resulted in "*Africans becoming 'sellers', 'buyers' or 'contractors' in its economic relations with China, in which Africa becomes an active decision-maker rather than a passive decision-receiver.*"²⁰ There is wide agreement that Africa has arrived at a critical juncture with potential for the rise of 'African agency', possessing the aforementioned decision-making power for itself. As we read in French's book quoting senior Ghanaian think tank executive Ed Brown: the relationship with China "*is going to determine Africa's future for the next fifty years. The big question is whether African countries are dynamic enough to take advantage, or whether they'll end up being the appendage of somebody else all over again.*"²¹ Despite convincing-sounding claims about the transfer of technologies to the Africans by Chinese company personnel, as Liu critically examines, "*not much has improved for Africans. Cheap Chinese labour is still flooding the African market.*"²² The entire picture of the benefits any of the parties can gain is therefore rather complicated. In addition to the dominant actors, in the form of state-owned companies (SOEs), we can see that "*reality is more meaningfully shaped by the deeds of countless smaller actors,*" which will shed light on "*each of China's new immigrants to Africa [as] an architect helping to shape this momentous new relationship.*"²³ China's people-to-people (P2P) approach is even more accentuated in its Second Africa Policy paper from 2015, which emphasizes the role of education and training: "*China will help train more much-needed professionals for African countries, in particular, teachers and medical workers. While enhancing exchanges and cooperation between education administration agencies and institutions on both sides, China will continue to implement the 'African Talents Program', gradually increase the number of government scholarships for applicants in African countries, and encourage local governments, institutions of higher learning, enterprises and social organizations to set up scholarships. It welcomes more African young people to study in China, encouraging and supporting them to play a bigger role in the pragmatic cooperation between China and Africa.*"²⁴ This renewed step undoubtedly confirms the flow of Chinese into African countries, as well as encouraging the flow of Africans into China: once again, raising awareness about a more dynamically developing setting of intercontinental migration. Although

¹⁸ MANJI – MARKS 2007.

¹⁹ See, for example: PÁSZTOR 2019.

²⁰ XING 2016, p 91.

²¹ FRENCH 2014, p 8.

²² LIU 2018, p 87.

²³ FRENCH 2014, p 5.

²⁴ MOFA 2015.

an expanding literature recognises the mobility of people in both directions in the large Sino-African context, Liu is right in saying that: “*The study of migrant flows between China and Africa has also yet to be incorporated into the study of international relations on bilateral relations.*”²⁵

It is unanimously reported that “*African migrants are increasingly attracted to fast-growing economies beyond the traditional destinations in Europe [...] Some Africans have gone as far afield as Russia, Turkey, Japan, India and China, and even Brazil and Argentina in search of work, education and business opportunities.*”²⁶ Overall “*migration from Africa to China has been growing fast,*” and after the initial wave of Africans travelling with a study purpose “*since 2000, growing numbers of West African (particularly Nigerian and Ghanaian) traders have been reported in China. [...] The increase of African immigration accelerated after China’s accession to membership of the World Trade Organization in 2001. [...] Most Africans are concentrated in Guangdong [province].*”²⁷

As Zhou et al. observes, “*Africans in China are predominantly self-made entrepreneurs doing business face-to-face with Chinese entrepreneurs and living among local Chinese residents.*”²⁸ They talk about the ambivalent attitudes of the locals towards African migrants, which is also highlighted in Liang and Le Billon’s research looking at the prevalent features of encounters. Liang and Le Billon conducted fieldwork in Guangzhou and, in contrast to Bodomo’s²⁹ view of these African migrants acting as cultural bridges, building up a context of mutual comprehension and appreciation, they underscore an “*antagonism against Africans [stemming] from the racialized representations amalgamated with both the traditional Sino-centric discourses of barbarians and Western-style racial hierarchy.*”³⁰ Amidst all these contrasting scenes, which we will see intensifying under the pressures of the global COVID-19 pandemic, Castillo investigates China as “the new land of opportunities” for Africans, together with “*African communities and organisations (‘networks of support’) [facilitating] place-making processes and [enhancing] the development of structures of belonging, which are central to the production of identities and the articulation of [...] feelings of ‘at-homeness’ amongst Africans in the city.*”³¹

²⁵ LIU 2018, p 81.

²⁶ CASTLES ET AL. 2014, p 188., and see also: FLAHAUX – DE HAAS 2016, p 18.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ ZHOU ET AL. 2016, p 141.

²⁹ BODOMO – MA 2010.

³⁰ LIANG – LE BILLON 2018, p 22.

³¹ CASTILLO 2014, p 236.

3. Yiwu as emerging hub of African migration to China

The City of Yiwu in Zhejiang province is located around 250 km west of Shanghai, and for over the last ten to fifteen years it has become one of the world's largest commodities markets. In fact, the entire city can be imagined as a massive “plaza of commodities”, where there is nothing one cannot buy – the question, obviously, is quantity: how many crates of toy pandas, for instance, do you want to purchase? After Guangzhou and other more (formerly) traditional destinations for Africans to foster trade in and with China – e.g. Hong Kong, Macau, Beijing – it is Yiwu which has grabbed the attention of the world, and has also grown into a sub-centre of gravity in Afro-Asian relations from a geo-economic perspective. As Bodomo–Ma describe it: *“Most of the Africans in Yiwu are traders, with their lives revolving around the commodities market located on ChouZhou Bei Lu (ChouZhou North Road).”*³² Based on our field research³³ in the city from 2012 and 2015 we also confirm Bodomo–Ma’s arguments that *“the African community in Yiwu is living more harmoniously with its Chinese hosts, than the African community in Guangzhou.”*³⁴ Undoubtedly, since its opening at the end of the 1970s, China has increased capacities and worked out solutions enabling its rise in global terms. From a migration point of view, and staying within our context of Sino-African relations, Cissé is right in saying that: *“China has thus become the new ‘locus’ of the African diaspora. While trade ties have existed between African countries, Europe and the United States for a considerable period of time, today new trade networks have developed between Africa and China and expanded in Chinese and African cities due to growing economic relations between China and African countries. China’s modernisation and openness to becoming an economic immigration destination have helped hasten this process.”*³⁵ The mentioned Chinese cities, including Yiwu, have become places of “translocality”, a complex of localities (in plural), incorporating *“both spatial dimensions: the emplacement and the mobility or flow through places.”*³⁶

During our fieldtrips we learnt about the conditions the city of Yiwu provided for inbound migrants with business purposes, mostly from the Gulf Region and African countries. Yiwu’s International Trade Centre offers office space for African businesses (when it was launched more than ten years ago, the first couple of years were rent-free) and dedicates a special quarter for such shops in the ‘Africa Centre’.

³² BODOMO – MA 2010, p 284.

³³ The author carried out these research projects together with Zoltán VÖRÖS, University of Pécs.

³⁴ *Ibid.* p 288.

³⁵ CISSÉ 2015, p 45.

³⁶ GILLES 2015, p 24.

Our respondents confirmed that the City of Yiwu made it easier for Africans to obtain a visa, thus more easily boosting the volume of traders from various corners of the African continent, as well as the Middle East. Many joint ventures also came into being, with Chinese ownership, in most cases, but run by Africans. The dynamically developing Sino-African migration flows – inbound as much as outbound – have embraced business, with the trade of African products, including ebony in particular, but timber in general, as well as precious stones such as Tanzanite, together with clothing and traditional jewelry. Made in China products on the other end of the spectrum are traded back to Africa by an increasingly large number of African traders, who can get good deals in Yiwu and all other such hubs in China.

As early as 2012, in the Ethiopian shop operated by a young businesswoman from Addis Ababa, we were told that the Chinese market can easily absorb ebony-made products, and she explained in detail how Chinese people love the buddha statues carved out of Ethiopian timber³⁷ – what an example of Afro-Asian ‘encounters’! When back in Yiwu in the summer of 2015, another round of interviews were recorded with Ethiopian, Sudanese, Ghanaian, Gambian and Senegalese traders. Frank from Ghana emphasized that despite the slowdown he had experienced in his venture, it still seemed promising that the Chinese government encouraged bilateral trade, so he remained positive about the expected benefits.³⁸ Although he had not had previous studies in Mandarin, he could communicate well enough with his Chinese customers.

African migrants are also more and more self-confident about localizing themselves in the daily linguistic realities of the destination country of their migratory decision, therefore, if possible, they are attempting to master Mandarin, too. As Fahrion reports about the African diaspora in “Little Africa” in Guangzhou, and telling the story of Tabou Diop from Senegal, in particular, we learn that: “*Having studied [the language] for three years at the Guangdong University of Technology, Diop speaks [it] fluently.*”³⁹ There are also the “agents, or ‘fixers’, some of whom speak fluent Mandarin, who negotiate deals for their fellow Africans.”⁴⁰ So long as China consistently proclaimed itself open for business, “*many migrants no longer only view the United States and Europe, but also China, as lands of opportunity.*”⁴¹ In a continent

³⁷ Interview with the Ethiopian shop owner in Yiwu (she asked not to mention her name) on April 4th, 2012.

³⁸ Interview with Frank (Ghanian shop owner) in Yiwu on August 29th, 2015.

³⁹ FAHRION 2019.

⁴⁰ MATHEWS 2011, p 62.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

where there are abundant opportunities as well as mounting challenges – especially during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic – such new engagements are of prime importance. A 2019 UNDP report underlines, as Fox summarizes, that “*migration is a reverberation of uneven development and particularly of a development trajectory that is failing young people.*”⁴² As opposed to still prevailing practices of uneven trade, “*the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world has to be more holistic in that it cannot be deducted solely to aid. It needs to be an equal partnership which involves looking at a host of other issues like trade.*”⁴³ All these are of heightened significance when the “*transformation of climate [especially hits] the African continent, which suffers the heaviest consequences of climate change.*”⁴⁴

4. African educational migration to Chinese universities

Another visibly unfolding reality of China–Africa relations has to be addressed, particularly as it is still under-researched: African student mobility to China. As Hodzi also underlines: “*Africans, with or without support of their governments are looking for better education beyond the continent and traditional destinations such as France, the UK and the United States. They are looking toward China.*”⁴⁵ China, together with other emerging economies including Turkey, India, or Brazil, concentrates a large chunk of its “*support for education and training in Africa at the higher education level.*”⁴⁶ This, then, results in a massively growing number of young African people studying at Chinese universities. According to the CSIS China Power Project, also acknowledging data limitations, the number of African students in China grew from less than 1,800 in 2003 to over 60,000 in 2016. “*The greatest number of these students came from Ghana (5,552 students), Nigeria (4,746), and Tanzania (3,520).*”⁴⁷ The FOCAC machinery plays a key role in attracting these young Africans, with its core message already echoed at the FOCAC III in Beijing, about the “*increase in government scholarships from 2,000 awards in 2006 to 4,000 awards by 2009, and to a total of 6,000 by 2015. [Together with] a similar commitment for short-term training of African professionals from 10,000 to 30,000 in total over that same period from 2006 to 2015.*”⁴⁸ As Breeze and Moore point out, with these numbers, after France, China has become “*the second most popular*

⁴² FOX 2019.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ MARSAL 2020, p 116.

⁴⁵ HODZI 2020, p 567.

⁴⁶ KING 2013, p 29.

⁴⁷ CSIS 2020.

⁴⁸ KING 2013, p 69.

*destination for African students studying abroad.”*⁴⁹ As long as “*China is comparatively well positioned to attract African students due to moderate tuitions fees, low living costs and welcoming visa policies, as compared to most Western destinations,*”⁵⁰ more than half of the total African student population at Chinese universities are self-funded, which also resembles a developing African middle class at home being able to finance the tertiary education of young family members outside of their respective countries.⁵¹ As a consequence of the heavy internationalization of Chinese universities, incentivized by the government, incoming African students can also choose from a broadening portfolio of English-taught degree programmes, in addition to the Mandarin-taught ones that had been available from the 1960s onwards.

During our fieldtrips in 2012, 2015 and 2019, while talking with African students at the five universities we visited (i.e. at Zhejiang Normal University (ZNU), Shanghai Institute of Technology (SIT), Hangzhou Normal University (HNU), University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (UESTC), and Nanjing Audit University (NAU)), we became convinced about the prospects China had been advertising and offering as part of its ‘charm offensive’ related to its soft power, which all our interviewees confirmed. They talked about their intention to return to their home countries with valuable and competitive degrees and a deep(er) understanding of Chinese people, and in possession of the necessary linguistic skills to foster long-term cooperation with China. A female student from Cameroon in Jinhua, for instance, explained to me that she wanted to return and work for either her government or a Chinese company, or any joint venture, as an interpreter who can utilize her fluent Mandarin in arranging businesses between the two countries. Peter from Kenya came to study international trade at ZNU, and after spending three years in China he spoke fluent Chinese, the acquisition of which was tremendously helped by the fact that he had a local Chinese girlfriend he was living together with off-campus.⁵² Fifth-year medical students from Ethiopia and Somaliland at HNU underscored their firm belief that by returning to their home countries they would be able to contribute to developing their societies and economies, including by using their connections with China. In fact, they said that they would be more competitive on the job market with their Chinese

⁴⁹ BREEZE – MOORE 2017.

⁵⁰ HAUGEN 2013, p 316.

⁵¹ This is also confirmed by HODZI 2020, p 573. mentioning also the quality of the programmes as important selling point for attracting students.

⁵² Interviews were recorded on 28 August, 2015, in Jinhua.

degrees.⁵³ In June 2019, more interviews were recorded⁵⁴ with adult learners who were sent to earn a Master's degree in auditing from NAU – their respective governments financed their studies to get additional professional training from the English-taught programme of NAU. From all of these discussions, we could conclude what Ho mentioned earlier: *“The African students move to China not only for acquiring Chinese educational credentials, but also to enhance the household's economic prospects by leveraging on growing geopolitical and geo-economic ties between China and Africa. They seek to accumulate cultural capital derived from the Chinese urban experience that together with a Chinese university degree would make oneself stand out in the country of origin or if they develop careers in a third country.”*⁵⁵

5. Changing relations in the COVID-19 pandemic context?

At the core of its Africa policy, China has always emphasized the importance of the people-to-people (P2P) dimension of all its engagements across the African continent since the launch of the FOCAC in 2000. While in general the Chinese ‘charm offensive’ has successfully reached out to publics at large, an increasing number of anti-Chinese sentiments have been reported in different African countries, in particular connected to ongoing large-scale (mostly transport) infrastructure investment schemes. As I wrote earlier about the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and such cases in East Africa, *“among the multiple local views towards increasing Chinese presence [across Africa], there is a growing resistance in some localities [...] and the execution of the BRI has made inadequate provisions for the management of local resistance and fears.”*⁵⁶ The COVID-19 pandemic has added yet another challenge in the form of xenophobic behaviour: atrocities against Africans in China, and more negative attitudes towards Chinese living in African countries. In such turbulent and disturbing times it is always the “other” who is to be blamed.

This is precisely what happened regarding the maltreatment of Africans in the City of Guangzhou in April 2020. As *“local authorities identified Africa as the source of the largest number of imported COVID-19 cases [...] Africans have become*

⁵³ Focus group meeting held on 26 August, 2015, in Hangzhou.

⁵⁴ Interviews were recorded on 3 June, 2019, in Nanjing.

⁵⁵ Ho 2017, p 17. This view is reaffirmed by Breeze and Moore when they say that most of the African students appreciated the trade and other business opportunities their Chinese education made available to them when they returned to their home countries. See: BREEZE – MOORE 2017.

⁵⁶ TARRÓSY 2019, p 170.

a top target of Chinese quarantine efforts.”⁵⁷ “Many Africans, including students, were evicted from their houses and hotel rooms (without prior notice which has effectively left many of them homeless) and denied entrance into commercial venues.”⁵⁸ Apparently, a spiralling campaign of discrimination soon became tangible in the city, which had experienced the build-up of “Little Africa” in the past, and it is no surprise that “the potential for cultural conflict exists and materializes in certain situations, such as negative media reporting about lifestyle differences, public health hazards, and social problems.”⁵⁹ Many say that implicit racism against people with different skin colour, that is black people, is not novel and “had been observed long before the COVID-19 crisis. However, COVID-19 has brought this tension to new levels.”⁶⁰

Numerous questions can be formulated in the wake of the abovementioned incidents: How far and in what ways will the pandemic affect (harm) Sino-African relations in their daily realities? How can governments and states themselves handle an even larger possible distancing between the cooperation partners? To what extent can local and national media contribute to either easing the tension, or just the opposite, stir emotions further? How strong is ‘African agency’ when it comes to criticizing China and therefore demonstrating its power to protect the interests of its countries and peoples? Or, as Castillo and Amoah ask: “*Is this the end of African migration to China as we know it?*”⁶¹

On 17 June, Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted a virtual ‘Extraordinary China–Africa Summit on Solidarity Against COVID-19’ with African leaders. As Van Staden reports: “*Xi did not issue an apology for early April’s events in Guangzhou [but] did say: ‘We oppose politicisation and stigmatisation of COVID-19 and we oppose racial discrimination and ideological bias.’*”⁶²

It is hard to state that everything is back to normal, as the pandemic still presents substantial challenges for the African continent – (seemingly) less so for China. The Chinese narrative over COVID-19 and its demonstrated solidarity with African countries are in line with China’s rise to global leading status. As Vaidyanathan explains, “*China seeks to emerge from this crisis as a leader of global health – promising funds and assistance to WHO as President Trump threatens to curtail both.*”⁶³ It is, first of all, in China’s interest to normalize the situation with Africa so that African

⁵⁷ SUN 2020.

⁵⁸ CASTILLO – AMOAH 2020, p 560.

⁵⁹ ZHOU ET AL. 2016, p 158.

⁶⁰ SUN 2020.

⁶¹ CASTILLO – AMOAH 2020, p 560.

⁶² VAN STADEN 2020.

⁶³ VAIDYANATHAN 2020, p 7.

migrants can continue their lives and activities in China, and Chinese migrants can foster their businesses across the African continent.

6. Concluding remarks

On 24 May, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made some firm statements about China–Africa relations at a press conference on the sidelines of the 13th National People’s Congress, when talking about China’s foreign policy priorities in 2020. According to CGTN, Wang said that his country is working out the means and methods to “*implement the debt service suspension initiative to ease Africa’s debt burden and it mulls further bilateral support for African countries to fight against COVID-19. China has sent medical expert teams to Africa’s five sub-regions and their neighbouring countries and has conducted nearly 400 training sessions in Africa for around 20,000 local medical workers as part of sharing anti-epidemic experience.*”⁶⁴ Wang underlined that China has always partnered with Africa for “common development” – all showing firm Chinese commitment to continue working together with and supporting African development, while obviously serving Chinese needs and national interests. This clearly reveals that the Chinese government is aware of the threats the pandemic has brought with it, including the hardships of Africans in China. While China’s prominent position in the international system cannot be hampered by such tensions, in particular, when those come from close allies who have been supportive of China’s politics on the world stage for decades, African countries’ further rise to a level where more assertive behaviour is demonstrated, with a clearly critical African voice of agency, even towards “big brother”, are yet to be monitored and analysed. With regard to the continuous flow of Chinese people to Africa and African people to China, lessons must be learned on both ends – and in fact for the entire international system – for the post-COVID-19 era. By monitoring and analysing all these changes, a more nuanced picture can be drawn about global African migrations in light of pragmatic foreign policies towards, and of, the many state entities of the continent.

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⁶⁴ CGTN 2020.

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Crisis on the edge of Europe. Migration and self-defense in Hungary

Rashed Daher

Abstract

In 2015, as the migration crisis unfolded in Central Europe, the Hungarian government took a firm stance on the issue by attempting to regulate the unprecedented inflow of people. Hungary quickly developed a policy of resistance against the migrants and closed its green borders from the south (by constructing a border fence) to divert the arrivals to the border checkpoints. Since then, the Hungarian government has denied any illegal (undocumented) entry into the country and refers to the sovereign right of the Hungarians to decide on the question of migration.

In my paper, I try to find the political roots of the strong Hungarian resentment against migration. It is evident that the presence of any migrants from the Middle East is rejected by both the government and the public, and the reception policy of Hungary mirrors this point of view. Focus on effective border management is considered a vital element for securing the nation-state against the illegal movement of people. I distinguish and analyze five critical components of Hungarian border control: deterrence of migrants entering the country (messaging), prevention of illegal border crossings (from outside Schengen area), interdiction at the border, apprehension of those who cross the border illegally (long-range border control), and expulsion.

Keywords: migration, refugee, Fidesz, border, Hungary Helps

1. Introduction

Migration has been a highly contested issue since 2015, as many European societies are directly affected by mass immigration on a daily basis. As this relatively new situation has triggered debates on possible responses, the whole issue with all its complexity has become a priority on the policymakers' agenda.

In 2015, the emergence of the Western Balkan route for mass immigration to Europe resulted in essential changes in the Hungarian political attitude towards migration. As the country saw an unprecedented mass movement of non-European

Union citizens through its borders, the notion and discourse of a migration crisis have become central to the political life of Hungary.

The issue of migration sparked international interest for two reasons: first, the country was among the most affected countries in 2015, with 411,515 recorded crossings, which was the largest per capita number in Europe.¹ Second, the country's leadership quickly developed an unambiguous policy against migration, which has remained consistent since then. The total rejection of immigration made the Hungarian case unique in the European Union at the beginning; however, many European countries later followed the same policy or pursued similar restrictive measures against mass migration.

Thus, the research problem can be defined around the migration crisis and the position of the Hungarian government, which is highly criticized by the central European discourse. This paper tries to understand and explain the reasons for, and evaluate the effectiveness of, the Hungarian government's stance on migration, and intends to spark a debate on the general understanding of migration. One of the objectives is to see how the discourse of migration both by the governing party and the opposition parties has evolved, and how it has created an audience and interacted with it during the last four years.

In the following, this paper examines this issue from a governmental level perspective ("high policy" response) instead of a "practical" response on the ground (analysis of the day-to-day interactions among people or public opinion). It means a macro-level focus in the study of the Hungarian migration policy and border management. The rising importance of executive power worldwide make an analysis from this perspective even more timely. I argue that the Hungarian stance must be understood from the viewpoint of sovereignty and national citizenship. As migration became a "border" question for Hungary in 2015, the issue is analyzed here through five layers connected to borders and security. Besides these analytical frameworks, this paper relies on the premise that political decisions manifest in an abstracted understanding of complex situations; therefore, the governmental level, by its nature, produces and must provide somewhat simplistic answers to difficult questions.

2. Positioning: fundamentals of the migration debate

The fundamental question of every discussion on migration from receiving countries is whether they should take a pro- or an anti-migration stance. As is

¹ IOM HUNGARY 2018.

the case for every dichotomic classification, over-simplifying papers that argue for only one of the approaches cannot be considered scientific.

The pro-migration viewpoint is based on the assumption that migration is a natural part of globalization; therefore, the mass migration of people is inevitable. This approach implies the historical responsibility of European nations for the poorer countries of the Third World, which is also interlinked with globalism. However, pro-migration advocates often forget the context of sending countries, and the effects that emigration might cause for those societies. They emphasize the positive opportunities embedded in migration (such as a better labour market, better opportunities for learning, both individually and socially) as their conceptions are linked to the neoliberal market theory (such as the free-market economy and the free flow of the labour force). Even though migration is a more complex issue, the pro-migration stance plays down the negative and sometimes uncontrollable social, economic, political, and cultural consequences of immigration for the receiving countries. Ultimately, in the pro-migration approach, the focus is more likely to be on the newcomers and their integration than on the host societies.

The anti-migration stance is based on the ideology of sovereignty (that has been a crucial element of international relations since the Peace Treaty of Westphalia) and maintains that state borders and the definition of citizenship are a state monopoly and should be kept as such. Advocates of this approach emphasize the challenges and the negative aspects of migration, sometimes even through xenophobic discourses of political mobilization. Supporters of an anti-migration stance concentrate on the problems of the receiving societies and lack a comprehensive (global) attitude towards migration.

Between these two extremes, there might be a third way, an in-between approach that considers the importance of sovereignty and is also open to migration on the global level. This approach also considers the local characteristics of each society. In democratic societies, we can rightfully assume that people can make decisions on their level of openness to migration; therefore, the governments of these communities are authorized to formulate policies on immigration to the extent the popular will empowers them.² A scientifically neutral approach must rely on past experiences and the existing situation, and not on how international migration regulation should be conducted. It is a more local-minded approach but not provincialism, and is based on the premise that currently, there is no realistic

² “There is no objective way to determine what number of irregular immigrants is above the acceptable limit for a country, as it is clearly a sovereign political decision dependent on many factors.” HOKOVSKÝ 2018, p 6.

prospect of operating a migration system on a global level; therefore, every state and the societies within it can choose their position on immigration. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that focus on and support for local communities cannot be restricted to the population of the receiving countries. Still, in a similar vein, the sustainability of communities must be considered in the sending states as well. Negative consequences of migration must be responded to by a multitude of actors in different levels of governance. Also, there must be some limits that regulate the freedom of movement of people internationally. “Global” freedom to migrate would result in an unpredictable and unsustainable situation that might cause unintended social turmoil in the receiving countries as well.

The Hungarian policy is based on the realist principle that sovereignty and territorial control still constitute the most important principles in international relations. Therefore, paradoxically or, normatively speaking, unfairly or tragically, some groups and nations are eligible for accessing Europe’s most developed countries, and some are not allowed to do so legally. As EU citizens, Hungarians have the opportunity to work or study in a Western European country if they wish, not only if they are forced out of their home country. Meanwhile, although those who are the subjects of mass migration and come from outside the European Union might have the same aspirations, they are not guaranteed the right of free movement within the European Union. This reality cannot be changed overnight; therefore, the importance of borders as lines that signify the limits of legal zones is higher than ever. In the era of uncontrolled movements of people, walls and barriers have gained prominence as means by which states can regain their power to control or at least profoundly influence migratory flows.

3. That fateful year: 2015

Hungary’s strategic location in the Schengen Area is beyond question. The country is the first entry point to the Schengen Area in the Northern Balkans and, except for Greece, the first continental entry point in South-eastern Europe. The year 2015 was when the immigration issue rose high on the Hungarian political agenda, and the country itself “enjoyed” extra attention from the world, and particularly from Europe. In the following section, the paper analyses the Hungarian government’s attitude towards the nascent migration crisis, and how its position on immigration has evolved over the years.

Hungary started preparation for the crisis in early 2015, as this small country in Central Europe had seen significant increases in the number of asylum claims

over the preceding years (from 2,157 in 2012 to 18,900 in 2013. This number doubled in 2014 reaching 42,777). In February 2015, Antal Rogán, head of the parliamentary group of the governing party Fidesz, announced that the Hungarian government intended to treat migrants and their asylum application strictly, and to seek public support for restricting illegal migration to the country.³ After this clear message of deterrence, the national consultation process began in April 2015, in which the government brought the issue of migration and terrorism to public attention.⁴ Following these events, a billboard campaign against migrants was launched in May 2015. On the one hand, it focused on the potential effects of immigration on the lives of Hungarian citizens (referring to such welfare problems as locals losing their jobs due to a growing number of immigrants and the cultural transformation of the country). On the other hand, the campaign also started to envision migrants as individuals who posed a security threat to the country, and may be responsible for disorder and criminal actions (“If you come to Hungary, you have to respect our laws!” as one billboard stated).

In constructing the discourse on the migration crisis, the focus was on the threat that the “newcomers” may constitute to the Hungarian society.⁵ The government managed to monopolize the discussion on the subject by sidelining the opposition parties and the scientific community.⁶ The main message of this new discourse for the Hungarians was that Hungary served as a gatekeeper country, the protector of Western Europe from the south (as a border fortress). Hungary would protect the European values and the principles of “Europeanness” (the Christian foundation of Europe); therefore, it was Hungary’s responsibility to defend the continent against the culturally different out-group as long as the “madness” (and tardiness) persisted in Europe, in the general policymaking level concerning migration. In this new discourse, Hungarians were identified by the government as Christians, and Christianity was presented as the essence of Hungarian culture (the Hungarian Fundamental Law established this notion in 2012). Migrants were allegedly against this culture and positioned outside the legitimate political community.

The choice of terminology contributes to the negative discourse around migration, which is done consciously by the Hungarian government. Since the early months of the crisis in 2015, Hungarian government officials have named the newcomers

³ HCH 2015.

⁴ DESSEWFFY-NAGY 2016.

⁵ Central European countries lack significant foreign-born populations (as they are largely monoethnic), therefore have no personal experiences on immigration from different cultures. It must also be noted that a significant anti-immigrant attitudes prevailed even before the crisis. – MAGYAR HELSINKI BIZOTTSÁG 2011.

⁶ CANTAT-RAJARAM 2019.

as migrants or rather “economic migrants” and not refugees. The aim has been to signal their intention not to take responsibility for those seeking asylum, and to indicate that the Hungarian government and public cannot accept them as refugees fleeing from war zones, but views them rather as “subsistence migrants” seeking only better conditions for themselves. Playing on the fears of the public, the Hungarian government considers migrants as threats and introduced the notion of “illegal” migrant (the word “migrant” always shows up with this denominator in the governmental discourse), and also “economic” migrant. (The term “irregular migration” appears in the publications of the International Organization for Migration referring to those who migrate after the expiry of their visa, lack legal status in a transit or host country, and try to enter these countries against the statutory regulations of these countries.⁷

Parallel with the creation of a new discursive field, the Hungarian government has developed legal reasoning both for the public and the international community. Viktor Orbán’s government positioned Hungary as a country committed to the existing migration agreements, and one which follows the rules and responsibilities of the Schengen area. The Hungarian government argued that migrants coming to Hungary from the south first passed through either Bulgaria or Greece, thus under the Dublin Treaty, these countries are responsible for their registration, asylum applications, and repatriation (even if the Hungarian authorities first registered some of the migrants in 2015 and 2016). Besides, during the migration crisis in July 2015, the Hungarian government amended the Asylum Act. It declared Serbia as a safe third country for immigrants, which enabled the Hungarian authorities to deny asylum for those who entered Hungary from Serbia automatically.⁸ (Only 146 of the 177,135 applicants were granted asylum in Hungary in 2015.)⁹ During the peak of the migration crisis in the summer of 2015, the Hungarian authorities decided to set up a 175 km long fence with concrete elements along the Hungarian-Serbian border, hindering the free movement of migrants across the green border. However, the construction was not finished by the end of August, and this delay resulted in the resignation of the Hungarian Defence Minister, Csaba Hende.¹⁰ The construction was completed on 17 September 2015, and by that time, a new law criminalized those who climbed over the fence, breached or damaged it. It must be noted – as the Hungarian government has emphasized several times – that

⁷ HOKOVSKÝ 2018, p 3.

⁸ ASYLUMINEUROPE 2015.

⁹ AL-JAZEERA 2016.

¹⁰ INDEX 2015a.

the “wall’s” primary intention is to stop illegal migration¹¹ and to direct migration flows to the official international border crossing points. The government also maintained that a valid passport or an entry permit makes everybody eligible to enter Hungary; therefore, the country does not restrict people’s free movement under international agreements.

Hungary’s favorable geographic position was also an important factor in the successful deterrence of migrants by the Hungarian government. As the Hungarian border fence on the Serbian border took shape in September, Croatia was geographically unable to block the flow of migrants who started to find alternative routes to the West through the country.¹² Moreover, those who wanted to trespass through Croatia and then Hungary had to face further barriers on the Hungarian-Croatian border as well: the Drava river is a natural borderline between the two countries, and helped keep the migrants out of Hungary, as the Hungarian authorities could control the borderline more easily.

It must be acknowledged that the Hungarian government encountered a policy dilemma right before the emergence of the crisis in the early months of 2015. Finding a solution that satisfied all interested parties seemed impossible. The Hungarian government faced two choices: either acting in line with the Hungarian public opinion and rejecting immigration, or working together with the European partners and creating an open border policy, as many of them advocated, in the name of the responsibility and solidarity of European nations for immigrants. As the Hungarian government chose the former set of actions, Hungary emerged as an important (alternative) stakeholder that shapes the migration debate in Europe.

This paper argues that Europe and Hungary particularly faced a real crisis in 2015 (even if the mass movement of people was confined only to main transportation roads and the capital city), not only a constructed threat. It was unprecedented in Europe’s modern history, and can happen again, as the root causes are still at work. Besides, during that period, border control required extra capacities in many countries and crisis management procedures to decrease the potential number of incoming people.

¹¹ Here, illegal migration is defined by national laws and regulations. This approach contrasts with the claim that laws on migration should be defined by supranational principles. In the international arena, states are still the most important legal constituents, they have the legal and sovereign power to regulate, police and act according to rules and norms of the international relations.

¹² ANGYAL 2015.

4. Keeping the crisis on after 2015

The Hungarian government utilized and securitized the migration crisis, thereby leading the debate and policy actions on the whole issue. To strengthen the executive branch for the migration crisis like the one in 2015, in March 2016, the Hungarian government declared a national state of emergency, giving extraordinary legal power to the government. In June 2016, Hungary adopted a counterterrorism legislative package that ostensibly served the monitoring of the border and maintaining public order. In July 2016, new legislation enabled Hungarian authorities to extend their area of operation in defense of the southern border, meaning that refugees and migrants caught within 8 km of the border were escorted back to the Serbian side. The number of migrants forced back to Serbia reached 19,219 between 5 July and 31 December 2016. During the process, according to Doctors without Borders, there were instances of physical abuse by Hungarian authorities,¹³ which the Hungarian government repeatedly denied. These measures were part of an effective messaging campaign that aimed to deter any migrants who planned to reach Western Europe through Hungary.

