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Frontispiece:
The Ugandan army patroling the refugee settlement in Rwamwanja, January 2020, photo: Sándor Jászberényi.

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Swedish clans, criminal networks and the failure of postmodern theory

Johan Lundberg

Abstract

During the last decades, clans from mainly the Middle East and East Africa have arrived in Sweden, which has led to an increase in family-based criminal networks. Nevertheless, the clan as a phenomenon has been neglected in Swedish migration research and by contemporary politicians and journalists. This paper deals with problems that arise as a consequence of the return of the clan in Sweden, not least when it comes to legal issues but also regarding migration and integration in general. The paper also discusses the causes of the Swedish taboo around the clan issue, and pays particular attention to critical (postmodern) theories that focus more on discourses about reality than on reality itself.

Keywords: clan, Sweden, postmodernism, critical theory, rule of law, family-based criminal networks, criminal clans

Introduction

At the beginning of September 2020, the deputy national police chief in Sweden, Mats Löfving, who is also the head of the National Operation Division of the Police, was interviewed on Swedish public service radio. There he informed about the current criminal situation, and drew attention to the fact that there are at least forty criminal clans in Sweden. These family-based criminal networks are, according to the deputy chief of police, regarded as "threats to the system".[1]

The interview gave rise to strong reactions in the media. Clan cultures seemed to be a new phenomenon. What exactly was a clan? Almost no academic research had been conducted in this field, and the Swedish media's interest in clans had, for a long time, been minimal. How could the emergence of forty criminal clans have taken place without either the media or the academy having drawn attention to this strange phenomenon in Sweden?

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[1] Saarinen 2020.

A few days after the radio interview, two professors of political science – Bo Rothstein and Peter Esaiasson – published an article in Sweden's largest daily newspaper.[2] They criticized Swedish migration research for neglecting the issue of clans for several decades. During the last seven years, the professors pointed out, more than 200 doctoral dissertations, books, reports and articles on migration had been published in the field of migration research. But nothing about clans: "There is a flagrant failure, when it comes to mapping and analysis of this kind of family-based networks which, through threats of violence and harassment, exercise great power in suburban areas with many immigrants and thereby preventing integration".[3]

One reason for this obvious shortcoming in Swedish academia is – according to the two professors – that the field of research has become ideological and political: "This may have made it impossible for researchers to act in this area, if they criticize the established image of the integration problem as a structural problem, which is caused by discrimination by the majority population."[4]

In other words: in Swedish academia, there is a consensus that society is characterized by systematic racism and that this racism – among the majority population – is the reason for the integration failures. I will, later on in this article, return to the reasons for this academic disinterest in clans.

But first, something should be said about the clan's historical origins, how to define a clan and how a clan society differs from a society organized around the state.

The clan and European history

From Greek antiquity until at least the 19th century, clan societies and the struggle against clan rule have been depicted in literature: from Aichylos' trilogy Oresteia to Dante Alighieri's *The Devine Comedy*, William Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*, and *A Midsummer Night's Dream* as well as in 19th century novels by writers such as Walter Scott, Henry James and Edith Wharton. Literary history offers, in this way, an empirical basis for a study of how clans arose and were combated at different eras in European history.

In the ancient epic – often orally transmitted for many centuries before it was put into written form – one can see traces of the clan's origins in the formation of archaic societies organized along bloodlines. One reason for the emergence of

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[2] Esaiasson Et al. 2020.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

the clan seems to have been the ambition to organize society in such a way that incest could be avoided. Seen from an evolutionary perspective, the clan system has probably been the most competitive way of organizing societies – at least until the state system arises. In the competition between different communities, many thousands of years ago, societies organized around the clan were probably more likely to survive than communities which were not organized in this manner.

Why is that? One of the most important factors is that, in clan societies, order is guaranteed through an effective self-regulating system rather than through a superior central power. The clan system is furthermore remarkably adaptable, it can be scaled up to very large units; and scaled down to a single family – or a few families. The clan is, in short, a flexible, amoeba-like insurance company for cousins and siblings that effectively organizes large groups of people in a way that offers protection – financially, legally, socially and with regard to military security.

But how did the clan arise? As is pointed out by the Israeli professor in history Yuval Noah Harari in his bestselling book *Sapiens. A Brief History of Humankind* (2011), homo sapiens had, until the cognitive revolution, around 70 000 years ago, few competitive advantages and could only act in groups of 100–200 people. With the development of cognitive capabilities, this was changed. Men could gradually be organized in communities of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people, which meant enormous competitive advantages in the struggle between species.[5]

The cognitive abilities included, for example, the fictional narrative. From the imagination of possible, fictive scenarios, necessary for vital decision-making, stories gradually emerged. These stories were a necessary condition for holding larger and larger groups together and would eventually include descriptions of the group's origins but also fictional representations of the common codes of ethics and moral rules.

From some of these stories, we can gather information about how clan societies were organized and emerged. Regarding the latter, the clan can be seen as a consequence of the need to regulate sexuality. To avoid incest, a system was created where the sisters or brothers were sent away for marriages, which led to alliances between families. Thereby the clan grew larger and larger. A story considered to have originated from the Hittite Empire, that is assumed to have disappeared in the 1200s BC, concerns the queen of Kanesh, who gives birth to thirty sons in one year. The sons are put in baskets on the river and ultimately end up in the country of Zalpuwa. Some

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[5] HARARI 2014, Chapter 2: "The Tree of Knowledge."

years later the queen gives birth to thirty daughters. She looks after them herself. Many years later the sons arrive, as muleteers, at the town of Tamarmara. There they learnt that the queen of Kanesh is living with her thirty daughters, but that she had previously given birth to thirty sons. The men then go to the queen – to meet the mother they had sought. When they arrive the gods prevent the queen from recognising her sons. She offers her daughters to the thirty men, who do not understand that the women are their sisters. However, the youngest son realises the situation and objects to the arrangement. Unfortunately, that is where the text's fragment comes to an end.[6]

The *Hittites'* story about the importance of keeping the thirty sons separated from the thirty daughters is easily associated to the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss' "alliance theory", which in turn is linked to the taboo against incest that was a central component of his structuralist analysis.[7] Lévi-Strauss' alliance theory shows how a structuring of society based on clan is emerging, in that the daughters are used as currency in the hunt for mutual alliances in networks that with time become increasingly large and complex. In order to avoid incest, by consistently removing either daughters or sons from their father's house, an organic, amoeba-like system arises, held together by the same mechanisms at both micro and macro level.

The introduction to the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, which like the Hittites' myths originates from the second millennium BC, describes how King Gilgamesh is deprived of the privilege of having sex with all newly-wed women before their husbands.[8] Like the Hittites' story, the opening of the *Epic of Gilgamesh* communicates aspects of the fundamental conditions for the emergence of the very oldest of civilisations; namely the importance of regulating sexuality to avoid incest. According to the 19th century American anthropologist, Lewis Henry Morgan, it was exactly through the procedure described several decades later by Lévi-Strauss in his alliance theory that the clan structures were created by separating daughters and sons from each other.[9] One family's daughters were transferred to another family's sons, and the latter family's daughters to the first family's sons.

Regulations of sexuality, as well as strict rules on who is allowed to marry whom, are thus laid down in the DNA of clan culture. These kinds of rules will prove to live on in the form of family honor until today.

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[6] Hoffner 1991, pp 81–82.
[7] See Lévi-Strauss 2002.
[8] See tablet 1, *The Epic of Gilgamesh* 2001.
[9] See Morgan 1877, pp 227–236.

Aeschylos' tragedy *The Suppliants* from the 5th century BC seems to be a variation of the mythical story, mentioned above, from the Hittite Empire. The Greek tragedy revolves around the danaids' ancestress Hypermnestra and her forty-nine sisters of Argos, fleeing from Egypt. They are being persecuted by their fifty male cousins intending to marry the women. The sisters seek protection and therefore refer to their shared origins with the population of Argos.

However, unlike the Hittites' story, *The Suppliants* can be read as a drama about the transition from clan to state. What the sisters are fleeing from is, after all, forced marriages such as cousin (or endogamous) marriages which aim to keep the clan together. In Argos, the women are protected by the decision of a people-elected assembly. Greek city-states were at this time the prototypes of the state system that would make a big impact in Europe after the Middle Ages. It was to such a state the women fled from a clan-based culture.

As the Harvard professor Joseph Henrich shows in his book from 2020, *The weirdest people in the world. How the West Became Psychologically Peculiar and Particularly Prosperous*, a process in Christianity began as early as the 5th century, that would effectively break down the European family-based communities. Polygamy was forbidden by the church, as well as marriage between cousins (to strengthen the clan) and it was also forbidden for a widow to remarry her dead husband's brother so that she stayed within the family. In the same spirit Magdeburg lawmakers declared in the 10th century that a father cannot be held responsible if his son commits murder. [10]

The break-up of the clans was, according to Henrich, the cause of the Western trend towards democracy. When people left the clan, they developed into individuals. A man and a woman who married in medieval Europe could decide rather independently over their own household. As a consequence of the move from the collective to the individual, rational thinking and a positive attitude towards innovations and improvements, as well as foreigners, replaced conformism and the clan society's hostility towards everything that threatened its traditions. In this way, conditions were created for democracy, science and secularization.

According to Henrich, the guild was crucial in this process. The guild separated individuals from their relatives and united them in new social structures based on professional identity. Without the guilds, there would have been no modernity.[11]

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[10] See Henrich 2021, e.g. pp 156–157, 269–270.
[11] *Ibid*, pp 303–305.

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Traces of this historical movement away from clan-based communities can be seen in *The Divine Comedy*, where Dante Alighieri expresses strong antipathies to the clan culture of Florence in the early 14th century. At the end of the 13th century, an attempt was made to overcome Florentine clan culture by banning the magnates of the city's leading families from the government. The clan culture of Florence included forced marriage and honor-based murder. The decades-long conflicts that Dante described (and which developed into a kind of low-intensity civil war) stemmed from the fact that a man had defied an agreement reached between two families about who he would marry.

It is worth noting that the clan-based conflicts displayed in The Divine Comedy has nothing to do with religion, which was also the case in Scotland, where the clans also, as is shown by Walter Scott's novel *Waverley* (1814), had significant elements of honor culture before being crushed by the British army in the mid-18th century. However, the internal mechanisms of the systems (in Florence and Scotland) were the same as in today's clan cultures.

These mechanisms contrast with European society taking shape after the French Revolution. Its slogans *liberté, égalité* and *fraternité* could be broken down into the idea of a national community – *brotherhood* – whose citizens affirm social equality and whose individual freedom is guaranteed by the state. Because man was perceived as primarily a rational being – the Enlightenment marked, as Kant described it, "man's withdrawal from his self-inflicted state of tutelage" – the primary role of the state was considered to guarantee that which after the French Revolution would become the hallmark of the Western world: the autonomy of the individual.

The suppression of the French people by a monarch – whose authority came from God himself – was thus replaced by an idea with universalist claims that an optimal society consists of equal and free citizens that are held together in an intricate network of common rights and obligations, and surrounded by institutions that are autonomous in the sense that it was incumbent on the political and religious power to exercise no or minimal influence over such things as the administration of justice, research, education and the arts.