In the post-2015 period, the governmental discourse on migration partly followed the same lines that were established during the crisis, somewhat extended with new elements. After the September 2015 crisis, following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, Viktor Orbán made a direct link between migration and terrorism: “We should not look at economic migration as if it had any use, because it only brings trouble and threats to European people. Therefore, immigration must be stopped”.¹⁴ Later in 2016, these thoughts were reinforced continuously by government officials, and Orbán himself called migrants “poison”.¹⁵

The anti-migration campaign remained intensive even after the unsuccessful referendum on 2 October 2016. On that day, Hungarians overwhelmingly voted against the European Union’s plan to relocate asylum seekers in the Member States. The referendum was, however, constitutionally non-binding as the participation rate was lower (40.4%) than the minimum validity threshold (50%). Fidesz, the governing party, kept the issue of migration as a priority until the elections of April 2018 and has continued to do so ever since then. By this political move, the centrist party managed to stabilize its electoral base and undermine the ultra-nationalist Jobbik party’s support. The governing party’s campaign in 2018 was centered around the external threats that Hungary was allegedly facing (excessive

¹³ MSF 2016.

¹⁴ REUTERS 2015.

¹⁵ GUARDIAN 2016.

measurements by the EU, potential “invasion” of migrants, the influence of foreign actors via civil organizations), and tried to mobilise its support base by employing nationalist overtones.¹⁶ It was overall a successful campaign: Fidesz gained two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament.

On 20 June 2018, Fidesz and Jobbik voted to amend the Fundamental Law of Hungary for the seventh time. Other parties remained passive during the vote. The most important part of the legislation was the so-called “Stop Soros” law referring to the Hungarian-born billionaire George Soros and his alleged international network to help migrants get to Europe. According to the law, organizations and people who facilitate migration in Hungary are committing a crime, and may be imprisoned. Along with the identity questions, the new amendment prescribed that every state institution should defend Hungarian identity and Christian culture.¹⁷ At the end of 2018, Hungary voted against the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration created by the UN. From these legislative measures of the past five years, it can be seen that the Hungarian government has linked the question of migration to the question of identity since the beginning of the crisis.

There are examples of Hungarian migration governance that contradict the negative discourse towards migration and implement a positive attitude towards those who came from war-torn countries. As it turned out, at the beginning of 2018, 1,291 people were granted international protection, despite the government preferring to keep silent on the issue. Some of them also received Hungarian citizenship. Most prominent among the Syrian community in Hungary was Bassam al-Ghraoui, a Syrian businessman who established a chocolate factory in a Hungarian town, Hatvan, and an exclusive chocolate store in Budapest.¹⁸ It can be argued that Hungarian society and its identity are not 100% exclusionary: there are many instances of individuals who come to Hungary and positively contribute to the local culture, economy, and community, or have a well-grounded reason to live in Hungary, who can stay and are accepted as part of the nation.

All in all, in the period of direct exposure to the migration crisis (in 2015), the government launched a robust anti-immigration campaign to underline the policy actions (border protection) that it planned to take. However, after building the border fence and physically removing migrants from public spaces, the negative discourse on migration remained, and was sometimes even strengthened. In

¹⁶ DEUTSCHE WELLE 2018.

¹⁷ HVG 2018.

¹⁸ INDEX 2016.

this second period of “crisis” (after 2015), there is no real crisis in the sense that the country has taken such preventive steps that the existing capacities of the Hungarian state (including the strengthened border protection mechanisms, such as the border fence in September 2015 and the new border fence in April 2017) can maintain normal life in the country. As a consequence, there is almost no direct interaction between local Hungarians and (possible) newcomers. In this period, the government utilized the threat perception of “distant enemies” and maintained that the European Union’s pro-migration forces might transform Hungary into a pro-migration country by compelling the leadership to accept migrants under the framework of migration solidarity in the European Union. As this imagined threat creation could not work as effectively as the real experiences of locals and migrants in 2015 (manifested in several border clashes, mass movement of migrants traveling throughout the country, and the “settlements” at Keleti railway station), the government used a harsher tone in its discourse, to magnify and prioritize the perception of threat coming from the outside.

5. No real alternatives: the opposition parties and the migration issue

To add to the diversity of the migration debate in Hungary on the level of “high politics,” the paper also incorporates several approaches of the parliamentary opposition parties in Hungary, and examines how they tried to contest the mainstream discourse. Thus can we successfully highlight the division in the Hungarian political scene between the “defenders” (anti-migration camp, the government) and the “traitors to the nation” (pro-migration camp), as the government’s discourse defines the two camps.

Opposition parties such as Jobbik, MSZP–Dialogue, DK, and LMP developed their own policy on migration,¹⁹ while the Momentum Movement (founded in 2017 and not a parliamentary party) represents a new segment within the Hungarian youth, which contests the government’s focus on migration. Except for Jobbik (a far-right party), all the other parties were left-wing or centre-left parties. Therefore, within Hungarian opposition parties, a cleavage emerged between the pro-migration left block and anti-migration Jobbik. Jobbik is openly against migration and often speaks out against different minorities.²⁰ In the 2018 Hungarian parliamentary election, Jobbik received 1,092,806 votes as the second party behind the Fidesz-KDNP

¹⁹ The political stance and characteristics of these parties will be later explained.

²⁰ DESSEWFY-NAGY 2016, p 7.

coalition, with a vote share of 19.06%. Jobbik held the issue of migration to be essential and has expressed its opposition to waves of migrants since 2015. As an opposition party, Jobbik's dilemma was to remain faithful to its anti-migration attitude without echoing the government's discourse and policy. This proved hard to achieve, as the government's campaign against migration was sophisticated, extensive, and compelling for a right- and even far-right-wing public. Thus, Jobbik focused on criticizing the government of Fidesz-KDNP for being inconsistent. For example, in 2018, Jobbik denounced the granting of asylum to 2,300 people in Hungary, despite the government's restrictive policy on migration and asylum. Yet even Jobbik accepts that protection should be given to war refugees.²¹ Jobbik agrees with the Hungarian government on "reinforcing European border protection and setting up a special Hungarian border guard service." Still, it wishes to cooperate with the EU in any migration policy²² and disagrees with the government's media campaign against migration.

The MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) is an overtly pro-migration party.²³ Since 2015, it has promoted a policy of assisting transit migration through Hungary towards Western Europe by empowering humanitarian and administrative services.²⁴ It also criticized the construction of the fence along the southern Hungarian border for being expensive and for presumably accelerating migration.²⁵ MSZP has also endorsed cooperation with the EU and made a commitment to the joint European border police.²⁶ After the construction of the fence and the effect it had on controlling migration waves, MSZP had little to say about migration and turned its political communication towards criticism of the government's migration policy, especially its media campaign against immigration, which the socialist party considered to be a hate campaign.²⁷ Another component of the MSZP's approach to migration was to admit the necessity of a long-term European solution to guarantee the safety of Hungarians, while accepting all measures taken by the EU on immigration.²⁸

Similarly to the MSZP, LMP (Politics Can Be Different), as an anti-establishment green party in the opposition, focused first on dealing with the issues of migration as a humanitarian obligation, calling for improved legislation and the processing

²¹ ALFAHÍR 2018.

²² JOBBIK n.d.

²³ MSZP 2013.

²⁴ MSZP 2015a.

²⁵ MSZP 2015b.

²⁶ MSZP 2015c.

²⁷ MSZP 2015d.

²⁸ MSZP 2015e.

of asylum applications.²⁹ With the closure of the Hungarian borders, LMP moved on to criticize the government's political communication. Yet, LMP differs from Western European green parties in that it does not embrace migration wholeheartedly. Instead, it argues in favor of "strengthening the protection of the EU's external borders, claiming that mass migration is a consequence of climate change and economic exploitation by large companies."³⁰ LMP saw the solution to migration in "exploring and responding to real causes, as opposed to what it perceives as the government's "ad hoc" and "symptomatic treatment" measures."³¹ In the meantime, LMP admitted that migration should be within national competence, including the right to choose whom to live together with.

DK (Democratic Coalition) is "a left-wing party split from MSZP in the opposition, following the second and third term in power by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). Its previous leader and prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány, founded DK, or Democratic Coalition, citing MSZP's inability to reform itself. DK is a social-democratic party usually gaining around 5% to 6% of votes in elections".³² DK shares the tenets of its discourse on migration with MSZP and LMP. Thus, it considers that Hungary should assume immigration and refugee policy as the duties and moral obligations of a transit country.³³ In 2015, Ferenc Gyurcsány, formerly prime minister and currently the president of DK, even said that the fence built on the Hungarian-Serbian border should be demolished. Later, in 2019, he admitted the necessity of this "symbol."³⁴ DK also argues that the Hungarian government uses migration as a political tool. The party usually refers to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee in its approach to immigration and calls for the social integration of immigrants.³⁵ In its 2017 programme, DK strongly condemned "terrorism, religious hatred, Islamic radicalism, and support any measure that contributes to the effective integration of immigrants and combats discrimination against them."³⁶ However, DK's rhetoric on migration is overshadowed by personal attacks and an obsession with Viktor Orbán. In essence, DK is not different from MSZP and LMP in its political communication on immigration, and it constantly supports the EU's migration policies.

²⁹ LMP n.d.

³⁰ LMP 2019.

³¹ LMP 2019.

³² DESSEWFY-NAGY 2016, p 7.

³³ DK 2015.

³⁴ HÍRADÓ 2019.

³⁵ DK 2015.

³⁶ DK 2017.

The Momentum Movement is a centrist and liberal political party, which started as a movement contesting the organizing of the 2024 Summer Olympics in Budapest and transformed into a political party later in March 2017, addressing mainly young graduates.³⁷ Contrary to left-wing parties, the Momentum Movement believes that the “European Union has failed in tackling the migration crisis that erupted in 2015, and that to date has not found an effective and long-term common solution to this major challenge”.³⁸ According to its 2018 programme, Momentum’s migration policy is based on three pillars: “protecting Hungary and other European states, ensuring the fundamental human rights of asylum seekers, and thirdly implementing joint European action in as many areas as possible.”³⁹ The Momentum Movement recommends a “flexible reception of refugees according to the needs of the Member States.”⁴⁰ Furthermore, Momentum suggests reforming the quota system so that states can trade refugee quotas in financial contributions, much like the climate protection regulation of the Kyoto Convention. In its 2019 programme, Momentum reiterated its propositions, highlighting security as a priority in the migration issue and insisting on border protection.⁴¹

All in all, Hungarian opposition parties adopt three attitudes towards migration: the low profile anti-migration position of Jobbik, a cautious pro-migration view of the left parties of MSZP, DK and LMP and a centrist view of the Momentum Movement which prioritises a protective approach to European borders, together with granting asylum appropriately. It can be said that all parties, due to their centrist tendency, could be seen as incoherent (if looked at from Western Europe): leftist parties are cautious enough in Hungary to embrace border control as the Hungarian public is generally opposed to migration, while Jobbik avoids emphasising a critical approach towards migration and empowering the government. In contrast to the governing party where there is no place for criticism of the party’s overtly anti-migration policy, in certain parties of the left such as in MSZP, some members (for example, István Hiller, the former leader of the party), rejected the party’s pro-migration stance and referred to the Hungarian crisis management as a “necessity” as long as there is no common European Union policy accepted by all to solve the migration crisis.⁴²

³⁷ HÍRTV 2017.

³⁸ MOMENTUM 2018.

³⁹ MOMENTUM 2018.

⁴⁰ MOMENTUM 2018.

⁴¹ MOMENTUM 2019.

⁴² INDEX 2015b.

6. In search of “the Hungarian model”

National migration policy can be defined as a set of actions in the political realm aiming to deal with immigration to the nation-state from outside the EU. The main characteristic of this approach is that it tries to keep the decision-making at the nation-state level, i.e., the national governments. The current Hungarian government clearly and coherently pursues national migration policies as – based on previous experience of the bad management of the migration crisis on the EU level – it insists on tackling the migration issue on the level of nation-states and considers the EU institutions only as conciliation bodies. Similarly, the Hungarian government disregards the lowest levels of migration governance, the level of non-governmental organizations (including local responses to migration), and the level of migrants and refugees themselves (self-governing institutions of migrants and refugees). Therefore, the Hungarian response to immigration in Europe can be regarded as a one-level policy compared to the complex and multi-level migration challenge.⁴³

The central elements of the Hungarian reaction to immigration are creating and protecting an imagined as well as an actual border between the Hungarian citizens and the potential or real newcomers. As border-making is the central element of the Hungarian government’s political response, I summarise these policy steps of the last four years in connection with five concentric borderlines (both real and imagined). The aim of this system is the “bordering and ordering of a Hungarian national body”⁴⁴ by distinguishing between the groups of valuable and valueless.

These five components of Hungarian border control constitute the backbone of the so-called “Hungarian method” in migration issues.

1. deterrence of migrants entering the country (messaging)⁴⁵
2. prevention of illegal border crossings (from outside Schengen area)

⁴³ Migration governance policies might be developed by actors on four different levels. If decision making is shared and in harmony among these levels, the system can be considered as the multilevel governance of migration.

1. transnational level (by supranational institutions such as the EU)
2. national level (by national governments)
3. subnational, local level (by municipalities, local NGOs)
4. subject level (by the self-governing institutions of the migrants and refugees)

⁴⁴ CANTAT–RAJARAM 2018.

⁴⁵ Deterrence is the first step towards the prevention of the start of the migrant journey. The most important deterrent factor can be reality itself. “Many irregular migrants attempt to reach the EU under a false perception of an easier life. Once in the EU territory, they are disappointed with the reality.” HOKOVSKÝ 2018, p 17.

3. interdiction at the border
4. the apprehension of those who cross the border illegally (long-range border control)
5. expulsion or repatriation of illegal immigrants

As for the imagined borders, the government used different messages in its anti-migration campaign (economic migrants, migrants as terrorists, migrants do not respect the laws of Hungary), some of them contradicting each other.⁴⁶ It seems that in the first years of the discourse, the government aimed to address a unified audience disregarding the existing social and intellectual differences among various groups of Hungarian society. Lately, there has been an effort by the government to accumulate intellectual capacities in defense of the anti-migration discourse, thereby differentiating the audiences of higher and lower social and educated classes. Organizing scientific debates and inviting foreign experts that are in line with the mainstream discourse is not a paradigmatic change, but it is a crucial step out of the comfort zone and a step towards gaining more legitimacy both on the domestic and the international level. Therefore, unsurprisingly, verifying the government's arguments became prominent through the emergence of an anti-integration block within the EU, in which the Hungarian government claims to be a leading actor.

The “new” discursive campaign points beyond the defensive and reactive framework mentioned above, and cannot cover the full picture. Concerning the active measures taken by the Hungarian government, there is a strong commitment to the Eastern Christians in the Middle East. As such, Hungary positions itself as the defender of Christianity in Europe and among the oldest communities of Christianity in the Middle East. The government, therefore, seeks balance between different peoples of the Middle East, and helps to maintain religious diversity by addressing the root causes of migration in potential sending countries, and promoting Hungarian interests at the same time (supporting local initiatives in the sending countries under the framework of Hungary Helps program, such as post-conflict reconstruction among Christian communities in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt).⁴⁷ The observers who only started to comment on Hungary's foreign policy during or after the management of the migration crisis in 2015 do not justify the Hungarian foreign policy, forgetting about the fact that Hungary's policy of protecting its borders and restrictive migration policy was accompanied

⁴⁶ According to the billboard campaign, “migrants take the jobs of Hungarians”, however, migrants are also depicted as lazy people (or economic migrants) in governmental discourse.

⁴⁷ I want to express my gratitude to my colleague, Abdessamad Belhaj for his counsel on these issues.

from an early stage by a coherent strategy of helping societies of the Middle East and Africa to develop.

These initiatives are closely connected with the so-called Eastern Opening policy, which first took shape in the early years of the second Fidesz government (2010-2014). The action was formulated in 2011 but became particularly active in 2012 and 2013, extending later also to Southern countries (Africa and Latin America).⁴⁸ In light of the migration crisis of 2015, the aim of this foreign policy activism became twofold. First, it aimed to reduce the push factors towards migration among those who reside mainly in poor economic and social conditions in these Eastern and Southern countries. It also shows consistency between restrictive migration policies, channeling support and creating mutual economic benefits for the Middle East and Africa. Second, this new activism coincided with the increasing threat to Christian communities in these countries, and the Hungarian government has sought to mitigate the problems of these local communities by providing support for them. This activity is in line with the Christian character of Hungary, as manifested in the Fundamental Law (constitution) of 2012.

Hungary's model of assistance as part of Hungary Helps is highly selective as it targets communities that are connected to some form of Christianity or a Christian church. Therefore, the support to persecuted Christians and underdeveloped areas in the Middle East and Africa is unique. A deputy state secretariat for aiding persecuted Christians was created in 2016. It is based on the idea that everyone should stay in their homeland instead of migrating. Some countries have been inspired by the Hungarian model, such as the United States, Germany, and Denmark, while other countries have followed the Hungarian example, such as Slovakia, as the Slovak National Council also embraced the issue of persecuted Christians.⁴⁹ Since its inception in 2017, the Hungary Helps programme has enabled "some 35,000 people to choose to stay in their homeland rather than migrate".⁵⁰

The Hungary Helps programme has supported a dozen countries in Africa and Asia as well, and has built hospitals, schools etc. Syria is the primary beneficiary of assistance. In November 2018, Hungary Helps supported hospital care for Syrian war victims.⁵¹ In May 2019, "financial help was offered to build a center for children and families in Aleppo."⁵² Hungary Helps has supported Iraq several times

⁴⁸ FARKAS – PAP – REMÉNYI 2016, p 6.

⁴⁹ KORMÁNY 2018.

⁵⁰ VASÁRNAP.HU 2019.

⁵¹ KORMÁNY 2018.

⁵² ORIGO 2019.

as well. One of the most recent examples occurred in May 2019, when Hungary Helps assisted Assyrian Iraqi Christians in building the Erbil School of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the rehabilitation of the St. George's Church belonging to the Eastern Assyrian Church".⁵³ In addition to Syria and Iraq, Hungary Helps also gives donations to Egypt. This was the case in December 2018 when Hungary Helps supported "family members of the victims of the November El Minya terrorist attack."⁵⁴

The programme supports African countries as well. Thus, in June 2019, Hungary Helps gave 483 million forints to the Mai Ayni refugee camp in Ethiopia, which is maintained by church organizations, and donated another 161 million forints to the Ethiopian clinic Migbare-Senay.⁵⁵ In 2019, Hungary Helps "provided 486 million forints to Catholic and Protestant communities in Nigeria to mitigate the effects of armed violence against local Christians."⁵⁶

It must be noted that these forms of assistance are small-scale from the perspective of the whole migration crisis but essential for particular and well-selected local communities to help their preservation in times of economic, political, and social crises.

Besides the cultural proximity of those supported, economic partnerships promote a long-term solution to the migration problem, as they foster prosperity in the Middle East. Thus, more trade and more economic cooperation with the region's countries mitigate the tensions and moderate the push factors of migration.

One example of this approach can be illustrated by the Hungarian investments in Egypt in 2018, totaling "about 41.5 million dollars in 60 projects in the sectors of manufacturing, services, and tourism".⁵⁷ Suffering from significant water scarcity, Egypt is currently working with the Hungarian company Water and Soil to obtain assistance "in the field of water systems management, including training and exchange of expertise, technical information and localization of technology."⁵⁸

Stipendium Hungaricum is an educational programme that allows "thousands of students from all around the world to apply for higher academic studies in Hungary each year. In the 2018/2019 round of applications, more than 4,100

⁵³ HírTV 2019.

⁵⁴ KDNP 2018.

⁵⁵ VASÁRNAP.HU 2019.

⁵⁶ 24.HU 2020.

⁵⁷ ELWATANNEWS 2019.

⁵⁸ MASPERO 2019.

scholarships were awarded, and currently, over 5,000 students study in Hungary through the Stipendium Hungaricum.⁵⁹

Middle Eastern and African countries are the primary beneficiaries of Stipendium Hungaricum. Data from 2018 shows clearly the share of these countries in the programme. The following 17 countries received most of the scholarships:

Country	Number of students	Rate
Pakistan	5,529	19.5%
Syria	2,229	7.9%
Jordan	2,061	7.3%
Nigeria	1,498	5.3%
Ghana	1,412	5.0%
Kazakhstan	1,062	3.7%
Yemen	840	3.0%
India	821	2.9%
Mongolia	797	2.8%
Tunisia	684	2.4%
Algeria	674	2.4%
Tanzania	660	2.3%
Egypt	636	2.2%
Iraq	635	2.2%
Kenya	631	2.2%

Source : TKA 2017.

The Hungarian government also developed other initiatives to help countries in the Middle East and Africa, both academically and scientifically. For instance, “Hungary is also working on establishing a university in the Middle East, in collaboration with Budapest’s Pázmány Péter Catholic University.”⁶⁰

7. Conclusion

Hungary found itself at the forefront of the migration crisis in Europe. The government’s position in the discussion of the issue seemed relatively more substantial than the country’s size. Moreover, for many, the consistently “harsh” stance of the political leadership on the topic of migration contributed to the emergence of a unique Hungarian approach in the debate. During the analyzed

⁵⁹ STUDYINHUNGARY n.d.

⁶⁰ HUNGARYTODAY 2017.

period, one can see consistency in the Hungarian position against the contradictory interests and conflicting lines between member states and other stakeholders. This consistency aims to deliver a crystal-clear message: Hungary does not want to be part of a new global burden-sharing system in which participants aim to accept people from different cultures as part of the nation.

Viktor Orbán contends that Hungary represents the mean opinion of the EU citizens on the topic of migration. According to him, there is an emerging conservative axis in the world stretching from the USA, through British conservatives, Bavarian Christian Democrats, to Polish and Israeli rightists that consider Hungarian politics an ally.⁶¹ It is evident that Orbán's advances in European politics are based on the issue of migration and strong anti-establishment rhetoric, but in general, these are not the defining political factors in international relations, since political alliances that are built on existing economic and political structures have a more decisive role in the formation of governmental influence.

This paper argues that the legal basis for migration to or through the Hungarian territory is ineffective under the current legislative background as defined by the Dublin Regulation and the Schengen Treaty. However, the Hungarian government has to strike a delicate balance between identity issues and "practical" policies on the EU level, to avoid rifts between Hungary and other members of the European Union.

Finally, it must be noted that the Hungarian way of handling the migration crisis is very much dependent on the specificity of the Hungarian case, though this may be similar in some respects to the environment of and conditions prevailing in other member states (such as V4 countries). Still, it may face serious challenges to becoming a mainstream European policy direction.

⁶¹ MANDINER 2018.

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Objectification of the Human Body and Trafficking in Human Beings: Postmodern mentalities and the Impotence of the Law

José Luis Bazán

Abstract

The modern understanding of the body as an accidental reality of the soul has led to a practical dissociation of man from his body, and its transformation into a reality that can ultimately become an object of transaction. Despite international and national legislations prohibiting slavery and assimilated forms of crimes, these practices continue and new forms have appeared beyond labour and sexual exploitation. In a hyper-technological, consumerist and desire-driven culture, the emergence of so-called “surrogacy” constitutes a reality of reproductive exploitation, which should be classified as human trafficking. Although the law is an important and necessary instrument to fight against this new form of human trafficking, given that the cultural and ethical roots that lead to the social acceptance of surrogacy are deeper, it is necessary to generate new cultural contexts that allow for a change in social mentality that recognises this new form of trafficking.

Keywords: human body, dualism, soul, Christianity, trafficking in human beings

1. Dualism and objectification of the human body

The dualistic view of the human being as composed by two contradictory principles (body and soul) accidentally united is rooted in the Hellenistic philosophy represented by Plato and has extended its influence over centuries.¹ Modern dualism, as promoted by prominent thinkers such as Descartes, Bacon and Locke, has shaped our contemporary societies. “*It is impossible to make personal identity to consist in any thing but consciousness*”, wrote Locke in his *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*.² Not surprisingly, Locke expressed in Chapter V of his *Second Treatise on Civil Government* that “*every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to buy himself*”.³ In similar

¹ “While duality is about difference”, writes Heller, “dualism concerns hierarchy and more often than not, an irreconcilable one. (...) Plato’s metaphor about the body as the prison of the soul presents a very strong case for dualism.” RUNDELL 2011, p 109.

² LOCKE 1824, § 21.

³ LOCKE 1821, p 209.

line, Bacon considered the body as *“the tabernacle of the mind”*.⁴ But above all, Descartes clearly identified the “I” with one’s mind,⁵ and considered the human body as a kind of “machine”. This perspective has had enormous implications for the contemporary understanding of the human body and its relation with the human person and the world. Descartes looked upon man as a spiritual creature inhabiting (not informing) a body. Cartesian rationalism has converted man into an angel (“angelism”, as labelled by Maritain),⁶ which is only tenuously connected to the body.⁷ By privileging thought over body as constitutive of the person, suggests Cahill, *“Descartes laid the way for later disembodiments and dehistoricizations of subjectivity, and for the body’s deprivation of its role in knowledge and in moral valuation.”*⁸ When the dignity of human being is placed exclusively in his soul or mind the human body is “downgraded”, and easily becomes an object and an instrument of the “real I”, with limited moral meaning and ethical relevance. In this context, the predominant contemporary ethics of the body is exclusively based on free will and absence of coercion and deception (e.g. sexual ethics). In Bioethics, this principle, which is expressed in the – often more “ritual” or theoretical than real – free and informed consent of the person concerned,⁹ has enormous repercussions. Under the Cartesian paradigm, as Ferguson writes, *“the body becomes an addendum to a freely chosen, and freely changing, personal identity (...) The human body loses its specifically given reality and is understood eccentrically in terms of fashion, health, sport, leisure, sexuality, art”*.¹⁰ The human body is functionally fragmented and “used” in different dimensions of life, not necessarily interconnected. Arbitrary decisions over one’s own body contradicting its natural reality and identity are not seen as a despotic abuse but, on the contrary, as a genuine expression of individual’s nearly unrestricted sovereignty,¹¹ based on

⁴ BACON 1854, p 44. It is difficult to resist the comparison between this sentence and that of 1 Corinthians, 6, 19-20 (“your body is a temple of the holy Spirit within you”).

⁵ “So that ‘I’, that is to say, the mind by which I am what I am”: DESCARTES 1850, p 75. See also his Meditation VI, in: TWEYMAN 1993, p 91.

⁶ See: FOWLER 1999, p 159.

⁷ WOODS 2002, p 155.

⁸ CAHILL 2012, p 411.

⁹ This is particularly evident in countries where euthanasia has been legalised. In spite of the existence of legal procedures and protocols to assure the free consent of the person, as Pereira suggests, in these countries “laws and safeguards are regularly ignored and transgressed in all the jurisdictions and ... transgressions are not prosecuted.” PEREIRA, 2011, p 38. See: DELANY 2007; DIXON 2008.

¹⁰ FERGUSON 2000, p 21.

¹¹ In this respect, abusive interpretations of the notions of “privacy” as an expansive right to “self-determination” by some courts unduly privilege arbitrary individual decisions and undermine its necessary harmony with other fundamental rights, such as life or freedom of religion. It is

the belief that man (the spiritual “I”) is a free and unlimited will,¹² with full and unlimited power over his soul and body.

In the context of highly technological and consumerist contemporary societies, the objectification and instrumentalization of the human body has facilitated its trivialization. As a result, the dehumanization and alienation of the human person has increased. Noble moral purposes such as the elimination or alleviation of suffering and the expansion of human choice were achieved by Modernity,¹³ but frequently at the cost of the de-subjectification of the person and the dominion of the human body as an instrumental object. Modern calculative and instrumental thinking (Heidegger)¹⁴ has “disenchanted” the world and transformed it into a meaningless reality beyond purely practical and technical issues (Max Weber).¹⁵ The desacralization of the human person¹⁶ and his increasing alienating loneliness (Arendt)¹⁷ reinforced by secularization,¹⁸ have made human beings defenceless against any type of dominion, whether technical, political, economic or social. New forms of slavery have appeared in contemporary societies, fuelled by body-soul dualistic mentalities,¹⁹ and exacerbated by hyper technologies and economic globalisation that expel humanism from society and from culture.²⁰ Nowadays,

the case of the US Supreme Court judgement in *Roe v. Wade*, in 1973 (“the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision”): [BIT.LY/25994nQ](https://bit.ly/25994nQ); but also, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in *Goodwin v. The United Kingdom*, Gran Chamber, 11 July 2002, §90 (personal autonomy includes the right to establish details of one’s own sexual identity): [BIT.LY/1LwG2Iq](https://bit.ly/1LwG2Iq).

¹² See: BENEDICT XVI 2012.

¹³ MCKENNY 2012, p 402.

¹⁴ “Calculative thinking”, as Heidegger explains, “is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is” – HEIDEGGER 2003, p 89.

¹⁵ WEBER 1946, p 139.

¹⁶ Sacred means, as Pieper writes, the exceptionality of certain realities and their ordination to the divine: PIEPER 2000, pp 33–34. Modern’s man body “is without religious or spiritual significance”, suggests Mircea Eliade (ELIADE 1956, p 178).

¹⁷ Arendt expresses this view in saying: “The modern age, with its growing world-alienation, has led to a situation where man, wherever he goes, encounters only himself” (ARENDR 1993, p 89).

¹⁸ “Secularization, with its inherent emphasis on individualism, has its most negative effects on individuals who are isolated and lack a sense of belonging.” (BENEDICT XVI 2007, paragraph 76).

¹⁹ Interestingly, some feminist approaches to the body reject “dichotomy between mind and body, in which the mind is the master that controls the body” because it paves the way for a female “enslaving identity”. In this line, Saucedo writes that: “this mind-body split is a condition that forces woman to ‘live in’ her body in a special sense: the body is her essential, enslaving identity”. (SAUCEDO 2004, p 116).

²⁰ The crisis of humanistic studies, such as philosophy or literature, has diminished their influence in postmodern science and technology, which have become self-driven realities.

it seems that there is little room or time for human relations, for *“meditating and caring, that man be human and not inhumane, ‘inhuman’, that is, outside his essence”*,²¹ and the postmodern culture *“risks blurring that which is specifically human”*.²² Contemporary societies, frequently inspired by consumerism, anti-birth mentality and lack of family protection, can't be the place for building the civilization of love that John Paul II encouraged people to create.²³ The risk of totalitarianism as total domination,²⁴ in any of its forms, is real whenever its root causes remain, specifically *“the denial of the transcendent dignity of the human person who, as the visible image of the invisible God, is therefore by his very nature the subject of rights which no one may violate.”*²⁵

2. Man as substantial unity of soul and body

As Wheeler Robinson wrote, the Hebrew (and, we can add, Christian) idea of personality *“is an animated body, and not an incarnated soul”*.²⁶ Man is *terra animata* or animated earth (Saint Augustine),²⁷ and therefore there is no pre-existing soul that becomes imprisoned in an earthly body.²⁸ It is revealing that God named the first man “Adam”: the Hebrew word for earth is *adama* (*dam* means “blood”).²⁹ “Adam” alludes also to *adameh*, which means *“I will liken myself, indicating one’s ability to emulate God.”*³⁰ Therefore, from a Christian point of view, dust or earth is not a subsequent reality in human being, but the starting point of the creation of man by God.³¹ Body is essential to human being, as it is his soul. In this respect, Aquinas says: *“the soul, since it is part of man’s body, is not an entire man, and my soul*

²¹ HEIDEGGER 1977, p 200.

²² ROMERA 2015, p 39.

²³ JOHN PAUL II 1994, paragraph 13.

²⁴ ARENDT 1962, p 422.

²⁵ JOHN PAUL II 1991, paragraph 44. For a relation between total domination and the denial of the juridical personality of man, see: ARENDT 1962, p 447.

²⁶ ROBINSON 1925, p 362. Cf. 1 Corinthians, 15, 46–47.

²⁷ AUGUSTINE 2020.

²⁸ BROMILEY 1979, p 134.

²⁹ BARON 2020.

³⁰ Ibid. Rabbi Doniel Baron (op, cit) explains that: “In the name Adam, the word ‘dam’ is preceded by the letter ‘aleph’. The letter ‘aleph’ is also a word which means to teach or inculcate. It similarly indicates leadership, as implied by the related word ‘aluf’ which means a general or tribal head. God created man with many base desires that reside in the blood, but he also gave us the means to assert our control over them and be an ‘aluf’ over the dam. By being in control instead of subject to the dominion of our impulses, man, who is created in the image of God, resembles God.” Ibid.

³¹ See: Genesis 2, 7., Ecclesiastes 3, 19–21.

*is not I ('anima mea non est ego').*³² The soul is naturally united to the body and its departure from it is “*contrary to its nature and per accidens (...) the soul devoid of its body is imperfect, as long as it is without the body.*”³³ The human body cannot be seen simply as a limit and restriction to human soul knowledge and freedom, but the natural way of being human person because, as expressed by Benedict XVI, “*man is not merely self-creating freedom nor creates himself: he is intellect and will, but he is also nature, and his will is rightly ordered if he respects his nature, listens to it and accepts himself for who he is, as one who did not create himself. In this way, and in no other, is true human freedom fulfilled.*”³⁴

The Christian vision of human body has assumed and empowered this perspective on its dignity, strongly rooted in natural reason that is able to discover the substantial unity between body and soul.³⁵ But it has been also enlightened by divine revelation about God’s creation of man (male and female, including their bodies) “*in his own image*”.³⁶ The incarnation of God³⁷ and the resurrection of Christ have elevated the dignity of human body to the highest level. The Assumption of the Virgin Mary who “*was taken up body and soul into heavenly glory*” is also a central belief in Catholicism.³⁸ It reaffirms the importance of the unity between body and soul, and the eternal vocation of the person as a whole, including his body. The presence of the body and blood of Christ in the sacramental communion as the most holy reality reveals the importance of flesh in the Christian understanding of the human being. The mandate of one’s love and the love to the neighbour contains the respect and care of the body, too.³⁹ Not less the spouses’ community of persons embraces their entire life “*so they are no longer two, but one flesh.*”⁴⁰ It is against this background that Christian humanist perspective considers the human body not being merely an external instrument to be used by the “real person” – namely, the “spirit” or “soul” enjoining a formal will free of the body’s constraints⁴¹ – or even

³² AQUINAS.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ BENEDICT XVI. 2011.

³⁵ See: ARISTOTLE 2008, p 43.

³⁶ Genesis 1, 27.

³⁷ John 1, 14: “the Word became flesh” (“et Verbum caro factum”). The term „flesh” refers to man in his state of weakness and mortality (CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1993, p 990). Cf. Genesis 6,3. Interestingly, Husserl makes a distinction between the live or animate body, as an organism, the flesh body as inhabited by an ego that holds sway over it (“Leib”) from the body as a piece of physical nature (“Körper”). See: MORAN 2012, pp 129 et seq.

³⁸ PAUL VI 1964, paragraph 59.

³⁹ The corporal works of mercy are “charitable actions by which we come to the aid of our neighbor in his bodily necessities”: (CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1993, 2447).

⁴⁰ Mathew 19, 6; Genesis 2, 24 (“Et erunt in carnem unam”).

⁴¹ LAKOFF ET ALT 1999, p 554.

by other individuals to fulfil their wishes and desires. On the contrary, the human being is considered as a distinctive and unified reality (the human person), which intrinsically holds an inalienable dignity, natural and supernatural. The unique Christian doctrine of God's becoming human, suggests Zimmerman, made the *imago Dei* the foundation of a humanism that has contributed significantly to the formation of the European cultures.⁴²

The official modern doctrine and “dogma of the Ghost in the Machine”, as Ryle calls it, is a philosopher's myth “*entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle.*”⁴³ We would add that it is not only false, but dangerous: a mechanized view of human body as a machine and an object composed by parts opens the door to unlimited replacement and inter-changeability of “pieces” (organs, cells and tissues) and could easily justify the creation of cyborgs, cybernetic organisms, and even human beings that are “pieces” providers.⁴⁴ Contrary to this myth, we find that the human body is integral to the human person, and receives from the spiritual principle a supreme dignity. The body is not just a part of every human being: the person is also his body, an indivisible dimension of personhood along with his spiritual aspect. John Paul II expressed this view in his 1989 speech to the expert scientists who participated in the Working Group on Brain Death: “*when we consider that every individual is a living expression of unity and that the human body is not just an instrument or item of property, but shares in the individual's value as a human being, then it follows that the body cannot under any circumstances be treated as something to be disposed of at will.*”⁴⁵ As new research accumulates, notes Berecz, it is more evident that “*man emerges more and more as a total, unified organism, and the concept of the ‘ghost’ within the ‘machine’ is less tenable.*”⁴⁶ Most advanced research provides new evidences on the unity and interactions between soul and body in both directions, and opens the door to refreshing perspectives that combine philosophy and social sciences with health sciences in a more holistic approach to human body.

Ordinary language expresses properly the reality of the human body as integral part of the human being. Shinagawa underlines how obvious it is “*that we tend to say that the body is the person rather than that it is her property, consistent with Warren's claim that ‘it would be very odd to describe, say, breaking a leg, as damaging*

⁴² ZIMMERMANN 2015, p 58.

⁴³ RYLE 2009, pp 5–6.

⁴⁴ KLUGMAN ET ALT 1998, p 5.

⁴⁵ JOHN PAUL II 1992, p XXIV.

⁴⁶ BEREZ 1976, p 285.

one's property, and much more appropriate to describe it as injuring oneself".⁴⁷ Other examples in the same line of reasoning could be mentioned: e.g. any violation of the right to physical integrity is not an attack against a human body, but a violation of the dignity of the person whose physical integrity has been injured. The term "possession" when it refers to the human body should not be identified with legal property rights: possession in this context is not a "*condition of fact under which one can exercise his power over a corporeal thing at his pleasure, to the exclusion of all others.*"⁴⁸ The use of that word could be misleading if it implies the power of a person over the body (his body or of a third person) merely as a "thing", that's to say, an object susceptible of being appropriated and owned.

All parts of the human body are elements of the human person, and therefore, no single part of the human body, even those considered less noble than other parts, are worthless, and all parts of the human body are worthy. On the other hand, the *terra animata* exists from the zygote to the end of life, including extreme situations such as irreversible coma: each life from its very beginning by conception until death is a single personal history, Meilaender notes: "*that story begins before we are conscious of it, and, for many of us, continues after we have lost consciousness of it.*"⁴⁹ Obviously, the acceptance of these principles has an enormous impact for bioethical issues, including artificial reproduction (in particular, frozen embryos and "discarded" ones), genetic manipulation, research with embryonic stem cells, cloning in human beings, abortion and euthanasia.

3. Commodification of the human body and Trafficking in Human Beings (THB)

The objectification of the human body provoked by dualistic mentalities converts it into an object at disposal, initially of the "real I" (the soul). The human body as a private "possession" of the "real I" is under his scope of autonomous decision, and includes the possibility of "transferring" the use of his body as an object to third parties. Popular slogans like "*it's my body: I do what I want*" or "*my body... my business*" express this mentality. But what is the role of the law in this area of "personal business"? Certainly, any legislation promoting justice, particularly human rights law, generally contains and expresses certain ethical principles related to the protection of human dignity and the common good, including the human

⁴⁷ SHINAGAWA 2013, p 146.

⁴⁸ BLACK 1971, p 1324. "Possession".

⁴⁹ MEILAENDER 1995, p 22.

body. We can find a clear example of this inter-connection between ethics and law in the area of the protection of the human body's dignity in the 1997 Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, that has legally expressed this *extra commercium* principle in the following terms: "*The human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain.*"⁵⁰ For this reason, as recognized in international law, "*there is a need to protect individual rights and freedoms and to prevent the commercialisation of parts of the human body involved in organ and tissue procurement, exchange and allocation activities.*"⁵¹ We find another example of the interlink between legislation and ethics in the EU legal ban on patenting the human body "*at any stage in its formation or development, including germ cells, and the simple discovery of one of its elements or one of its products, including the sequence or partial sequence of a human gene*" so as "*to respect the fundamental principles safeguarding the dignity and integrity of the person.*"⁵² In this regard, the protection of the human body and of human embryos by the European Court of Justice from the moment of fertilisation "*since that fertilisation is such as to commence the process of development of a human being*"⁵³ is of utmost importance. From this perspective, as the human embryo has a true human body, he can also be subject to attacks against his dignity. But these legal protections of the human body and its dignity are permanently in tension with the broader and predominant social understanding that, as autonomous individuals, one's decisions over one's body are beyond the scope of others, including the state. The law exists and imposes limits, but restrictions to individual's moral autonomy tend to be interpreted in a restrictive way, and therefore, this personal autonomy becomes an expansive reality. Legal restrictions are progressively falling, and the law is increasingly impotent before this irrepressible expansion. From the idea that the human body is an object possessed by the "real I" to its commoditization and transfer of its use

⁵⁰ Article 21. See also Article 3.2 c) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and Article 12.1 of Directive 2004/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on setting standards of quality and safety for the donation, procurement, testing, processing, preservation, storage and distribution of human tissues and cells ("Member States shall endeavour to ensure voluntary and unpaid donations of tissues and cells"). This principle does not prevent, for example, the transplantation of certain organs and tissues of human origin carried out for therapeutic purposes. See: Article 2 of the 2002 Council of Europe's Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin.

⁵¹ 2002 Council of Europe's Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, Recital.

⁵² Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, Recital 16. See also its Article 5.1.

⁵³ Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 18 October 2011, case Oliver Brüstle v Greenpeace eV. (C-34/10), paragraph 35: bit.ly/1TziepL.

to third persons, there is just a little step, in spite of legal limits. Whether the free transfer of the use of the human body to a third person is a true free choice or not is disputable in certain circumstances: frequently, persons in vulnerable situations make choices with limited freedom.

One of the classical areas of defence of the human dignity in law and politics is the fight against slavery and trafficking in human beings. Over the last years, this phenomenon has gained more and more attention at international, European and national levels. The EU Anti-Trafficking Directive defines trafficking in human beings (THB) as: *“the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of persons, including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”*⁵⁴ The underlying principle in this definition is that the human being who is victim of trafficking is a person under exploitation. Exploitation includes the prostitution of others, or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, including begging, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the exploitation of criminal activities, or the removal of organs. THB is, therefore, an umbrella expression *“for activities involved when someone obtains or holds a person in compelled service.”*⁵⁵ THB is labelled as “modern slavery” because new *“institutions and practices similar to slavery”*⁵⁶ have appeared after the definition of slavery was adopted in the Slavery Convention (1926) and the ILO Forced labour Convention (1930). If, strictly speaking, slavery means the *“status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised”*,⁵⁷ then modern slavery embraces related situations of exploitation such as: forced marriage, bonded labour, children’s petty theft and drug trade and children’s military recruitment. Some other phenomena regarding the exploitation of human beings have emerged more recently, and should be examined under the rubric of THB, in particular reproductive exploitation (e.g. trafficking in human embryos and the so-called “surrogacy”).⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Article 2 of the Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA.

⁵⁵ US DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

⁵⁶ Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted by a Conference of Plenipotentiaries convened by Economic and Social Council resolution 608(XXI) of 30 April 1956.

⁵⁷ Article 1.1 of the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926.

⁵⁸ WHITE 2014.

THB is a complex phenomenon, with a variety of roots, causes and drivers, one of which is precisely the dualism of the human person and the objectification of the human body, in the context of a mainstream consumerism in contemporary societies, which privileges individual desires.⁵⁹ Certain forms of THB are fuelled by a predominant culture of unrestricted desire, promoted by omnipresent stimulating messages, that considers goods or services primarily in terms of their marketability, including human beings and their bodies. In a “civilization of consumption”, wrote John Paul II in *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* “an object already owned but now superseded by something better is discarded, with no thought of its possible lasting value in itself, nor of some other human being who is poorer.”⁶⁰ Consumerism necessarily involves a culture of “throwing-away” and “waste” in which individuals can be simply “discarded” when they are considered as a “burden”⁶¹ or easily replaced. As Miles expresses it, consumerism is a powerful and seductive ideology, and a way of life “rooted in the fact that the pleasures which consumers find through consumption outweigh any comparable concern as to its ideological underpinnings.”⁶² Since desire is oriented, not to the action, but to its result, as Norrie highlights, it can lead to a form of alienation, focusing not on the doing itself but on the result.⁶³ The alienation of the perpetrator of the exploitation and of those who knowingly take direct benefit of it is the reverse side of the exploitation of the victim of trafficking.

Some examples can illustrate this correlation between “desire-driven” societies and the diverse forms of objectification and commoditization of the human body: e.g. the production of children under demand through so-called “surrogate motherhood” involving the use of third women’s wombs or the preselected choice of sex or hair colour in artificially conceived children. More explored has been the relation between sexual exploitation and a market approach to sex, particularly evident in the colossal pornography industry, mostly of women, in which “*woman’s body or body parts are singled out and separated from her as a person and she is viewed primarily as a physical object*”.⁶⁴ As Faith writes, feminists tend to see the objectification and commodification of female bodies as a reality promoted by pornography and prostitution.⁶⁵ The globalised economy of sex certainly reinforces

⁵⁹ Some scholars argue positively about the benefits of consumerism, such as James B. Twitchell, who defends the idea that consumerism provides a meaning to people replacing the meaning formerly provided by religion and is actually a source of happiness and emancipation. See TWITCHELL 1999, and TWITCHELL 2004, pp 37–48.

⁶⁰ Paragraph 28.

⁶¹ POPE FRANCIS 2015.

⁶² MILES 1998, pp 153 and 155.

⁶³ NORRIE 2007, p 120.

⁶⁴ SZYMANSKI ET AL 2011, p 8; BARKTY 1990, p. 35.

⁶⁵ FAITH 2004, p 259.

this phenomenon, and as expressed by Penttinen, “creates the domain of subjects as a population of consumers and the zone of the abject as consumable bodies”.⁶⁶ One of the most far-reaching effects of cultural globalisation is the commercialisation of culture, as rightly points Akande,⁶⁷ and the reduction of moral goods to marketable goods. Moral goods are reduced to commodities subject to the law of supply and demand, with limited further restrictions: they are priced and tradeable. These practices create an unhealthy cultural atmosphere of false normality that deeply harms the most vulnerable persons in our societies, in particular the elderly, the severely handicapped or ill, and children (including the unborn). As Benedict XVI reminds us, the market is “shaped by cultural configurations which define it and give it direction,”⁶⁸ and therefore, societies that predominantly consider the human body as an “external asset” and primarily as a resource for production or pleasure, will tend to discard their most vulnerable members as “non-valid.”⁶⁹ The “production and leisure” cultural paradigm applies also to other vulnerable persons (e.g. young foreign women) that can easily become exploited “in a market conceived as a place where strong subdue the weak.”⁷⁰ The objectification of the human body brings the objectification of the person as a whole, as the human body is not something different than the person herself. As objects can be generally replaced in consumerist societies, individual human beings, and even categories of human beings, become replaceable. When this practice is transformed into an ideology, it paves the way for an incipient totalitarianism aiming at the improvement of the human species and the production of “perfect” individuals, or the creation of a paradisiac collective society that might justify the “suppression” of some individuals for the “improvement and wellbeing” of the rest.

We should not underestimate the relevance of the cultural framework and prevailing mentalities in society and their relationship with certain emergent forms of trafficking in human beings, despite legal restrictions and limits to exploitation of human beings. A civilization rooted in the utilitarianism of production and use is a civilization of “things” and not of “persons”: then, persons are used in the same way as things are used, as John Paul II stated.⁷¹ For example, the objectification and commodification of the human body has

⁶⁶ PENTTINEN 2008, p 17.

⁶⁷ AKANDE 2002.

⁶⁸ BENEDICT XVI 2009, paragraph 36.

⁶⁹ In “Centesimus Annus (op. cit)”, John Paul II mentioned the “excessive promotion of purely utilitarian values, with an appeal to the appetites and inclinations towards immediate gratification, making it difficult to recognize and respect the hierarchy of the true values of human existence” (paragraph 29).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ JOHN PAUL II 1994, paragraph 13.

contributed to making prostitution widespread in many European countries. In spite of the limited research and information, the relation between prostitution and THB is becoming more evident. The European Parliament recognised that “prostitution and forced prostitution are forms of slavery incompatible with human dignity and fundamental human rights (...) prostitution markets fuel trafficking in women and children”. It also stressed that “there are several links between prostitution and trafficking, and recognises that prostitution – both globally and across Europe – feeds the trafficking of vulnerable women and under-age females”, and “that looking upon prostitution as legal ‘sex work’, decriminalising the sex industry in general and making procuring legal is not a solution to keeping vulnerable women and under-age females safe from violence and exploitation, but has the opposite effect and puts them in danger of a higher level of violence, while at the same time encouraging prostitution markets – and thus the number of women and under-age females suffering abuse – to grow”.⁷² The Dutch experience, as expressed by its national Rapporteur on Human Trafficking, shows that “there has always been a clear relationship between human trafficking and prostitution in the Netherlands.”⁷³ This association between THB and prostitution existed ever since trafficking was included in Dutch criminal law. A high percentage of prostitutes are actually controlled by criminal gangs. In Germany, legalization of prostitution has not diminished cases of THB.⁷⁴ At the global level, an empirical analysis for a cross-section of up to 150 countries showed that on average, countries with legalised prostitution experience a larger degree of reported human trafficking inflows.⁷⁵ As Leidholdt suggests, the boundaries between prostitution and sex trafficking are blurred: “Sex trafficking and prostitution overlap in fundamental ways (...) The sex industry business in which trafficked and prostituted women are exploited are often one and the same, with trafficked and domestically prostituted women ‘working’ side by side”.⁷⁶ However, the European Court of Justice has adopted a “neutral” position concerning prostitution, due to the diverse legal regimes in EU Member States, and has recognised the freedom of movement of “sex workers” offering “sexual services” in *Adoui v. Belgian State*: if a Member State allows prostitution for its own nationals, it can’t claim the activity

⁷² Resolution of 26 February 2014 on sexual exploitation and prostitution and its impact on gender equality: bit.ly/1Ppm1OE.

⁷³ DUTCH NATIONAL RAPPOURTEUR ON TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS 2010, p 26.

⁷⁴ Official statistics don’t reveal, as Herz suggests, the actual extent of THB, but they reflect the number of investigations of the law enforcement authorities. The difficulty of proving THB – very dependent on the testimony of the victim – is also an obstacle to reduce the number of investigations: HERZ 2006, pp 12 and 26. See: GERMAN FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR FAMILY AFFAIRS, SENIOR CITIZENS, WOMEN AND YOUTH 2007.

⁷⁵ CHO ET AL 2013, pp 75–76.

⁷⁶ LEIDHOLDT 2003, p 178.

to be against public policy in order to deny free movement for prostitution for nationals of other Member States.⁷⁷ The same position was reaffirmed 20 years later by the ECJ in *Jany and Others*, extending this tolerance of prostitution to EU candidate countries (at that time from Central and Eastern Europe).⁷⁸ This ECJ perspective, based on a definition of work which is in “*true liberal style economically determined*”,⁷⁹ is hardly compatible with a humanistic view of the human being that takes ownership of the dignity of the human body.

Another less explored case, though no less important, is the connection between the so-called “surrogate motherhood” or “surrogacy” and the cultural framework that accepts more or less openly – and certainly in practice – the treatment of the human body as a commodity. In surrogacy, usually a couple (“the intended parents”) agrees with a woman to become either the “gestational mother” (after the human embryo produced by in-vitro fertilisation is transferred to her) or the “traditional” one in which the mother is impregnated naturally or artificially. Leaving aside the controversial issue of the consent of the surrogate mother (frequently in situation of need and vulnerability, and not sufficiently informed about the practice), from the exploitation point of view, she (even with her consent) is being misused by third parties as an object and instrument to “provide” them a child. Whether or not this agreement is profitable, that does not exclude the exploitation dimension. Profit surrogacy could be assimilated also to bonded labour when the surrogate mother has to stay in the hostel provided by the reproductive clinic for nine months until the delivery of the child, as happens in India.⁸⁰ No less, surrogacy is a form of exploitation of babies,⁸¹ who are deprived of the full and integral filiation with the natural parents (one mother and one father) and their identity.⁸² The UN Convention of the Rights of the Child recognises “*the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents*”,⁸³ a right violated by surrogacy. Moreover, babies are transferred

⁷⁷ *Adoui v. Belgian State and City of Liège, and Cornuaille v. Belgian State*, Joined Cases 115 and 116/81, Judgment of 18 May 1992: bit.ly/1MtXt79.

⁷⁸ *Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie*, Case C-268/99, judgment of 20 November 2011: bit.ly/25bvULE.

⁷⁹ ASKOLA 2007, p 57.

⁸⁰ CHATTERJEE 2015, p 68.

⁸¹ COMECE REFLECTION GROUP ON BIOETHICS 2015, p 9.

⁸² The list of contentious ethical and juridical issues is much larger: e.g. extreme restrictions in “surrogate mother” privacy during pregnancy; absence of transparency in the contract provisions; provisions imposing “contractual abortion” when the baby becomes an “unwanted object” of the contract; the relation between baby and “surrogate mother” after birth; the selection of “wanted children”, good-looking and with high academic potential, etc. See: EUROPEAN CENTER FOR LAW AND JUSTICE 2012.

⁸³ Article 7.1.

to third persons as a result of a private agreement that should never be legally enforced. Filiation is a matter of *ordre publique* and private agreements should not be allowed to violate it. Moreover, the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits the sale or traffic of children “for any purpose and in any form”.⁸⁴ Some countries in the world have legalised all forms of surrogacy, while some others admit non-commercial surrogacy or tolerate commercial surrogacy practiced in a third country.⁸⁵ Surrogacy is not legally qualified as a form of trafficking, even in those jurisdictions where the practice is illegal, except in Cambodia.⁸⁶ However, there is an increasing awareness that this understanding creates inconsistencies in the legal systems. The European Parliament has recognized that the practice of surrogacy “undermines the human dignity of the woman, since her body and its reproductive functions are used as a commodity”, and that “gestational surrogacy (...) involves reproductive exploitation and use of the human body for financial or other gain”.⁸⁷ This is a promising start which should lead to a general legal ban of these practices in order to protect women and children’s rights, as they are direct victims of this new form of trafficking in human beings.⁸⁸

4. Conclusion

Any dualistic philosophy that considers the soul as the real “I” of the person, and reduces the human body to an instrumental object of the soul, not only downgrades the human body but paves the way – in a hyper-technological, global and consumerist world – for its use as a resource of production or a source for immediate pleasure or emotional gratification. The risk of any object (including the human body when is considered as such) becoming an object of trade (commodity) in postmodern consumerist societies is undeniable, despite the number of existing legal prohibitions and restrictions in domestic and international legislations,

⁸⁴ Article 35. See Articles 1 and 2 of the Article 2(a) of the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography: bit.ly/1qNtkEv.

⁸⁵ See: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2013.

⁸⁶ See: THE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS AND CULTURE 2015; TAKIHIRO 2015.

⁸⁷ European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2015 on the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 2014 and the European Union’s policy on the matter, paragraph 115: bit.ly/1RgFYgm.

⁸⁸ Contrary to this perspective, the European Court of Human Rights, in its judgement *Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy* (27 January 2015, referred to the Gran Chamber) reveals a lack of sensitivity towards the exploitation of the gestational mother and the child, justifying commercial surrogacy on the basis of a misleading interpretation of the best interests of the child and a wrong understanding of the right to private and family life: bit.ly/1LH6mQe.

and the general recognition that the human body is *res extra commercium*. Legal restrictions are insufficient to stop certain irresponsibly expansive interpretations of individual autonomy, as the social context and mainstream mentalities undermines the legal implementation of those restrictions. Recovering the dignity of the human body as an integral and substantial part of the human being will create a cultural framework in societies that will help to better prevent human exploitation, including emerging forms such as reproductive exploitation. This cultural framework will facilitate the enforceability of specific international and European legislation to prevent exploitation, in particular of children and women, and to better protect the rights of the victims.

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Demagogy, Destruction and Manipulation: Putting the 2020 Riots into a Comparatist Historical Perspective

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Abstract

For many people in the Western world who have not immediately experienced any serious social or political upheaval since the end of the Second World War, the sheer violence of the current 2020 riots sparked by the death of George Floyd may come as a real shock. However, analysing the events through the mere lense of social and cultural resentments would be a superficial analysis, as it would focus only on the symptoms, but not on the real causes behind the present events. Indeed, in its long history, the West has often faced similar threats when confronted with its innumerable wars, revolutions or upheavals, but there has never been such a toxic mix of irrational self-hate and blatant cultural ignorance. If we want to understand the real reasons behind this vicious onslaught on our civilisation, we have to consider a further aspect: the cultural self-loathing so typical for all late civilisations. In order to do so, we will study in some detail another similar case of self-destruction, i.e. the crisis generated by the Tribune of Clodius during the last years of the Roman Republic, before rapidly sketching some further parallels with events from other civilisations and daring a rapid outlook on the events that may yet be to come.

Keywords: demagogy, Roman Empire, riots, decline

1. Introduction

For many people in the Western world who have not immediately experienced any serious social or political upheaval since the end of the Second World War (except, to a small degree, the student “revolution” of 1968),¹ the sheer violence of the 2020 riots sparked by the death of George Floyd may come as a real shock. There is, of course, the astonishing hate with which monuments of all ages and political or religious orientations are defiled and destroyed, shops plundered and innocent citizens attacked, even murdered – and this not only by those whose miserable living conditions, poor education or sad personal experiences may make such riotous acts more understandable (though still intolerable), but also by well-

¹ Cf. ENGELS 2018a.

to-do, smart and privileged young people acting as spearheads of the new “cultural revolution” and even by many leftist-liberal politicians hoping to benefit from the climate of unrest.

But there is also the omnipresence of the astounding and dangerous endeavour to re-interpret the entire history of the West in a way dwelling exclusively on its dark sides, such as war, genocide, inequality or intolerance, and without acknowledging the numerous impressive feats of progress, compassion, art, beauty or science, and conveniently ignoring that all other human civilisations have displayed a rather similar, all-too human ambivalence between darkness and light. The influence exerted by this ideological preparation on the immediate physical violence of the BLM riots cannot be underestimated: Only when an entire civilisation is imbued with the idea that its history is so criminal that it deserves only resentment and punishment can we expect such a total lack of collective reaction and outcry in front of the depredations operated by what is only an aggressive, though highly publicised and protected, minority of vandals and criminals.

Why such a hatred not only for the material, but also the immaterial aspects of our civilisation, from people who, very often, are not even the (alleged) victims of this same civilisation, but rather those who benefitted the most from its achievements? We could, of course, enumerate many factual reasons such as: a perverted, wholly misunderstood form of the Christian notion of original sin (transferred here from the faulty nature of humanity unto the Western civilisation as such, and without any possibility for atonement and redemption); the Herostratian hatred for an elite culture that so often characterises not only some iconoclast fringes of the populace, but also those members of the elite who feel excluded from power; the vandalism ultimately resulting from all forms of materialist thought; the resentment of all those members of foreign civilisations who have lost their previous power and self-assertiveness in the wake of the political, cultural and technological expansion of the West; and, of course, the elites’ age old cynical technique of increasing their own power by disorienting the people through violence and insecurity.

However, this would be a mere superficial analysis, as it would focus only on the symptoms, not on the real causes behind the present events. Indeed, in its long history, the West has already often faced similar threats when confronted with its innumerable wars, revolutions or upheavals such as the wars against the Muslim conquest, the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution or the spread of Bolshevism, but without succumbing to the generalised fatigue, even indirect compliance with the riots, displayed by today’s citizens as well as politicians;

and though the West has undergone many re-appreciations of its past, there has never been such a toxic mix of irrational self-hate and blatant cultural ignorance. In order to understand the real reasons behind this vicious onslaught on our civilisation, we have to consider a further aspect: the cultural fatigue and self-loathing so typical for all late civilisations. Hence, in the following, we will try to underline this hypothesis by examining in some detail another similar case of self-destruction, i.e. the crisis generated by the Tribunate of Clodius during the last years of the Roman Republic, before rapidly sketching some further parallels with events from other civilisations² and daring a rapid outlook on the events that may yet be to come.

2. A Look into the Past

2.1. A Republic in Decline

One of the most obvious parallels to the present situation are doubtless the riots and events characterising the reign of terror exerted by Publius Clodius Pulcher, one of the most interesting, though still only partly known politicians of the Late Roman Republic in the mid first century B.C.³

During the second century, Rome had changed drastically. While the Republic had now conquered most of the Mediterranean and provided the ruling elite with an astonishing influx of wealth, the simple people had suffered much from the numerous wars, as well as from the consequences of growing social polarisation. The farmers were driven from their land to the city; large semi-industrial estates owned by the elite took their place; the state, instead of finding employment for the new urban proletariat, sedated and corrupted them with a politics of bread and circuses; the traditional agrarian religion declined to the advantage of oriental cults and philosophical nihilism; politics became increasingly short-term-oriented; the need to bribe citizens and colleagues for political support brought forth an essentially debt-oriented financial economy; the Senate became nearly paralysed because of inner rivalries, and proved unable to impose the necessary reforms; law and tradition were gradually ignored in favour of improvised measures imposed by political urgency, thus establishing dangerous precedents; and the competition for

² On the theoretical background of the following explanations, cf. ENGELS 2018b and ENGELS 2018c.

³ Concerning the comparison between the Late Roman Republic and the crisis of the Western world in the 21st century, cf. ENGELS 2014.

political power started to involve physical violence between citizens, sometimes even parts of the army.⁴ The Romans themselves were fully aware of the extent of this nefarious evolution, and their politicians and historians went to great detail in order to describe the dilemma. However, the general tendency, namely the fear that only a monarchy could still assure the cohesion of a society drifting apart, seemed nearly unavoidable, as Sallust seems to have expressed in a letter addressed to Caesar:

*When, however, idleness and poverty gradually drove the commons from the fields and forced them to live without a fixed abode, they began to covet the riches of other men and to regard their liberty and their country as objects of traffic. Thus little by little the people, which had been sovereign and had exercised authority over all nations, became degenerate, and each man bartered his share of the common sovereignty for slavery to one man.*⁵

The general conflagration finally broke out in the late 2nd century, when a number of Roman politicians, both idealistic and ambitious, attempted to tackle the social, economic, political and military problems listed above with a comprehensive reform programme which, in the face of opposition from the Senate, they could only implement with the help of the goodwill of the Roman people - a momentous tactic that gave birth to the political party of the *populares*.⁶ Its founders, the brothers Tiberius and Gaius Sempronius Gracchus, who both held the office of tribunes of the people, tried in 133 and 123 to return state land (*ager publicus*), which had gradually fallen into the hands of the big landowners, to the most impoverished citizens. They also endeavoured to revolutionise the political constitution, which was traditionally based on the annuity and collegiality of all state offices, by seeking a second mandate as tribune immediately after the first, and by circumventing the veto rights of their respective colleagues. These coup-like measures inevitably led to a serious conflict with the more conservative forces, the *optimates*. The *optimates* finally defeated the Gracchi and their sympathisers by force of arms, but were unable to rebuild the dams once they had been torn down, so that the conflict between *populares* and *optimates* severely strained the political cohesion of the Roman elite in the following century, and contributed significantly to the collapse of the Republic.

The ensuing decades were increasingly marked by violent struggles, leading notably to the first civil war and the sole-rule of the *popularis* Marius, then the dictatorship

⁴ As general introduction to the history of the Late Republic, see BRUHNS – DAVID – NIPPEL 1997; PINA POLO 1999; DAVID 2000; CHRIST 2000; BRINGMANN 2003; HÖLKESKAMP 2009.

⁵ (Ps.) Sall., epist. 1.5.4-5 (transl. J.C. Rolfe, Loeb).

⁶ On social movements in Classical Antiquity, see BRINGMANN 1985; ENGELS 2011; FERGUSON 1975; NICOLED 1990; von PÖHLMANN 1912; TARN 1923; VOGT 1957.

of the *optimatis* Sulla, and even after an uneasy truce between both parties had been established after the death of Sulla in 78 BC, the situation remained extremely volatile, and the differences between the often armed supporters of the various political factions and the increasingly politicised big-city criminal gangs became gradually blurred.⁷ These struggles, which were difficult to overlook and which revealed both the weakness of the Senate and the inability of the Roman constitution to guarantee political freedom along with peace and order in a clear systemic crisis, were already evident in the insurgency plans of Catilina,⁸ whose political programme contained a dangerous mixture of cynical demagoguery, honest reform efforts, frustration over the reform backlog blamed on the *optimates* and the criticising of the intolerable economic and social polarisation of the Roman citizenry, as shows the following extract of a speech attributed to Catilina by Sallust:

*For ever since the state fell under the jurisdiction and sway of a few powerful men, it is always to them that kings and potentates are tributary and peoples and nations pay taxes. All the rest of us, energetic, able, nobles and commons, have made up the mob, without influence, without weight, and subservient to those to whom in a free state we should be an object of fear. Because of this, all influence, power, rank, and wealth are in their hands, or wherever they wish them to be; to us they have left danger, defeat, prosecutions, and poverty. How long, pray, will you endure this, brave hearts?*⁹

2.2. Clodius

The danger emanating from Catilina may have been averted by Cicero's much publicised uncovering in 63 BC of his plot to overthrow the Republic. But this was only the beginning of a new round of crisis. The increasing radicalisation of the struggles undoubtedly culminated in 58 during the tribunate of Clodius. Publius Clodius Pulcher, born 93 BC, was a Roman politician belonging to the *populares* and is chiefly known as a colourful personality, street agitator and Cicero's arch-enemy.¹⁰ Nevertheless, despite his alleged wish to defend the 'simple people', he was descended from the aristocratic *gens Claudia*, one of Rome's oldest patrician families, though he at least superficially rejected this heritage and managed to be adopted by an obscure plebeian in order to be eligible for the office of tribune of the people, an office reserved only to plebeians. While in charge, he convinced

⁷ Cf. NIPPEL 1981; NIPPEL 1982; LABRUNA 1991; WILL 1992.

⁸ On Catilina, see SCHWARTZ 1897; BRINGMANN 1972; VON UNGERN-STERNBERG 1997.

⁹ Sall., Cat. 20.7-9

¹⁰ On Clodius, cf. WHITE 1900; MOREAU 1982; SPIELVOGEL 1997; TATUM 1999; STABRYŁA 2006; FEZZI 2008.

the citizens to vote for a broad-scale series of laws, including a highly popular free of charge distribution of grain to every Roman citizen, and became one of the most important political forces in the context of the first triumvirate and thus the last years of the Roman Republic. Though it is difficult to reconstruct Clodius' exact aims, as most sources available are clearly oriented against him, the following aspects seem noteworthy and eerily reminiscent of the present riots of 2020.

First, Clodius tried to draw on the resentments of the gradually impoverished lower and middle classes against the rich and wealthy. The close connection between politics and the economic crisis is particularly evident in the fact that Clodius succeeded in increasingly combining his political power with the *collegia compitalicia*,¹¹ a series of local associations which had at first had mainly religious and administrative duties, then became a kind of neighbourhood watch organisation before finally transforming into an actor of popular terror themselves, terrifying the city of Rome and above all tyrannising the wealthier and richer. Clodius further extended his influence by recruiting slaves and gladiators and occupied central strategic positions in the city of Rome in order to create an atmosphere of insecurity, which was intended both to demonstrate the incapacity of conservative politicians and to strengthen the call for a fundamental reorganisation of the state in agreement with the requests of the populace:

In the presence and sight of these same consuls, a levy of slaves was held before the tribunal of Aurelius, under pretence of filling up the guilds, when men were enrolled according to their streets, and divided into decuries, and stirred up to violence, and battle, and slaughter, and plunder. It was while these same men were consuls, that arms were openly carried into the temple of Castor, and the steps of the temple were pulled up; armed men occupied the forum and the assemblies of the people; slaughters and stonings of people took place; there was no senate, no magistrates were left; one man by arms and piratical violence seized on all the power of all the magistrates not by any power of his own, but having bribed the two consuls to desert the republic by the treaty respecting the provinces, he insulted every one, domineered over every one, made promises to some held down many by terror and fear and gained over more by hope and promises.¹²

Furthermore, Clodius seems to have wished for a certain remodelling of the Roman collective memory, as he proceeded to destroy and replace monuments erected by his immediate political enemies or those representing the opposite, that is optimate, political ideology. Thus did he not only raze to the ground the house of Cicero, his arch-enemy, whom he managed to banish from Rome, but also

¹¹ Cf. BRENNER 1987; SPIELVOGEL 1997.