The citizen whose freedom and autonomy were guaranteed by the state had thereby left behind a society built around the collective instead of the individual. Or was it really left behind? In fact, clan society would return to parts of Europe more than 200 years later.

Clan characteristics

What then are the differences between a clan and other communities in society? In what way does a clan-based organization of people differ from a state-based organization?

After all, people are constantly organizing themselves in collectives with more or less clear rules for being accepted by or expelled from a community. And how exactly are the clans different from families who are successful in economics, media or politics, such as the Kennedys or the Kardashians? To what extent is there a difference between, for example, Lebanese clans (like the criminal Ali Khan Clan in Gothenburg) that have established themselves in Sweden as a consequence of migration, and people living in upper-class areas with a strong consensus on norms, conventions and values?

One should, perhaps, first of all, point out that according to the Swedish constitution, in Sweden you may have whatever values you want: communist, Christian, reactionary, totalitarian, feminist, patriarchal, Islamist and so on. However, whatever your values are, you have to follow Swedish legislation. And it is in this respect that criminal clans and family-based networks are problematic. What distinguishes the clan is namely a legal system that is fundamentally contrary to Swedish law. In communities organized around the clan, people are defined on the basis of collective belonging rather than as individuals. In a modern state, governed by the rule of law, a person who commits a crime against another person is individually liable. If I am run over by a person driving a car when I am on a bicycle, the person driving the car is held liable. If the person driving the car cannot atone for the crime or replace my damaged bicycle, I (or my relatives) do not seek out the driver's relatives to find a solution. They are not considered as having anything to do with the matter.

Clan-based society is, in this way, very different from the state-based form of organisation that has characterised the Western world since, at least, the Enlightenment. The latter is based on, as we have seen, an idea of equality before the law and that justice is administered as objectively as possible. The ultimate result of this legal practice includes the idea that a person's origin, age or gender should not be adduced as support for their reliability or unreliability. Those judged are primarily individuals, rather than being regarded as cousins or offspring. This is an important cornerstone of western democracy, in conflict with the clan, which can

be described, as we have seen, as an insurance company for cousins that organizes people in a way that offers protection – financially, legally, socially et cetera. From the perspective of the clan, the core of the law system is the family or the extended family; and the function of the law is to regulate the relation between the clan's losses and the clan's compensations for these losses.

The American professor of law, Mark S Weiner, discusses in his book *The Rule of the Clan* (2013) an Afghan murder case, in which the clan leaders agreed that an appropriate compensation for the murder would be a marriage between the brother of the murdered man and the perpetrator's sister.[12] From a contemporary Swedish perspective, it may seem unfair that the close relatives of the victim are those affected the most by the punishment. The brother of the murdered Afghan man is, for the rest of his life, through his wife, reminded of his brother's murderer, who, in addition, becomes a member of the victim's family; that is, his own brother-in-law. In accordance with the logic of the clan, the family or extended family as a collective has thus received reasonable compensation for the death of one of its members in the shape of an alliance with the murderer's family through marriage. Under such a system, women – and even men – are seen as objects of exchange in transactions between families. The perpetrator, on the other hand, goes free. The act of receiving compensation is more important than punishing the guilty man.

The question of family honor is closely linked to the question of clan cultures. Within the clan, a person's value is, as we have seen, mainly based on family relations, while in a state-based society one's value depends on individual merits. In clan societies, the status of the individual is based on the clan's status, which in turn is based on the honor of the clan – that is, on the capacity to hold the clan together and the capacity of individual members to act loyally towards the family. The clan is thus no stronger than its weakest link. What makes the clan such an effective way of organizing communities is primarily loyalty – captured in Alexandre Dumas famous motto: *all for one, one for all*. If loyalty begins to fail, then honor can be lost, and when honor is lost the status of the clan's members will be decimated. That is the reason for parents, cousins, uncles and siblings being so strongly involved in dealing with undisciplined behaviors when it comes to things like marriage. In the clan, there is therefore no space for self-realization.

While the clan members are forced to always have the best interests of the clan in mind, the ultimate purpose of the modern state is to act as a guarantee of the individual's autonomy. It is not until the latter happens that the question of sexual liberation can become relevant.

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[12] Weiner 2013, pp 19–23.

The fact that each person's value in the clan is tied to every other person's actions, is an important reason for the clan being such a successful way of organising societies. In clan societies, order is in fact – as Mark S Weiner has pointed out – guaranteed through the self-regulating system of the clan itself rather than through a superior central power: "The system as a whole can be compared to the steel girders of a building, which each provide support to the others so as to keep the entire structure in place."[13]

Why have clans been neglected in Sweden?

One reason why opening a discussion of differences between clan and state has had such difficulties in Sweden, is probably, or at least partly, that we, because of our history, take the state for granted. Due to our unique history, the state has always been perceived by us as something quite natural and almost universal. For us in Sweden, it was unbelievable that in many countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa and the Balkans, the process from clan to state hardly started or only partially took place.

In Sweden the transition from clan to state probably took place gradually from the 14th to the 17th century. From the 17th century, Sweden has had a strong state that could be transformed without major problems in accordance with the *liberté* of the French Revolution – a freedom that threatens to blow up all former communities, such as the family or the clan, and free the people of the nation from their bonds, turning them into free individuals. The Swedish welfare state, since World War II, has not only been one of the richest in the world, but also perhaps one that best implemented the slogans of the French Revolution.

Another plausible explanation has to do with an aversion to the state, both on the right and the left side of the political spectra. Among right-wing libertarians (influenced by for example Ludwig van Mises) as well as among the academic Foucault-reading left, the state – at least at a theoretical level – is frequently perceived not so much as promoting freedom as repressive, authoritarian and disciplinarian.[14] But there are other, even more ideological reasons. At least since the 1970s. it has been a more or less political taboo among Swedish academics to discuss the challenges that the Western state in general, and the Swedish

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[13] *Ibid*, p 61.
[14] See Mises 1962, p 98 and p 109. According to Focault 1980, p 123, "The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth".

state in particular, has faced as a consequence of the extensive migration during recent decades. The Swedish immigration, during the last 20 years, has largely consisted of people from societies characterized by clans and with extremely weak and fragile state structures – in other words, from countries of a fundamentally and radically different or directly opposite character as compared to the Swedish culture. Historically, this taboo is connected to the ideological shift from 1975 and onwards, when the government declared Sweden a multicultural society. Immigrants could consequently choose the extent to which they would be integrated.[15] From this point of view cultural relativism has been encouraged, especially when it comes to religious demands. Furthermore, other opinions were neglected. It was demonstrated well when I, together with the Swedish journalist Per Brinkemo, edited an anthology in 2017 about clans. We were depicted in the Swedish daily tabloid *Aftonbladet* as racists and right-wing extremists, due to our tendency to discuss cultural differences with respect to the clan-issue.[16]

To understand these kinds of accusations, it is necessary to consider the way in which Swedish research in humanities and social or political science has evolved during the last decades. In my recent book, *When Postmodernism Reached Sweden* (2020), I show how contemporary research in humanities and social or political science has been influenced by a number of thinkers in a tradition dating back to the writings of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault in the late 1960s. As a consequence of the postmodernist thinking that has dominated Swedish universities since at least the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a shift in focus from the concrete reality to a one-sided interest in discourses.[17]

The question posed from a postmodern point of view is not primarily what reality looks like, but what discourses are reproduced when certain phenomena – such as clans – are described by journalists and academics. This is connected to the postmodern view that research, science and fiction create, rather than describe, reality. This, in turn, is the basis for the kind of constructivism that has come to dominate both the cultural world and academic thinking. The existence of discourses has been considered to prove that a certain phenomenon is a social or cultural construction. Furthermore, the presence of discourses is seen as the key to the perception of Western society as characterized by the oppression of various minority groups.

In my book, *When Postmodernism Reached Sweden*, I take the debate on cultures of honor as an example. As I have previously pointed out, the issue of family honor

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[15] Regeringsproposition 1975. Cf. Bauhn Et al. 2010.
[16] Ravini 2018.
[17] Lundberg 2020.

is closely linked to the question of clan cultures. When Swedish postcolonial academics have directed criticism against what they regard as the social construction of family honor, their accusations of "cultural racism" have been based on the idea that those who discuss family honor reproduce discourses invoking differences between population groups in terms of cultural qualities.

These kinds of discourses are, in turn, considered to reproduce and maintain racist – or in other ways oppressive – ideas. Discussing cultures of honor, honor-based violence and family honor, is perceived to legitimize racist oppression by the use of Western thought patterns. These thought patterns are considered to be built up by binary oppositions which legitimize and perpetuate various forms of oppression. The world is thus, in accordance with those thought patterns, described in the form of different, opposing pairs: men vs women, culture vs nature, civilization vs wildness, health vs disease, human vs non-human et cetera. According to the mostly French philosophers who attacked the Enlightenment in the late 1960s, these contradictions were a misguided and temporally limited way of perceiving reality.

The same kind of thinking, in binary oppositions, was claimed a few decades later to benefit groups traditionally devoted to science and the arts: white, heterosexual males. An example of this kind of thinking can be found in postcolonial theory, whose most prominent precursor has been Edward Said, who in turn was influenced by Michel Foucault. Based on Foucault's concept of discourse and with a biased selection of examples, Said showed in his influential book *Orientalism* (1978) how discourses have been reproduced over the centuries in the visual arts, literature and science, where people from the Orient were depicted in an opposite way compared to people from the western world.[18] While the latter were associated with concepts such as activity, long term thinking, reason and truth, the Orientals were portrayed as dreamy, despotic, primitive, fanatical, irrational, violent and deceitful. These representations came, according to Said, to influence Westerners to perceive the Orient in a racist manner that justified imperialist practices.

A person who talks about cultures as fundamentally different, and, for example, state that there are considerable differences between a population group that has migrated from Somalia and a population group consisting of people born and raised in Sweden by Swedish-born parents, has, by researchers influenced by Said (and later postcolonial thinkers), been considered to reproduce a racist discourse – and can consequently be held responsible for systematic racism in society.

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[18] Said 1978, pp 2–3, p 23 and p 39.

These ideas, where one connects discourse analysis with an image of Western society as characterized by oppression, are also typical of the intersectional theories that have had an extremely large influence in Sweden over the past ten years. The Swedish government has, during that time, prescribed all higher education institutions and government agencies to draw up action plans based on intersectional analysis. An example of the prescribed intersectional focus can be found in a department of police training (at Södertörn University), where police students were taught not to regard the criminals in a neutral way in accordance with the main principle of equality before the law. Instead, the police should make an intersectional analysis, and consider those who were oppressed, from a racial or sexual perspective – and treat criminals belonging to oppressed groups differently from other criminals.[19]

The intersectional theories have thus come to permeate the Swedish education system and Swedish bureaucracy in a way that has made it at worst impossible, at best difficult to discuss such things as clans and cultures of honor. To say that there are cultural differences has, for many years, been dismissed as leading to Nazism. Michael Azar, professor at Gothenburg University, describes the engagement against honor-related violence as an expression of a "racially dominated ideology", which aims to "guard the race to avoid 'racial mixing'" and actualizes "the potential for [. . .] ethnic cleansing".[20]

Another Swedish professor, Masoud Kamali, who was head of a governmental investigation on integration, on behalf of the social democratic government in the early 2000s, criticized women (often with immigrant background) who were engaged against honor-related violence, in an article in the tabloid *Aftonbladet* in October 2003 .[21]

In the article, he asks himself rhetorically what really distinguishes "these groups" of "experts" from "neo-Nazis". He further predicts that these women's public engagements run the risk of "reinforcing discrimination and exclusion and, in the worst case, leading to another genocide". The division of the population into immigrants and natives is in itself a testimony, he claimed, of "an us-and-them-thinking" that justified colonialism, slavery, war and genocide".[22]

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[19] Ibid, pp 211–212.
[20] Azar 2005. See Lundberg 2020, pp 193–200.
[21] Kamali 2003.
[22] *Ibid.*

It ought to be clarified that the views dismissed in this way do not stipulate that people are predisposed to act in a certain way because they originate from a certain culture. In both the debates about clans and about family honor, the people who are criticized have the opinion that man is formable and capable to change.