¹² Cic., Sest. 34 (transl. C.D. Yonge, Loeb).

erected, on Cicero's former property, a sanctuary dedicated to 'Liberty', suggesting thus that only by physically ridding the city of his enemies and even destroying their property, could the people whom Clodius claimed to represent gain their liberty. Cicero would describe the events as follows:

I was absent. I was even in your own opinion a citizen with all my rights as such unimpaired, when my house on the Palatine hill, and my villa in the district of Tusculum, were transferred one a-piece to each of the consuls; decrees of the senate were flying about; marble columns from my house were carried off to the father-in-law of the consul in the sight of the Roman people; and the consul who was my neighbour at my villa had not only my stock and the decorations of my villa, but even my trees transferred to his farm; while the villa itself was utterly destroyed, not from a desire of plunder, (for what plunder could there be there?), but out of hatred and cruelty. My house on the Palatine hill was burnt, not by accident, but having been set on fire on purpose. The consuls were feasting and revelling amid the congratulations of the conspirators, while the one boasted that he had been the favourite of Catiline, and the other that he was the cousin of Cethegus.¹³

However, Clodius did not only target Cicero's belongings. We have already seen how he managed to make his supporters squat in the temple of Castor and Pollux to establish an immediate power base right at the Forum Romanum, in the centre of Rome. We also know that he had the porticus of Catulus, erected out of the spoils of the war against the Germanic invasion of the Cimbri, destroyed, probably because Q. Lutatius Catulus had been one of the foremost representatives of the optimate resistance to the danger of the *populares*. Indeed, not only had Catulus sided with Sulla to expel Marius, Cornelius Cinna and their supporters from Rome, but he also committed suicide after Cinna and Marius re-occupied Rome in 87 BC and prosecuted him.¹⁴ The porticus itself was adjacent to Catulus' *domus* and located on a ground formerly confiscated from M. Fulvius Flaccus, a supporter of C. Gracchus condemned to death. Cicero would thus explain in his speech '*pro domo sua*':

You, O Quintus Catulus, chose the house of Marcus Fulvius, though he was the father-in-law of your own brother, to be the monument of your victories, in order that every recollection of that man who had embraced designs destructive of the republic should be entirely removed from the eyes and eradicated from the minds of men if, when you were building that portico, any one had said to you that the time would come when

¹³ Cic., *pro domo* 62 (transl. C.D. Yonge, Loeb) (see also *ibid.* 116; App., *bell. civ.* 2.15; Vell. 2.45; Plut., *Cic.* 33; Cass. Dio 38.17.6).

¹⁴ On Q. Lutatius Catulus, see LEWIS 1974; SUERBAUM 2002, pp 447–453.; WALTER 2009.

*that tribune of the people, who had despised the authority of the senate and the opinion of all virtuous men, should injure and overthrow your monument, while the consuls were not looking on only, but even assisting in the work, and should join it to the house of that citizen who as consul had defended the republic in obedience to the authority of the senate; would you not have answered that that could not possibly happen, unless the republic itself was previously overthrown?*¹⁵

The destruction was thus clearly targeted at fulfilling popular resentments, even more so as the porticus displayed many works of art and was considered by Pliny the Elder as one of the most impressive built in the late 2nd century BC, rivalling even with Marius' contemporary Temple of Honour and Virtue.

The allegation that Clodius seems to have displayed the statue of a deceased courtesan on the former ground of Cicero's house in order to be venerated as goddess 'Libertas'¹⁶ could be just a piece of Ciceronian polemic against his enemy, but it fits quite well with the systematic provocation of tradition and elite culture displayed by Clodius, and was doubtless hugely popular with the masses: This deliberate 'cultural bolshevism' was obviously meant to discredit the unwritten rules of behaviour, aesthetics and piety not only important for the Roman republican nobility, but also for the cohesion of the Roman society as a whole. Indeed, if we are to believe Cicero, Clodius tried for his entire life to insult the nobility through his scandalous lifestyle, which included not only an alleged incest with his own sister, but also the violation of the sanctity of the feast of Bona Dea, a religious ceremony reserved only for women, with the intention of seducing Caesar's wife Pompeia, who conducted these ceremonies.¹⁷

These deliberate insults are even more interesting as, after all, they targeted a social class to which Clodius himself belonged, as he was by no means an upstart, but a member of one of the oldest and most powerful patrician families. Hence, it does not come as a surprise that Clodius was not alone in his political actions and cultural provocations, but rather, exactly as Catilina before, accompanied by many members of the Roman 'Jeunesse dorée', as Cicero frequently suggests; a generation which, following Livy, had developed a '*passion for ruining themselves and everything else through self-indulgence and licentiousness*'.¹⁸ And we should also not forget that establishing an image as an 'enfant terrible' and provoking the *optimates* by ridiculing tradition was, as it is today, a practical means of standing out from the mass of would-be politicians and gaining the necessary notoriety and

¹⁵ Cic., pro domo 114.

¹⁶ Cic., pro domo 111–112.

¹⁷ On the Bona Dea scandal, cf. BROUWER 1989; MASTROCINQUE 2014.

¹⁸ Liv., pref. 12 (transl. C. Roberts).

attention from the crowd – at the prize, of course, of the long-term stability of the ‘*mos maiorum*’, the implicit canon of tradition and virtues on which the Republic was built, and whose gradual disappearance was bitterly deplored by politicians such as Cicero:

‘The commonwealth of Rome is founded firm / On ancient customs and on men of might.’ Our poet [i.e. Ennius] seems to have obtained these words, so brief and true, from an oracle. For neither men alone, unless a State is supplied with customs too, nor customs alone, unless there have also been men to defend them, could ever have been sufficient to found or to preserve so long a commonwealth whose dominion extends so far and wide. Thus, before our own time, the customs of our ancestors produced excellent men, and eminent men preserved our ancient customs and the institutions of their forefathers. But though the republic, when it came to us, was like a beautiful painting, whose colours, however, were already fading with age, our own time not only has neglected to freshen it by renewing the original colours, but has not even taken the trouble to preserve its configuration and, so to speak, its general outlines. For what is now left of the ‘ancient customs’ on which he said ‘the commonwealth of Rome’ was ‘founded firm’? They have been, as we see, so completely buried in oblivion that they are not only no longer practised, but are already unknown. And what shall I say of the men? For the loss of our customs is due to our lack of men, and for, this great evil we must not only give an account, but must even defend ourselves in every way possible, as if we were accused of capital crime. For it is through our own faults, not by any accident, that we retain only the form of the commonwealth, but have long since lost its substance.¹⁹

The close connections between the demagogic defender of the simple people and the highest circles of the Roman aristocracy also explain why Clodius’s political acts should not be interpreted in a political vacuum, but rather as an intrinsic part of traditional Roman party politics. Indeed, Clodius by no means acted against the common wishes of the entire Roman elite; to the contrary, many politicians, especially from the *populares*, openly or covertly supported his actions in order to further their own aims. One of the most important, albeit indirect supporters was certainly Cn. Pompey, without whom Clodius would have long since been expelled from Rome. Indeed, Clodius had systematically backed the positions of the triumvirate, the informal alliance between Pompey, Crassus and Caesar, which explains why Cicero’s fight against Clodius became most inopportune to these three men, who therefore did not hinder Clodius’ endeavour to exile Cicero. Only when Clodius, with the backing of Crassus, started to attack first Pompey and then Caesar, did the two men act in favour of recalling Cicero while at the same

¹⁹ Cic., rep. 4.1 (transl. C.W. Keyes)

time backing the establishment of a rival political gang under the tribunes Titus Annius Milo and Publius Sestius, leading thus to continual street-fights. Violence, terror and crime gradually became a permanent state of affairs, the politicisation of which made police intervention more and more difficult and began to block the Roman state completely, until, on the 18th January 52, the clashes finally culminated in a bloody battle between the two main protagonists, Clodius and Milo, in which Clodius was finally slain to the horror of the populace and the joy of the *optimates*; an act which gained sad notoriety in Cicero's defensive speech *Pro Milone* delivered for the benefit of his friend Milo and which eloquently underlines the general disorder.²⁰

However, the general uncertainty had already led to the inevitable realisation that domestic political chaos could not be dealt with while maintaining the traditional constitution, since the veto right common between magistrates of the same rank, which also allowed each of the two consuls, who usually belonged to different factions, to block the other in his official acts, prevented any effective intervention. In the year 52, the Senate finally had to agree, in order to at least prevent the establishment of a dictatorship, to an extraordinary appointment of Pompey, who had long been skilfully manoeuvring between the fronts of the *optimates* and the *populares*, as *consul sine collega*. There were rumours, however, that Pompey was by no means uninvolved in the general disorder, but rather had done everything possible to exacerbate the situation, so as to consolidate his power in Rome and obtain a third consul in view of the imminent expiry of the First Triumvirate and the deterioration of his relations with Caesar. Thus, Appian reports:

For these reasons good men abstained from office altogether, and the disorder was such that at one time the republic was without consuls for eight months, Pompey conniving at the state of affairs in order that there might be need of a dictator. Many citizens began to talk to each other about this, saying that the only remedy for existing evils was the authority of a single ruler, but that there was need of a man who combined strength of character and mildness of temper, thereby indicating Pompey, who had a sufficient army under his command and who appeared to be both a friend of the people and a leader of the Senate by virtue of his rank, a man of temperance and self-control and easy of access, or at all events so considered. The expectation of a dictatorship Pompey discountenanced in words, but in fact he did everything secretly to promote it, and went out of his way to overlook the prevailing disorder and the anarchy consequent upon the disorder.²¹

²⁰ Cf. the description in Cass. Dio 40.48.

²¹ App., *bell. civ.* 2.19–20 (transl. H. White, Loeb).

2.3. The Ideological Background

Of course, such a self-destructive political course would not have been possible without an adequate ideological atmosphere, making it possible to destroy Roman cultural heritage, ridicule religious traditions, plunder and destroy private properties and physically attack politicians. Without a doubt, it was the toxic combination between the social revendications of the impoverished lower and middle classes and the relativist, sometimes even nihilist tendencies of contemporary Hellenistic philosophy which provided the mental background for these events.

Thus, social criticism had become widespread everywhere in the Mediterranean since the 2nd century BC; a period filled with episodes where not only slaves, but also the lower classes, influenced by religious movements and philosophical schools, revolted against the oligarchic rule of wealthy landowners and merchants, and set up short-lived dictatorial regimes. These were characterised by the redistribution of land, the freeing of slaves, the banning or even extermination of the rich, the militarisation of society and the promotion of new civic religions, from the sun-state of Aristonikos and the Spartan revolution through the social stirrings within the members of the Achaian League and the Sicilian slave revolts up to the tribunate of the Gracchi in Rome who famously declared:

‘The wild beasts that roam over Italy,’ he [i.e. Tib. Gracchus] would say, ‘have every one of them a cave or lair to lurk in; but the men who fight and die for Italy enjoy the common air and light, indeed, but nothing else; houseless and homeless they wander about with their wives and children. And it is with lying lips that their imperators exhort the soldiers in their battles to defend sepulchres and shrines from the enemy; for not a man of them has an hereditary altar, not one of all these many Romans an ancestral tomb, but they fight and die to support others in wealth and luxury, and though they are styled masters of the world, they have not a single clod of earth that is their own.’²²

At the same time, resistance to the Roman Empire, where the area of Roman political dominion and the life space of Greco-Roman culture merged so that state and civilisation became inseparable, grew inexorably, as did the hatred of those who did not belong to the empire and wanted to retain their individuality, grew. This, of course, applied first of all to the ‘barbarians’, to whom the Romans themselves ascribed an ideological criticism of their empire that revealed the utter fragility of their own ideology of civilisation. Even though Tacitus, writing under the empire, is a fairly late source, his description of the speech the rebellious Briton Calgacus

²² Plut., Tib. Gracch. 9.4 (transl. B. Perrin, Loeb).

allegedly pronounced before the battle of Mons Graupius certainly reflect many aspects of the lucid self-criticism already in use during the Late Republic:

*Robbers of the world, having by their universal plunder exhausted the land, they [i.e. the Romans] rifle the deep. If the enemy be rich, they are rapacious; if he be poor, they lust for dominion; neither the east nor the west has been able to satisfy them. Alone among men they covet with equal eagerness poverty and riches. To robbery, slaughter, plunder, they give the lying name of empire; they make a solitude and call it peace.*²³

But even from the ranks of the Greeks came resistance to the Roman idea of imperial civilisation and peace, as is demonstrated by the rebellion of the Greeks of Asia Minor against Rome led by Mithridates, the King of Pontus,²⁴ which was comparable in its consequences only to 11th September 2001. The so-called Vespers of Ephesos cost the lives of 80,000 Romans and Italians in Asia Minor, and confronted Rome for the first time in its history with the full extent of the hatred which the provincial inhabitants were able to bring to their administration,²⁵ so that the Romans had to abandon their previous idea of indirect rule over the Orient and, in the following decades, systematically reorganised the entire Levant by founding numerous new cities, establishing provinces and, above all, raising to power new kings and dynasties.²⁶ The hatred was naturally directed on the one hand against the Roman tax collectors, but on the other hand also against the Roman claim of not governing their provinces on the mere basis of the right of the strongest, as had been customary until now, but as a result of justly fought wars and for the benefit of their subjects - a combination of power politics and the claim to justice which had already met with massive criticism from philosophers in Antiquity, as is shown, for example, by the speech reproduced in Lactantius, which the Academic philosopher Carneades gave in 156 BC., to the horror of the senatorial upper class in Rome, and which may explain why not only the subjects, but also the poorer Roman citizens themselves came to loathe the empire and the senatorial elite:

The substance of his disputation was this: 'That men enacted laws for themselves, with a view to their own advantage, differing indeed according to their characters, and in the case of the same persons often changed according to the times: but that there was no natural law: that all, both men and other animals, were borne by the guidance of nature to their own advantage; therefore that there was no justice, or if any did exist, it was the greatest folly, because it injured itself by promoting the interests of others.'

²³ Tac., Agr. 30 (transl. S. Bryant).

²⁴ See in general MCGING 1986; MAYOR 2009.

²⁵ App., Mithr. 85–88 und 91s.

²⁶ Cf. KALLET-MARX 1995.

*And he brought forward these arguments: 'That all nations which flourished with dominion, even the Romans themselves, who were masters of the whole world, if they wish to be just, that is, to restore the possessions of others, must return to cottages, and lie down in want and miseries.'*²⁷

Finally, it should be mentioned that such a critical, alternative view of Roman history was not limited to social revolts and Hellenistic philosophy alone: it also entered certain strands of Roman historiography and thus political thought. Unfortunately, most of what is called the Roman 'Annalistic' has been lost, but the fragments of these studies, conserved through quotations in other authors, make it possible to at least reconstruct the general attitude of some of its more important proponents. One of the clearest examples seems to have been Gaius Licinius Macer,²⁸ born around 110, tribune in 73 and praetor in 68, who died shortly after having been accused of corruption by Cicero. He is the author of a probably unfinished 'History of Rome' which was renowned for its tendency to project much of the popular dissatisfaction with the ruling elite unto the city's remote past. Sallust ridicules him in his own 'Histories', where he renders a speech allegedly given by Macer, and it is no surprise that he not only insists on the latter's endeavour to instrumentalise, and probably even largely invent, past events to promote political agitation in the present, but also ascribes to him an inflationary use of the word '*libertas*', whose importance we already saw when discussing Clodius' propaganda:

*If you did not realize, fellow citizens, what a difference there is between the rights left you by your forefathers and this slavery imposed upon you by Sulla, I should be obliged to make a long speech and to inform you because of what wrongs, and how often, the plebeians took up arms and seceded from the patricians; and how they won the tribunes of the commons as the defenders of their rights. But as it is, I have only to encourage you and to precede you on the road which, in my opinion, leads to the recovery of your liberties. I am not unaware how great is the power of the nobles, whom I alone, powerless, am trying to drive from their tyranny by the empty semblance of a magistracy; and I know how much more secure a faction of wicked men is than any upright man alone. But in addition to the fair hopes which you have inspired and which have dispelled my fear, I have decided that defeat in a struggle for liberty is for a brave man better than never to have struggled at all.*²⁹

²⁷ Cic., rep. 3.7.21 (in: Lact., inst. 5,17) (transl. W. Fletcher).

²⁸ On Licinius Macer, see WALT 1997; CORNELL et al. 2013. nr. 27.

²⁹ Sall., hist. 3.48 Maurenbrecher (transl. P. McGushin).

2.4. Further examples

Not only would it lead much too far in this context to dwell extensively on other examples from history; it would also be problematic from a scholarly point of view, as our source material is not nearly so extensive as in the case of the Roman Republic, so that it would be quite hazardous to flesh out our meagre information with suppositions which might very well be true, but cannot be immediately confirmed through direct testimonies. Nevertheless, in order to show that the Late Roman Republic was by no means the only civilisation witnessing a comparable period of crisis of tradition and memory, let us quickly refer to three further cases.³⁰

Thus, already in Egypt in the late 14th century B.C., Akhenaten,³¹ whose totalitarian characteristics have often been stressed in research, not only attempted to strip the Amun-clergy of its wealth by disbanding all cults and/or diverting their income to his new, quasi-monotheist cult of Aten, but also defaced inscriptions mentioning other gods, re-wrote the history of the past and imposed himself as sole mediator between Aten and the masses, to bypass the traditional religious elites. Despite utopian claims of having inaugurated an ideal age of universal bliss, his regime was characterised by the corruption of officials, failures of the new centralism, the expense of gigantic projects such as the construction of Amarna, as well as the increasing influence of the army, and left a longstanding memory of trauma. The shortcomings of Atenism led to the downfall of Akhenaten's regime and beliefs after his death, and the short restauration of the exploitive economic structures of the priesthood of Amun under the reigns of the kings of the late 18th dynasty. However, the Amarna period left deep scars, and explains the ultimate rise to power of the 19th dynasty and thus the Ramesside era in the 13th century BC, combining a traditionalist outlook on Egyptian culture and religion with social preoccupations and strong centralism.³²

A further, though generally less well-known example, comes from the early 6th century A.D. in Sasanian Iran. Here, it was the religious movement of the Mazdakites³³ which rose against the wealthy land-owning elite that controlled the

³⁰ See also ENGELS 2018d.

³¹ On Akhenaten, cf. BERTRAM 1953; DODSON 2014; HOFFMEIER 2015; HORNING 1995; LABOURY 2010; REEVES 2000.

³² On the post-Amarna and Ramesside restauration, cf. DODSON 2009; JAMES 2002; KITCHEN 1983.

³³ On the Mazdakites, see CHRISTENSEN 1925; CRONE 1991; KLIMA 1957; WIESEHÖFER 2009; YARSHATER 1983.

major state structures. With the initial support of the ruling king, Kavadh I, who hoped to strengthen his empire against the very influential nobility of the time, the Mazdakites abolished private property, imposed a 'community of women' and thus made patrilineal heredity impossible. They confiscated land and riches, and challenged the Zoroastrian clergy in order to set up a utopian and egalitarian state. Here too, the experience of violence, social disorder and anti-traditionalist iconoclasm left Iranian civilisation scarred. The counter-revolution of the wealthy classes led to a long period of political chaos, from which it could only be saved by the authoritarian reforms of king Chosroes I in the 6th century AD.³⁴ Chosroes endeavoured to restore the ancestral social and religious order, while improving, at the same time, the living conditions and moral education of the simple people and fortifying the political position of the 'king of kings'.

In the Islamic world as well, the extreme social injustice of the late Abbasid era was contested by numerous communist movements, most notably the Qarmatians.³⁵ Influenced by the increasingly popularised social doctrines of the Isma'ili movement, the Qarmatians promoted the redistribution of land, preached an egalitarian, communist society based on collectivised slave labour forces, successfully founded a state which controlled much of southern Iraq and the Persian Gulf Coast in the 10th century, and opposed many traditional religious rituals such as pilgrimage, fasting and Friday prayer; even closing down mosques and pillaging Mecca, which lastingly discredited them in the eyes of all Muslims. In the post-Classic Islamic world, the Qarmatian State gradually declined during the 10th century AD, through the endeavours of the rich merchants who controlled the Arabian trade routes, and who were endangered by the Qarmatian raids and social reforms. However, the new hegemonic power of the Islamic world, the Fatimids, who, after an initial alliance, were instrumental in the Qarmatians' final demise, took over many of the latter's ideological features and social claims, though they restored most of the traditional ritual forms of Islam and its society, despite their own Isma'ili identity.³⁶

³⁴ On Chosroes, compare BÖRM 2008; HOWARD-JOHNSTON 2008; JULLIEN 2015; RUBIN 1995.

³⁵ On the Qarmatians, see DE GOEJE 1886; IVANOW 1942; LEWIS 1940; RAMAHI – QUINTERN 2005.

³⁶ On the end of the Qarmatians, see DE GOEJE 1895; MADELUNG 1959. On the Fatimids, see BRETT 2001; HALM 1991; HALM 2003; LEV 1992.

3. Conclusions

To sum up, it would appear that the events happening presently throughout the Western World can by no means be considered as unique or exceptional, but correspond broadly to a phase of dangerous crisis and transformation which has also affected many other civilisations. Thus, the rise of an egalitarian ideology, the re-writing of history, the attacks on the spiritual as well as material heritage of the past, the instrumentalisation of historical guilt, civil unrest and the endeavour to grab absolute power, often in cooperation with parts of the ruling elite – all these features seem by no means unusual, but rather describe a standard stage in the development of many late civilisations.

If this is the case, what can we learn from such an observation? On the one hand, we can understand that the current evolution is not a passing accident in the history of the West, but an evolution that seems to be an intrinsic part in the developmental dynamic of many civilisations. This should, of course, not deflect our vision from the individual responsibilities behind the nefarious evolutions our society is suffering just now, but it could at least help us to understand their meaning, and perhaps even their necessity as a mere transition. Another important point to realise is that the comparison with other civilisations may help us to predict at least broadly the further evolution caused by the current crisis. Unfortunately, this does not imply good news. Instead of coming again to its senses and re-establishing a new concord between the fighting factions of society, the unrest will increase still further and, at one point or another, lead to a major disruption and trauma for the entire civilisation, before, at the end of a decade-long process, provoking general exhaustion, or, in the words of Appian:

Repeatedly the parties came into open conflict, often carrying daggers; and from time to time in the temples, or the assemblies, or the forum, some tribune, or praetor, or consul, or candidate for these offices, or some person otherwise distinguished, would be slain. Unseemly violence prevailed almost constantly, together with shameful contempt for law and justice. As the evil gained in magnitude open insurrections against the government and large warlike expeditions against their country were undertaken by exiles, or criminals, or persons contending against each other for some office or military command. There arose chiefs of factions quite frequently, aspiring to supreme power, some of them refusing to disband the troops entrusted to them by the people, others even hiring forces against each other on their own account, without public authority. Whenever either side first got possession of the city, the opposition party made war

*nominally against their own adversaries, but actually against their country. They assailed it like an enemy's capital, and ruthless and indiscriminate massacres of citizens were perpetrated. Some were proscribed, others banished, property was confiscated, and prisoners were even subjected to excruciating tortures.*³⁷

Only at the final end of this ordeal, the people as well as its elite will finally submit to those parties and leaders who have successfully displayed their ability to attract a sufficient number of armed followers, to create law and order, to build up solid political alliances and, most importantly, to succeed in winning the war of propaganda.

Augustus, Ramses II, Khosroes or the Fatimids: They all managed not only to establish their rule on the basis of military power or economic success, but also to present themselves as defenders of a cultural restoration, building thus a new civilisational cohesion by fully endorsing the legacy of tradition and history without, however, excluding all those citizens and allies who, though from a foreign background, wished to integrate and assimilate. Thus, history, from an object of shame, loathing and hate, became once again a central element in the self-identification of the respective civilisations, and many of those witnesses of the past previously destroyed, defiled or forgotten were restored to their old glory, at least outwardly.

Of course, as is most obvious in the case of Augustus, such a restoration was usually accompanied by a centralisation of power in the hands of a ruler or magistrate able to wield it not in the short but in the long-term, and this was barely feasible in republican, oligarchic or aristocratic systems characterised by short-term legislative periods, collegial vetoes and the paralysis often induced by check and balances. However, it is to be noticed that, at least in the case of the Roman Republic, the civil disorder and discredit that the Senatorial Republic had brought upon itself were such that nobody, not even the members of the elite, seems to have seen the transformation of the Republic into the Principate as a major loss, as they were only too aware that the end of the Republic was not an accident, but the inevitable consequence of its numerous inherent contradictions which, for a time, were the very roots of its success, but then became the reasons for its depravation and downfall.

It may thus be a further lesson of history to realise that, as is the case for a living organism, great civilisations have their developmental stages too, and that, just as with life itself, history is not an 'open' process, but rather subject to a series of

³⁷ App., bell. civ. 1.2 (transl. H. White, Loeb).

contingencies which we may have to accept – however grudgingly – as the ancient Romans did. This need can be most clearly exemplified when considering the Augustan historian Livy who, in the preamble to his work, wrote the following description of the fundamental tragedy of his own times, where political order, social harmony and cultural pride could only be restored at the price of accepting the fact that their balance had henceforth to be guaranteed by the authority of the princeps; a political ‘remedy’ as intolerable, though inevitable, as the previous, self-inflicted disorder:

I would have every man apply his mind seriously to consider these points, viz. what their life and what their manners were; through what men and by what measures, both in peace and in war, their empire was acquired and extended; then, as discipline gradually declined, let him follow in his thoughts their morals, at first as slightly giving way, anon how they sunk more and more, then began to fall headlong, until he reaches the present times, when we can neither endure our vices, nor their remedies.³⁸

³⁸ Liv., pref. 7-8 (transl. D. Spillan).

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Demography and Migration

Population boom in the Muslim world: causes and consequences

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Abstract

The migration crisis suffered by Europe was primarily caused by the social and economic tensions prevailing in the Muslim world from the Middle East through the Near East to the Maghreb (North Africa), i.e. from Tajikistan to Morocco. This crisis manifested in the dramatic events of the ‘Arab Spring’, the Syrian civil war (Sunni-Shiite conflict), the emergence of the Islamic State, the outbreak of the migration crisis, and the ‘neverending’ war in Afghanistan. We have already explained many times that the mentioned events are not the ‘disease’ itself, but rather only their ‘symptoms’. From the perspective of Europe, one of the most shocking conclusions is that we are unable to treat even the ‘symptoms’, never mind the ‘disease’.

We can identify the tremendous demographic boom behind the above dramatic events that fundamentally changed the overall picture of the three analysed regions. According to UN data (from the *Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division*), we can see a massive growth in the total population of 28 states in the analysed regions over the past 70 years, from 193,416,897 in 1955 to 879,038,864 in 2018. This average population growth of 454% found the countries of these regions unprepared. This demographic stress effect is one of the most important social tensions – perhaps even the most prominent one – that led to the above events from the year 2012 on.

However, this process is still ongoing. Population growth continues in the already stressed three regions also responsible for sending millions of emigrants. According to UN forecast (from the *Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division*), the total population of the three regions will grow to 1,282,578,210 between 2020 and 2050 (medium scenario). This further growth of 403,539,346 will exacerbate the already severe challenges faced by the three Muslim regions – and, unfortunately, will cause troubles for Europe as well. As of today, Europe would already be unable to admit all those leaving the three regions (not to mention migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). This population is expected to grow by a number corresponding to the population of the whole EU by 2050 (if we include the population growth of Sub-

Saharan Africa). This additional explosive growth will mean an unbearable burden on the Muslim states of the regions concerned, triggering further emigration waves.

Keywords: : demography, overpopulation, Middle East and North Africa, Muslim world

1. Introduction

This study aims to map the demographic trends which characterise the broader Muslim region from the Middle East through the Near East to the Maghreb (from Tajikistan to Morocco). This broader region has witnessed dramatic population growth over the past decades, and according to a UN forecast (from the *Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division*), this dramatic growth – already leading to a migration crisis – will continue, even if at a slightly lower pace (*see below*), and will fundamentally affect the future of Europe in the form of a more severe migratory pressure in the short to medium term.

As we already know from ancient civilisations in the Near East, in times when the carrying capacity of an area is exceeded by the population of a given community living there, a stress effect emerges that typically triggers definite (violent) responses. Such response may be population movement (the settlement of Akkadians in Sumer, the migration of Hebrew tribes to Canaan, or population movements in the Migration Period), conquest (Assyrian Empire) or colonisation (ancient Greek colonisation), all resulting in conflicts with neighbouring societies. The modern version of this is reflected in the principle elaborated by Huntington, who argued that in societies where the share of male population aged 15–25 (predominantly at the age of mandatory military service) approaches 20%, a revolution, uprising or war, i.e. an armed conflict, can be foreseen. According to Huntington, examples include the conflict in Chechnya and the Iranian Islamic revolution (1979),¹ but many analysts similarly see the Iraq-Iran war (1980–1988) as a tool for ‘addressing’ the problem of excess population. Based on some estimates, the latter war resulted in the death of 800,000 Iranian and 400,000 Iraqi soldiers. There is no doubt that if we examine the 2011 demographic situation of the Arab countries affected by the revolutionary events of the ‘Arab Spring’ (*see below*), the results will conform to Huntington’s theory. This series of events – the world’s first semi-spontaneous experimental revolution organised online – logically mobilised these social groups,

¹ Decades before the ‘Arab Spring’, Huntington already foresaw that Egypt would face the same threat.

and especially young men who have little chance, for instance, to get a job, to establish their first relationship, and to start a family. They were the ones who took to the streets, and those leaving for Europe during the migration crisis also came from this segment.

Even prior to conducting a detailed analysis, the possibility arises that the tolerated, inspired or eventually supported migration of the excess population may play a key role in the European migrant crisis (*see* the composition of migrant groups).² This overpopulation, and the corresponding social, political and economic tensions ('Arab Spring', Syrian Civil War, emergence and early successes of the Islamic State, ancient rivalry between the Sunnis and Shiites manifesting once again in armed conflict, the migration crisis) played a crucial role in the decision of the UN – where net sending countries represent a 75% majority³ – to make free movement and settlement across borders a fundamental human right, while clearly being aware of the demographic forecasts also used herein (projections which might even have shocked the organisation, leading to such a decision).

2. Background of population growth

We have witnessed dramatic population growth in the Muslim world over the past 70 years. The total population of the Muslim world has more than quadrupled in the analysed regions (*Figs. 1–29*). The main causes explaining this dramatic growth are as follows:

1. Sociological aspects. The growth is clearly associated with sociological factors like the improvement of healthcare and services. As in the past, these factors will play its part in the population growth of the two regions in the future as well: due to decreasing child mortality⁴ and increasing life expectancy for older age groups,⁵ their weight within society, and average age, are all expected to grow in the future (*Fig. 29*).

² For instance, from among the 173,947 migrants registered in Hungary, 45,376 (26.1%) were Afghan nationals, including 37,535 men (82.6%), 6,609 persons (14.5%) aged 14–17, 23,707 persons (52.2%) aged 18–34, and 2,457 men (5.4%) aged between 35–64 (see below, *Figs. 33, 34*). These figures well illustrate that a modern population movement fuelled by social causes underlies the migrant crisis.

³ Presentation by Balázs Orbán at the conference titled *The interest of Hungary. Challenges of the UN migration compact* (2 March 2018).

⁴ From the 1950's to the year 2000, the number of deaths per 1,000 live births fell from 200 to 50, which is a significant improvement. – ROUDI-FAHIMI 2001.

⁵ See *Fig. 32*, the growth in the 60+ age group between 2015 and 2050 based on UN data.

2. **Socio-structural aspects.** The social fabric of the analysed regions – regardless of the fact that they have been living in state-based societies for millennia (kingdom, caliphate, sultanate, republic) – are still characterised by very strict family ties. As the primary source of identity, family, large family, clan and tribe shape societies in all regions of the Muslim world, whose interests and values are usually given prominence over state institutions.⁶ This family-orientation also facilitates population growth.
3. **Gender composition.** Unlike in the West, men make up the majority within societies in the Muslim world (*see Figs. 31, 32*). The fact that Muslim societies are characterised by a majority of males (by a ratio of 51-49%, or even greater) further deteriorates the chances of starting a sexual relationship or a family. This imbalance was an important direct or indirect factor behind the migration crisis, and is still at play today.
4. **Religious, cultural aspects.** The key root causes include some factors that were not emphasised in various studies, or in arguments elaborated in security policy analyses discussing the future challenges of the Middle and Near East and North Africa (Maghreb) – perhaps for reason of political correctness. This set of factors is based on a number of religious and cultural determinations.⁷

The social possibility and acceptance of premarital sexual life are completely missing in the Muslim world (from Afghanistan to Morocco). Virginity is a requirement of marriage for girls. In the Muslim world, sexual life outside marriage is essentially absent. Adultery is hardly accepted in terms of religion and social norms. ‘Guilty’ girls and women are severely stigmatised by society. In the Muslim world, abortion is not accepted and is hardly known. It is accepted only exceptionally, in justified health-related cases. The acceptance of divorce is rather low in the Muslim world. Polygamy is still a common phenomenon. It further narrowed the possibilities of starting a family among the poor and young, a factor still exerting its effects today.

Overall, it can be concluded that the mentioned religious/cultural norms make up the world’s strongest and most rigorous organisation of families and relatives (large

⁶ Evidence from Afghanistan – and, seeing the operation of the Islamic State, more recently from Syria and Iraq – shows that clan and tribal armies make the most important armed forces in the analysed regions, in addition to state armies. These were equipped by the US in Iraq for the fight against the Islamic State, but such armed groups – led by clan head warlords – also made up the dominant part of the armed forces of the Islamic State and of the ‘democratic opposition’ in Syria.

⁷ For the situation and rights of Muslim women in light of Muslim traditions, see MRI 2019.

families, clans). Breaking out of this organization, which is partly responsible for the explosive population growth, is extremely difficult. The people of Europe cannot comprehend how indestructible this dense – and, from a Western perspective, archaic – set of family ties is, resisting all challenges posed by Western civilization, and also making migrant communities largely immune to the West's integration efforts. The sanctity of family and relatives protect these communities from the effects of Western-type development which they consider to be undesirable or even valueless.

3. Trends in population growth

The data series for the three analysed regions need to be assessed retrospectively (1955–2018), in light of current data series, and by considering the calculated and prospective forecasts for 2020–2050. This assessment cannot simply include net population growth (population) or percentages, but should also cover the average age, fertility rate, etc. In this chapter, we analyse these trends, along with the short-term, medium-term and long-term consequences of changes. We take our data series from the UN *Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division*⁸ and *Worldometers*⁹ that uses the same UN data.

3.1 Population growth 1955–2018

1) Cumulative population growth (1955–2018). The analysis of net population growth in the examined countries and the two/three regions from 1955 to date (*Figs. 1–28* present detailed country data, while *Fig. 29* presents selected country data) shows the following overall picture.

	1955	2018	1955–2018 (growth)		2017–2018 (growth)		Average age (2018)	Fertility rate (2018)
Afghanistan	8,270,581	36,373,176	439%	28,102,595	2.37%	843,095	17.6	5.07
Pakistan	40,424,296	200,813,818	496%	160,389,522	1.93%	3,797,863	22.7	3.65
Iran	19,293,999	82,011,735	425%	62,717,736	1.05%	848,947	30.1	1.72
Iraq	6,502,657	39,339,753	605%	32,837,096	2.78%	1,065,135	19.5	4.47
Syria	3,911,501	21,018,834	537%	17,107,333	2.82%	544,845	21.5	3.35
Saudi Arabia	3,558,155	33,554,343	943%	29,996,188	1.87%	616,130	30.2	2.67

⁸ UN EcoSoc 2019.

⁹ WORLDOMETERS 2017. (www.Worldometers.info). Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

	1955	2018	1955–2018 (growth)		2017–2018 (growth)		Average age (2018)	Fertility rate (2018)
Yemen	4,767,587	28,915,284	606%	24,147,697	2.35%	664,864	19.4	4.28
Turkey	24,270,585	81,916,871	337%	57,646,286	1.45%	1,171,851	30.2	2.10
Egypt	23,523,384	99,375,741	422%	75,852,357	1.87%	1,822,590	24.8	3.33
Sudan	6,549,298	41,511,526	633%	34,962,228	2.41%	978,196	19.0	4.69
Algeria	9,929,719	42,008,054	427%	32,178,335	1.67%	689,912	27.8	2.90
Morocco	10,502,666	36,191,805	344%	25,689,139	1.27%	452,225	28.3	2.56
Hunary		9,688,847			-0.34%	-32,712	42	1.3

Figure 1 Demographic trends in selected countries of the Muslim world.

The Muslim world witnessed an explosive population growth in the last more than 70 years (within the territorial boundaries finalised after World War II). Values in the third column of *Figure 1* show rates of growth ranging from 400% to 600%. This means that the total population of the three analysed regions of the Muslim world grew from 193 million in 1955 to 879 million in 2018, and is expected to further increase to 1.3 billion by 2050 (*Figure 2*).

	1955	2018	2050
Near East	89,870,570	478,120,358	722,557,421
Middle East*	47,952,374	163,701,250	201,097,436
North Africa	55,593,953	237,217,256	358,923,353
Total	193,416,897	879,038,864	1,282,578,210

* Turkey and the predominantly Turkish speaking Central Asian, former Soviet republics.

Figure 2 Growth in the number of Muslims in the three examined regions of the Muslim world.

2) Annual population growth (2017–2018) If we take a look at UN¹⁰ data series (*see Figs. 1–29*), we also see a dramatic annual population growth in the three examined regions. This analysed population growth already reflects the slowing rate foreseen by population research institutes, but still envisages a high growth rate. By today, the 3–6% annual growth rate prevailing decades ago has slowed down to ‘only’ 2%, but the net numbers still continue to exceed previous years’ growth. If we wish to illustrate this in a concrete example, Pakistan, for instance, had an average annual population growth rate well over 3% between 1980 and 1990, corresponding to an annual population growth of 2.2–3 million. The annual growth rate has slowed down to around 2% in the last 3 years, but this means 3.7–3.8 million a year, since a 3% annual growth in a society of 80 million is not at all the same as a 2% annual growth in a society of 200

¹⁰ UN EcoSoc 2019.

million.¹¹ Data series in *Figure 3* clearly show that the population of Pakistan alone grows by Hungary's total population every 2.5 years, so it only takes a decade for the country population to grow by four times that of Hungary!

	Population	Annual growth rate	Annual population growth
2018	200,813,818	1.93%	3,797,863
2017	197,015,955	1.97%	3,812,479
2016	193,203,476	2.02%	3,822,963
2015	189,380,513	2.12%	3,764,066
1990	107,678,614	3.15%	3,091,825
1985	92,219,488	3.39%	2,830,269
1980	78,068,144	3.17%	2,256,049

Figure 3 Annual population growth of Pakistan in selected years (*Fig. 2*).

Figure 4 shows the overall development of population figures in the three analysed regions. It is apparent that the predominantly Muslim population of the three analysed regions grows by 15-16 million a year. Over just four years this is a growth comparable to the population of France or Great Britain.

	Middle and Near East	Middle and Near East (Turkish speaking)	North Africa	Total
2017	8,857,704	2,386,722	4,204,098	15,448,524
2016	9,183,236	2,431,601	4,237,407	15,852,244
2015	9,728,854	2,415,628	4,155,905	16,300,387

Figure 4 Population growth of the three analysed regions.

3) Average age. One of the most shocking population statistics of the analysed societies is average age (*Figs. 1–28*). It is not fundamentally the population trends which should be used for analysing data series for the selected most populated – and politically most relevant – countries; rather, we should take a security policy approach with regard to internal social processes. The countries concerned can be divided into two groups:

- 1) The average age ranges between 17.6 and 24.9 years. The countries falling in this category (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Egypt and Sudan) have all faced some kind of armed conflict. Pakistan may be an exception,

¹¹ Add to this the fact that the setback in population growth due to a decreasing willingness to have children is somewhat counterbalanced the rising average age and increasing life expectancy.

where the system attempts to address internal social tensions. All the other countries have witnessed some kind of armed conflict in recent years.

- 2) The average age ranges between 27.8 and 30.2 years. It is apparent that the countries falling into this category (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Algeria and Morocco) were able to successfully stay out of the 'Arab Spring', and more or less avoided being involved in the armed conflicts which have unfolded from 2011 to date. Three of them (Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) have even managed to strengthen their regional power position – at the expense of others. Iran – as pointed out by S.P. Huntington – already went through this age-related social conflict decades ago in the late 1970's and 1980's, when the 'Islamic revolution' (1978-1979) and the Iraq-Iran War (22 September 1980 – 20 August 1988) eased this generational pressure through a large number of casualties (approx. 800,000 men of mandatory military service age).

The data can be analysed more precisely by taking a look at Table 32 (*Fig. 32*), which shows the composition of the male population of selected countries by age groups. According to another principle elaborated by Huntington, if the share of young males aged 15–25/30 reaches a critical level (around 20%) in a society, then an armed conflict will be inevitable in the given society.¹² By looking at the history of the Middle and Near East and the Maghreb over recent decades, we can identify armed conflicts (from the Iraq-Iran War to the 'Arab Spring', or from the emergence of the Islamic State to the Yemeni civil war) which could all be associated with low average age and imbalanced age group composition. These two elements were at play in the above-mentioned conflicts because these age groups had suffered the most from economic problems and unemployment, so the extreme ideologies and revolutionary atmosphere could spread most widely and rapidly among them.

- 4) **Fertility rate.** The fertility rate is another statistical indicator that can be compared to similar indicators of other societies, describing the difference resulting in the dramatic overpopulation of the analysed Muslim societies, corresponding conflicts, and finally in a migration crisis. It is very visibly the countries with the highest fertility rates which suffer the most from conflicts.
- 5) **Willingness to have children.** In contrast to decreasing willingness in the West to have children, the Muslim world is still characterised by high fertility. Consequently, societies in the West not only suffer from dramatically low

¹² The problem is further compounded by the extremely high (over 50%) share of young males aged 15–25/30 in the parallel societies, closed systems of migrant communities arriving in Europe, in particular due to the composition of recently arrived migrant communities and its corresponding distortive effect. This results in a stronger radicalisation compared to other communities.

fertility rates, but at the same time, as a result of delayed childbearing, in the West one century can cover only 3 generations, while this number is 4 or 5 in the Muslim world.

3.2 Population growth 2020–2050

Beyond overviews of historical trends in these population data series, we have to analyse the UN's official population forecasts as well, and more concretely their medium variant scenario. These data series (*Figs. 1–29*) are the most up-to-date official UN forecasts, which are universally accepted and used.

1) Cumulated population growth (2020–2050) According to the model calculations of the UN *Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division*, all the three examined regions will continue to undergo rapid population growth by global standards. If we examine the relevant forecasts for key countries, we can see all of them facing an increase in population. Based on the projections, some will experience a 10% growth (Iran and Turkey), some will grow by third of their population (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco), while others will have their population nearly doubled (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Sudan).

If we examine the population of the key countries, their total estimated 2020 population of 735,863,781 will grow to 1,055,532,341 – i.e. by 319 million – by 2050, reaching its 143% level. As already discussed above (*Figure 2*), the total population of these three Muslim regions alone will reach almost 1.3 billion (even in the medium variant), which will be more than double Europe's population.

2) Other population indicators (2020–2050) Based on the model calculations of the UN *Department of Economic and Social Affairs*, all indicators used to describe the pace of population growth indicate growth. Although all the three relevant data series – annual population growth rate, average age and fertility rate – envisage a 'flattening dynamic', the continued population boom is hard to hide.

Annual population growth rate. According to UN forecasts, the annual population growth rate will gradually decrease over the next 30 years, and will fall below 1% in countries where the average age already reaches 28–30 years (*see above*, Turkey, Iran, Algeria and Morocco). The other countries will see a drop to between 1 and 2%. Nevertheless, these values are set to remain high, since the population of Afghanistan will still grow by 687,402 annually in 2050,

while this growth figure for Pakistan and Iraq is foreseen to be 2,854,546 and 1,589,062, respectively. This is simply explained by the fact that the base value of population – the annual growth rate of which is expected to fall to around 1% – will already be rather high by 2050.

Model calculations predict a slowly increasing *average age*, which will reduce the pace of population decline besides a moderating population growth rate, since people will live longer.

The decrease in the *fertility rate* will fall to between 2 and 3 – which is still very high by European standards – giving a further possible explanation for the medium- and long-term population growth of the Muslim world.

3.3 Gender composition

Based on data from the UN, the World Bank (*Fig. 31*) and the Pew Research Center¹³, we can observe an opposite trend in gender composition in the analysed regions compared to European – and even global – developments. Data in Table 31 (*Fig. 31*) shows that most Muslim states in the world rank at the very end of the country list based on the number of women per man. In the Gulf states, the large number of guest workers distorts the picture, but the majority of key states (where we do not find masses of guest workers) rank similarly. Add to this the phenomenon of polygamy, which, according to historical tradition, provides wealthier families with the opportunity to have more children.

4. The future of Europe

Demographic scenarios

The key question, based on the above analysis, reads as follows: what further changes will the outlined demographic trends and resulting migration crisis entail for the future of Europe, beyond those we have already witnessed? We may even ask: is the future we hoped for and believed in endangered? The past and future demographic boom of the examined regions and the resulting current and future migratory pressure could give rise to the following key effects.

¹³ PRC 2015.

1. The most recent population growth scenarios for the European Muslim community by 2050 were published by the Pew Research Center¹⁴ (*see below*). These scenarios are determined by two factors: the higher population growth rate of Muslims already living in Europe in comparison to the indigenous peoples of Europe, and the level of immigration. Seeing the ideas of the West's political elite, unfortunately, we have to consider the high-migration scenario the most likely from among the low, medium and high versions (*Figure 5*). According to this scenario, the Muslim population of Europe will grow from 19.5 million to 75.6 million by 2050 (i.e. in 30 years' time), meaning it will almost quadruple. As a result, Muslims will represent 14% of Europe's total population (*Figure 5*). Within this, the Muslim population will reach 30.6% in Sweden, 28.3% in Cyprus, 19.9% in Austria, 19.7% in Germany, 18.2% in Belgium, 18% in France, 17.2% in Great Britain, 17% in Norway, 16% in Denmark and 15.2% in the Netherlands, respectively. These percentages will be sufficient to trigger social and cultural processes that will result in irreversible changes. Any of these scenarios including the effect of migration foresees not necessarily a complete loss of Europe's identity, but at least some significant changes to it by 2050. In possession of these projections, the Western, globalist political ideas supporting the settlement of a large number of migrants – seeing this phenomenon as highly desirable – are clearly unaware:
 - 1) of the power of Islam and the negative side effects of these demographic developments. They hope that the Western liberal philosophy, lifestyle and conception of democracy (including the valuable achievements of gender equality and respect for otherness) will be stronger than Islam, thus successfully breaking up the highly dense Islamic fabric of society based on families/relatives/clans which has defied all social challenges for millennia. They hope that Western moral values will overcome the moral system of Islam. They hope that the economic productivity and a strong work ethic will remain the dominant economic principle, etc.
 - 2) or, even worse, they are supportive of the cultural, philosophical, economic and social changes (which we consider to be undesired) that will completely and fatally change the image of Europe.
2. However, in the shadow of migration, the world-conquering ambitions of Islamic extremisms will have a wide range of new opportunities. Firstly, terrorist activities and fighters can be transferred into Europe,¹⁵ and, in addition, the new

¹⁴ PRC 2017.

¹⁵ See the author's study under preparation on foreign fighters travelling to the Near East and then returning to Europe.

wave of ‘community-organising’ and ‘conversion’ activities can endanger the territorial, political, ethnical, cultural, etc. integrity of Europe, further boosting the pace of Islamisation. This security policy change – partly concerning public security – will fuel and intensify debates on the future of Europe.

3. Globalist groups in the West intend to exploit the political chaos in Europe caused by the migration crisis to achieve their own short- and medium-term political goals, to speed up European integration, and to fight their political/ideological battle in a scenario that improves their chances of victory.

	2010	2016	2050		
			zero migration	medium migration	high migration
Muslims	19.5	25.8	35.8	57.9	75.6
non-Muslims	495.3	495.1	445.9	459.1	463.0
total	514.8	520.8	481.7	516.9	538.6
share of Muslims	3.78%	4.95%	7.43%	11.20%	14.03%

Figure 5 Shift between the share of Muslim and non-Muslim population in Europe based on the calculation of Pew Research Center.

5. The impact of the demographic boom on the societies concerned¹⁶

1. Ancient historians, archaeologists and social anthropologists (such as Esther Boserup, Robert Carneiro, etc.) considered the (stress) effect of population growth on a given society as one of the key historical driving forces in the course of examining the development of ancient societies. This stress effect led to the intensification of internal resource gathering (more intensive production), extensive growth (conquering of new resources) or colonisation (attainment of new resources and decrease of surplus population). The most typical effect was an armed conflict between adjacent systems, and, as a result, the development of new systems. Many scholars used improved Malthusian principles for their theories.
2. The societies concerned will face growing internal tensions. The most important manifestations of this include unemployment, difficulties of making a living, a widening gap between the poor and the rich, all putting a burden on society and all of its subsystems. Unfortunately, overpopulation entrenches the

¹⁶ As indicated by the title, this study is an outline for a more detailed research project dedicated to exploring the underlying causes and effects of this process in depth. This work, however, will not change the preliminary conclusions that can be drawn from these demographic trends.

problems suffered by the given society for a long time, including poverty. Such volume and pace of population growth makes it almost impossible to fight poverty and social inequalities, because they keep regenerating over and over.

3. Overpopulation puts a serious burden on state services. This stress on the state's subsystems causes tremendous internal tension, mainly due to disruptions in basic services.¹⁷ The forecasted decrease in the world's freshwater resources will severely impact the analysed regions (*see* below), and will almost inevitably lead to serious internal and interstate tensions, meaning a potential source of destabilisation in the Muslim world and triggering further armed conflicts and migration waves.
4. The state's response. The question of how the predominantly secular states will address the above mentioned internal and external tensions is a serious one. The population of the countries concerned will grow by 50–100%, which will entail a serious burden on the state's subsystems. If these states fail to act, the demographic boom they face will stretch their systems. Regardless of which scenario materialises, it is a key question whether governments will sooner or later be forced to allocate sources for making family-planning information more readily available, to raise interest in birth control.

Basically, there are three available scenarios:

- 1) *Development resources*. By using various foreign development resources, the state can strengthen the economic/social subsystems and social protection systems, thereby easing the social burden caused by overpopulation. This requires international development programmes that contribute to the economy and carrying capacity of the given country through investments.
- 2) *Armed conflict*. The lack of resources and the disposition of the remaining resources has already led to a number of armed conflicts (e.g. the Iraq-Iran War). There are fears that debates over resources will give rise to further armed conflicts in the next 30 years.¹⁸

¹⁷ For example see the following developments as a source serious internal tensions in Iraq since the summer of 2018: (1) water supply problems (due to their increased water demand, Turkey and Iran limited the amount of water flowing into Iraq from the Euphrates, Tiger, Diyala, etc. rivers (RUDAW 2018d), (2) power supply problems (Iran had refused to transmit the contracted electricity volume to Southern Iraq, which triggered a series of violent protests, where the Iranian consulate was set on fire (RUDAW 2018c); RUDAW 2018a).

¹⁸ The ideological framework of the fight for resources and economic/political influence can be based on ethnical/tribal (Turkish, Kurdish, Arab, Persian and Afghanistan's ethnical/tribal groups) and religious (Sunni – Shiite) divisions as well.

- 3) *Migration*. The leaders of a given country can opt for a third ‘escape’ or ‘survival’ strategy by joining the Western globalist interests that have emerged in consequence of the still ongoing ‘first migration crisis’, and will support the global migration idea which would make free movement and settlement a fundamental human right in international organisations (UN).¹⁹ However, organised migration cannot solve all the problems resulting from overpopulation, since there is no such a country that would be able to ‘dispatch’ one-third of its total population.
5. *Response by Islamic extremisms*. Nevertheless, as seen in the case of the Islamic State, one of the easiest and most appealing responses will, unfortunately, be delivered by extreme ideologies. These extreme Islamic ideologies convince people that they are not to blame for their situation, but that it is rather the fault of the ‘guilty West’, and they transfer responsibility to the West as the source of all their problems. They make people believe that moral superiority is on their side in the form of the true faith, while the West does not believe and is decadent, meaning that Muslims will win in the end, and the true faith will spread all over the world.

6. Summary

6.1 The expected effect of climate change

If we examine the studies of research institutes engaged in analysing the issues of sustainable development and environmental changes (e.g. World Resources Institute), the best-case conclusion we can draw is that the analysed regions (from Afghanistan to Morocco, including Southern European states) will suffer a loss of more than 80% (!) of their fresh water resources by 2050,²⁰ which is expected to further deteriorate the problems of Muslim regions already afflicted by the demographic stress effect, and to trigger even larger waves of emigration. Add to this the fact that calculations by the UN (*Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division*) show that the population of the world will grow to 9,771,822,753 (at some point), i.e. will approach – or even exceed – the psychological barrier of 10 billion. With the overburdening of the environment, the dramatic decrease in freshwater resources and overpopulation, the world is following a road at the end of which no clear-cut

¹⁹ The text of the migration compact submitted to the UN General Assembly on 11 July 2018 (UN NEWS 2018) is available at UN GLOBAL COMPACT FOR MIGRATION (2018).

²⁰ MADDOCKS 2013; MADDOCKS – YOUNG – REIG 2015.

solution currently presents itself. The European green parties obviously formulate their policies in full knowledge of these threats.

6.2 A future oil crisis?

Another potential problem that could shake the foundations of the analysed regions' economies is the explosive spread of electric vehicles (an otherwise positive development in terms of protecting the environment). The key question is how this expansion – forecasted e.g. by Bloomberg (*Figure 6*) or J.P. Morgan (*Figure 7*) – will affect the market of refined hydrocarbons (fuels). One thing is sure: this major market segment will face a huge decline in demand. We have no knowledge yet of how the oil industry (producing, distribution, processing) will replace its loss of revenues resulting from what is expected to be a significant (?) decline in demand in the refined hydrocarbons (fuel) market segment by developing and marketing new products. However, since hydrocarbons – in particular crude oil – represent a significant share in the GDP of the sending countries involved in the refugee and then the migration crisis, any systemic setback in their extraction and trade could leave a hole in the budget of the given country, potentially deepening the economic and consequent social crises in these countries, and even leading to further migration waves to Europe.

		2017	2025	2030	2040
Bloomberg New Energy Finance	New EV sales	1.1 million	11 million	30 million	60 million
					55%
	Out of global car fleet				559 million
					33%

Figure 6 Global Electric Vehicle Forecast – Bloomberg (<https://about.bnef.com/electric-vehicle-outlook/>)

		2020	2025	2030
J.P. Morgan	New EV sales	12%	32%	59%

Figure 7 Global Electric Vehicle Forecast – J.P. Morgan
(<https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/research/electric-vehicles>)

6.3 Expected consequences

The key question, based on the above analysis, reads as follows: what further changes will the already experienced demographic and other trends and the resulting migration

crisis entail for the future of Europe, beyond those we have already witnessed? We may even ask: is the future we hoped for and believed in endangered? The past and future demographic boom of the examined regions and the resulting current and future migratory pressure may give rise to the following key effects.

The most recent population growth scenarios for the European Muslim community by 2050 were published by the Pew Research Center.²¹ These scenarios are determined by two factors: the higher population growth rate of Muslims already living in Europe in comparison to the indigenous peoples of Europe, and the level of immigration. According to the high migration scenario of the report, the Muslim population of Europe will grow from 19.5 million to 75.6 million by 2050 (i.e. in 30 years' time), meaning it will almost quadruple. As a result, Muslims will represent 14% of Europe's total population. Within this, the Muslim population will reach 30.6% in Sweden, 28.3% in Cyprus, 19.9% in Austria, 19.7% in Germany, 18.2% in Belgium, 18% in France, 17.2% in Great Britain, 17% in Norway, 16% in Denmark and 15.2% in the Netherland, respectively. These shares will be sufficient to trigger social and cultural processes that will result in irreversible changes. Any of these scenarios including the effect of migration foresees not necessarily a complete loss of Europe's identity, but at least some significant changes to it by 2050. In possession of these projections, the Western, globalist political ideas supporting the settlement of a large number of migrants – seeing this phenomenon as highly desirable – will fundamentally question traditional European values, and the achievements of Western democracy.

The situation is further deteriorated by the late 2018 public opinion polls of Gallup. The data series were published as a result of a highly representative survey.²² According to the data series, in Sub-Saharan Africa, approximately one-third of the respondents would like to move to another country: 30% between 2010 and 2012, 31% between 2013 and 2016, and 33% in 2017, respectively. The same data series for the Middle and Near East and North Africa showed 19%, 22% and 24%, respectively. This data series – published by an independent international public opinion polling firm that could hardly be accused of any bias in either direction – envisages that the willingness to migrate to Europe (more accurately, to the EU) is already so high that Europe would barely be able to cope with it, even without the population boom of the next 30 years.

²¹ PRC 2017.

²² ESIPOVA – PUGLIESE – RAY 2018.

	2010–2012	2013–2016	2015–2017
Sub-Saharan Africa	30%	31%	33%
Middle East and North Africa	19%	22%	24%

Figure 8 Gallup public opinion poll on the willingness to migrate (<https://news.gallup.com/poll/245255/750-million-worldwide-migrate.aspx>)

Based on UN projections, the Muslim world from Tajikistan/Afghanistan to Morocco alone faces a net population increase of 403 million (*see* above). The effort to supply this additional population will keep pushing the already greatly overpopulated Muslim world to its limits. Despite the fact that the more socially mobile segment of the population is leaving these countries, the dramatically growing number of those staying in their homeland will still create unsolvable problems for the mostly secular governments, and will further strengthen Islamic extremisms that offer moral- and emotion-based solutions. The lack of resources, combined with dramatic overpopulation, will not only sharpen internal social and economic conflicts, but will also increase existing interstate tensions and create fertile ground for the outbreak of further interstate armed conflicts and sectarian wars.

Moreover, this open and inclusive identity conceals hypocritical behaviour: it is a declared goal of the educated West to attract educated, foreign-language-speaking graduates from crisis regions. People who can become useful members of the receiving country. Overall, Europe will have to face a level of migratory pressure in the next 30 years that will be more severe than the spontaneous/semi-spontaneous migratory pressure experienced in the past, supported – and perhaps, even organised – by the Western global political/economic elite and international organisations (UN). The direction of this prospective migratory pressure is unambiguous: there is no sign of a scenario where the rather closed societies of Russia, China and India (three nuclear powers) – all in some way fighting their own, mostly separatist Muslim communities – would be willing to admit large numbers of Muslim immigrants from neighbouring Muslim regions. This excess population cannot move towards Africa either, since masses seek to emigrate from there as well. Consequently, future migration waves from Africa and the Middle and Near East can target only Europe, where we see no sign of the power and will to stop migration, and where the Western political/economic elite shows a willingness to accept organised migration. If this remains the case, Europe will slowly but certainly lose its ability to act, and instead of steering the processes concerning its future, it will solely react to developments as they slowly but certainly slip out of its control. In order to preserve our ability to act for the future, current irregular and illegal migration must be stopped, and the Western/

globalist plans must be prevented, under which migration/settlement projects – which, in my opinion, are ill-considered – are foreseen in the near future, that can force Europe to take a path from where return is not possible.

Nor does it bode well for the future that typically, secular Muslim governments can only experiment with technical solutions (e.g. creating jobs) in order to mitigate the many internal social tensions of the Muslim world that already became explosive in 2011 ('Arab Spring') for which they, apparently, did not have the necessary internal resources, and it is also uncertain whether they will have them in the future.²³ They have not even really cleaned up the wreckage of the years-long Syrian and Iraqi wars yet, and we do not know whether they are going to get external help for this, or whether the mass outflow of people towards the richer regions of the world, mainly Europe, will continue. At a conference held in the autumn of 2018, Mustafa al-Hiti, the head of an Iraqi reconstruction agency, announced that the reconstruction of Iraq after its war with the Islamic State would cost 88.2 billion dollars, for which amount they had only been given promises of loans.²⁴ This amount (approximately 80 billion euros) corresponds to the amount spent by Germany on the sustenance and integration programmes of the approximately 1.5 million refugees/migrants who arrived in the country in the span of four years. This amount would be enough to restore the destroyed infrastructure, create a huge number of jobs and revitalise the economy of Iraq. This would result in a significant decrease in the rate of migration from Iraq to Europe. But the question remains: *cui prodest?* Who would benefit from supporting crisis-torn countries and thus slowing, stopping or eventually reversing migratory flows? Is there truly the global economic or political will to do so?

Furthermore, it is still an open question whether organised migration will meet the expectations of the Western globalist political/economic elite, or whether the cultural (Islamic) interests of potential source countries will prevail. Nevertheless, the key – seemingly decided – question is whether the values of the 'new Europe' will be based on the Western (liberal) values or new Muslim values. If Europe admits, say, 2 million migrants a year between 2020 and 2050, the new 60 million

²³ However, in contrast to secular governments, Islamic radicals offer simple, moral answers, and strive to convince the most vulnerable groups of the society that it is the West's old and new exploitative practices which are to blame for their poor situation.

²⁴ RUDAW 2018b.

immigrants and the descendants of those already living here would completely and fatally change the ethnical, cultural, religious and political image of Europe and the nation states.

If the dramatic rate of population growth continues, the pace of decline in the world's fresh water resources keeps up, and the demand for hydrocarbons drops, the economic, political and social subsystems of the sending countries will face sufficient pressure to trigger an 'explosion', and new migration waves will follow one another, sending the masses which their countries are no longer able to sustain.

In contrast, investing money and putting energy into improving the living conditions in crisis regions by the developed world could be a much more effective solution – and, of course, would require a lot more effort. Germany spends more than 20 billion euros a year on the sustenance/'integration' of refugees/migrants. Other developed countries in Europe also spend huge sums for this purpose. In my opinion, these amounts would be sufficient to solve the problems of crisis regions. Perhaps even for good. Support should be provided to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco (not to mention the states of Sub-Saharan Africa) to allow them to augment the resources necessary to sustain their growing population by means of more efficient water management, agricultural and food industry developments, as well as job-creating investments. In the absence of such developments, independent of migration, these states will also face an internal pressure that may cause their systems to implode.

Having said that, we have to say that those who see immigration as a solution in Europe today either have no knowledge of the UN data, or intentionally ignore them. Or perhaps they foresee a completely different future for Europe. It is clear that the philosophy of unrestricted migrant admission is not the philosophy for a solution, but rather conceals completely different ideas. World history shows clearly that political changes have always been coated with an ideological, moral gaze, intended to hide the real underlying reasons. It is an important historical experience that in crucial moments of change throughout world history, the message and code have always been of a moral type, but the real underlying reasons have always been political and economic. This is exactly the case now. The moral message is always designed to hide the underlying political and economic reasons.

If some financial groups decided to solve the problem instead of exploiting it, we would be much closer to a solution. If these players did not see migration as an opportunity for financial and/or political benefits, the picture would be much clearer. As soon as the people of Europe find the answer to the most ancient and most important question *cui prodest* (Who benefits?), the solution will be known right away, too.