Consequences of clan cultures in Sweden

The spread of the clan system in countries such as Sweden is, of course, in many ways a threat to certain foundations in a liberal and democratic society. As it has been pointed out, the clan system challenges the judiciary and its innermost principles as well as equality before the law. The expansion of culture of honor is, as we have seen, intimately linked to the clan as a form of organization and entails significant restrictions on individual freedom. In Sweden, a 2009 survey showed that 70,000 young people lived with family honor-related limitations.[23] In 2014, another study estimated that 100,000 young people were affected by family honor.[24] It is unacceptable that a large part of the young population does not enjoy their statutory freedom. A large proportion of young people have their freedom limited and run the risk of being punished by their families because of their sexual orientation or as a consequence of who they love and want to live with.

The existence of forty clan-based criminal networks in Sweden in 2021 shows, on the other hand, how easily the clan system transforms into criminal organizations – and how its system of organization works well in such contexts. After all, the clan organization is the very core of the Italian mafia.

Regarding a major Swedish lawsuit against criminal networks in the spring of 2021, there were revelations about the use of the Somali hawala-system.[25] The hawala system, developed in Asia during the Middle Ages, is closely connected to an honor system and depends on strong clan connections. Hawala means that you can transfer for example 10 000 Euro to a person in Morocco by paying the amount to a hawala dealer in Sweden. A few hours later the person in Morocco receives the same amount of money from a Moroccan hawala dealer. This system is totally dependent on a functioning clan system and built on the clan's capacity to force the individual members to act loyally towards the family. A person who is cheating is punished by "loss of honor" and excommunication.

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[23] Modée 2009.
[24] Götblad 2014, p 221.
[25] Wierup 2021.

What makes the clan such an effective way of organizing communities is primarily loyalty and, of course, a penal system that allows those who do not behave loyally to be punished hard and immediately.

However, every modern state must demand, as a minimum, a monopoly on violence and the rule of law. Neither armed voluntary civilian guards nor criminal gangs with firearms can be allowed, nor an alternative legal system (as customary law) that has no basis in a country with a legislative parliament and an executive judiciary. Clan-based criminal networks are, at the same time, growing as a consequence of a general lack of integration. And the integration is obstructed by the powerlessness of the Swedish authorities.

As a consequence of the large migration during the last decades (the following statistics are from 2018[26]), 25 percent of all Swedish children of school age are foreign-born or born in Sweden with two foreign-born parents. Thus, every fourth child in the Swedish school system does not speak Swedish as their mother tongue. If we include children with one foreign-born parent, more than a third of the children in Swedish schools are in need of extra help in learning the Swedish language. The problem is that as early as 30 years ago you could leave the Swedish school system without the necessary skills in the Swedish language – that is, long before the huge migration. Over the past 30 years, there have also been regular reports about teachers' inadequate knowledge of the Swedish language. There is, therefore, every reason to believe that many students will leave high school with poor language skills, which is worrying given that language skills are necessary for integration. And if integration fails, clans tend to grow, which is an obstacle for integration et cetera.

After all, there are ultimately only two options. Either immigrants must be integrated with the aim of eventually dissolving or destroying the clan and its order or the clan will establish itself as a parallel society at the side of the Swedish welfare state with, among other things, ghettos as one of several possible unpleasant consequences.

Solutions

How should one then act to solve the problems created by clan cultures in Sweden? Probably, the most important factor is firstly to understand how clans actually work, secondly to realize that people do not choose a state-based society automatically, not even in the long run. The state has to offer a number of desirable and functional advantages to the people: protection, justice, health care, education,

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[26] See Regeringsbeslut 2019.

insurances. Thirdly, you have to convince the clan members that the freedom that the state provides has many advantages over lack of freedom in a clan-based society, not least regarding individual self-realisation but also – and perhaps even more importantly – when it comes to the creation and the accumulation of wealth that is crucial for a common welfare system

Regarding the first factor – the understanding of the clan phenomenon – what is needed is a de-ideologization or de-politicization of the universities. To a greater extent, a distinction must be maintained between science and ideology. The purpose of the humanities in academia, for example, is not, as formulated in a Swedish textbook in literary theory for university students, to conduct research whose "ultimate goal" is to "prevent Planet Earth from being destroyed". Nor is the purpose of university education and academic research to create gender equality, in the sense that there will be no differences in statistics between women's life choices and men's life choices – or no income and wealth disparities between different ethnic or religious groups.

The purpose of university education and academic research is and must remain to gain knowledge about the world. This requires a broad range of theoretical inputs. Certain theoretical and methodological approaches cannot be categorically dismissed as oppressive or unscientific, just because they assume, for example, that there may be disparities between different cultures. A way to deal with the politicization of research in Sweden is to minimize the political influence over research and to increase the freedom of the individual researcher.

It is also necessary, for productive solutions to be formulated, to realize that the choice between state and clan is not obvious. The choice between state and clan is a choice between loneliness and fellowship, between a lack of context and historical continuity, between having a changeable or relative value as an individual on the basis of performance and of having a natural, firm value as part of a group.

But above all, it is a matter of being able to use the freedom the state provides for something constructive. If this opportunity is not offered, it is difficult to understand why anyone should choose state over a form of organisation that throughout history has exhibited an exceptional competitiveness and capacity for survival. In a society where the state does not function optimally with regards to the administration of justice; in a society where rape cases are investigated too slowly and where the police fail to solve problems with gang violence – in such a society it is no wonder that the most vulnerable people turn to clan leaders

to administer justice. Wherever the state weakens, clan structures tend to grow stronger. A weak state that fails to gain trust is the clan's best soil.

A concluding Swedish example is when it turned out that the criminal Ali Khan clan in Gothenburg had chosen to rent the conference facilities in one of the city's most fancy hotels for the purpose of negotiating with another criminal network, after a series of shootings that, in turn, led to the Ali Khan clan setting up roadblocks in suburban areas where motorists were checked.[27] Both of these episodes – the renting of the conference rooms and the roadblocks – had taken place a few weeks before the initially mentioned police chief informed on the radio that there are about forty clan-based criminal networks in Sweden today. However, both the roadblocks and the conference in Gothenburg signify that the clans do not see the Swedish police force as a major threat. Both of these phenomena can rather be regarded as a demonstration of strength showing contempt not only for the Swedish police force but the Swedish state-based society in general.

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[27] Nordlblad Et al. 2020.

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Refugee Host Community Development in Kenya: Approaches and Challenges

Gordon Ochieng' Ogutu

Abstract:

Implementing development programs aimed at improving the livelihoods of the refugee host communities remain a major challenge to better migration management in the global South despite being a pathway to a peaceful and efficient refugee integration process. While the integration efforts can be argued to have worked fairly well in developed nations, in the South, a lot of countries are still struggling with ensuring a smooth relationship between refugees and the host communities even as they grapple with development projects to counter the impacts of displacement in the communities. The long-term effect of poor migration management includes; tensions, conflicts, poverty and marginalization, which exist between and amongst settled refugees, camped refugees, and the host communities. Despite concerted efforts by state and non-state actors to improve the livelihoods of refugee host communities, challenges such as poor implementation frameworks and strategies, inadequate funds, corruption and poor coordination of development programs persist. As a result, stronger collaboration between governmental and non-governmental actors in host communities, allocation of more funds, and having stronger systems in place for effective implementation of development programs is needed.

Keywords: Kenya, development programs, refugee host communities

Introduction

The number of refugees and migrants is expected to grow tremendously in the near future even as reports indicate that economics or political conflicts no longer remain the primary driving factors behind migration.[1] Other factors such as climate change will drive millions into new destinations as the World Bank estimates that Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia will generate at least 143 million more climate migrants by 2050[2] while the International Organization for Migration (IOM) predicts 200 million additional environmental migrants by 2050. Further, a report by the United Nations Institute for Water, Environment

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[1] FAO 2018; Miletto Et al. 2017.
[2] World Bank 2018.

and Health suggests that one billion people will be forced to migrate by 2050 due to a combination of water and climate-driven challenges and conflicts. These projections point to the rapidly increasing growth of refugees and migrants across the world while at the same time challenging the global governments and institutions to prepare for the future. Already, United Nations (UN) global trends report (2016; p. 2) indicates that the highest burden of the refugee crisis is being borne by the poorest and developing countries, making Africa an important region in addressing the impacts of displacement.

The success or failure of government responses to the growing numbers of refugees depends on the nature of the preparations in terms of policy frameworks and development interventions targeting both the refugee populations and most importantly the host communities, which are usually in low-income regions. This should, at the very best, be inclusive and effectively implemented because the arrival of refugees in host communities, while it should be celebrated and embraced, might turn out to be a major economic and social challenge to the hosts. According to a study conducted on 'Refugee-Host Community Causes of Tensions and Conflicts in Kakuma Refugee Camp', the three major causes of tensions between the two groups are: 1) feelings of economic privilege enjoyed by refugees from aid agencies; 2) fear of being harmed by the refugees because they outnumber the locals; 3) competition over the scarce resources such as land, water and energy.[3] The study recommended that the refugee agencies should tailor their programs to include the development of both the host communities and refugees. The critical role of government involvement and approach that should be adopted in implementing such programs was, however, not highlighted in their study.

Socio-economically, the interaction between refugees and host communities can be beneficial or costly. Where the community is entrepreneurial and politically stable, the economic benefits can be greater as refugees, like the Somalis who are more likely to be self-employed and set up retail shops, will be trading with the locals thus boosting the economies of refugee centers.[4] When the support for refugees is higher than that being offered to the locals, however, they gain an advantage in terms of employment and income as evident in Kakuma town where 62 percent of the Congolese, 38 percent of the Somalis, and 19 percent of the Sudanese are employed both by the UNHCR and implementing partner NGOs as compared to 40 percent of the Turkana (host community) making a living from selling firewood and charcoal. Further, compared to the host Turkana people in Kakuma, the Congolese and Somali refugees are better off based on metrics such as the

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[3] Ali – Imana – Ocha 2017.
[4] Betts – Omata – Sterck 2018.

number of meals per day, diversity of diet, ownership of clothing, mobile phone or television, and access to electricity.[5] While refugees who have employment can adjust and integrate more and better than those who are unemployed, there's a gap that needs to be explored in cases where the refugees are employed but the host communities have high unemployment rates.