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Plate 1 Population of Afghanistan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	36,373,176	2.37%	843,095	-60,000	17.6	5.07	56	25.4%	9,576,359	0.48%	7,632,819,325	39
2017	35,530,081	2.52%	874,049	-60,000	17.6	5.07	54	26.0%	9,223,051	0.47%	7,550,262,101	40
2016	34,656,032	2.73%	919,538	-60,000	17.6	5.07	53	25.6%	8,880,234	0.46%	7,466,964,280	40
2015	33,736,494	3.21%	986,665	89,601	17.3	5.26	52	25.3%	8,546,635	0.46%	7,383,008,820	40
2010	28,803,167	2.81%	746,474	-155,499	16.0	6.37	44	24.3%	7,011,272	0.41%	6,958,169,159	42
2005	25,070,798	4.53%	995,408	185,824	16.1	7.18	38	22.7%	5,691,905	0.38%	6,542,159,383	45
2000	20,093,756	3.28%	598,843	-75,895	15.7	7.65	31	21.8%	4,383,053	0.33%	6,145,006,989	49
1995	17,099,541	6.90%	970,085	465,495	16.0	7.48	26	20.3%	3,474,413	0.30%	5,751,474,416	51
1990	12,249,114	0.78%	93,213	-296,837	15.9	7.47	19	17.5%	2,148,654	0.23%	5,330,943,460	58
1985	11,783,050	-2.32%	-293,064	-663,660	16.3	7.45	18	16.6%	1,955,053	0.24%	4,873,781,796	56
1980	13,248,370	1.02%	131,617	-218,492	17.0	7.45	20	15.6%	2,066,880	0.30%	4,458,411,534	51
1975	12,590,286	2.50%	292,833	-4,000	17.4	7.45	19	13.5%	1,704,871	0.31%	4,079,087,198	48
1970	11,126,123	2.28%	237,542	-4,000	17.9	7.45	17	11.4%	1,269,972	0.30%	3,700,577,650	48
1965	9,938,414	2.01%	188,413	-4,000	19.2	7.45	15	9.6%	952,137	0.30%	3,339,592,688	48
1960	8,996,351	1.70%	145,154	-4,000	18.8	7.45	14	8.0%	721,379	0.30%	3,033,212,527	48
1955	8,270,581	1.30%	103,693	-4,000	19.2	7.45	13	6.7%	553,706	0.30%	2,772,242,535	48

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Afghanistan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	38,054,941	2.44%	863,689	-60,000	18.6	4.41	58	27.1%	10,320,963	0.49%	7,795,482,309	37
2025	42,388,400	2.18%	866,692	-60,000	20.1	3.71	65	29.3%	12,418,550	0.52%	8,185,613,757	37
2030	46,699,545	1.96%	862,229	-60,000	21.9	3.19	72	31.7%	14,788,124	0.55%	8,551,198,644	35
2035	50,907,550	1.74%	841,601	-60,000	23.6	2.82	78	34.1%	17,374,813	0.57%	8,892,701,940	36
2040	54,914,122	1.53%	801,314	-60,000	25.2	2.56	84	36.6%	20,093,889	0.60%	9,210,337,004	32
2045	58,614,315	1.31%	740,039	-60,000	27.0	2.36	90	39.0%	22,863,478	0.62%	9,504,209,572	33
2050	61,928,118	1.11%	662,761	-60,000	28.9	2.20	95	41.4%	25,642,244	0.63%	9,771,822,753	33

Source: **Worldometers** (www.Worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 2 Population of Pakistan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	200,813,818	1.93%	3,797,863	-214,356	22.7	3.65	260	38.4%	79,279,647	2.63%	7,632,819,325	6
2017	197,015,955	1.97%	3,812,479	-214,356	22.7	3.65	256	39.1%	77,107,125	2.61%	7,550,262,101	6
2016	193,203,476	2.02%	3,822,963	-214,356	22.7	3.65	251	38.8%	74,986,621	2.59%	7,466,964,280	6
2015	189,380,513	2.12%	3,764,066	-236,384	22.5	3.72	246	38.5%	72,920,650	2.57%	7,383,008,820	6
2010	170,560,182	2.08%	3,330,103	-279,275	21.4	3.98	221	37.2%	63,369,630	2.45%	6,958,169,159	6
2005	153,909,667	2.13%	3,077,276	-134,298	20.2	4.23	200	35.6%	54,863,424	2.35%	6,542,159,383	6
2000	138,523,285	2.43%	3,138,827	-145,726	19.2	4.99	180	34.4%	47,687,034	2.25%	6,145,006,989	7
1995	122,829,148	2.67%	3,030,107	-200,745	18.6	5.67	159	32.8%	40,333,123	2.14%	5,751,474,416	8
1990	107,678,614	3.15%	3,091,825	27,958	18.5	6.30	140	31.5%	33,967,023	2.02%	5,330,943,460	8
1985	92,219,488	3.39%	2,830,269	279,048	18.6	6.44	120	30.2%	27,813,268	1.89%	4,873,781,796	9
1980	78,068,144	3.17%	2,256,049	140,000	18.5	6.60	101	28.8%	22,448,238	1.75%	4,458,411,534	10
1975	66,787,901	2.83%	1,739,428	-27,621	18.6	6.60	87	26.9%	17,952,986	1.64%	4,079,087,198	10
1970	58,090,759	2.70%	1,449,108	-41,996	19.3	6.60	75	25.3%	14,692,753	1.57%	3,700,577,650	10
1965	50,845,221	2.51%	1,187,386	-1,651	20.2	6.60	66	23.9%	12,166,264	1.52%	3,339,592,688	14
1960	44,908,293	2.13%	896,799	-3,340	20.2	6.60	58	22.4%	10,066,423	1.48%	3,033,212,527	14
1955	40,424,296	1.49%	576,384	-1,651	20.2	6.60	52	19.9%	8,035,464	1.46%	2,772,242,535	14

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Pakistan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	208,362,334	1.93%	3,796,364	-214,356	23.5	3.38	270	40.2%	83,764,075	2.67%	7,795,482,309	6
2025	226,767,952	1.71%	3,681,124	-174,360	24.5	3.10	294	42.2%	95,618,196	2.77%	8,185,613,757	6
2030	244,248,371	1.50%	3,496,084	-160,011	25.6	2.88	317	44.2%	107,880,376	2.86%	8,551,198,644	6
2035	261,093,438	1.34%	3,369,013	-160,000	26.8	2.69	339	46.1%	120,266,202	2.94%	8,892,701,940	6
2040	277,494,590	1.23%	3,280,230	-160,000	28.2	2.54	360	47.8%	132,548,149	3.01%	9,210,337,004	6
2045	293,003,264	1.09%	3,101,735	-160,000	29.6	29.6	380	49.3%	144,454,795	3.08%	9,504,209,572	6
2050	306,940,443	0.93%	2,787,436	-160,001	30.9	2.30	398	50.7%	155,746,618	3.14%	9,771,822,753	6

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 3 Population of Iran (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	82,011,735	1.05%	848,947	-55,000	30.1	1.72	50	73.8%	61,640,105	1.07%	7,632,819,325	18
2017	81,162,788	1.10%	885,360	-55,000	30.1	1.72	50	74.6%	60,552,800	1.07%	7,550,262,101	18
2016	80,277,428	1.16%	916,941	-55,000	30.1	1.72	49	74.0%	59,443,534	1.08%	7,466,964,280	17
2015	79,360,487	1.25%	958,595	-80,000	29.5	1.75	49	73.5%	58,315,802	1.07%	7,383,008,820	17
2010	74,567,511	1.15%	829,140	-109,853	26.9	1.79	46	70.5%	52,589,842	1.07%	6,958,169,159	17
2005	70,421,811	1.26%	857,991	-14,061	24.1	1.97	43	67.3%	47,393,356	1.08%	6,542,159,383	17
2000	66,131,854	1.77%	1,111,242	123,059	20.8	2.63	41	63.8	42,210,684	1.08%	6,145,006,989	17
1995	60,575,644	1.50%	869,892	-419,201	18.5	3.95	37	60.1%	36,423,980	1.05%	5,751,474,416	16
1990	56,226,185	3.50%	1,776,697	268,875	17.2	5.62	35	56.5%	31,748,896	1.05%	5,330,943,460	20
1985	47,342,702	4.13%	1,734,896	403,884	17.3	6.53	29	53.6%	25,379,649	0.97%	4,873,781,796	22
1980	38,668,220	3.39%	1,187,533	83,999	18.1	6.28	24	50.0%	19,325,507	0.87%	4,458,411,534	22
1975	32,730,554	2.80%	843,309	15,527	18.1	6.24	20	46.0%	15,040,458	0.80%	4,079,087,198	25
1970	28,514,010	2.70%	711,779	10,351	17.7	6.68	18	41.3%	11,789,487	0.77%	3,700,577,650	25
1965	24,955,115	2.64%	609,642	-218	20.9	6.91	15	37.2%	9,275,865	0.75%	3,339,592,688	26
1960	21,906,903	2.57%	522,581	-389	19.6	6.91	13	33.8 %	7,407,650	0.72%	3,033,212,527	26
1955	19,293,999	2.42%	434,946	-218	20.9	6.91	12	30.6%	5,903,540	0.70%	2,772,242,535	26

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Iran Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	83,587,129	1.04%	845,328	-55,000	32.4	1.62	51	76.3%	63,738,744	1.07%	7,795,482,309	18
2025	86,729,781	0.74%	628,530	-40,000	35.5	1.53	53	78.9%	68,472,823	1.06%	8,185,613,757	17
2030	88,863,308	0.49%	426,705	-40,000	38.4	1.50	55	81.6%	72,543,820	1.04%	8,551,198,644	17
2035	90,478,779	0.36%	323,094	-40,000	41.0	1.52	56	84.1%	76,105,956	1.02%	8,892,701,940	19
2040	91,899,463	0.31%	284,137	-40,000	42.9	1.55	56	86.2%	79,230,575	1.00%	9,210,337,004	19
2045	93,045,086	0.25%	229,125	-40,000	44.2	1.59	57	88.1%	82,017,008	0.98%	9,504,209,572	20
2050	93,553,454	0.11%	101,674	-40,000	45.2	1.62	57	90.2%	84,357,725	0.96%	9,771,822,753	21

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 4 Population of Iraq (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	39,339,753	2.78%	1,065,135	7,834	19.5	4.49	91	66.9%	27,042,424	0.52%	7,632,819,325	36
2017	38,274,618	2.88%	1,072,046	7,834	19.5	4.49	88	68.7%	26,306,153	0.51%	7,550,262,101	36
2016	37,202,572	3.01%	1,086,923	7,834	19.5	4.49	86	68.7%	25,576,081	0.50%	7,466,964,280	37
2015	36,115,649	3.26%	1,070,590	92,733	19.4	4.55	83	68.8%	24,847,389	0.49%	7,383,008,820	37
2010	30,762,701	2.64%	750,855	-91,466	18.9	4.55	71	69.5%	21,374,433	0.44%	6,958,169,159	39
2005	27,008,426	2.76%	688,603	-53,264	18.7	4.66	62	69.7%	18,825,977	0.41%	6,542,159,383	40
2000	23,565,413	3.12%	671,405	-3,572	18.2	5.19	54	69.2%	16,302,927	0.38%	6,145,006,989	43
1995	20,208,387	2.96%	547,876	-30,805	17.5	5.65	47	69.3%	14,005,725	0.35%	5,751,474,416	47
1990	17,469,005	2.32%	378,522	-126,037	16.8	6.09	40	69.9%	12,210,719	0.33%	5,330,943,460	46
1985	15,576,395	2.67%	384,608	-39,988	16.7	6.35	36	68.8%	10,711,365	0.32%	4,873,781,796	49
1980	13,653,356	3.16%	393,753	-9,558	16.6	6.80	31	65.5%	8,945,866	0.31%	4,458,411,534	50
1975	11,684,589	3.33%	353,321	-1,717	17.0	7.15	27	61.4%	7,171,849	0.29%	4,079,087,198	51
1970	9,917,983	3.44%	308,438	-1,375	17.5	7.40	23	56.2%	5,569,368	0.27%	3,700,577,650	52
1965	8,375,793	2.82%	217,206	-110	20.3	7.30	19	50.7%	4,242,439	0.25%	3,339,592,688	64
1960	7,289,761	2.31%	157,421	-220	19.6	6.20	17	42.9%	3,127,213	0.24%	3,033,212,527	62
1955	6,502,657	2.60%	156,693	-110	20.3	7.30	15	37.6%	2,447,030	0.23%	2,772,242,535	64

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Iraq Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	41,502,885	2.82%	1,077,447	7,834	20.0	4.27	96	68.8%	28,564,086	0.53%	7,795,482,309	36
2025	47,199,653	2.61%	1,139,354	-10,437	20.6	4.01	109	69.2%	32,654,360	0.58%	8,185,613,757	33
2030	53,297,666	2.46%	1,219,603	-12,475	21.4	3.79	123	69.2%	36,880,434	0.62%	8,551,198,644	30
2035	59,820,984	2.34%	1,304,664	-10,000	22.2	3.58	138	69.2%	41,385,909	0.67%	8,892,701,940	29
2040	66,751,984	2.22%	1,386,200	-6,000	23.1	3.40	154	69.0%	46,082,548	0.72%	9,210,337,004	28
2045	74,007,050	2.08%	1,451,013	-6,000	23.9	3.25	170	68.7%	50,862,249	0.78%	9,504,209,572	24
2050	81,490,359	1.95%	1,496,662	-6,000	24.7	3.11	188	68.3%	55,653,186	0.83%	9,771,822,753	22

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 5 Population of Syria (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	18,284,407	0.08%	14,539	-248,000	20.5	3.05	100	75.0%	14,289,848	0.24%	7,632,819,325	64
2017	18,269,868	-0.87%	-160,585	-248,000	20.5	3.05	99	75.1%	13,722,428	0.24%	7,550,262,101	63
2016	18,430,453	-1.63%	-304,534	-248,000	20.5	3.05	100	71.7%	13,223,024	0.25%	7,466,964,280	61
2015	18,734,987	-2.27%	-456,769	-831,579	20.2	3.10	102	68.5%	12,837,178	0.25%	7,383,008,820	60
2010	21,018,834	2.82%	544,845	74,000	21.5	3.35	114	57.0%	11,988,656	0.30%	6,958,169,159	55
2005	18,294,611	2.20%	376,753	-75,982	19.7	3.80	100	53.4%	9,770,957	0.28%	6,542,159,383	58
2000	16,410,848	2.73%	413,071	-26,000	18.7	4.30	89	51.8%	8,504,294	0.27%	6,145,006,989	57
1995	14,345,492	2.88%	379,864	-14,000	17.5	4.80	78	50.1%	7,184,030	0.25%	5,751,474,416	58
1990	12,446,171	3.17%	359,508	-29,300	16.3	5.87	68	49.0%	6,092,664	0.23%	5,330,943,460	56
1985	10,648,632	3.58%	343,572	-17,400	15.6	6.77	58	48.0%	5,108,681	0.22%	4,873,781,796	57
1980	8,930,774	3.46%	279,012	-32,334	15.5	7.32	49	46.8%	4,183,215	0.20%	4,458,411,534	64
1975	7,535,714	3.48%	237,035	-16,300	15.8	7.54	41	45.2%	3,408,395	0.18%	4,079,087,198	69
1970	6,350,541	3.40%	195,481	-3,200	15.9	7.56	35	43.5%	2,764,867	0.17%	3,700,577,650	71
1965	5,373,137	3.28%	159,925	-14,000	18.8	7.23	29	40.2%	2,159,655	0.16%	3,339,592,688	80
1960	4,573,512	3.18%	132,402	-3,000	17.0	7.38	25	37.0%	1,690,445	0.15%	3,033,212,527	76
1955	3,911,501	2.76%	99,634	-14,000	18.8	7.23	21	34.8%	1,361,803	0.14%	2,772,242,535	80

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Syria Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	18,924,442	0.20%	37,891	-248,000	21.7	2.84	103	81.2%	15,363,857	0.24%	7,795,482,309	63
2025	23,410,906	4.35%	897,293	556,000	24.4	2.63	127	73.5%	17,213,252	0.29%	8,185,613,757	60
2030	26,608,489	2.59%	639,517	240,000	26.5	2.45	145	71.8%	19,108,652	0.31%	8,551,198,644	59
2035	28,885,224	1.66%	455,347	46,000	28.4	2.30	157	72.7%	20,985,766	0.32%	8,892,701,940	59
2040	30,798,944	1.29%	382,744	-10,000	30.3	2.17	168	74.1%	22,818,080	0.33%	9,210,337,004	59
2045	32,524,870	1.10%	345,185	-10,000	32.2	2.06	177	75.6%	24,577,197	0.34%	9,504,209,572	59
2050	34,021,051	0.90%	299,236	-10,000	34.1	1.97	185	77.1%	26,244,525	0.35%	9,771,822,753	60

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 6 Population of Jordan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	9,903,802	2.08%	201,449	0	22.4	3.53	112	67.1%	6,710,702	0.13%	7,632,819,325	91
2017	9,702,353	2.61%	246,551	0	22.4	3.53	109	68.5%	6,648,077	0.13%	7,550,262,101	92
2016	9,455,802	3.24%	296,500	0	22.4	3.53	107	69.4%	6,561,598	0.13%	7,466,964,280	93
2015	9,159,302	4.98%	395,382	195,057	22.1	3.60	103	70.3%	6,434,690	0.12%	7,383,008,820	93
2010	7,182,390	4.68%	293,656	129,999	21.5	3.70	81	74.1%	5,323,284	0.10%	6,958,169,159	101
2005	5,714,111	2.29%	122,196	-18,779	20.8	3.85	64	74.4%	4,253,176	0.09%	6,542,159,383	106
2000	5,103,130	2.22%	106,045	-30,029	19.6	4.30	57	74.6%	3,804,810	0.08%	6,145,006,989	109
1995	4,572,904	5.13%	202,464	82,494	19.2	5.00	52	74.0%	3,385,490	0.08%	5,751,474,416	112
1990	3,560,582	4.22%	132,919	34,120	16.8	6.02	40	69.1%	2,461,455	0.07%	5,330,943,460	121
1985	2,895,985	4.05%	104,313	16,331	16.3	7.05	33	64.4%	1,864,431	0.06%	4,873,781,796	126
1980	2,374,422	2.85%	62,301	-16,152	15.5	7.38	27	57.7%	1,369,061	0.05%	4,458,411,534	131
1975	2,062,918	3.72%	68,801	-5,941	16.4	7.79	23	55.5%	1,144,415	0.05%	4,079,087,198	131
1970	1,718,913	7.95%	109,273	50,870	17.1	8.00	19	53.9%	926,187	0.05%	3,700,577,650	134
1965	1,172,550	4.69%	48,059	24,619	17.6	7.38	13	51.8%	607,628	0.04%	3,339,592,688	144
1960	932,257	6.42%	49,861	23,849	18.0	7.38	11	48.5%	452,126	0.03%	3,033,212,527	141
1955	682,952	7.25%	40,326	24,619	17.6	7.38	8	40.9%	279,166	0.02%	2,772,242,535	144

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)
 Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Jordan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	10,208,662	2.19%	209,872	0	23.2	3.26	115	67.1%	6,854,804	0.13%	7,795,482,309	89
2025	10,610,246	0.77%	80,317	-120,000	24.6	3.00	120	70.6%	7,495,196	0.13%	8,185,613,757	88
2030	11,122,063	0.95%	102,363	-84,000	26.0	2.78	125	72.9%	8,102,779	0.13%	8,551,198,644	88
2035	11,840,789	1.26%	143,745	-34,000	27.5	2.60	133	73.4%	8,696,405	0.13%	8,892,701,940	86
2040	12,679,815	1.38%	167,805	-4,000	29.0	2.45	143	73.1%	9,271,538	0.14%	9,210,337,004	86
2045	13,470,733	1.22%	158,184	-4,000	30.6	2.32	152	72.8%	9,808,258	0.14%	9,504,209,572	85
2050	14,187,734	1.04%	143,400	-4,000	32.1	2.21	160	72.5%	10,282,849	0.15%	9,771,822,753	83

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 7 Population of Lebanon (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	6,093,509	0.18%	11,152	-30,000	29.0	1.71	596	72.8%	4,386,037	0.08%	7,632,819,325	112
2017	6,082,357	1.26%	75,689	-30,000	29.0	1.71	595	73.0%	4,437,679	0.08%	7,550,262,101	111
2016	6,006,668	2.65%	155,189	-30,000	29.0	1.71	587	74.3%	4,461,385	0.08%	7,466,964,280	111
2015	5,851,479	6.17%	302,868	250,000	28.5	1.72	572	75.8%	4,436,670	0.08%	7,383,008,820	112
2010	4,337,141	1.70%	70,058	36,674	28.5	1.58	424	87.3%	3,784,699	0.06%	6,958,169,159	124
2005	3,986,852	4.27%	150,297	110,022	26.5	2.01	390	86.6%	3,451,984	0.06%	6,542,159,383	125
2000	3,235,366	1.30%	40,394	-5,886	26.3	2.43	316	86.0%	2,782,427	0.05%	6,145,006,989	129
1995	3,033,394	2.33%	66,076	18,000	24.5	2.80	297	84.8%	2,572,921	0.05%	5,751,474,416	131
1990	2,703,016	0.20%	5,287	-45,608	23.2	3.23	264	83.1%	2,246,760	0.05%	5,330,943,460	131
1985	2,676,583	0.54%	14,258	-42,876	21.5	3.75	262	79.4%	2,125,815	0.05%	4,873,781,796	130
1980	2,605,293	0.23%	5,921	-54,000	19.9	4.23	255	73.7%	1,919,362	0.06%	4,458,411,534	126
1975	2,575,690	2.31%	55,660	-2,000	19.5	4.67	252	67.0%	1,725,143	0.06%	4,079,087,198	123
1970	2,297,389	1.89%	41,008	-14,000	18.7	5.23	225	59.5%	1,366,383	0.06%	3,700,577,650	123
1965	2,092,348	3.00%	57,484	323	22.0	5.74	205	50.9%	1,065,744	0.06%	3,339,592,688	123
1960	1,804,926	3.33%	54,563	8,000	20.4	5.72	176	42.3%	764,253	0.06%	3,033,212,527	122
1955	1,532,109	2.80%	39,498	323	22.0	5.74	150	36.3%	556,203	0.06%	2,772,242,535	123

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Lebanon Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	6,019,795	0.57%	33,663	-30,000	31.1	1.70	588	71.6%	4,311,658	0.08%	7,795,482,309	113
2025	5,605,987	-1.41%	-82,762	140,000	34.6	1.69	548	80.1%	4,489,132	0.07%	8,185,613,757	121
2030	5,368,598	-0.86%	-47,478	-90,000	37.9	1.69	525	86.3%	4,634,198	0.06%	8,551,198,644	126
2035	5,335,520	-0.12%	-6,616	-34,000	40.8	1.69	522	88.8%	4,739,787	0.06%	8,892,701,940	127
2040	5,392,419	0.21%	11,380	-4,000	43.3	1.69	527	89.2%	4,810,490	0.06%	9,210,337,004	128
2045	5,412,032	0.07%	3,923	-4,000	45.7	1.69	529	89.7%	4,854,546	0.06%	9,504,209,572	129
2050	5,411,830	-0.00%	-40	-4,000	47.6	1.70	529	90.1%	4,873,871	0.06%	9,771,822,753	129

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 8 Population of Israel (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	8,452,841	1.58%	131,271	10,000	30.3	3.02	391	88.9%	7,632,530	0.11%	7,632,819,325	100
2017	8,321,570	1.58%	129,742	10,000	30.3	3.02	385	90.3%	7,514,792	0.11%	7,550,262,101	100
2016	8,191,828	1.58%	127,281	10,000	30.3	3.02	379	90.4%	7,402,083	0.11%	7,466,964,280	100
2015	8,064,547	1.66%	127,718	3,899	30.2	3.04	373	90.5%	7,297,043	0.11%	7,383,008,820	100
2010	7,425,959	2.38%	164,598	54,727	30.1	2.93	343	91.8%	6,813,683	0.11%	6,958,169,159	99
2005	6,602,970	1.89%	117,846	20,587	28.7	2.91	305	91.5%	6,043,558	0.10%	6,542,159,383	100
2000	6,013,741	2.43%	136,004	49,067	28.0	2.93	278	91.2%	5,484,684	0.10%	6,145,006,989	100
1995	5,333,719	3.46%	166,649	91,385	27.3	2.93	246	90.8%	4,844,628	0.09%	5,751,474,416	102
1990	4,500,475	1.97%	83,538	13,084	25.9	3.07	208	90.3%	4,065,416	0.08%	5,330,943,460	106
1985	4,082,787	1.74%	67,624	521	25.4	3.13	189	89.8%	3,667,479	0.08%	4,873,781,796	109
1980	3,744,667	2.33%	81,581	12,509	25.0	3.47	173	88.6%	3,317,141	0.08%	4,458,411,534	107
1975	3,336,760	3.21%	97,428	33,176	24.1	3.81	154	86.6%	2,891,082	0.08%	4,079,087,198	107
1970	2,849,622	2.47%	65,418	14,488	23.5	3.78	132	84.2%	2,399,238	0.08%	3,700,577,650	111
1965	2,522,530	3.83%	86,528	52,433	24.6	4.28	117	80.9%	2,041,746	0.08%	3,339,592,688	119
1960	2,089,889	3.99%	74,186	33,513	24.1	3.89	97	76.8%	1,606,030	0.07%	3,033,212,527	116
1955	1,718,958	6.44%	92,197	52,433	24.6	4.28	79	71.0%	1,220,458	0.06%	2,772,242,535	119

Source: **Worldometers** (www.Worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Israel Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	8,713,559	1.56%	129,802	10,000	30.6	2.92	403	90.3%	7,866,565	0.111%	7,795,482,309	99
2025	9,348,954	1.42%	127,079	10,000	31.1	2.81	432	90.1%	8,418,737	0.111%	8,185,613,757	98
2030	9,983,645	1.32%	126,938	10,000	31.7	2.71	461	89.9%	8,972,762	0.12%	8,551,198,644	96
2035	10,628,000	1.26%	128,871	10,000	32.4	2.61	491	89.8%	9,539,217	0.12%	8,892,701,940	94
2040	11,281,554	1.20%	130,711	10,000	33.1	2.53	521	89.6%	10,112,937	0.12%	9,210,337,004	92
2045	11,937,013	1.14%	131,092	10,000	34.0	2.45	552	89.4%	10,669,974	0.13%	9,504,209,572	92
2050	12,577,297	1.05%	128,057	10,000	35.1	2.37	581	89.0%	11,188,661	0.13%	9,771,822,753	91

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 9 Population of Saudi Arabia (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	33,554,343	1.87%	616,130	118,000	30.2	2.67	16	77.0%	26,304,988	0.44%	7,632,819,325	41
2017	32,938,213	2.05%	662,526	118,000	30.2	2.67	15	78.4%	25,829,952	0.44%	7,550,262,101	41
2016	32,275,687	2.28%	718,543	118,000	30.2	2.67	15	78.5%	25,344,685	0.43%	7,466,964,280	41
2015	31,557,144	2.85%	826,294	318,000	29.8	2.73	15	78.8%	24,853,959	0.43%	7,383,008,820	41
2010	27,425,676	2.79%	704,004	199,000	25.9	3.23	13	81.6%	22,374,784	0.39%	6,958,169,159	45
2005	23,905,654	2.86%	628,268	146,000	23.7	3.65	11	83.6%	19,993,877	0.37%	6,542,159,383	46
2000	20,764,312	2.08%	405,694	-70,000	21.3	4.40	10	77.5%	16,084,987	0.34%	6,145,006,989	48
1995	18,735,841	2.79%	481,805	-22,000	19.4	5.55	9	78.0%	14,607,001	0.33%	5,751,474,416	48
1990	16,326,815	4.36%	627,540	146,000	19.5	6.22	8	76.0%	12,411,049	0.31%	5,330,943,460	51
1985	13,189,115	6.25%	689,703	278,325	19.3	7.02	6	73.1%	9,643,065	0.27%	4,873,781,796	52
1980	9,740,599	5.57%	462,379	164,267	18.4	7.28	5	66.6%	6,482,740	0.22%	4,458,411,534	61
1975	7,428,703	4.94%	318,463	98,375	18.0	7.30	3	57.9%	4,304,904	0.18%	4,079,087,198	72
1970	5,836,389	3.80%	198,551	37,401	18.0	7.26	3	48.4%	2,824,240	0.16%	3,700,577,650	76
1965	4,843,635	3.46%	151,419	5,258	18.8	7.18	2	38.6%	1,869,612	0.15%	3,339,592,688	84
1960	4,086,539	2.81%	105,677	5,194	18.5	7.18	2	31.1%	1,272,545	0.13%	3,033,212,527	83
1955	3,558,155	2.65%	87,364	5,258	18.8	7.18	2	25.9%	922,664	0.13%	2,772,242,535	84

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Saudi Arabia Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	34,709,640	1.92%	630,499	118,000	31.9	2.48	16	78.4%	27,202,447	0.45%	7,795,482,309	41
2025	37,290,305	1.44%	516,133	60,000	33.2	2.29	17	78.0%	29,085,517	0.46%	8,185,613,757	42
2030	39,480,349	1.15%	438,009	60,000	34.7	2.14	18	77.5%	30,602,519	0.46%	8,551,198,644	42
2035	41,317,419	0.91%	367,414	60,000	36.0	2.02	19	77.4%	31,999,465	0.46%	8,892,701,940	42
2040	42,777,611	0.70%	292,038	40,000	37.2	1.92	20	78.0%	33,376,063	0.46%	9,210,337,004	45
2045	44,026,516	0.58%	249,781	40,000	38.5	1.84	20	78.8%	34,697,663	0.46%	9,504,209,572	46
2050	45,056,349	0.46%	205,967	40,000	39.6	1.78	21	79.5%	35,838,611	0.46%	9,771,822,753	45

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 10 Population of the United Arab Emirates (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	9,541,615	1.50%	141,470	60,200	33.5	1.80	114	89.8%	8,787,816	0.13%	7,632,819,325	93
2017	9,400,145	1.41%	130,533	60,200	33.5	1.80	112	91.2%	8,572,545	0.12%	7,550,262,101	94
2016	9,269,612	1.26%	115,310	60,200	33.5	1.80	111	90.3%	8,371,435	0.12%	7,466,964,280	94
2015	9,154,302	2.05%	176,724	96,000	33.4	1.82	110	89.5%	8,192,333	0.12%	7,383,008,820	94
2010	8,270,684	12.55%	738,224	666,200	31.9	1.97	99	85.8%	7,095,546	0.12%	6,958,169,159	95
2005	4,579,562	7.74%	284,927	232,200	29.8	2.40	55	74.5%	3,412,973	0.07%	6,542,159,383	116
2000	3,154,925	5.20%	141,221	96,890	28.1	2.97	38	77.0%	2,428,236	0.05%	6,145,006,989	132
1995	2,448,820	5.65%	117,729	73,625	27.8	3.93	29	75.0%	1,837,597	0.04%	5,751,474,416	137
1990	1,860,174	5.98%	93,824	52,270	26.7	4.90	22	76.8%	1,428,059	0.03%	5,330,943,460	143
1985	1,391,052	5.94%	69,734	36,832	26.3	5.30	17	77.3%	1,075,130	0.03%	4,873,781,796	146
1980	1,042,384	13.46%	97,612	77,567	26.2	5.75	12	78.6%	819,061	0.02%	4,458,411,534	147
1975	554,324	18.67%	63,765	53,020	25.4	6.45	7	76.7%	425,128	0.01%	4,079,087,198	156
1970	235,499	9.39%	17,027	10,765	22.7	6.77	3	78.5%	184,760	0.01%	3,700,577,650	170
1965	150,362	10.17%	11,546	-28	18.4	6.97	2	75.6%	113,741	0.00%	3,339,592,688	182
1960	92,634	3.09%	2,611	-35	17.7	6.97	1	71.1%	65,862	0.00%	3,033,212,527	178
1955	79,578	2.72%	1,998	-28	18.4	6.97	1	63.4%	50,483	0.00%	2,772,242,535	182

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

United Arab Emirates Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	9,813,170	1.40%	131,774	60,200	34.0	1.73	117	93.7%	9,197,733	0.13%	7,795,482,309	92
2025	10,435,287	1.24%	124,423	58,000	34.7	1.65	125	96.5%	10,071,980	0.13%	8,185,613,757	92
2030	11,054,579	1.16%	123,858	58,000	35.5	1.61	132	98.7%	10,914,590	0.13%	8,551,198,644	89
2035	11,642,335	1.04%	117,551	52,000	36.7	1.60	139	N.A.	N.A.	0.13%	8,892,701,940	89
2040	12,207,333	0.95%	113,000	52,000	38.0	1.60	146	N.A.	N.A.	0.13%	9,210,337,004	90
2045	12,721,861	0.83%	102,906	52,000	39.2	1.61	152	N.A.	N.A.	0.13%	9,504,209,572	89
2050	13,163,548	0.68%	88,337	50,000	40.4	1.63	157	N.A.	N.A.	0.13%	9,771,822,753	89

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 11 Population of Oman (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	4,829,946	4.18%	193,684	121,000	29.3	2.82	16	71.6%	3,510,390	0.06%	7,632,819,325	124
2017	4,636,262	4.78%	211,500	121,000	29.3	2.82	15	74.6%	3,456,850	0.06%	7,550,262,101	127
2016	4,424,762	5.36%	224,952	121,000	29.3	2.82	14	76.1%	3,367,507	0.06%	7,466,964,280	127
2015	4,199,810	6.67%	231,670	163,500	29.0	2.90	14	76.9%	3,228,136	0.06%	7,383,008,820	128
2010	3,041,460	3.91%	106,038	53,400	26.2	2.90	10	69.3%	2,106,593	0.04%	6,958,169,159	136
2005	2,511,269	2.06%	48,656	3,000	22.9	3.20	8	72.7%	1,826,169	0.04%	6,542,159,383	140
2000	2,267,991	0.57%	12,742	-38,674	20.9	4.46	7	69.2%	1,569,169	0.04%	6,145,006,989	141
1995	2,204,283	4.00%	78,425	20,940	20.9	6.27	7	70.1%	1,544,170	0.04%	5,751,474,416	140
1990	1,812,160	3.88%	62,749	2,234	17.9	7.85	6	66.0%	1,196,523	0.03%	5,330,943,460	144
1985	1,498,417	5.36%	68,808	16,300	17.5	8.32	5	57.1%	855,281	0.03%	4,873,781,796	144
1980	1,154,379	5.53%	54,467	15,282	17.6	8.10	4	47.6%	549,041	0.03%	4,458,411,534	145
1975	882,044	4.03%	31,638	5,094	17.1	7.41	3	38.2%	337,059	0.02%	4,079,087,198	148
1970	723,852	2.98%	19,769	-1,000	16.9	7.31	2	29.7%	214,732	0.02%	3,700,577,650	148
1965	625,009	2.53%	14,654	-2,000	18.5	7.25	2	22.3%	139,614	0.02%	3,339,592,688	149
1960	551,740	2.16%	11,185	-2,000	18.0	7.25	2	16.4%	90,485	0.02%	3,033,212,527	150
1955	495,816	1.67%	7,879	-2,000	18.5	7.25	2	12.0%	59,303	0.02%	2,772,242,535	149

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Oman Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	5,149,700	4.16%	189,978	121,000	30.7	2.54	17	69.9%	3,598,555	0.07%	7,795,482,309	122
2025	5,572,149	1.59%	84,490	22,000	32.2	2.28	18	69.7%	3,885,201	0.07%	8,185,613,757	122
2030	5,897,473	1.14%	65,065	12,000	34.1	2.09	19	69.1%	4,076,303	0.07%	8,551,198,644	122
2035	6,128,590	0.77%	46,223	0	35.8	1.95	20	68.4%	4,191,428	0.07%	8,892,701,940	121
2040	6,343,520	0.69%	42,986	0	36.8	1.84	20	67.0%	4,248,074	0.07%	9,210,337,004	120
2045	6,549,888	0.64%	41,274	0	38.0	1.77	21	65.9%	4,315,330	0.07%	9,504,209,572	120
2050	6,756,570	0.62%	41,336	4,000	39.9	1.74	22	64.8%	4,380,317	0.07%	9,771,822,753	119

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 12 Population of Kuwait (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	4,197,128	1.46%	60,600	20,000	33.5	2.03	236	88.3%	3,789,841	0.05%	7,632,819,325	129
2017	4,136,528	2.07%	83,944	20,000	33.5	2.03	232	89.6%	3,707,225	0.05%	7,550,262,101	130
2016	4,052,584	2.97%	116,790	20,000	33.5	2.03	227	89.3%	3,619,376	0.05%	7,466,964,280	131
2015	3,935,794	5.59%	187,542	134,000	33.4	2.05	221	89.5%	3,523,977	0.05%	7,383,008,820	133
2010	2,998,083	5.66%	144,292	95,900	29.5	2.40	168	98.1%	2,939,625	0.04%	6,958,169,159	137
2005	2,276,623	2.11%	45,176	5,300	28.2	2.60	128	99.0%	2,254,680	0.03%	6,542,159,383	141
2000	2,050,741	4.95%	88,018	48,400	27.8	3.00	115	91.2%	1,870,267	0.03%	6,145,006,989	142
1995	1,610,651	-5.16%	-97,793	-131,000	26.6	2.55	90	96.5%	1,555,083	0.03%	5,751,474,416	146
1990	2,099,615	3.84%	72,124	23,954	23.5	3.65	118	96.1%	2,018,046	0.04%	5,330,943,460	138
1985	1,738,994	4.85%	73,335	23,068	22.2	5.00	98	97.4%	1,694,151	0.04%	4,873,781,796	142
1980	1,372,318	6.01%	69,476	28,220	20.5	5.60	77	94.7%	1,299,912	0.03%	4,458,411,534	143
1975	1,024,940	6.54%	55,635	19,167	17.7	6.75	58	91.6%	938,521	0.03%	4,079,087,198	144
1970	746,767	9.54%	54,643	29,320	18.8	7.40	42	86.1%	642,820	0.02%	3,700,577,650	147
1965	473,554	11.92%	40,787	770	22.7	7.20	27	80.7%	382,293	0.01%	3,339,592,688	169
1960	269,618	8.19%	17,546	10,550	23.3	7.20	15	72.8%	196,216	0.01%	3,033,212,527	164
1955	181,888	3.51%	5,758	770	22.7	7.20	10	74.3%	135,094	0.01%	2,772,242,535	169