Shellito and Miller also highlight some of the negative outcomes of refugee presence as straining public and private services, causing physical and economic overcrowding, and increasing societal strife and potential for civil conflict.[6] In refugee towns, such as Kakuma and Dadaab, which are surrounded by heavily armed pastoralists who periodically raid each other, incidents of conflicts can be very dangerous and of serious ramifications. This, therefore, is a time bomb that should be adequately addressed by the host governments by implementing development projects to the host communities to improve their livelihoods in response to the displacement impacts. Miller opines that to craft responses that to minimize the costs and risks suffered by host countries and communities, and to maximize the protection available to refugees, there should be a clear understanding of the impacts of hosting refugees.[7]

While the development responses to refugees in Sub-Saharan African countries are varied, complex, and have different outcomes, one of the most widely cited success stories is the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) implemented by the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The SRS, which is mostly applied in protracted refugee situations, is geared towards improving the standard of living of the people of refugee-hosting districts, including the refugees, through empowering them to be able to support themselves and establishing mechanisms that ensure integration of services for the refugees with those of the nationals.[8] As a result of the strategy, in Uganda, the refugees have the right to work, attend school, and move freely.[9] Despite the fact that the GoU and refugee agencies praise the SRS as having achieved success,[10] Meyer argues that a critical tension between refugee self-reliance and refugee empowerment still exists.[11] Moreover, a deeper analysis of the model should be

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[5] *Ibid.*
[6] Shellito 2016; Miller 2018.
[7] Miller 2018.
[8] UNHCR 2003, p 3.
[9] Clements – Shoffner – Zamore 2016, p 49.
[10] UNHCR 2004.
[11] Meyer 2006.

conducted 'based on an evidence-based understanding of what works, for whom and under what conditions'.[12]

In migration research, especially refugee studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, a lot of focus and attention has been paid to the impacts of the refugees on communities, but little focus has been on how the governments should respond in terms of development and policy frameworks. The few studies existing have only made recommendations for the governments but have not examined specific development responses in terms of the projects and policies that specifically target the host communities and have been or are being implemented by the governments. In Kenya, for example, the government and non-governmental organizations' responses focus on refugees living in camps and amongst the host communities, which in effect has sidelined the host communities' socio-economic needs and, in some instances, led to tensions between the refugees and the communities. In some towns, like Nakuru, Kajiado,[13] Kakuma and Dadaab, which host refugees, the host communities have been neglected by the government's and NGOs' interventions resulting in issues such as rising land rates, rent levels, and dwindling business enterprises, and also an increased amount of crime have been witnessed amongst the host communities.[14]

This paper, therefore, evaluates the interventions carried out by actors in major refugee-hosting counties of Turkana and Garissa, the challenges involved and recommends what should be done to realize effective response to displacement impacts.

Overview of Turkana and Garissa Counties

The two counties of Turkana and Garissa are located in the North-Western and North-Eastern parts of Kenya respectively with a combined population of 1,768,329 persons (Turkana 926,976; and Garissa 841,353).[15] The counties are dominantly inhabited by pastoralists who mainly depend on livestock for economic and cultural purposes. They rank amongst the most marginalized regions in Kenya having a Development Index score of 0.2697, and 0.4688 respectively compared to the national development index of 0.520.[16] Further, the counties are prone to

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[12] Betts Et al. 2019a, p 6.
[13] Ngotho 2019.
[14] Musasia 2019.
[15] KPHC 2019.
[16] CRA 2012, p 23.

droughts, famine, and climate-related impacts that displace thousands of people every year and lead to loss of lives.

In terms of security, the areas are generally prone to conflicts as there are small arms that are in the hands of pastoralists, which they use to carry out cattle rustling raids. Historically, due to inter-ethnic conflicts and neighboring war-prone areas in South Sudan and Somalia, Turkana, Garissa, and the neighboring regions have witnessed the proliferation of small arms giving Northern Kenya the highest prevalence of small arms.[17]   Intelligence and security reports have also identified Garissa county as one of the places where Al-Shabaab terrorists enter the country from Somalia, plan[18] and execute their attacks.[19]

Together, these counties also host the highest percentage of the total refugees and asylum-seekers in Kenya, which is 494,289 with Dadaab camp (Garissa County) hosting 44 percent (218,873) while Kakuma and Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement (Turkana County) accounting for 40 percent, which amounts to 196,666.[20]

Approaches to displacement impacts

There is a consensus that displacement requires a humanitarian response to address the emergency needs of the people affected but also a development response to address the social and economic effects of such displacement. Today, there are different development approaches adopted in response to displacement impacts by countries involved as Devictor opines that there is no commonly accepted development response and how it should be implemented despite displacement posing a challenge towards achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[21] In developed nations, due to stronger economies that can withstand the impacts, the approaches are different compared to the ones adopted by developing nations, some of which rely on aids and grants to adequately address the impacts.

Humanitarian response is becoming costly and the donor base is narrowing, even if in 2015, global humanitarian financing was 28 billion USD, which was 21 billion more than it was in the year 2001.[22] Metois and Ruaudel argue that funding for the response to forced displacement has failed to meet the needs hence

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[17] Wairagu – Ndung'u 2003, p 3.
[18] Astariko 2016.
[19] Solomon 2020.
[20] UNHCR 2020a.
[21] Devictor 2017.
[22] UNHCR 2020c.

resulting in a competition between immediate humanitarian response and long-term programming.[23] There is, therefore, a need to adopt approaches that will be sustainable while addressing the challenges faced by refugees, migrants, and the host communities. The approaches should be part of the broader response framework adopted by governments and partners, focused on alleviating poverty, and also leverage the capacity of the development institutions. They should also focus on addressing the medium-term socio-economic dimensions of the displacement crises.

Displaced people are a concern to the development institutions because of their vulnerability, which arises from their situation thus affecting their ability to engage in economic activities leading them into poverty. Some challenges faced are the loss of assets, trauma which arises from their ordeal, human rights violations because they are often scapegoated and not adequately protected by the laws of the host countries, and lack of access to economic opportunities due to limitations such as discrimination by the laws of the host countries or living in places that provide low income and are often remote. Consequently, the World Bank Group established two facilities to support development programs targeting refugees and host countries/communities. They are the Global Concessional Financing Facility (GCFF), which avails loans to low-middle income host countries, and a USD 2 billion made available through the International Development Association set aside for host countries. They will be disbursed through the traditional methods, mostly government bodies, to support institutional and policy changes to better manage crises.

In Kenya, before 2016, there has never been a clear development approach to the impacts of displacement. It can be described as a mixed and uncoordinated development response comprising the local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), aid agencies and donors, intergovernmental organizations, and international development partners. The focus of the development approach adopted in Kenya has been on self-reliance, host communities, inclusion into the nation's system (government-led), and addressing inequality as part of the national development plan.

I. Self-Reliance

Widely cited as a success story of improving the standards of living of the refugee host community districts in Uganda, including the refugees, the Self-reliance

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[23] Metois – Ruaudel 2017.

approach seeks to empower the refugees and hosts to be able to self-sustain and establish mechanisms which ensure refugee services are integrated with those of the host communities. Implemented by the Government of Uganda and UNHCR, the approach seeks to address, amongst other topics, social issues such as education, health and community services; food security; burden-sharing; and poverty eradication. In Kenya, the same model was adopted in 2016 in Turkana County under the Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Program (KISEDP) spearheaded by the Government of Kenya, Turkana County, UNHCR, and partners.

Kalobeyei settlement was established to provide 'integrated, market-based opportunities to both refugees and the host community, and to support self-reliance for refugees'.[24] The approach in Kalobeyei offers cash-based interventions to meet basic needs, such as nutritional and housing needs, and supports special entrepreneurship training for refugees and hosts while in Kakuma refugee camp, the same approach is implemented in a slightly different way as it focuses on developing individual refugee abilities and creating an enabling environment that enhances access to livelihood opportunities and partnerships that help realize policy reforms that promote refugee integration.[25] In Dadaab refugee camp in Garissa County, the focus is on a global livelihood strategy where the actors implement market-based projects that enhance the financial, physical, social, and economic capital of target groups and general resilience building. For the urban refugees, the strategy is to build their capacities and also to advocate and to promote an environment that allows them to access opportunities.[26]

While this approach has realized some levels of success both in Uganda and Kenya, it still has some structural challenges which require effective implementation and monitoring such as the involvement of host communities in the policy and program formulation stages, which is still low hence their voices and needs are not adequately listened to and addressed resulting in a low adoption of such programs. In regions like Turkana and Garissa where the people have experienced marginalization for a long time, the self-reliance approach needs to be inclusive and should not just target refugees as that has led to the emergence of a wealthy class of refugees and poor host community members.

Overdependency on aid support amongst the refugee and host communities is also a major challenge to the effective implementation of the self-reliance approach.

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[24] Betts et al 2019a.
[25] UNHCR 2020d.
[26] *Ibid.*

This is because they get used to the humanitarian assistance that they receive aimed at making their lives bearable from the moment they are received at the camp. The continued provision of such assistance makes the refugees dependent and any other program that seeks to divert their way of life to self-sustenance is often unwelcome. The situation gets complicated because, as compared to the beginning when they still have some funds some of them might have carried from their places of origin, as time goes by, this gets diminished thus making them rely only on cash interventions by aid or donor agencies. The same happens to the host communities that rely on the support from the humanitarian agencies operating in the refugee camp.

Poor labor policies and legal hurdles that limit the access to opportunities by refugees also derail the implementation of the self-reliance strategy. As Calabria opines, many refugees are still confronted by legal restrictions imposed by host governments which deny them or limit their right to work and freedom of movement, and even in countries where they have the right to work, high unemployment rates dim their hopes of landing a gainful employment.[27] In poor and marginalized counties like Turkana and Garissa, training refugees in entrepreneurship skills may not, therefore, achieve the intended outcome due to the general prevailing economic conditions of the region whereas, in urban centers, the refugees are also confronted with challenges such as the high cost of establishing a business, harassment by the local authorities, and taxes that hinder the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, which most refugees engage in. To this end, the success of self-reliance highly depends on local circumstances and should not be an end in itself but a means to achieving sustainable livelihoods thus it should be a continuous process.

II. Host Community development approach

This approach mainly targets host communities that have been impacted by refugee inflow. Currently, the ongoing Kenya Development Response to Displacement Impacts Program (KDRDIP) is being implemented in Kakuma and Dadaab, which host the most camped refugees in the country. Developed mainly to 'improve access to basic social services, expand economic opportunities, and enhance environmental management for communities hosting refugees in the target areas of Kenya'[28], the implementation of this program began in 2018.

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[27] Calabria 2019.
[28] The Kenya National Treasury 2018, p 6.

Before the setting up of the camps in Kakuma and Dadaab and the eventual occupation by refugees, the ecosystem in the areas was balanced and could support nomadic pastoral activities. Consequently, this environment was systematically destroyed and degraded as the refugees harvested wood for fuel and construction thus impacting the lives of the host communities which depended on the same environment for support. Another development outcome that has deepened the division between refugees and host communities is the accessibility to better health care education by refugees while sidelining the hosts because trained experts prefer working in refugee facilities due to better remuneration packages.