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)
 Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Kuwait Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	4,302,875	1.80%	73,416	20,000	33.7	1.97	241	91.8%	3,951,460	0.06%	7,795,482,309	129
2025	4,602,914	1.36%	60,008	14,000	34.1	1.91	258	94.8%	4,365,654	0.06%	8,185,613,757	129
2030	4,873,674	1.15%	54,152	14,000	34.8	1.88	273	97.7%	4,763,945	0.06%	8,551,198,644	130
2035	5,111,323	0.96%	47,530	12,000	36.1	1.85	287	N.A.	N.A.	0.06%	8,892,701,940	130
2040	5,323,821	0.82%	42,500	12,000	37.0	1.84	299	N.A.	N.A.	0.06%	9,210,337,004	129
2045	5,504,477	0.67%	36,131	11,000	37.6	1.83	309	N.A.	N.A.	0.06%	9,504,209,572	128
2050	5,643,532	0.50%	27,811	9,000	38.1	1.82	317	N.A.	N.A.	0.06%	9,771,822,753	127

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 13 Population of Qatar (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	2,694,849	2.11%	55,638	40,000	31.4	1.98	232	90.8%	2,479,094	0.04%	7,632,819,325	142
2017	2,639,211	2.70%	69,407	40,000	31.4	1.98	227	92.7%	2,445,669	0.03%	7,550,262,101	142
2016	2,569,804	3.56%	88,265	40,000	31.4	1.98	221	93.3%	2,398,564	0.03%	7,466,964,280	142
2015	2,481,539	6.87%	140,373	120,400	31.3	2.00	214	94.0%	2,332,785	0.03%	7,383,008,820	142
2010	1,779,676	15.53%	182,963	168,260	31.8	2.23	153	97.0%	1,726,172	0.03%	6,958,169,159	148
2005	864,863	7.87%	54,519	42,783	31.0	2.95	74	92.5%	800,213	0.01%	6,542,159,383	158
2000	592,267	2.90%	15,762	5,901	30.5	3.46	51	96.5%	571,791	0.01%	6,145,006,989	164
1995	513,455	1.51%	7,402	-2,026	29.0	3.74	44	92.7%	476,086	0.01%	5,751,474,416	164
1990	476,445	5.13%	21,073	11,503	28.7	4.40	41	92.8%	442,141	0.01%	5,330,943,460	164
1985	442,141	10.64%	29,461	20,419	26.9	5.45	32	90.1%	334,293	0.01%	4,873,781,796	165
1980	223,775	6.36%	11,872	5,677	23.4	6.10	19	89.4%	199,952	0.01%	4,458,411,534	176
1975	164,413	8.47%	10,980	6,874	23.2	6.75	14	88.9%	146,125	0.00%	4,079,087,198	177
1970	109,514	8.26%	7,176	4,212	22.0	6.97	9	88.2%	96,608	0.00%	3,700,577,650	184
1965	73,633	9.22%	5,250	1,137	19.4	6.97	6	87.0%	64,032	0.00%	3,339,592,688	201
1960	47,384	5.73%	2,304	911	19.4	6.97	4	85.2%	40,349	0.00%	3,033,212,527	197
1955	35,866	7.48%	2,173	1,137	19.4	6.97	3	83.0%	29,756	0.00%	2,772,242,535	201

Source: **Worldometers** (www.Worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Qatar Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	2,791,807	2.38%	62,054	40,000	31.9	1.88	240	90.6%	2,530,695	0.04%	7,795,482,309	142
2025	3,028,568	1.64%	47,352	26,000	33.2	1.78	261	87.6%	2,653,239	0.04%	8,185,613,757	138
2030	3,231,911	1.31%	40,669	21,000	34.7	1.71	278	85.2%	2,753,026	0.04%	8,551,198,644	139
2035	3,402,497	1.03%	34,117	17,000	36.5	1.66	293	83.3%	2,835,770	0.04%	8,892,701,940	138
2040	3,536,617	0.78%	26,824	12,000	38.0	1.63	305	82.1%	2,905,051	0.04%	9,210,337,004	138
2045	3,660,625	0.69%	24,802	12,000	39.4	1.62	315	80.8%	2,956,160	0.04%	9,504,209,572	135
2050	3,773,285	0.61%	22,532	12,000	40.5	1.62	325	78.9%	2,978,482	0.04%	9,771,822,753	134

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 14 Population of Bahrain (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	1,566,993	4.99%	74,409	47,000	31.4	2.10	2,062	79.7%	1,273,237	0.02%	7,632,819,325	152
2017	1,492,584	4.73%	67,413	47,000	31.4	2.10	1,964	83.7%	1,248,919	0.02%	7,550,262,101	152
2016	1,425,171	3.89%	53,316	47,000	31.4	2.10	1,875	86.1%	1,226,456	0.02%	7,466,964,280	152
2015	1,371,855	2.03%	26,199	8,400	31.2	2.12	1,805	88.0%	1,207,101	0.02%	7,383,008,820	152
2010	1,240,862	6.89%	70,339	54,400	30.1	2.25	1,633	89.3%	1,108,032	0.02%	6,958,169,159	1,108,032
2005	889,168	5.99%	44,911	31,100	27.8	2.65	1,170	87.4%	777,508	0.01%	6,542,159,383	157
2000	664,614	3.35%	20,183	7,836	26.6	2.95	874	88.9%	590,539	0.01%	6,145,006,989	161
1995	563,699	2.59%	13,554	1,096	26.4	3.40	742	88.4%	498,272	0.01%	5,751,474,416	162
1990	495,931	3.41%	15,300	2,580	25.4	4.08	653	88.1%	437,126	0.01%	5,330,943,460	163
1985	419,430	3.11%	11,908	647	25.2	4.63	552	87.2%	365,550	0.01%	4,873,781,796	163
1980	359,888	6.19%	18,669	9,792	22.3	5.23	474	86.1%	309,880	0.01%	4,458,411,534	164
1975	266,543	4.63%	10,788	3,825	19.3	5.95	351	85.0%	226,617	0.01%	4,079,087,198	168
1970	212,605	2.55%	5,035	-1,607	17.5	6.97	280	84.0%	178,527	0.01%	3,700,577,650	172
1965	187,431	2.91%	5,001	616	19.2	6.97	247	82.5%	154,561	0.01%	3,339,592,688	172
1960	162,427	3.99%	5,768	1,572	19.6	6.97	214	82.4%	133,771	0.01%	3,033,212,527	172
1955	133,585	2.93%	133,585	616	19.2	6.97	176	75.6%	100,946	0.00%	2,772,242,535	172

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Bahrain Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	Bahrain Population Forecast	4.36%	65,182	47,000	32.4	2.00	2,234	77.7%	1,318,982	0.02%	7,795,482,309	152
2025	1,862,403	1.87%	32,928	15,000	33.5	1.89	2,451	75.5%	1,406,447	0.02%	8,185,613,757	151
2030	2,013,135	1.57%	30,146	13,000	34.1	1.80	2,649	73.4%	1,478,197	0.02%	8,551,198,644	151
2035	2,121,977	1.06%	21,768	6,000	35.6	1.74	2,792	72.7%	1,543,056	0.02%	8,892,701,940	149
2040	2,205,227	0.77%	16,650	4,000	36.9	1.69	2,902	72.6%	1,600,499	0.02%	9,210,337,004	150
2045	2,272,490	0.60%	13,453	4,000	37.9	1.67	2,990	72.5%	1,648,229	0.02%	9,504,209,572	150
2050	2,327,108	0.48%	10,924	4,000	39.8	1.66	3,062	72.4%	1,683,914	0.02%	9,771,822,753	151

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 15 Population of Yemen (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	28,915,284	2.35%	664,864	-30,000	19.4	4.28	55	33.0%	9,910,504	0.38%	7,632,819,325	50
2017	28,250,420	2.42%	666,207	-30,000	19.4	4.28	54	33.8%	9,544,397	0.37%	7,550,262,101	50
2016	27,584,213	2.48%	668,006	-30,000	19.4	4.28	52	33.3%	9,186,285	0.37%	7,466,964,280	50
2015	26,916,207	2.66%	661,886	-15,002	19.2	4.40	51	32.8%	8,836,778	0.36%	7,383,008,820	50
2010	23,606,779	2.78%	604,770	-13,154	18.0	5.00	45	30.6%	7,223,114	0.34%	6,958,169,159	50
2005	20,582,927	2.86%	541,640	-22,430	16.8	5.90	39	28.3%	5,827,562	0.31%	6,542,159,383	52
2000	17,874,725	3.13%	510,814	-20,000	15.6	6.80	34	25.7%	4,602,612	0.29%	6,145,006,989	54
1995	15,320,653	4.91%	652,723	123,000	14.9	8.20	29	23.3%	3,568,385	0.27%	5,751,474,416	56
1990	12,057,039	4.13%	441,828	-10,000	14.3	8.80	23	20.5%	2,467,846	0.23%	5,330,943,460	60
1985	9,847,899	3.93%	345,480	-10,000	14.7	8.80	19	18.0%	1,773,247	0.20%	4,873,781,796	69
1980	8,120,497	3.52%	257,961	-15,000	15.2	8.60	15	16.1%	1,307,317	0.18%	4,458,411,534	72
1975	6,830,692	1.98%	127,376	-70,600	16.2	7.90	13	14.5%	991,096	0.17%	4,079,087,198	74
1970	6,193,810	1.88%	110,033	-49,132	17.6	7.80	12	13.1%	810,844	0.17%	3,700,577,650	72
1965	5,643,643	1.76%	94,302	-10,000	18.7	7.35	11	10.9%	614,569	0.17%	3,339,592,688	71
1960	5,172,135	1.64%	80,910	-15,000	18.5	7.40	10	9.0%	464,080	0.17%	3,033,212,527	72
1955	4,767,587	1.61%	73,053	-10,000	18.7	7.35	9	7.3%	348,583	0.17%	2,772,242,535	71

Source: **Worldometers** www.worldometers.info

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Yemen Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	30,245,305	2.36%	665,820	-30,000	20.3	3.84	57	35.3%	10,663,432	0.39%	7,795,482,309	50
2025	33,560,644	2.10%	663,068	-30,000	21.5	3.41	64	37.7%	12,639,136	0.41%	8,185,613,757	49
2030	36,815,286	1.87%	650,928	-27,000	22.8	3.07	70	39.9%	14,684,198	0.43%	8,551,198,644	44
2035	39,962,096	1.65%	629,362	-27,000	24.3	2.79	76	41.9%	16,750,663	0.45%	8,892,701,940	44
2040	42,986,334	1.47%	604,848	-20,000	25.9	2.56	81	43.8%	18,847,624	0.47%	9,210,337,004	44
2045	45,791,086	1.27%	560,950	-20,000	27.6	2.36	87	45.7%	20,938,790	0.48%	9,504,209,572	42
2050	48,304,040	1.07%	502,591	-20,000	29.3	2.19	91	47.6%	22,976,349	0.49%	9,771,822,753	43

Source: **Worldometers** www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 16 Population of Turkey (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	81,916,871	1.45%	1,171,851	305,000	30.2	2.10	106	71.0%	59,060,906	1.07%	7,632,819,325	19
2017	80,745,020	1.55%	1,232,594	305,000	30.2	2.10	105	72.0%	58,172,652	1.07%	7,550,262,101	19
2016	79,512,426	1.59%	1,240,954	305,000	30.2	2.10	103	72.0%	57,251,665	1.06%	7,466,964,280	18
2015	78,271,472	1.59%	1,188,912	325,434	29.9	2.12	102	71.9%	56,288,353	1.06%	7,383,008,820	18
2010	72,326,914	1.27%	884,702	-10,000	28.3	2.20	94	70.5%	51,011,925	1.04%	6,958,169,159	18
2005	67,903,406	1.43%	932,657	-7,999	26.6	2.37	88	67.6%	45,918,585	1.04%	6,542,159,383	18
2000	63,240,121	1.58%	950,748	-20,000	24.9	2.65	82	64.7%	40,899,833	1.03%	6,145,006,989	18
1995	58,486,381	1.64%	912,936	-24,000	23.5	2.90	76	62.2%	36,355,820	1.02%	5,751,474,416	18
1990	53,921,699	1.88%	957,563	-20,000	22.1	3.39	70	59.3%	31,966,194	1.01%	5,330,943,460	21
1985	49,133,883	2.24%	1,031,592	-13,999	21.0	4.11	64	52.5%	25,793,140	1.01%	4,873,781,796	21
1980	43,975,921	2.29%	939,742	-51,999	20.0	4.69	57	43.7%	19,222,062	0.99%	4,458,411,534	21
1975	39,277,211	2.41%	880,189	-48,000	19.6	5.39	51	41.5%	16,295,737	0.96%	4,079,087,198	20
1970	34,876,267	2.40%	780,660	-36,000	19.0	5.80	45	38.1%	13,294,704	0.94%	3,700,577,650	21
1965	30,972,965	2.43%	700,127	-3,800	19.8	6.69	40	34.3%	10,610,333	0.93%	3,339,592,688	20
1960	27,472,331	2.51%	640,349	-12,000	19.4	6.50	36	31.6%	8,683,368	0.91%	3,033,212,527	20
1955	24,270,585	2.54%	572,437	-3,800	19.8	6.69	32	28.5%	6,924,965	0.88%	2,772,242,535	20

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)
 Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Turkey Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	83,835,750	1.38%	1,112,856	305,000	31.6	2.02	109	72.5%	60,796,966	1.08%	7,795,482,309	17
2025	86,124,851	0.54%	457,820	-275,000	33.3	1.94	112	75.5%	65,010,516	1.05%	8,185,613,757	18
2030	88,416,609	0.53%	458,352	-190,000	35.0	1.88	115	77.9%	68,841,882	1.03%	8,551,198,644	18
2035	90,915,264	0.56%	499,731	-64,999	36.8	1.83	118	79.4%	72,180,630	1.02%	8,892,701,940	18
2040	92,980,818	0.45%	413,111	-60,000	38.6	1.79	121	80.6%	74,977,077	1.01%	9,210,337,004	18
2045	94,561,424	0.34%	316,121	-60,000	40.3	1.77	123	81.8%	77,322,236	0.99%	9,504,209,572	18
2050	95,626,879	0.22%	213,091	-60,000	41.8	1.75	124	82.8%	79,188,556	0.98%	9,771,822,753	19

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 17 Population of Azerbaijan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	9,923,914	0.98%	96,325	0	30.7	2.09	120	54.5%	5,480,441	0.13%	7,632,819,325	90
2017	9,827,589	1.05%	102,213	0	30.7	2.09	119	55.0%	5,404,933	0.13%	7,550,262,101	90
2016	9,725,376	1.12%	107,892	0	30.7	2.09	118	54.8%	5,328,156	0.13%	7,466,964,280	91
2015	9,617,484	1.26%	117,005	0	30.3	2.10	116	54.6%	5,250,367	0.13%	7,383,008,820	91
2010	9,032,457	1.13%	98,770	10,716	28.7	1.83	109	53.8%	4,856,675	0.13%	6,958,169,159	91
2005	8,538,606	1.00%	83,173	7,305	27.1	1.90	103	52.5%	4,486,271	0.13%	6,542,159,383	90
2000	8,122,741	0.88%	69,463	-22,370	25.6	2.25	98	51.4%	4,171,405	0.13%	6,145,006,989	89
1995	7,775,426	1.43%	106,531	-23,023	24.6	2.90	94	52.2%	4,056,830	0.14%	5,751,474,416	88
1990	7,242,770	1.67%	115,263	-32,314	24.1	3.20	88	53.6%	3,878,793	0.14%	5,330,943,460	86
1985	6,666,455	1.62%	103,143	-20,314	22.8	3.30	81	53.6%	3,570,493	0.14%	4,873,781,796	85
1980	6,150,738	1.63%	95,320	-10,093	20.9	3.80	74	52.9%	3,253,139	0.14%	4,458,411,534	84
1975	5,674,137	1.84%	98,822	-10,093	19.1	4.60	69	52.1%	2,954,913	0.14%	4,079,087,198	81
1970	5,180,025	2.44%	117,483	-8,000	18.2	5.40	63	50.0%	2,589,491	0.14%	3,700,577,650	80
1965	4,592,610	3.35%	139,443	0	22.1	5.20	56	51.0%	2,343,196	0.14%	3,339,592,688	88
1960	3,895,396	3.19%	113,202	0	22.0	5.60	47	52.7%	2,052,755	0.13%	3,033,212,527	85
1955	3,329,387	2.60%	80,293	0	22.1	5.20	40	50.0%	1,664,720	0.12%	2,772,242,535	88

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Azerbaijan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	10,099,743	0.98%	96,452	0	32.4	2.04	122	55.7%	5,626,766	0.13%	7,795,482,309	91
2025	10,442,074	0.67%	68,466	0	34.6	1.98	126	57.1%	5,961,261	0.13%	8,185,613,757	90
2030	10,680,202	0.45%	47,626	0	36.7	1.94	129	58.6%	6,259,496	0.12%	8,551,198,644	92
2035	10,860,905	0.34%	36,141	0	38.3	1.90	131	60.2%	6,537,855	0.12%	8,892,701,940	93
2040	10,988,920	0.23%	25,603	0	39.2	1.87	133	61.8%	6,788,584	0.12%	9,210,337,004	95
2045	11,049,380	0.11%	12,092	0	39.5	1.85	134	63.3%	6,991,273	0.12%	9,504,209,572	95
2050	11,039,198	-0.02%	-2,036	0	40.0	1.83	134	64.6%	7,136,014	0.11%	9,771,822,753	95

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 18 Population of Uzbekistan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	32,364,996	1.42%	454,355	-8,863	26.7	2.35	76	34.5%	11,334,708	0.42%	7,632,819,325	44
2017	31,910,641	1.48%	463,846	-8,863	26.7	2.35	75	34.9%	11,152,328	0.42%	7,550,262,101	44
2016	31,446,795	1.52%	470,774	-8,863	26.7	2.35	74	34.9%	10,975,466	0.42%	7,466,964,280	44
2015	30,976,021	1.60%	473,945	-13,294	26.3	2.38	73	34.9%	10,804,131	0.42%	7,383,008,820	44
2010	28,606,294	1.53%	418,822	-28,026	24.5	2.49	67	35.1%	10,049,933	0.41%	6,958,169,159	43
2005	26,512,184	1.30%	332,653	-48,459	22.8	2.51	62	36.0%	9,551,947	0.41%	6,542,159,383	42
2000	24,848,920	1.68%	397,131	-48,527	21.0	3.10	58	37.4%	9,293,082	0.40%	6,145,006,989	39
1995	22,863,264	2.24%	480,160	-64,555	19.8	3.95	54	38.6%	8,822,242	0.40%	5,751,474,416	40
1990	20,462,463	2.47%	470,833	-69,284	19.6	4.40	48	40.4%	8,257,421	0.38%	5,330,943,460	39
1985	18,108,300	2.58%	433,711	-37,034	19.6	4.80	43	41.0%	7,424,049	0.37%	4,873,781,796	41
1980	15,939,744	2.79%	409,421	14,416	18.9	5.46	37	41.0%	6,536,104	0.36%	4,458,411,534	41
1975	13,892,638	2.78%	356,522	14,133	18.0	6.16	33	39.9%	5,464,693	0.34%	4,079,087,198	41
1970	12,110,028	3.61%	393,258	88,856	17.5	6.40	28	36.3%	4,395,778	0.33%	3,700,577,650	44
1965	10,143,740	3.48%	318,849	38,122	23.6	5.30	24	35.6%	3,611,311	0.30%	3,339,592,688	53
1960	8,549,493	3.22%	250,439	19,804	22.2	5.90	20	34.0%	2,908,020	0.28%	3,033,212,527	50
1955	7,297,296	3.10%	206,648	38,122	23.6	5.30	17	31.4%	2,292,160	0.26%	2,772,242,535	53

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Uzbekistan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	33,235,825	1.42%	451,961	-8,863	28.2	2.24	78	35.3%	11,716,797	0.43%	7,795,482,309	43
2025	35,146,617	1.12%	382,158	-8,863	30.2	2.13	83	36.3%	12,770,986	0.43%	8,185,613,757	44
2030	36,712,267	0.88%	313,130	-8,863	31.9	2.04	86	38.0%	13,963,798	0.43%	8,551,198,644	48
2035	38,059,262	0.72%	269,399	-8,863	33.2	1.97	89	40.1%	15,259,675	0.43%	8,892,701,940	50
2040	39,246,465	0.62%	237,441	-8,863	34.3	1.90	92	42.1%	16,530,597	0.43%	9,210,337,004	51
2045	40,238,337	0.50%	198,374	-8,863	35.7	1.86	95	44.1%	17,741,084	0.42%	9,504,209,572	51
2050	40,950,366	0.35%	142,406	-8,863	37.2	1.83	96	46.0%	18,842,195	0.42%	9,771,822,753	55

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 19 Population of Kazakhstan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	18,403,860	1.10%	199,361	0	29.6	2.67	7	49.4%	9,182,798	0.24%	7,632,819,325	63
2017	18,204,499	1.21%	216,763	0	29.6	2.67	7	50.0%	9,096,503	0.24%	7,550,262,101	64
2016	17,987,736	1.34%	238,088	0	29.6	2.67	7	50.1%	9,012,067	0.24%	7,466,964,280	64
2015	17,749,648	1.60%	270,134	31,961	29.3	2.70	7	50.3%	8,929,685	0.24%	7,383,008,820	63
2010	16,398,976	1.08%	171,504	-7,039	28.9	2.54	6	52.2%	8,554,667	0.24%	6,958,169,159	63
2005	15,541,457	0.63%	96,819	8,906	28.6	2.01	6	53.0%	8,242,917	0.24%	6,542,159,383	62
2000	15,057,363	-1.25%	-195,519	-264,997	27.8	2.00	6	53.9%	8,122,825	0.25%	6,145,006,989	62
1995	16,034,956	-0.62%	-101,060	-282,349	27.1	2.55	6	54.2%	8,695,585	0.28%	5,751,474,416	53
1990	16,540,258	0.93%	150,164	-131,218	26.0	3.03	6	55.0%	9,099,287	0.31%	5,330,943,460	50
1985	15,789,437	1.16%	176,710	-85,959	24.6	3.04	6	54.6%	8,627,264	0.32%	4,873,781,796	46
1980	14,905,889	1.07%	155,164	-82,413	23.5	3.23	6	52.7%	7,860,791	0.33%	4,458,411,534	44
1975	14,130,071	1.51%	204,015	-25,620	22.3	3.61	5	51.2%	7,231,137	0.35%	4,079,087,198	40
1970	13,109,996	1.94%	240,199	34,669	21.8	3.67	5	48.9%	6,408,761	0.35%	3,700,577,650	40
1965	11,909,003	3.56%	382,601	113,153	23.3	4.41	4	45.8%	5,452,230	0.36%	3,339,592,688	50
1960	9,996,000	4.58%	400,800	195,987	22.9	4.56	4	43.0%	4,293,505	0.33%	3,033,212,527	44
1955	7,991,998	3.58%	257,801	113,153	23.3	4.41	3	38.9%	3,106,547	0.29%	2,772,242,535	50

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Kazakhstan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	18,777,139	1.13%	205,498	0	30.6	2.57	7	49.8%	9,360,240	0.24%	7,795,482,309	64
2025	19,610,258	0.87%	166,624	0	31.7	2.46	7	50.1%	9,831,707	0.24%	8,185,613,757	64
2030	20,301,322	0.70%	138,213	0	32.0	2.36	8	51.0%	10,356,786	0.24%	8,551,198,644	69
2035	20,950,360	0.63%	129,808	0	31.6	2.28	8	52.5%	10,990,175	0.24%	8,892,701,940	69
2040	21,621,166	0.63%	134,161	0	32.1	2.20	8	54.1%	11,691,455	0.23%	9,210,337,004	69
2045	22,309,977	0.63%	137,762	0	33.2	2.14	8	55.5%	12,388,600	0.23%	9,504,209,572	71
2050	22,959,432	0.58%	129,891	0	34.6	2.09	9	56.8%	13,034,401	0.23%	9,771,822,753	72

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 20 Population of Kyrgyzstan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	6,132,932	1.45%	87,815	-20,000	25.5	3.07	32	34.6%	2,164,778	0.08%	7,632,819,325	111
2017	6,045,117	1.50%	89,383	-20,000	25.5	3.07	32	35.1%	2,120,072	0.08%	7,550,262,101	112
2016	5,955,734	1.54%	90,333	-20,000	25.5	3.07	31	34.9%	2,077,592	0.08%	7,466,964,280	112
2015	5,865,401	1.58%	88,613	-27,580	25.3	3.12	31	34.7%	2,037,999	0.08%	7,383,008,820	111
2010	5,422,337	1.33%	69,391	-15,321	24.0	2.78	28	34.7%	1,883,132	0.08%	6,958,169,159	112
2005	5,075,380	0.62%	30,932	-34,582	23.8	2.50	26	35.1%	1,779,463	0.08%	6,542,159,383	113
2000	4,920,718	1.51%	70,926	-5,454	22.5	2.96	26	35.5%	1,748,963	0.08%	6,145,006,989	112
1995	4,566,087	0.87%	38,639	-55,250	21.6	3.64	24	36.6%	1,669,217	0.08%	5,751,474,416	113
1990	4,372,890	1.83%	75,957	-25,377	21.8	4.06	23	38.0%	1,660,123	0.08%	5,330,943,460	109
1985	3,993,106	2.03%	76,425	-10,832	21.7	4.20	21	38.6%	1,540,243	0.08%	4,873,781,796	110
1980	3,610,981	1.87%	63,981	-9,168	20.9	4.59	19	38.8%	1,401,188	0.08%	4,458,411,534	110
1975	3,291,077	2.08%	64,243	-2,413	19.6	5.12	17	38.3%	1,259,765	0.08%	4,079,087,198	109
1970	2,969,864	2.94%	80,081	20,837	19.4	5.21	15	37.4%	1,110,669	0.08%	3,700,577,650	107
1965	2,569,458	3.44%	79,873	3,505	25.3	4.36	13	35.9%	922,630	0.08%	3,339,592,688	114
1960	2,170,093	2.65%	53,207	5,641	24.0	5.20	11	34.2%	742,572	0.07%	3,033,212,527	113
1955	1,904,060	1.82%	32,811	3,505	25.3	4.36	10	30.6%	581,910	0.07%	2,772,242,535	114

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Kyrgyzstan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	6,301,718	1.45%	87,263	-20,000	26.3	2.91	33	35.8%	2,257,406	0.08%	7,795,482,309	111
2025	6,675,072	1.16%	74,671	-20,000	27.2	2.74	35	37.4%	2,497,199	0.08%	8,185,613,757	110
2030	6,997,284	0.95%	64,442	-20,000	27.7	2.61	36	39.4%	2,753,717	0.08%	8,551,198,644	110
2035	7,300,284	0.85%	60,600	-20,000	28.3	2.50	38	41.7%	3,042,268	0.08%	8,892,701,940	112
2040	7,596,178	0.80%	59,179	-20,000	29.4	2.40	40	44.3%	3,365,003	0.08%	9,210,337,004	112
2045	7,872,543	0.72%	55,273	-20,000	31.0	2.32	41	47.1%	3,708,610	0.08%	9,504,209,572	113
2050	8,112,653	0.60%	48,022	-20,000	32.5	2.24	42	49.9%	4,051,740	0.08%	9,771,822,753	113

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 21 Population of Turkmenistan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	5,851,466	1.62%	93,391	-5,000	25.9	2.96	12	47.7%	2,846,311	0.08%	7,632,819,325	113
2017	5,758,075	1.69%	95,531	-5,000	25.9	2.96	12	48.5%	2,793,433	0.08%	7,550,262,101	113
2016	5,662,544	1.75%	97,260	-5,000	25.9	2.96	12	48.4%	2,740,864	0.08%	7,466,964,280	114
2015	5,565,284	1.81%	95,615	-10,000	25.6	3.00	12	48.3%	2,688,708	0.08%	7,383,008,820	114
2010	5,087,210	1.36%	66,514	-12,543	24.4	2.65	11	48.0%	2,440,433	0.07%	6,958,169,159	115
2005	4,754,641	1.03%	47,702	-25,177	23.0	2.76	10	47.0%	2,233,759	0.07%	6,542,159,383	114
2000	4,516,131	1.42%	61,658	-12,935	21.7	3.03	10	45.8%	2,066,754	0.07%	6,145,006,989	115
1995	4,207,840	2.69%	104,775	8,727	20.1	4.03	9	44.6%	1,875,970	0.07%	5,751,474,416	118
1990	3,683,966	2.58%	87,990	-7,940	19.6	4.55	8	44.9%	1,653,346	0.07%	5,330,943,460	119
1985	3,244,018	2.43%	73,442	-7,159	19.4	4.79	7	45.8%	1,484,810	0.07%	4,873,781,796	123
1980	2,876,808	2.64%	70,289	-1,014	18.7	5.60	6	46.8%	1,346,900	0.06%	4,458,411,534	123
1975	2,525,361	2.84%	66,038	5,069	18.0	6.19	5	47.5%	1,198,448	0.06%	4,079,087,198	124
1970	2,195,173	3.01%	60,515	5,629	17.7	6.56	5	47.6%	1,045,657	0.06%	3,700,577,650	124
1965	1,892,599	3.37%	57,868	1,745	23.0	5.30	4	47.1%	890,918	0.06%	3,339,592,688	130
1960	1,603,258	3.28%	47,725	6,004	21.7	6.20	3	46.1%	739,573	0.05%	3,033,212,527	127
1955	1,364,634	2.42%	30,728	1,745	23.0	5.30	3	45.4%	619,277	0.05%	2,772,242,535	130

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Turkmenistan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	6,031,195	1.62%	93,182	-5,000	26.9	2.79	13	49.0%	2,952,721	0.08%	7,795,482,309	112
2025	6,430,544	1.29%	79,870	-5,000	28.0	2.61	14	50.0%	3,217,956	0.08%	8,185,613,757	113
2030	6,767,418	1.03%	67,375	-5,000	28.8	2.47	14	51.3%	3,473,226	0.08%	8,551,198,644	112
2035	7,073,504	0.89%	61,217	-5,000	29.6	2.35	15	52.5%	3,710,479	0.08%	8,892,701,940	114
2040	7,371,176	0.83%	59,534	-5,000	30.3	2.25	16	53.3%	3,929,549	0.08%	9,210,337,004	116
2045	7,650,906	0.75%	55,946	-5,000	31.8	2.17	16	54.0%	4,128,851	0.08%	9,504,209,572	116
2050	7,887,617	0.61%	47,342	-5,000	33.1	2.09	17	54.6%	4,303,165	0.08%	9,771,822,753	114

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 22 Population of Tajikistan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	9,107,211	2.08%	185,868	-20,000	22.6	3.45	65	26.7%	2,501,704	0.12%	7,632,819,325	96
2017	8,921,343	2.13%	186,392	-20,000	22.6	3.45	64	27.3%	2,434,616	0.12%	7,550,262,101	96
2016	8,734,951	2.18%	186,300	-20,000	22.6	3.45	62	27.1%	2,369,397	0.12%	7,466,964,280	97
2015	8,548,651	2.27%	181,404	-20,000	22.4	3.50	61	27.0%	2,306,057	0.12%	7,383,008,820	98
2010	7,641,630	2.20%	157,491	-14,649	21.3	3.50	55	26.5%	2,022,482	0.11%	6,958,169,159	98
2005	6,854,176	1.97%	127,594	-16,498	19.8	3.60	49	26.2%	1,798,951	0.10%	6,542,159,383	98
2000	6,216,205	1.52%	90,299	-58,959	18.3	4.29	44	26.4%	1,638,449	0.10%	6,145,006,989	99
1995	5,764,712	1.76%	96,197	-57,853	17.8	4.88	41	29.0%	1,670,328	0.10%	5,751,474,416	97
1990	5,283,728	3.09%	149,188	-13,607	18.1	5.50	38	31.7%	1,677,012	0.10%	5,330,943,460	99
1985	4,537,789	3.05%	126,475	-7,640	18.4	5.60	32	33.3%	1,509,112	0.09%	4,873,781,796	103
1980	3,905,413	2.87%	102,896	-3,405	18.2	5.90	28	34.4%	1,343,335	0.09%	4,458,411,534	106
1975	3,390,935	2.96%	92,171	-2,441	17.6	6.83	24	35.8%	1,212,783	0.08%	4,079,087,198	106
1970	2,930,079	3.33%	88,425	5,177	17.1	7.00	21	36.7%	1,076,636	0.08%	3,700,577,650	109
1965	2,487,953	3.58%	80,183	7,153	22.4	5.40	18	35.2%	875,154	0.07%	3,339,592,688	117
1960	2,087,038	3.07%	58,525	-3,823	21.6	6.20	15	32.8%	684,603	0.07%	3,033,212,527	117
1955	1,794,414	3.22%	52,583	7,153	22.4	5.40	13	30.9%	554,382	0.06%	2,772,242,535	117

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Tajikistan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	9,475,246	2.08%	185,319	-20,000	23.3	3.28	68	27.9%	2,641,682	0.12%	7,795,482,309	95
2025	10,360,358	1.80%	177,022	-20,000	24.1	3.09	74	29.2%	3,027,138	0.13%	8,185,613,757	93
2030	11,194,411	1.56%	166,811	-20,000	24.8	2.93	80	31.0%	3,472,802	0.13%	8,551,198,644	86
2035	12,022,921	1.44%	165,702	-20,000	26.0	2.79	86	33.4%	4,013,805	0.14%	8,892,701,940	85
2040	12,876,073	1.38%	170,630	-20,000	27.3	2.66	92	36.3%	4,671,446	0.14%	9,210,337,004	83
2045	13,727,805	1.29%	170,346	-20,000	28.6	2.55	98	39.4%	5,406,485	0.14%	9,504,209,572	83
2050	14,521,291	1.13%	158,697	-20,000	29.9	2.45	104	42.6%	6,185,202	0.15%	9,771,822,753	82