In general, the refugees and host communities in Kenya are located in historically and economically marginalized areas experiencing food security challenges, poor social services and economic infrastructure, and a significant dependency on refugee camps for social and economic opportunities. It is therefore against this backdrop that the DRDIP was designed and is being implemented. It is being done in collaboration with local organizations and selective international partners that have a history and a better working relationship with the target communities. The international partners have been purposely selected to ensure that a repeat of a similar approach that leads to only refugees gaining doesn't recur.

Whereas this program has realized significant successes such as mobilizing the community members to embrace the objectives, enhancing the capacities of the local social groups, promoting women and youth empowerment, and improving social infrastructures in the areas, it faces structural and systemic challenges that could jeopardize the effective delivery of the project goals. Some of the challenges are the dependency attitude that has been cultivated by the aid and humanitarian agencies supporting refugees and host communities in the two areas. Structurally, there is a poor coordination of activities of the projects, which involves different units at the national, county, and sub-county units. Consequently, the program is not being delivered effectively and efficiently as many teams are involved, which creates a program implementation process. System-related challenges on issues such as the quality of the human resources also hamper the effective delivery of the program goals.

Inadequate policies and legal frameworks at the devolved levels (county governments) where the program is being implemented have created a loophole for exploitation by those involved in the implementation thus creating room for

corruption and poor service deliveries. This has also resulted in non-compliance with the project requirements by beneficiaries targeted by the project, further leading to a loss of funds that would have otherwise been channeled to other activities. In some instances, the beneficiaries have misused the funds received for unintended purposes.

III. Inclusion into the nation's development plan

Before prioritizing migration affairs and related programs, the refugee host community development approaches were incorporated into the national development plans of the country. Some of the documents are the national budget, the Kenya Vision 2030, and the Kenyan foreign policy. Through the national budget, the Government of Kenya has always allocated resources and funds to facilitate development programs in underdeveloped/marginalized regions some of which happen to host refugee camps. Further, through the Ministry of Immigration and Interior Government, funds have been directly channeled to various state departments such as the State Department of Special Programs and the Department of Refugee Affairs to complement other efforts to respond to the impacts of displacement by improving the livelihoods of the host communities and refugees.

The Kenya Vision 2030 is a development blueprint formulated in 2007 covering the period 2008 to 2030 intending to transform 'Kenya into a newly industrializing middle-income country providing a high-quality life to all its citizens by the year 2030'.[29] It is further divided into three pillars; economic, social, and political. Though not spelled out in the vision document, the development responses to displacement have been included in economic and social pillars where the country seeks to maintain economic growth and to ensure equitable social development. To this end, the government included development programs targeting host communities and refugees considering that both the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps were set up before the Vision 2030 was formulated (1991[30] and 1992[31] respectively).

As part of its role in promoting regional integration and multilateralism, Kenya has ratified international treaties that relate to refugees and thus adopted them in its foreign policy. The treaties include, amongst others, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),

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[29] The Kenya Vision 2030, p 1.
[30] UNHCR 2020a.
[31] UNHCR 2020e.

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non – International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Further, under the regional integration cornerstone, Kenya recognizes and appreciates the role of some of the regional economic and political blocs such as its 'principal avenues for pursuing its foreign policy goals'.[32] As part of its role as a founding member of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), it commits 'to continue to provide leadership and support to IGAD as an effective regional tool for confronting challenges to sustainable development in the region'.[33] These challenges include displacement as a result of conflicts, refugee management, peace, and stability.

Despite having a development blueprint, a comprehensive foreign policy document, and setting aside budgetary allocations through its state departments such as Special Programs, this approach has proven to be very ineffective in dealing with the development response to impacts of displacement in refugee host communities. The fact that it is not targeted and is uncoordinated makes it difficult to monitor the development responses thus achieving little impact. The corruption challenge in Kenya's public sector also remains a big impediment to the effective and efficient delivery of services to refugee host communities thus a lot of funds are stolen from the public coffers that would have otherwise been put to good use. Additionally, because the government budget is overstretched due to many development projects being implemented across the country and revenue challenges, the development programs targeting refugee host communities in the country do not receive enough funds for effective implementation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, refugee host community development in Kenya experiences a myriad of challenges that need to be addressed for effective and efficient development. The Government of Kenya, which should take a leading role in refugee affairs, has left the role to non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations and development partners who mainly focus on the refugees at the expense of the host communities. In Turkana County, for example, the county's administration

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[32] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kenya 2016, p 29.

[33] *Ibid.*

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has significantly reduced the allocation of resources to Turkana West sub-county which hosts the Kakuma refugee camp because the county directors wrongfully believe that the host community in that area also benefits from the refugee projects being implemented by the non-governmental organizations and other agencies working in Kakuma.

The approaches that have been adopted too, have also realized little success due to poor planning, coordination, and implementation. Coupled with the high levels of corruption in the country, the refugee host community development responses have been turned into cash cows rather than humanitarian and development projects.

Based on the analysis of the refugee host community development approaches and challenges in Kenya, this paper recommends a more coordinated approach jointly led by the government, development partners, and other non-governmental agencies with interest in forced displacement impacts and migration governance. The non-governmental agencies operating in Turkana and Garissa counties should support and collaborate further with the government agencies as working in isolation and leaving out the host communities has a negative economic and social impact on them and thus creates a division between the refugees and the host communities. Additionally, the existing government institutions that spearhead refugee and host community affairs should be strengthened more with operational policy frameworks, sufficient funds, and effective monitoring systems to ensure effective implementation of the development projects targeting refugee host communities.

The county governments hosting the two refugee camps should support the host communities further instead of reducing their budgetary allocations for such areas because they need economic and social empowerment due to the displacement impacts which have interrupted their livelihoods. This can be achieved through deeper collaboration and partnership with the non-governmental agencies supporting refugees in the regions to ensure that they also include the host communities in their development planning.

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Before the judges. The journey of anti-immigration Matteo Salvini to the courtrooms

Márk Vargha

Abstract

In the eyes of one half of the European press and public opinion, he is a far-right pariah, and in the eyes of the other half, a saviour of „old-fashioned Christian democracy". Either way: Matteo Salvini is now an inescapable figure in Italian politics with a realistic chance of becoming prime minister in 2022. It also seems certain that if he moves into the Chigi Palace in Rome, he, his cabinet and his programme will come under fierce attack, as he will fight immigration not only in rhetoric but also in action, as he has already demonstrated during his short stint as interior minister. In this essay, we set out to present his anti-immigration policy activities, which cannot fail to include details of the two cases in which Salvini has fought his opponents not only on the communication and political level, but also on the legal level.

Keywords: Matteo Salvini, Italy, anti-immigration policy

1. Introduction

In mid-2021, it looks as if, unless trends change drastically, the Italian right-wing alliance of four parties, which will run as a single party, will win 49.5% of the vote, while the left-wing alliance of three parties – whose unity is highly questionable – will win 46% in the 2022 parliamentary elections.[1] In the event of a right-wing victory, if the parties' strengths remain unchanged, Matteo Salvini will become Prime Minister of Italy and will have a major influence on the political process in the European Union (EU) as a member of the European Council representing a founding member state of 60 million inhabitants.

The election victory could be a further catalyst in the process that began with the meeting of Viktor Orbán, Mateusz Morawiecki and Matteo Salvini in Budapest on 1 April 2021. It is the creation of a European right-wing force capable of providing a political home for tens of millions of voters who seek a new one, as the European People's Party, leading the EU together with the Social Democrats and Liberals,

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[1] Colluzzi 2021.

has moved towards the centre. Although the organisational implementation of this merger is still under consideration – although Salvini has more concrete plans: the merger of the European Conservatives and Reformists and the Identity and Democracy groups[2] – it seems certain that one of the common pillars will be the rejection of migration, and that the 'brand' of the League, one of the largest members of the alliance to be formed, has been strongly built on this in recent years, and it was also responsible for its popularity peak in the spring of 2019, when it won the European Parliament elections in Italy by a landslide.

It is therefore useful to present the party's charismatic leader's anti-migration activities, which have been marred by criminal prosecutions recently. However, it should be stressed that the League is far from being a 'one-issue' party, making its voice heard on a number of other important policy issues and confronting its current (forced) allies in Mario Draghi's government, for example on the management of epidemics.

2. A stable background: the League[3]

Matteo Salvini is known to the European public as the anti-immigration Interior Minister. However, it was not his first stint in the Conte government that gave a decisive boost to his hitherto highly successful political career. Rather, it was his earlier role as general secretary that made the Northern League, a party deeply embedded and highly organised in a section of Italian society, Italy's second political force after its historic low performance in 2012.

In February 1979, at the University of Pavia, Umberto Bossi, 38, listened to a lecture by Bruno Salvadori, the main ideologist of the still active party, the Union of the Aosta Valley (UV), who spoke about the importance of federalism in the context of the forthcoming (for the first time direct) European elections. The young Bossi was captivated by the idea and soon began his long political career as a local man in the UV-led coalition of 19 regionalist movements, which won 0.47% of the vote in the EP elections. (The career is still on-going, as the politician is still a senator.)

As he, himself saw that the deepening of European integration could jeopardise the regional specificities of Italy, which, historically, are far more important than the national, Bossi decided to put his skills, as an author and editor - although he

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[2] Kohán 2021.
[3] The content of this section is a summary of Balocco – Maggiora 2021.

had trained as an electronics technician - at the service of the regional movements in the north. After a brief stint in the North West, he was responsible for the newspaper Autonomista Lombardia. In 1983, he stood, for the first time, in elections in Lombardy for the List of Trieste. Even though the Friulian city is closer to Lake Balaton than to Lake Varese, around which the founder grew up, Bossi and his comrades-in-arms still received more than 8,000 votes in the four Lombardy constituencies in which they stood. Meanwhile, in the neighbouring province, the League of Veneto did particularly well, with two of its members entering the Roman parliament.

Buoyed by their relative successes, the time had come to form their own formation: the Lombard Autonomist League was born on 12 April 1984. Together with several 'neighbouring' regionalist parties, it stood in the forthcoming EP elections, but failed to win a seat. However, some of them were elected to local councils. On 21 March 1986, the party changed its name to the Lombard League and its internal processes became more democratic, although Bossi's role as general secretary remained unquestioned. They 'exploded' into public consciousness during the parliamentary elections held the following summer, when Bossi was elected senator. Two years later, he could have become a Member of the European Parliament, but he decided not to swap his seat in Rome for the one in Strasbourg.

From then on, the party found itself in the throes of history. On the one hand, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended and the Iron Curtain fell. This also affected the Italian (almost) two-party system: the Communist Party (PCI) was drawn towards the centre and became more electable for a wider section of the population, while the Christian Democratic Party (DC), which had been the sole party on the right since the end of the Second World War and had been forced to govern, at best occasionally, in conjunction with various small parties, collapsed under the weight of the Tangentopoli corruption scandal and was torn apart. Voters needed clean hands and fresh ideas. This development undoubtedly put Bossi's party in the driving seat: in the 1990 municipal elections they were already third in Lombardy behind the DC and the PCI. Two weeks later, in Pontida, a small town near Bergamo, the Northern League (LN) unfurled its flag at a historic site (it was here that the Lombard army defeated Frederick Barbarossa in 1167). At that time, its main agenda was federalisation, i.e. the independence of the economically developed northern provinces from the rest of Italy. They sharply criticised 'thieving Rome' *(Roma ladrona)* for using the resources from the

economic growth generated by the north to develop the poor southern provinces without spectacular results. The president of the republic and the Roman Catholic Church were also critical of 'Legizm', but the non-establishment party was increasingly successful in elections at various levels. In 1993, the League candidate won the mayoral elections in Milan with an outstanding 57% of the vote. From then on, the party was seen as a stable player in Italian politics, a position it has maintained ever since.

The second era in the history of the LN thus began with the rally on the field of Pontida[4] and continued with their entry into the first Berlusconi government (11 May 1994 – 17 January 1995). The LN was given a number of important portfolios and Irene Pivetti became the second woman in the history of the country to chair the Chamber of Deputies. However, in addition to Forza Italia (FI), the cabinet also included the post-fascist party (MSI), popular in the South (from which grew the Fratelli d'Italia [FdI] a.k.a. Brothers of Italy, the League's current rival on the Italian right). In the wake of mounting tensions, the government collapsed and a caretaker government of experts was set up, supported by the LN. This put the LN on the same platform as the left, whose then leader did not rule out the possibility of including the LN in the government if it was formed, because „it is the largest Labour party in the North, like it or not." Berlusconi interpreted this rapprochement as a betrayal, and Bossi and Berlusconi had harsh words for each other. After the elections, a socialist-liberal-centrist coalition government was formed, but the LN was not needed for a majority.

The secretary general then concentrated on building the party and strengthening the identity of northern Italy. He now set his sights on the complete secession of Padania *(secessione),* formed his own police force under the name of the Padanian National Guard, designed a flag, adopted an anthem, ran a parallel parliament, and later founded his own television and radio channels, a daily newspaper and even a bank. But as elections approached, Bossi realised that the only way the LN would be able to get into government was to move closer to Berlusconi again and to tune down its separatist rhetoric. Thus, the party's goal in the campaign was simply to give the country's regions (not just the north) as much autonomy as possible, i.e. as many powers as possible, while the central government had as little as possible (*devolution* is the English word the Liga use to describe their desire).

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[4] In the 12th century, a league was formed by the northern Italian cities (Mantua, Brescia, Bergamo and other communes, city-states) in the north of Italy that protested against the rule and policies of Frederick Barbarossa.

They have been in government with Berlusconi twice since. The first was between 11 June 2001 – the third chapter in the party's history – and 17 May 2006, when the LN had a major success and a major failure. The success: the first anti-illegal immigration law (the so-called Bossi-Fini law) was passed. The failure: a referendum on constitutional change on devolution, which was valid but 61.3% of those who took part rejected the idea. Italians apparently did not want, for example, 20 different healthcare systems. It was also a personal failure for Bossi, who for the first time in his career held a ministerial post, and the one responsible for devolution.

The second time was between 8 May 2008 and 16 November 2011, when the joint government ended with Berlusconi's resignation. The failure was due, in no small part, to the fact that, like his left-wing predecessors, he was unable to implement far-reaching reforms to boost productivity. The uncompetitive economy could not cope with the effects of the global financial crisis on Italy. And after the government, Bossi also flopped: the corruption scandals that erupted in 2012 were traced back to him, and even members of his family caused deep disappointment not only among party members – €49 million in party subsidies had to be paid back to the treasury – but also among the electorate. The most striking evidence of the latter was the loss of the contest for the mayoralty of Milan. The Northern League, in the doldrums, needed to be cleansed of the shadows of the past, a task that, after a transitional period, was now awaiting Matteo Salvini. He ushered in the party's fourth era, which continues today.

Salvini joined the Northern League in 1990, at the age of 17, and became a municipal councillor in the northern Italian metropolis at the age of 20, when he conquered Milan. In addition to his political activities, he worked for the party newspaper La Padania, and later for Radio Padania. He was a Member of the European Parliament from 2004 to 2006, before returning home after the 2006 municipal elections to become leader of the LN parliamentary group in Milan. In 2008 he was elected to the lower house of the Parliament, but in 2009 he returned to Strasbourg to work as a MEP. Under his leadership, the party, in alliance with Forza Italia and the Brothers of Italy, won two important victories in the 2015 regional elections: in Veneto, Luca Zaia of the League, while in Liguria, Giovanni Toti of Forza Italia became regional governor. In 2018, as the silver medallist in the parliamentary

elections, the League, after lengthy negotiations, formed a coalition with the gold medallist anti-establishment outfit, the Five Star Movement. Salvini reached the peak of his career, becoming interior minister and deputy prime minister in Giuseppe Conte's first government. The League's record in government has been a clear political success: in 2019, it won the European Parliament elections with a record 34% of the vote. After leaving government, this support began to decline, but in 2020, with two natural allies on the right, they were able to win new regions from the left, now in opposition: Jole Santelli (FI) in Calabria and Francesco Aquaroli (FdI) in Marche were helped to power by the League voters, while Toti and Zaia secured themselves another five-year term with much higher margins of victory than before (53.13% and 76.79% respectively).

3. Immigration in the party's 2018 election manifesto

The League prepared a 71-page manifesto[5] for the parliamentary elections on 4 March 2018. It covered 27 topics, with *Immigration* coming third right after *Taxes* and *Pensions*, demonstrating how important the party considers the issue to be in this day and age. The three-page chapter is divided into four sections, preceded by a basic premise: „No one should feel forced to leave their country and their roots for economic reasons. We can help the disadvantaged countries of the planet by supporting local projects, not by welcoming everyone. Italy will not become Africa!"

The first part is entitled: *Immigration regulation and repatriations*. It talks about changing the rules of reception centres and the need to conclude bilateral agreements on readmission with countries of origin. The second part is entitled: *International protection*. It proposes that reception centres be set up in countries bordering Libya under the auspices of the United Nations, with Italy playing a role in their maintenance. Furthermore: the docking of NGO vessels should be banned, the refugee status of criminals should be withdrawn, the conditions for granting humanitarian protection should be tightened, a list of safe third countries should be drawn up and the daily allowance of an immigrant should not be more than that of an invalidity pensioner. The text stresses that the focus should be on helping Italians living in poverty and that, in particular, families with three or more children should be supported in order to bring about a positive demographic change. In the third section, entitled *The perpetrators of irregular migration*, the party calls for a fight against people smugglers. The fourth and fifth sections deal

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[5] Lega 2018.

with issues of residence and citizenship, while the fifth, entitled *Relations with Islam*, would, among other things, ban polygamy, public prayer, the prospect of the expulsion of students who disobey their female teachers on religious grounds. The document also raises funding problems and stresses the need to create financial transparency for Islam in Italy.

4. Salvini as the Minister of the Interior: actions against illegal migration[6]

4.1 The approach to immigration of the first Conte Government

In June 2018, as a result of lengthy bargaining, Gentiloni's left-wing government was replaced by a coalition of the mixed-ideology proto-party, the Five Star Movement led by Luigi Di Maio, and the radical right-wing League, led by Matteo Salvini, which had been a regional minor party but had become a centre party with a strong national base; Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, a law professor, nominated by the Five Stars, and deputised by the party presidents Di Maio as Minister of Social Affairs and Labour and Salvini as Minister of the Interior.

Point 13 of the 57-page government programme deals with migration. It states that the current migration situation is unsustainable for Italy. Migration is a serious business, sustained by funds that are less transparent and linked to organised crime. The failure of the asylum system raises the need to rethink the Schengen system. Italy, given its merits, must play a leading role at the European negotiating table. The pressure on the external borders must be reduced as well as the disproportionate burden on the Italian coastguard, which other European states are not willing to share, must be reviewed (it should be noted that the Visegrad Four offered €35 million in aid for Italian maritime border protection at the end of last year). It proposed to speed up the processing of asylum applications, designate safe countries of origin and transit, provide protection in the countries of origin and harmonise the quality of current protection with international standards, while respecting constitutional rights.

The section on migration also identifies, as a serious problem, the opaque and confusing management of NGOs providing services to asylum seekers in the country, which makes it impossible to monitor the proper use of public funds allocated to them (in particular, the failure to ensure that the mafia is excluded from these funds

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[6] The content of this section is a summary of Janik – Tóth – Vargha 2019.

is a matter of concern). The need for agreements with third countries, the policy of „local aid" and the fight against human trafficking groups (all of which are in line with the Hungarian government's position) are mentioned. The document also makes clear the heavy burden that migration management places on public administrations and budgets. The final section draws attention to the lack of state regulation of the conditions of Islamic religious life, the exposure of mosque-going communities to radical ideas and the lack of embeddedness in local societies.

4.2 The first package of Salvini (Decreto di Sicurezza)

The Interior Minister himself, who is responsible for drafting the migration legislation, has repeatedly stated that if Europe does not fulfil its duty of solidarity in terms of distribution, it will turn back the boats rescuing migrants towards Africa, i.e. not allow them to dock. (See the case of Gregoretti and Open Arms below, in sections 5.2 and 5.3.) This happened regularly during Salvini's time as interior minister. Each case has been met with strong protests from rights organisations and with increased media attention. At the same time, the Italian government has also taken humanitarian concerns into account, with sick people, minors and pregnant women being taken off the ships.

The Diciotti rescue boat case in August 2018, when Salvini allowed the boat to dock in Catania, Sicily, but refused to allow the adult migrants, 150 in total, to disembark, also caused domestic political tensions. The decision was strongly criticised not only by the left-liberal opposition but also by coalition partners, such as the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Roberto Fico. Prime Minister Conte called Salvini on the phone and told him that, although he was of course on his side, he had to resolve this issue, i.e. allow the migrants to leave. In response, the Interior Minister indicated that he would not budge an inch, and that if Conte or the President of the Republic wanted to take action, they should. However, he added that the long-term solution was to adopt the strict Australian model, whereby no one would be allowed to enter Europe without official papers. In an interview, Salvini said he was fed up with migrants doing nothing all day in cities, costing the country €5 billion per year. He also added that he feels a responsibility towards others: the 5 million Italians living in poverty, the 1 million people living on a 278 euro salary who are mentally handicapped or disabled, children with autism, teachers, farmers, small businessmen, lorry drivers. It has taken the moral condemnation of a Europe that has only managed to take in 12,000 migrants instead of 35,000 – a reference to the failed implementation of the 2015 quota decision.

In autumn 2018, the Italian Parliament adopted a law on migration and security, known as the „first Salvini package". It included:

1. Humanitarian protection (since 1998) was extended - in the form of a different type of residence permit – to those who would be subject to persecution in their home country or would be victims of forced labour or trafficking in human beings. The majority of asylum applications submitted in 2017 were rejected. The distribution of positive decisions among all applicants was as follows: 25% were granted humanitarian protection, 8% refugee status and 8% protection status. It was therefore likely, as argued by the Home Secretary, that many economic migrants who did not qualify for refugee or protection status were residing legally in the country by abusing this legal status.