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 23 Population of Egypt (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	99,375,741	1.87%	1,822,590	-55,000	24.8	3.33	100	38.1%	38,491,949	1.30%	7,632,819,325	14
2017	97,553,151	1.95%	1,864,470	-55,000	24.8	3.33	98	38.8%	37,826,341	1.29%	7,550,262,101	14
2016	95,688,681	2.04%	1,910,509	-55,000	24.8	3.33	96	38.9%	37,175,090	1.28%	7,466,964,280	14
2015	93,778,172	2.20%	1,934,113	-55,005	24.7	3.38	94	39.0%	36,537,834	1.27%	7,383,008,820	14
2010	84,107,606	1.84%	1,465,891	-56,715	23.9	2.98	84	39.9%	33,587,708	1.21%	6,958,169,159	15
2005	76,778,149	1.89%	1,374,432	-14,893	22.6	3.15	77	40.2%	30,883,800	1.17%	6,542,159,383	15
2000	69,905,988	1.87%	1,238,320	-42,180	21.2	3.41	70	40.5%	28,304,150	1.14%	6,145,006,989	15
1995	63,714,386	2.10%	1,260,434	-92,081	20.1	4.12	64	41.1%	26,188,469	1.11%	5,751,474,416	15
1990	57,412,215	2.72%	1,441,446	-42,437	19.6	5.15	58	42.7%	24,493,933	1.08%	5,330,943,460	15
1985	50,204,985	2.63%	1,221,169	-77,956	19.5	5.49	50	44.1%	22,121,201	1.03%	4,873,781,796	20
1980	44,099,142	2.39%	982,288	-112,714	19.4	5.70	44	44.7%	19,706,161	0.99%	4,458,411,534	20
1975	39,187,702	2.26%	828,286	-109,359	19.2	6.00	39	44.6%	17,471,660	0.96%	4,079,087,198	21
1970	35,046,273	2.57%	834,062	-47,940	19.0	6.45	35	43.0%	15,073,608	0.95%	3,700,577,650	20
1965	30,875,964	2.72%	775,886	-10,020	20.7	6.75	31	41.2%	12,732,784	0.92%	3,339,592,688	22
1960	26,996,533	2.79%	694,630	-10,020	19.9	6.75	27	39.3%	10,600,966	0.89%	3,033,212,527	22
1955	23,523,384	2.58%	562,011	-10,020	20.7	6.75	24	36.1%	8,495,623	0.85%	2,772,242,535	22

Source: **Worldometers** (www.Worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Egypt Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	102,941,484	1.88%	1,832,662	-55,000	25.3	3.15	103	38.7 %	39,869,482	1.32%	7,795,482,309	14
2025	111,470,930	1.60%	1,705,889	-55,000	25.9	2.96	112	39.1%	43,609,708	1.36%	8,185,613,757	14
2030	119,745,677	1.44%	1,654,949	-45,001	26.6	2.80	120	40.0%	47,863,592	1.40%	8,551,198,644	15
2035	128,264,287	1.38%	1,703,722	-45,001	27.4	2.67	129	41.1%	52,747,355	1.44%	8,892,701,940	14
2040	137,065,513	1.34%	1,760,245	-45,001	28.5	2.56	138	42.4%	58,122,876	1.49%	9,210,337,004	13
2045	145,575,547	1.21%	1,702,007	-45,001	29.9	2.45	146	43.7%	63,549,623	1.53%	9,504,209,572	13
2050	153,433,492	1.06%	1,571,589	-45,001	31.2	2.36	154	44.9%	68,863,540	1.57%	9,771,822,753	12

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 24 Population of Sudan (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	41,511,526	2.41%	978,196	-50,000	19.0	4.69	24	34.2%	14,636,770	0.54%	7,632,819,325	35
2017	40,533,330	2.41%	954,502	-50,000	19.0	4.69	23	35.0%	14,195,253	0.54%	7,550,262,101	35
2016	39,578,828	2.41%	931,025	-50,000	19.0	4.69	22	34.8%	13,779,071	0.53%	7,466,964,280	35
2015	38,647,803	2.36%	852,368	-117,877	18.9	4.75	22	34.6%	13,391,448	0.52%	7,383,008,820	35
2010	34,385,963	2.15%	694,810	-215,629	18.3	5.00	19	34.3%	11,793,687	0.49%	6,958,169,159	35
2005	30,911,914	2.55%	732,276	-109,201	18.1	5.30	18	33.5%	10,347,426	0.47%	6,542,159,383	36
2000	27,250,535	2.49%	629,510	-126,600	17.9	5.65	15	33.1%	9,010,852	0.44%	6,145,006,989	37
1995	24,102,986	3.65%	791,079	130,697	17.7	6.00	14	32.8%	7,906,344	0.42%	5,751,474,416	37
1990	20,147,590	3.20%	587,481	30,000	17.0	6.30	11	28.4%	5,724,505	0.38%	5,330,943,460	42
1985	17,210,187	3.48%	540,544	44,000	16.6	6.63	10	22.8%	3,921,632	0.35%	4,873,781,796	43
1980	14,507,468	3.62%	472,667	36,000	16.4	6.92	8	19.8%	2,877,639	0.33%	4,458,411,534	47
1975	12,144,135	3.39%	372,487	4,000	16.5	6.90	7	18.8%	2,287,491	0.30%	4,079,087,198	50
1970	10,281,700	3.23%	302,321	0	16.8	6.86	6	16.4%	1,690,716	0.28%	3,700,577,650	51
1965	8,770,097	3.06%	245,121	0	17.8	6.65	5	13.3%	1,168,589	0.26%	3,339,592,688	62
1960	7,544,491	2.87%	199,039	0	17.5	6.65	4	10.7%	808,934	0.25%	3,033,212,527	59
1955	6,549,298	2.70%	163,102	0	17.8	6.65	4	8.6%	561,607	0.24%	2,772,242,535	62

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Sudan Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	43,541,203	2.41%	978,680	-50,000	19.7	4.43	25	35.8%	15,575,156	0.56%	7,795,482,309	34
2025	48,999,711	2.39%	1,091,702	-10,000	20.6	4.15	28	37.2%	18,220,092	0.60%	8,185,613,757	31
2030	54,842,478	2.28%	1,168,553	-10,000	21.6	3.89	31	39.0%	21,392,713	0.64%	8,551,198,644	29
2035	60,996,110	2.15%	1,230,726	-10,000	22.5	3.65	35	41.2%	25,119,558	0.69%	8,892,701,940	27
2040	67,357,464	2.00%	1,272,271	-10,000	23.3	3.45	38	43.4%	29,237,628	0.73%	9,210,337,004	27
2045	73,834,917	1.85%	1,295,491	-10,000	24.2	3.27	42	45.6%	33,668,595	0.78%	9,504,209,572	25
2050	80,385,607	1.71%	1,310,138	-10,000	25.1	3.11	46	47.8%	38,387,533	0.82%	9,771,822,753	23

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 25 Population of Tunisia (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	11,659,174	1.10%	127,047	-4,000	31.4	2.23	75	66.1%	7,809,656	0.15%	7,632,819,325	78
2017	11,532,127	1.13%	128,879	-4,000	31.4	2.23	74	66.9%	7,710,512	0.15%	7,550,262,101	78
2016	11,403,248	1.15%	129,587	-4,000	31.4	2.23	73	66.7%	7,610,517	0.15%	7,466,964,280	79
2015	11,273,661	1.16%	126,746	-13,193	31.1	2.25	73	66.6%	7,509,909	0.15%	7,383,008,820	80
2010	10,639,931	1.04%	107,490	-6,588	29.2	2.02	68	65.9%	7,009,981	0.15%	6,958,169,159	80
2005	10,102,482	0.82%	80,657	-27,809	27.2	2.04	65	64.8%	6,543,194	0.15%	6,542,159,383	79
2000	9,699,197	1.25%	117,044	-7,361	25.1	2.34	62	62.5%	6,059,507	0.16%	6,145,006,989	80
1995	9,113,975	2.05%	176,236	28,068	23.1	2.98	59	60.6%	5,522,032	0.16%	5,751,474,416	80
1990	8,232,797	2.37%	182,184	9,800	21.3	4.00	53	57.3%	4,714,067	0.15%	5,330,943,460	80
1985	7,321,876	2.83%	190,742	17,116	19.9	4.82	47	52.9%	3,870,330	0.15%	4,873,781,796	80
1980	6,368,167	2.41%	143,138	-14,414	18.6	5.65	41	50.1%	3,189,934	0.14%	4,458,411,534	80
1975	5,652,476	2.24%	118,416	-19,413	17.8	6.39	36	46.8%	2,646,264	0.14%	4,079,087,198	82
1970	5,060,397	2.17%	103,012	-19,305	17.0	6.92	33	42.8%	2,166,499	0.14%	3,700,577,650	82
1965	4,545,339	1.71%	73,815	-3,733	19.4	6.65	29	38.8%	1,762,879	0.14%	3,339,592,688	79
1960	4,176,266	1.15%	46,548	-38,484	18.5	6.85	27	35.2%	1,468,655	0.14%	3,033,212,527	81
1955	3,943,528	1.81%	67,644	-3,733	19.4	6.65	25	31.2%	1,229,428	0.14%	2,772,242,535	79

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Tunisia Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	11,903,136	1.09%	125,895	-4,000	32.7	2.15	77	67.2%	8,004,648	0.15%	7,795,482,309	80
2025	12,431,567	0.87%	105,686	-4,000	34.5	2.06	80	68.1%	8,463,860	0.15%	8,185,613,757	80
2030	12,841,615	0.65%	82,010	-4,000	36.2	2.00	83	69.1%	8,868,960	0.15%	8,551,198,644	81
2035	13,161,033	0.49%	63,884	-4,000	37.6	1.94	85	70.1%	9,226,380	0.15%	8,892,701,940	81
2040	13,434,541	0.41%	54,702	-4,000	38.5	1.91	86	71.1%	9,555,323	0.15%	9,210,337,004	82
2045	13,681,104	0.36%	49,313	-4,000	39.2	1.88	88	72.0%	9,855,470	0.14%	9,504,209,572	84
2050	13,883,996	0.29%	40,578	-4,000	39.9	1.86	89	72.8%	10,108,450	0.14%	9,771,822,753	85

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 26 Population of Libya (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	6,470,956	1.51%	96,340	-1,999	27.6	2.36	4	79.1%	5,209,809	0.08%	7,632,819,325	108
2017	6,374,616	1.29%	81,363	-1,999	27.6	2.36	4	80.3%	5,119,943	0.08%	7,550,262,101	109
2016	6,293,253	0.94%	58,298	-1,999	27.6	2.36	4	80.0%	5,036,241	0.08%	7,466,964,280	109
2015	6,234,955	0.21%	13,163	-86,681	27.2	2.40	4	79.6%	4,962,312	0.08%	7,383,008,820	109
2010	6,169,140	1.27%	75,290	-23,711	25.8	2.43	4	76.0%	4,690,054	0.09%	6,958,169,159	108
2005	5,792,688	1.58%	87,387	-4,114	24.0	2.64	3	74.3%	4,302,128	0.09%	6,542,159,383	104
2000	5,355,751	1.59%	81,391	-11,474	22.1	3.20	3	73.8%	3,951,824	0.09%	6,145,006,989	104
1995	4,948,798	2.21%	102,427	793	20.2	4.22	3	72.9%	3,607,903	0.09%	5,751,474,416	106
1990	4,436,661	2.75%	112,576	1,098	18.5	5.71	3	72.7%	3,225,662	0.08%	5,330,943,460	108
1985	3,873,781	3.77%	130,863	22,676	17.4	6.68	2	72.8%	2,820,945	0.08%	4,873,781,796	111
1980	3,219,466	4.01%	114,865	11,507	16.1	7.67	2	67.0%	2,157,657	0.07%	4,458,411,534	117
1975	2,645,139	4.39%	102,323	11,733	16.1	8.10	2	60.1%	1,589,712	0.06%	4,079,087,198	122
1970	2,133,526	4.24%	80,044	9,600	17.0	7.99	1	48.3%	1,030,990	0.06%	3,700,577,650	126
1965	1,733,306	3.66%	56,978	0	19.8	7.14	1	33.2%	576,245	0.05%	3,339,592,688	133
1960	1,448,417	3.07%	40,612	9,204	19.3	7.20	1	26.9%	390,294	0.05%	3,033,212,527	132
1955	1,245,358	2.06%	24,169	0	19.8	7.14	1	22.9%	284,963	0.04%	2,772,242,535	133

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Libya Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	6,662,173	1.33%	85,444	-1,999-1,999	29.0	2.21	4	80.9%	5,387,304	0.09%	7,795,482,309	108
2025	7,031,832	1.09%	73,932	-1,999-1,999	30.8	2.06	4	82.0%	5,768,972	0.09%	8,185,613,757	107
2030	7,342,346	0.87%	62,103	-1,999-1,999	32.5	1.94	4	83.1%	6,103,346	0.09%	8,551,198,644	107
2035	7,603,743	0.70%	52,279	-1,999-1,999	34.2	1.86	4	84.3%	6,406,883	0.09%	8,892,701,940	108
2040	7,825,251	0.58%	44,302	-1,999-1,999	35.8	1.81	4	85.5%	6,689,452	0.08%	9,210,337,004	111
2045	8,003,680	0.45%	35,686	-1,999-1,999	37.4	1.78	5	86.8%	6,944,658	0.08%	9,504,209,572	112
2050	8,123,669	0.30%	23,998	-1,999-1,999	38.9	1.76	5	88.1%	7,155,060	0.08%	9,771,822,753	112

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 27 Population of Algeria (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	42,008,054	1.67%	689,912	-10,000	27.8	2.90	18	71.8%	30,852,336	0.55%	7,632,819,325	34
2017	41,318,142	1.75%	712,090	-10,000	27.8	2.90	17	73.0%	30,165,137	0.55%	7,550,262,101	34
2016	40,606,052	1.84%	734,524	-10,000	27.8	2.90	17	72.6%	29,460,354	0.54%	7,466,964,280	34
2015	39,871,528	2.00%	750,778	-28,654	27.5	2.96	17	72.1%	28,738,799	0.54%	7,383,008,820	34
2010	36,117,637	1.64%	565,840	-71,468	26.0	2.72	15	69.3%	25,027,022	0.52%	6,958,169,159	34
2005	33,288,437	1.31%	420,955	-41,046	24.1	2.38	14	65.1%	21,677,180	0.51%	6,542,159,383	34
2000	31,183,660	1.53%	455,872	-32,883	21.7	2.89	13	60.9%	19,005,851	0.51%	6,145,006,989	34
1995	28,904,298	2.21%	598,386	-25,736	19.4	4.12	12	56.8%	16,415,906	0.50%	5,751,474,416	34
1990	25,912,367	2.80%	669,292	-18,660	18.0	5.30	11	52.7%	13,666,998	0.49%	5,330,943,460	33
1985	22,565,905	3.14%	645,638	-16,204	17.1	6.32	9	48.6%	10,959,445	0.46%	4,873,781,796	34
1980	19,337,715	2.97%	525,723	-44,967	16.7	7.18	8	43.9%	8,479,849	0.43%	4,458,411,534	35
1975	16,709,099	2.81%	431,813	-49,564	16.5	7.57	7	40.6%	6,788,940	0.41%	4,079,087,198	35
1970	14,550,034	2.88%	384,616	-24,267	16.4	7.65	6	39.9%	5,802,827	0.39%	3,700,577,650	36
1965	12,626,952	2.57%	300,413	-62,083	18.6	7.28	5	38.1%	4,807,377	0.38%	3,339,592,688	37
1960	11,124,888	2.51%	259,034	-38,371	17.9	7.38	5	30.9%	3,440,879	0.37%	3,033,212,527	37
1955	9,829,719	2.07%	191,494	-62,083	18.6	7.28	4	26.4%	2,593,228	0.35%	2,772,242,535	37

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Algeria Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	43,333,255	1.68%	692,345	-10,000	29.1	2.65	18	74.3%	32,176,230	0.56%	7,795,482,309	35
2025	46,307,643	1.34%	594,878	-10,000	30.6	2.44	19	75.9%	35,145,275	0.57%	8,185,613,757	34
2030	48,821,963	1.06%	502,864	-10,000	31.8	2.29	20	77.0%	37,569,253	0.57%	8,551,198,644	34
2035	51,070,401	0.90%	449,688	-10,000	32.7	2.18	21	77.5%	39,560,981	0.57%	8,892,701,940	34
2040	53,248,997	0.84%	435,719	-10,000	33.7	2.09	22	77.7%	41,396,189	0.58%	9,210,337,004	35
2045	55,411,769	0.80%	432,554	-10,000	35.1	2.03	23	77.9%	43,170,296	0.58%	9,504,209,572	35
2050	57,436,703	0.72%	404,987	-10,000	37.0	1.98	24	78.0%	44,786,570	0.59%	9,771,822,753	34

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 28 Population of Morocco (2018 and historical)

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2018	36,191,805	1.27%	452,225	-51,419	28.3	2.56	81	58.8%	21,691,011	0.47%	7,632,819,325	40
2017	35,739,580	1.31%	462,794	-51,419	28.3	2.56	80	59.6%	21,284,578	0.47%	7,550,262,101	39
2016	35,276,786	1.36%	473,464	-51,419	28.3	2.56	79	59.2%	20,868,301	0.47%	7,466,964,280	39
2015	34,803,322	1.44%	478,737	-61,422	27.9	2.60	78	58.7%	20,439,199	0.47%	7,383,008,820	39
2010	32,409,639	1.21%	377,714	-113,028	26.3	2.55	73	56.3%	18,252,530	0.47%	6,958,169,159	38
2005	30,521,070	1.13%	334,290	-130,964	24.4	2.68	68	54.4%	16,606,903	0.47%	6,542,159,383	37
2000	28,849,621	1.28%	354,878	-111,876	22.7	2.97	65	53.1%	15,312,537	0.47%	6,145,006,989	36
1995	27,075,232	1.71%	439,219	-93,325	21.1	3.70	61	51.2%	13,870,621	0.47%	5,751,474,416	36
1990	24,879,136	2.00%	468,352	-83,715	19.8	4.45	56	48.0%	11,940,483	0.47%	5,330,943,460	35
1985	22,537,376	2.40%	503,506	-64,132	18.7	5.40	50	44.3%	9,975,646	0.46%	4,873,781,796	35
1980	20,019,847	2.37%	443,230	-58,666	17.8	5.90	45	40.8%	8,159,039	0.45%	4,458,411,534	34
1975	17,803,698	2.16%	360,738	-99,535	16.8	6.40	40	37.5%	6,669,840	0.44%	4,079,087,198	34
1970	16,000,008	2.37%	354,193	-95,551	16.2	6.85	36	34.3%	5,487,485	0.43%	3,700,577,650	34
1965	14,229,044	2.91%	380,102	0	19.2	6.61	32	31.6%	4,490,092	0.43%	3,339,592,688	35
1960	12,328,532	3.26%	365,173	-2,600	18.1	6.90	28	29.4%	3,619,335	0.41%	3,033,212,527	34
1955	10,502,666	3.17%	303,335	0	19.2	6.61	24	27.7%	2,913,418	0.38%	2,772,242,535	35

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Morocco Population Forecast

Year	Population	Yearly % Change	Yearly Change	Migrants (net)	Median Age	Fertility Rate	Density (P/Km ²)	Urban Pop %	Urban Population	Share of World Pop	World Population	Global Rank
2020	37,070,718	1.27%	453,479	-51,419	29.6	2.42	83	60.7%	22,496,502	0.48%	7,795,482,309	40
2025	39,100,641	1.07%	405,985	-51,419	31.4	2.28	88	62.6%	24,472,884	0.48%	8,185,613,757	39
2030	40,873,592	0.89%	354,590	-51,419	33.0	2.17	92	64.2%	26,257,882	0.48%	8,551,198,644	40
2035	42,407,174	0.74%	306,716	-51,419	34.6	2.08	95	65.7%	27,856,239	0.48%	8,892,701,940	39
2040	43,713,705	0.61%	261,306	-51,419	36.0	2.00	98	67.0%	29,276,961	0.47%	9,210,337,004	42
2045	44,798,428	0.49%	216,945	-51,419	37.4	1.94	100	68.2%	30,567,707	0.47%	9,504,209,572	45
2050	45,659,886	0.38%	172,292	-51,419	38.9	1.89	102	69.5%	31,720,658	0.47%	9,771,822,753	44

Source: **Worldometers** (www.worldometers.info)

Elaboration of data by United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. (Medium-fertility variant).

Plate 29

	AFGHANISTAN	PAKISTAN	IRAN	IRAQ	SYRIA	SAUDI ARABIA	TURKEY	EGYPT	SUDAN	ALGERIA	MOROCCO
POPULATION											
2020	38,054,941	208,362,334	83,587,129	41,502,885	18,924,442	34,709,640	83,835,750	102,941,484	43,541,203	43,333,255	37,070,718
2025	42,388,400	226,767,952	86,729,781	47,199,653	23,410,906	37,290,305	86,124,851	111,470,930	48,999,711	46,307,643	39,100,641
2030	46,699,545	244,248,371	88,863,308	53,297,666	26,608,489	39,480,349	88,416,609	119,745,677	54,842,478	48,821,963	40,873,592
2035	50,907,550	261,093,438	90,478,779	59,820,984	28,885,224	41,317,419	90,915,264	128,264,287	60,996,110	51,070,401	42,407,174
2040	54,914,122	277,494,590	91,899,463	66,751,984	30,798,944	42,777,611	92,980,818	137,065,513	67,357,464	53,248,997	43,713,705
2045	58,614,315	293,003,264	93,045,086	74,007,050	32,524,870	44,026,516	94,561,424	145,575,547	73,834,917	55,411,769	44,798,428
2050	61,928,118	306,940,443	93,553,454	81,490,359	34,021,051	45,056,349	95,626,879	153,433,492	80,385,607	57,436,703	45,659,886
YEARLY % CHANGE											
2020	2.44%	1.93%	1.04%	2.82%	0.20%	1.92%	1.38%	1.88%	2.41%	1.68%	1.27%
2025	2.18%	1.71%	0.74%	2.61%	4.35%	1.44%	0.54%	1.60%	2.39%	1.34%	1.07%
2030	1.96%	1.50%	0.49%	2.46%	2.59%	1.15%	0.53%	1.44%	2.28%	1.06%	0.89%
2035	1.74%	1.34%	0.36%	2.34%	1.66%	0.91%	0.56%	1.38%	2.15%	0.90%	0.74%
2040	1.53%	1.23%	0.31%	2.22%	1.29%	0.70%	0.45%	1.34%	2.00%	0.84%	0.61%
2045	1.31%	1.09%	0.25%	2.08%	1.10%	0.58%	0.34%	1.21%	1.85%	0.80%	0.49%
2050	1.11%	0.93%	0.11%	1.95%	0.90%	0.46%	0.22%	1.06%	1.71%	0.72%	0.38%

	AFGHANISTAN	PAKISTAN	IRAN	IRAQ	SYRIA	SAUDI ARABIA	TURKEY	EGYPT	SUDAN	ALGERIA	MOROCCO
MEDIAN AGE											
2020	18.6	23.5	32.4	20.0	21.7	31.9	31.6	25.3	19.7	29.1	29.6
2025	20.1	24.5	35.5	20.6	24.4	33.2	33.3	25.9	20.6	30.6	31.4
2030	21.9	25.6	38.4	21.4	26.5	34.7	35.0	26.6	21.6	31.8	33.0
2035	23.6	26.8	41.0	22.2	28.4	36.0	36.8	27.4	22.5	32.7	34.6
2040	25.2	28.2	42.9	23.1	30.3	37.2	38.6	28.5	23.3	33.7	36.0
2045	27.0	29.6	44.2	23.9	32.2	38.5	40.3	29.9	24.2	35.1	37.4
2050	28.9	30.9	45.2	24.7	34.1	39.6	41.8	31.2	25.1	37.0	38.9
FERTILITY RATE											
2020	4.41	3.38	1.62	4.27	2.84	2.48	2.02	3.15	4.43	2.65	2.42
2025	3.71	3.10	1.53	4.01	2.63	2.29	1.94	2.96	4.15	2.44	2.28
2030	3.19	2.88	1.50	3.79	2.45	2.14	1.88	2.80	3.89	2.29	2.17
2035	2.82	2.69	1.52	3.58	2.30	2.02	1.83	2.67	3.65	2.18	2.08
2040	2.56	2.54	1.55	3.40	2.17	1.92	1.79	2.56	3.45	2.09	2.00
2045	2.36	2.96	1.59	3.25	2.06	1.84	1.77	2.45	3.27	2.03	1.94
2050	2.20	2.30	1.62	3.11	1.97	1.78	1.75	2.36	3.11	1.98	1.89

World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Medium fertility variant, 2015 – 2100. POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2017/POP/F02, June 2017 - Copyright © 2017 by United Nations. All rights reserved. Suggested citation: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition.

Plate 30

	1960	%	1980	%	2000	%	2016	%	2040 ¹	% ²	% ³
Algeria	11,124,888	100	19,337,715	174	31,183,660	280	40,606,052	365	52,875,495	475	130
Bahrain	162,427	100	359,888	221	664,614	409	1,425,171	877	3,056,078	1,881	214
Djibouti	83,636	100	358,960	429	717,584	858	942,333	1,126	1,237,474	1,479	131
Egypt	26,996,533	100	44,099,142	163	69,905,988	259	95,688,681	354	130,980,537	485	137
Iran	21,906,903	100	38,668,220	176	66,131,854	302	80,277,428	366	97,448,734	445	121
Iraq	7,289,761	100	13,653,356	187	23,565,413	323	37,202,572	510	58,731,470	805	158
Israel	2,114,020	100	3,878,000	183	6,289,000	297	8,547,100	404	11,615,983	549	136
Jordan	932,257	100	2,374,422	255	5,103,130	547	9,455,802	1,014	17,521,049	1,879	185
Kuwait	269,618	100	1,372,318	509	2,050,741	760	4,052,584	1,503	8,008,538	2,970	198
Lebanon	1,804,926	100	2,605,293	144	3,235,366	179	6,006,668	333	11,151,771	618	185
Libya	1,448,417	100	3,219,466	222	5,355,751	370	6,293,253	434	7,394,861	511	117
Morocco	12,328,532	100	20,019,847	162	28,849,621	234	35,276,786	286	43,135,805	350	122
Oman	551,740	100	1,154,379	209	2,267,991	411	4,424,762	802	8,632,538	1,564	195
Qatar	47,384	100	223,775	472	592,267	1,250	2,569,804	5,423	11,150,195	23,531	434
Saudi Arabia	4,086,539	100	9,740,599	238	20,764,312	508	32,275,687	790	50,168,769	1,228	1,108,032
Syria	4,573,512	100	8,930,774	195	16,410,848	359	18,430,453	403	20,698,601	453	112
Tunisia	4,176,266	100	6,368,167	152	9,699,197	212	11,403,248	273	13,406,684	321	118
United Arab Emirates	92,634	100	1,042,384	1,125	3,154,925	3,405	9,269,612	10,006	27,235,419	29,401	294
West Bank and Gaza					2,922,153		4,551,566		7,089,551		156
Yemen	5,172,135	100	8,120,497	157	17,874,725	346	27,584,213	533	42,567,861	823	154
Afghanistan	8,996,351	100	13,248,370	147	20,093,756	20,093,756	34,656,032	385	59,771,829	664	172
Pakistan	44,908,293	100	78,068,144	174	138,523,285	308	193,203,476	430	269,467,931	600	139
Turkey	27,472,331	100	43,975,921	160	63,240,121	230	79,512,426	289	99,971,755	364	126

	1960	%	1980	%	2000	%	2016	%	2040 ¹	% ²	% ³
Turkmenistan	1,603,258	100	2,876,808	179	4,516,131	282	5,662,544	353	7,099,972	443	125
Kyrgyzstan	2,172,300	100	3,617,400	166	4,898,400	225	6,082,700	280	7,553,332	348	124
Tajikistan	2,087,038	100	3,905,413	187	6,216,205	298	8,734,951	419	12,274,268	588	140
Uzbekistan	8,549,493	100	15,939,744	186	24,650,400	288	31,848,200	372	41,147,723	481	129
Kazakhstan	9,714,260	100	14,518,924	149	14,883,626	153	17,797,032	183	20,280,724	219	120

Source: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ZQ-EG>

¹ The forecast is based on the growth rate prevailing between 2000 and 2016.

² Compared to the data of 1960.

³ Compared to the data of 1960.

Plate 31

Rank		Number of men per 100 women	Number of women per 100 me	Rank		Ratio of women in the society	Number of men per 100 women
	Turkey			51	Turkey	50.893	96.49
148	Iran	100.90	99.11	145	Iran, Islamic Rep.	49.698	101.22
166	Iraq	102.15	97.90	158	Iraq	49.447	102.24
170	Afghanistan	102.79	97.29	163	Afghanistan	49.297	102.85
181	Syrian Arab Republic	103.65	96.48	175	Syrian Arab Republic	49.060	103.83
183	Jordan	104.04	96.11	178	Jordan	48.973	104.19
190	Pakistan	105.75	94.57	183	Pakistan	48.627	105.65
196	Saudi Arabia	139.36	71.75	189	Saudi Arabia	42.533	135.11
197	Kuwait	148.20	67.48	190	Kuwait	40.214	148.67
198	Bahrain	162.66	61.48	191	Bahrain	37.825	164.38
199	Oman	188.14	53.15	192	Oman	36.421	174.57
200	United Arab Emirates	228.20	43.82	193	United Arab Emirates	29.926	234.16
201	Qatar	324.35	30.83	194	Qatar	23.470	326.08
		http://statistics.times.com/population/countries-by-sex-ratio.php (based on 2015 United Nations data)				http://statistics.times.com/population/countries-by-sex-ratio.php (based on 2013 World Bank data)	

Plate 32

			0-14	15-29	30-44	45-59	60 +	Male population
AFGHANISTAN	2015	male population	44.31%	28.57%	15.69%	7.72%	3.72%	17,390
	2015	total population	22.15%	14.28%	7.84%	3.86%	1.86%	
	2050	male population	26.22%	26.07%	23.19%	16.09%	8.43%	31,516
	2050	total population	13.11%	13.03%	16.60%	8.04%	4.22%	
PAKISTAN	2015	male population	35.38%	28.76%	18.33%	10.97%	6.56%	97,286
	2015	total population	17.69%	14.38%	9.16%	5.48%	3.28%	
	2050	male population	28.93%	25.24%	20.53%	14.89%	10.40%	173,494
	2050	total population	14.47%	12.62%	10.26%	7.45%	5.20%	
IRAN	2015	male population	23.99%	27.36%	25.71%	14.65%	8.29%	39,942
	2015	total population	12.00%	13.68%	12.65%	7.32%	4.14%	
	2050	male population	19.62%	18.11%	19.62%	16.96%	25.68%	51,172
	2050	total population	9.81%	9.05%	9.81%	8.48%	12.84%	
IRAQ	2015	male population	41.32%	27.97%	17.93%	8.24%	4.53%	18,276
	2015	total population	2.66%	13.98%	8.96%	4.12%	2.26%	
	2050	male population	36.19%	26.95%	18.29%	11.54%	7.03%	45,522
	2050	total population	18.09%	13.47%	9.15%	5.77%	3.51%	
SYRIA	2015	male population	38.58%	27.96%	17.20%	10.40%	5.84%	9,476
	2015	total population	19.29%	13.98%	8.60%	5.20%	2.92%	
	2050	male population	26.30%	24.32%	20.89%	16.19%	12.28%	18,794
	2050	total population	13.15%	12.16%	10.44%	8.9%	6.14%	

		0-14	15-29	30-44	45-59	60+	Male population
SAUDI ARABIA	2015	23.27%	22.58%	31.93%	4.40%	0.008%	17,893
	2015	16.63%	11.29%	15.96%	2.20%	0.004%	
	2050	15.56%	17.42%	23.20%	20.66%	6.67%	24,658
	2050	7.78%	8.71%	16.60%	10.33%	3.33%	
	2015	26.55%	25.35%	22.63%	15.32%	10.14%	38,503
TURKEY	2015	13.27%	12.67%	11.36%	7.66%	5.7%	
	2050	17.45%	18.58%	19.93%	19.59%	24.45%	47,123
	2050	8.72%	9.29%	9.96%	9.79%	12.22%	
	2015	33.76%	26.58%	20.21%	12.49%	6.94%	47,409
	2015	16.88%	13.29%	10.11%	6.25%	3.47%	
EGYPT	2050	30.02%	24.36%	19.18%	13.75%	12.04%	85,699
	2050	26.01%	23.08%	21.38%	15.28%	14.24%	
	2015	42.18%	27.75%	15.85%	9.16%	0.009%	19,305
	2015	21.09%	13.88%	7.98%	4.58%	0.004%	
	2050	31.93%	26.67%	20.30%	13.49%	7.60%	40,181
SUDAN	2050	15.96%	13.33%	10.15%	6.75%	3.80%	
	2015	28.95%	26.16%	22.75%	6.58%	2.16%	20,133
	2015	14.48%	13.08%	11.36%	3.29%	1.08%	
	2050	20.21%	19.64%	22.09%	15.86%	15.65%	28,964
	2050	10.11%	9.82%	11.04%	7.93%	7.82%	
MOROCCO	2015	28.66%	26.36%	20.00%	15.42%	1.99%	17,220
	2015	14.33%	13.18%	10.00%	7.71%	0.99%	
	2050	19.22%	19.63%	20.32%	18.48%	6.94%	22,708
	2050	9.61%	9.82%	10.16%	9.24%	3.47%	

Medium variant. *World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision*. File POP/7-2. Male population by five-year age group, region, subregion and country, 1950-2100 (thousands). Estimates, 1950 – 2015. POP/DB/WFP/Rev.2017/POP/F07-2. Suggested citation: *United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, DVD Edition*.

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