2. Raising the 90-day maximum limit for asylum detention in repatriation centres to 180 days.

3. Creating the possibility to detain migrants after entry by allowing asylum seekers to be held in hotspots for 30 days. The aim is to clarify their identity and nationality. They will then be transferred to repatriation centres, but may be kept in hotspots longer at the request of the notary, with the authorisation of the competent public authority, if there is insufficient space in the repatriation centres.

4. Provide more resources for repatriations: half a million more for 2018, one and a half million more for 2019 and half a million more for 2020.

5. The list of offences on the basis of which asylum applications may be rejected will include sexual violence, production, possession and trafficking of drugs, robbery and extortion, theft, burglary, threatening or assaulting a public official. The examination of an application may be suspended if the applicant is being prosecuted for an offence punishable by refusal of asylum while the application is being examined. Furthermore, if a refugee or a protected person returns, even temporarily, to his/her country of origin, he/she loses his/her status.

6. Only persons who have refugee or asylum status or unaccompanied minors may stay in accommodation in the municipalities.

7. Asylum seekers cannot be registered in the civil registry.

8. The amendment to the law on citizenship has made it possible to refuse to register a marriage to an Italian citizen. The application fee has been increased from €200 to €250 and the time limit for approval has been set at 48 months. Citizenship may be refused and citizenship already granted may

be withdrawn from a person who has been convicted by a final judgment of a criminal offence related to terrorist activities. (In addition, there are measures in the Regulation not related to migration but aimed at increasing citizens' sense of security.)

4.3 The second package of Salvini (Decreto di Sicurezza bis)

In the summer of 2019, the Parliament adopted the second package of Salvini's toughening legislation. These focus on maritime rescue can be summarised as follows:

1. The Minister of the Interior may restrict or prohibit the passage of vessels through Italian territorial waters or the docking of vessels in Italian ports for reasons of public order or security. It may do the same if the crew of the vessel is suspected of committing an offence of facilitating illegal immigration.
2. The captain may also be immediately arrested for disobeying naval orders or committing an act of violence.
3. If the lawfulness of the seizure of the vessel is confirmed, it shall become the property of the State, which may use it, sell it or destroy it two years after its confiscation.
4. The other provisions deal with procedural and financial matters. The additional resources foreseen for repatriation in 2020 are increased fourfold to €2 million.

In 2018, there were 5 615 repatriations for every 27 070 rejected applications, which in percentage terms (24%) was a significant improvement compared to the previous year (19.4%).

4.4 Result: significant reduction in maritime migration

Salvini's heavy-handed policy, which focused on the protection of maritime borders and which was criticised by the European mainstream as inhumane and a „trampling on European values", has found sympathy in Italian society and among politicians opposed to the European mainstream. If we consider the possibilities and capabilities of Libya's border protection largely unchanged under the first Conte and Gentiloni governments, it can be said that this policy, coupled with a particularly hostile and blame-based communication towards Germany and France, proved to

be more effective than the previous ones. While arrivals from Lybia (Africa) fell by 34% year-on-year in 2017, in 2018 they were down by 80% on the previous year. And this trend was not broken for a long time: in the first half of 2019, arrivals were 79% down compared to the same period in 2018. However, the estimated number of drownings at sea is also on a downward trend: 37% fewer people died in the 2016/2017 and 54% fewer in the 2017/2018 crossings.

5. Criminal proceedings against Salvini

5.1 The Diciotti case

The first case in which Salvini was prosecuted was that of the Diciotti ship. On 16 August 2018, this Coast Guard vessel rescued 190 migrants, including 37 minors, from the sea off the coast of Malta. Although the migrants' boat had been berthed for two days, Malta, which is not party to the rescue conventions to which Italy is, did not carry out a rescue operation. So the Italian boat took on board the people in distress, put thirteen of them ashore on Lampedusa for urgent medical reasons and took the others to Catania, where it docked. A long-running dispute then ensued between the Italian and Maltese sides over whose duty it was to rescue the passengers, and the captain was refused permission to disembark by the Ministry of the Interior on 20 May. He was only allowed to do so on the 26th.[7]

The case never reached the pre-trial stage. First the Palermo prosecutor's office proposed that Salvini be charged with a serious case of kidnapping, then the case was referred to the Catania prosecutor's office, which did not recommend that the case be prosecuted. The decision to proceed was taken by the Catania Ministerial Court, sitting in a three-member chamber, which refused to dismiss the case. This court could request the waiver of immunity, which was granted.[8] However, as Salvini's League was still in government with the Five Star Movement at the time, the ruling majority in parliament came together against the waiver of immunity, and many opposition votes were also cast. On 20 March 2019, 237 senators voted against the waiver of immunity and only 61 voted in favour.[9]

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[7] Camilli 2019.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] Il Fatto Quotidiano 2019.

5.2 The Gregoretti case

On 25 July 2019, after two separate operations by the Finance Police and the Coast Guard to rescue migrants, the Gregoretti boat picked them up and brought them to Lampedusa. It was then given permission to dock first in Catania and then in Augusta on the 27th, but the Ministry of the Interior did not allow most of the migrants to disembark until the 31st. The total number of passengers was 131, but only a 29-year-old woman, eight months pregnant, and fifteen minors were allowed to disembark.

Several NGOs have initiated criminal proceedings against Salvini for the crime of kidnapping. His immunity was suspended by both houses of parliament, and during the proceedings Salvini defended himself by claiming that he had acted in collusion with other members of the government. Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte and other ministers were also heard.[10]

The preliminary proceedings, at the end of which the court, acting as a single judge, would decide whether to proceed to trial, ended with a negative decision on 14 May 2021. On the proposal of the Catania Public Prosecutor's Office *(procura),* Judge Nunzio Sarpietro's decision was based on the grounds that Salvini had not violated international law, that the government had decided the matter collectively and that the minister's behaviour was not that of a kidnapper.[11]

5.3 The Open Arms case

On 1 August 2019, the NGO ship Open Arms took 161 migrants, including 32 Kiksiris, on board in Libyan waters during two rescue operations. The Interior Ministry allowed only three people in a medical crisis to disembark. On the 10th, another 39 people were rescued from the sea by the crew. The ship remained at sea for 19 days, during which time several people were allowed to disembark to receive medical treatment. The case ended with Agrigento's prosecutor boarding the vessel, where he seized it on suspicion of abuse of authority and ordered the passengers to be taken ashore. On the 20th, in Lampedusa, 83 passengers were affected.

It should be noted that Open Arms' lawyers have also challenged the legal basis itself, the Decreto di Sicurezza Bis, in the administrative court in Lazio.

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[10] Camilli 2020a.
[11] De Luca 2021.

In November 2019, the prosecutor's office in Agrigento opened an investigation on suspicion of kidnapping and continued abuse of office, and the case was continued by the prosecutor's office in Palermo, which requested a ruling from the Ministerial Court on 29November. In February 2020, the judiciary decided to request the waiver of immunity, which was granted by the Senate on 30 July 2020, with 147 votes in favour and 141 against.[12]

During the preliminary proceedings, Salvini defended himself in a similar way as in the Gregoretti case, but while the Gregoretti was a state vessel, which he could directly control as a state leader, the Spanish Open Arms is a civilian rescue vessel. Moreover, Giuseppe Conte has denied that he collaborated with Salvini in the Open Arms case, backing away from his former minister in his pleas. Judge Lorenzo Janelli decided that a trial was in order and set the first hearing for 15 September 2021.[13]

6. Conclusion

Above, we have reviewed how Matteo Salvini became one of the best known of Europe's leading anti-migration politicians. We can see that he needed a strong political organisation with a long history, free from conflict, and therefore united. He needed the political talent to take up an issue on which he could distinguish himself from the mainstream in the Italian and European political space. He needed a coalition agreement in which he could secure a portfolio in line with his tangible agenda on migration. And finally, he needed a consistently implemented, high-profile ministerial deal and the procedures that followed to help him stay in the limelight.

There is no getting away from the fact that, however important a position he has put his like-minded party colleague in the current unity government[14] led by Mario Draghi, the second Conte government's lenient migration policy is apparently not going to change.

It is impossible to predict the outcome of the Open Arms case, which has reached the trial stage, but it is certain that Salvini will be a hero in the eyes of his supporters if he is acquitted, and a martyr if he is convicted. Then comes the next dilemma: if he will be the next prime minister of Italy, in the midst of solving Italy's economic and social problems, how long can any political advantage he gains in the prosecution last?

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[12] Camilli 2020b.
[13] Rainews 2021.
[14] Vargha 2021.

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How EU citizens see the issue of migration – results of an EU-wide representative research

Szabolcs Janik

Abstract

This study presents the results of a specific EU-wide survey conducted by Hungary's oldest conservative think tank, Századvég. The so-called Project Europe included a separate set of questions dedicated to the issue of migration in which respondents were surveyed in all the 27 EU member states in 2020. This representative research gave a valuable insight into how Europeans see contemporary immigration processes amid the COVID pandemic. The results revealed that European societies agree on the broader issue of migration in several important areas. For example, the majority of EU citizens clearly see the current migration towards Europe as economic immigration, and expect the European Union to take more effective action, including more successful border protection. The distribution of asylum seekers is already revealing the division between "Westerners" and "Easterners", pointing out one of the key reasons why quotas should not be a way out of the migration crisis for the EU and its member states. However, there is a clear demand from the majority of respondents to try to solve demographic problems through an increase in birth rate and through the support of families instead of immigration. These positions are particularly popular in the post-socialist and V4 countries, but, apart from Luxembourg, they also form a majority opinion in Western member states.

Keywords*: immigration, EU, survey, Századvég, public opinion, Project Europe

Introduction

The issue of migration (more precisely: immigration) is still strongly present in European public discourse. This highlights the fact that although the number of illegal arrivals in the European Union (EU) has been significantly reduced[1] since

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[1] While in 2015 a total of more than 1.822 million illegal border crossings (IBCs) were registered at the EU's external borders, in 2019 this number was only about 142,000. The number of asylum applications submitted also fell sharply after 2015 but stabilised at a higher level (the two statistics correlate but may differ significantly for practical reasons). See: FRONTEX 2020.

2015–2016, the problem is far from being resolved.[2] On the other hand, it is also important to emphasise that the perception of illegal migration is not primarily shaped by the process itself, but by the "final result", i.e., the everyday experiences of immigration, and the ideas and perceptions formed about them. Thus, for example, Europeans' impression of the success of integration or how they view the state of public security is a much more determining factor. Migration has become an important social and political issue over the last five years, and one which is capable of generating serious debates – both within and across member states. In addition to the objective/subjective social reality, politicians in Brussels and the member states, as well as the media, have played a key role in this. The level of interest in the topic and the strength of related concerns are shown by the fact that the issue of immigration remained in the TOP 3 of the EUROBAROMETER 2020 summer survey, even during the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic.[3]

This paper briefly presents the results of an EU-wide survey conducted by *Hungary's oldest conservative think tank,* Századvég *in 2020, and also provides some possible underlying reasons for the attitudes of EU citizens.*

About the research

In the first half of 2016, Századvég conducted a public opinion poll covering all 28 EU member states, with the aim of analysing the opinions of EU citizens regarding the issues that most affect the future of the Union. In a unique way, Project28 conducted the widest possible survey of 1,000 randomly selected adults in each country, thus a total of 28,000 individuals. Gaining an understanding of society's sense of prosperity and mapping the population's attitudes towards the performance of the European Union, the migration crisis and the growing threat of terrorism were among the most important subjects of the analysis. Századvég conducted the research again in 2017, 2018 and 2019. These surveys also continued to reflect on the topics that most determined the European political and social discourse.[4]

In 2020, the survey, now called Project Europe, continued with the aim of mapping the population's attitude towards the most important public issues affecting our continent.[5]

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[2] And this still holds true: after dropping to 124,000 in 2020, the number of IBCs is on the rise again in 2021, having reached 133,900 by the end of September. See: FRONTEX 2021a. and FRONTEX 2021b.

[3] Eurobarometer 2020.

[4] For the results of the surveys see: Project 28 2020.

[5] Project Europe 2020.

In addition to society's sense of prosperity, the performance of the European Union and the attitudes towards the migration crisis, in line with the latest challenges affecting Europe, the dominant theme of the 2020 poll is the coronavirus pandemic, climate change and anti-Semitism. In addition to the EU member states, the research covered the United Kingdom, Norway and Switzerland, interviewing a total of 30,000 randomly selected adults using the CATI method.

The issue of migration formed a separate block in the research. The most important results are analysed below. Due to the Project28 research conducted by Századvég in previous years, data are available on several issues in a chronological sequence, so where possible and relevant, the changes and trends in the perception of migration are also covered.

Perception of Immigration

The research shows that illegal migration is still a major concern for Europeans: there were extremely high rates of response to the question of how serious they think illegal immigration into their own country was. The combined rate of "very serious" or "only somewhat serious" responses has not decreased significantly since 2016, and was still at 75% in 2020. (*Chart 1*).

Although there are significant differences in the perception of the influx of illegal immigrants between groups of different countries, it can be seen that even in the Visegrad (V4) countries, almost two-thirds of respondents (65%) selected either "very serious" or "only somewhat serious" (*Chart 2*).[6]

The concerns observed in the V4, which are somewhat more moderate than the European average, can be explained by the fact that migratory pressures on the Mediterranean front countries are higher than in the Central European region (partly due to the geographical location of the latter countries and partly due to the effectiveness of their migration policy – see Hungary), that is, the citizens of the V4 states assess the migration situation of their countries quite realistically. This is reinforced by the fact that the founding countries and those who joined the European integration during the 20th century can be considered traditional target countries, so the problem of illegal immigration was known there even before 2015. Not surprisingly, the highest response at the country level was in Greece, with 63% there finding the arrival of illegal immigrants very worrying and 25% rather worrying. It is noteworthy that even in Luxembourg, which is the least concerned, this cumulative rate is 62%.

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[6] During the research, the response rates of the Visegrad four (i.e. the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) were tallied separately within the post-socialist countries.

Chart 1

Chart 2

The survey also asked why Europeans think immigrants come to the continent. While in 2016 (the second peak of the migration crisis) a narrow majority (51%) believed that the majority of illegal migrants fled their homeland to the EU to save their lives, in 2020 only 37% thought so (*Chart 3*). At the same time, and in line with the results of research published since then[7], the proportion of those who say that most people come for economic purposes or for social benefits has increased steadily (those who think so have become a majority since 2017). The data draw attention to the unsustainability of the exclusive narrative of the "refugee crisis", also demonstrating Europeans' sense of reality, since, based on the recognition rates in the member states, the majority of newcomers are indeed considered to be economic migrants.[8]


Chart 3

There is a significant difference between the response rate of the V4 and other member states: while in the group of the 27 EU member states and the United Kingdom the rates are 57% to 37% in favour of economic immigration, in the V4 countries the rates are 68% to 26%. It is noteworthy that the highest response rates were in Latvia (79%) and Lithuania (77%), but the third Baltic state, Estonia, is also in the highest bracket (fifth place with 70%) (*Chart 4.*). Those who say that the migrants are essentially refugees from persecution are in a majority only in six countries, Romania, Sweden, Cyprus, Portugal, Malta and Luxembourg. Among these, Malta seems particularly interesting, since illegal immigration increased significantly there in 2020.

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[7] For example see: ZAPTIA 2016.
[8] For the latest data see: EASO 2021.

Chart 4

Crisis Management

Project Europe was also interested in how Europeans assess the EU's crisis management performance and measures regarding migration. The answers to the related question suggest that, while immigration is essentially a member state competence, Europeans expect Brussels to take effective action, and clearly assign it a role in resolving the crisis. The results obtained suggest that, similar to the experience of recent years, the majority of Europeans are dissatisfied with the way in which Brussels is handling the migration crisis. More than two-thirds (67%) of EU and UK respondents consider the EU's action on this issue to be weak, while only 26% are satisfied with Brussels' migration policy (*Chart 5*).


Chart 5

There are noticeable differences between certain groups of countries. In Western, Northern and Southern Europe, which are most affected by immigration, 70% of respondents gave Brussels a "poor" rating, compared with the former socialist member states and the V4 countries, where this rate is 58% in both cases (*Chart 6*). In addition to being affected to different degrees by migration, the latter result can also be explained by optimistic, idealistic attitudes stemming from a high level of commitment to EU membership.

Chart 6

Interestingly, the majority are dissatisfied with the EU's crisis management in all member states, and the worst certificate has been issued by respondents in two front countries, Greece and Italy: 82% of Greeks and 81% of Italians rated the EU's performance as poor. The least dissatisfied were the Irish, Romanians and Luxembourgers (the cumulative rate of "excellent" and "good" was 44%, 39% and 45%, respectively). The research also asked about two important crisis management tools: border protection and distribution quotas.

Border Protection

The results obtained suggest that Europeans expect Brussels to take stronger action on border protection, without which it is impossible to effectively address the migration crisis. Accordingly, more than three-quarters of the respondents (78%) agree with the statement that "the EU should protect the European borders more efficiently". There is a noticeable difference in the response rates between the founders and those who joined in the 20th century and the post-socialist countries (*Chart 7*). In the latter group, there is a higher proportion of those who expect more effective border protection, which reinforces the overall picture that border protection is strongly expected of Brussels, even if the protection of external (Schengen) borders is basically a member state competence. With this in mind,

Chart 7

the minimum that European citizens expect from leaders in Brussels is to support the member states in these efforts.

It is important to note that the proportion of those expecting more efficient border protection is highest in two member states with external borders: Malta (90%) and Hungary (88%).

Relocation Quotas

There is no trace of an "EU-wide" consensus on the EU's relocation quota proposal. There has been a change in the perception of the plan in recent years: while the proportion of supporters was 53% in 2020 (the same as in 2016, although it fell to as low as 45% in the intervening years), and the proportion of opponents fell from a "peak" of 41% to 29%, the proportion of those who could not or did not want to respond (18%) was remarkably high (*Chart 8*). The data suggest that this is still an extremely divisive proposal.

Looking at the response rates between certain groups of countries, the division is well illustrated. In the "old" member states, support for the quota plan is 59%, while in the former socialist countries and the V4 countries, only 30 and 28% of respondents, respectively, support Brussels' plans for a mandatory distribution of

Chart 8

asylum seekers. Interestingly, in the Visegrad countries, opposition to the quota plan is exactly twice as high (56%) as support for it, on the basis of which it can be stated that Brussels' efforts to implement the mandatory distribution of asylum seekers do not meet the expectations of the citizens of the Visegrad countries (*Chart 9*).


Chart 9

The fault line is also striking in the national data. Malta (78%), Germany (76%), Italy (69%), Greece (68%), Austria (66%) and Spain (60%) have the highest support for the distribution of asylum seekers. In contrast, the proposal is largely rejected in the Czech Republic (73%), Hungary (73%), Slovakia (71%), Bulgaria (62%), Estonia (60%) and Latvia (60%).

It is clear that both the front countries and key target countries for immigration have also lined up behind the proposal, as the quota is primarily a relief from their point of view. The member states that reject mass (illegal) migration and admission can be found on the other side. It is striking that while the protection of external borders is eminently suitable as the basis for a "common EU" migration policy, the quota system is still extremely divisive. This also highlights the main problems with the European Commission's migration proposal package presented in September 2020.[9] It does not give sufficient weight to the importance of external border protection (as a key factor in curbing illegal migration), yet the quota, which is not de jure mandatory but could easily become de facto mandatory in a migration crisis – i.e., mandatory optional – is presented as a solidarity element. The latter element is incompatible with the position of citizens in the Visegrad countries, especially in Hungary, which has been outlined in recent years.

Strategic Vision

Project Europe also examined the link between population decline and migration. According to the majority of respondents, population decline should be solved by increasing rates of childbirth and not by immigration (*Chart 10*). In the "old" member states, the proportion of those who hold this view is 53%, while in the former socialist and Visegrad countries it is noticeably higher (74% and 72%, respectively). The difference may be explained by the traditionally more permissive attitude of Western Europe, reflecting the fact that in some "old" member states, the phenomenon of multiculturalism has been part of the social landscape for many decades. In addition, the escalating social (especially integration-related) tensions following the migration crisis, added to those that had accumulated in the past, may have strengthened the aversion of the "newer" member states towards mass immigration (from which, in contrast to Western, Northern and Southern Europe, the "Easterners" have been completely left out since the middle of the 20th century). The proportion of those who support the promotion of childbearing instead of migration is highest in Hungary (89%), followed by Bulgaria (88%) and Latvia (84%). On the other end of the spectrum, a relative majority of Irish and British respondents (40% and 38%, respectively) see immigration as a solution for halting population decline.

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[9] EC 2020a.

Chart 10

In this context, the study also asked the opinion of respondents on the following statement: "Your country should rely on its internal resources and support families instead of immigration." A vast majority of respondents (69%) essentially agreed with the statement. However, the difference in emphasis between the two groups of countries was also echoed here: 65% of respondents in the "old" member states agreed with the statement, compared to 81% in the post-socialist countries and 78% in the V4 countries. Thus, it can be stated that respondents in the former socialist bloc, including Hungary, consider the protection and support of families a fundamental expectation of their governments. The encouragement of immigration is not considered key to overcoming demographic and related economic difficulties (*Chart 11*).

Chart 11

Response rates at the member state level naturally reflect and support the above observation. Support for internal resources is particularly high in Hungary (91%), Latvia (90%), Bulgaria (90%), Slovakia (89%), Romania (88%) and the Czech Republic 87%). Of the 28 countries surveyed, only in Luxembourg does the proportion of those agreeing with the statement not exceed 50%. However, it can also be said of this country that a relative majority of respondents (47%) consider family support, instead of immigration, to be the key to solving the emerging challenges.

It is striking that in Western Europe, the rate of the "do not know/refused" responses is consistently 10%. Overall, it can be stated that EU citizens expect their own government not to encourage immigration but to support and help the indigenous society. In light of this, it is particularly troubling that a proposal of the Commission released in November 2020[10] earmarks for the member states significant support for the integration of immigrants (e.g., housing), which is clearly not in line with the above response rates.

Conclusion

Based on the survey results presented above, it can be stated that European societies agree on the broader issue of migration in several important areas. For example, the majority of EU citizens clearly see the current migration towards Europe as economic immigration, and expect the European Union to take more effective action, including more successful border protection. The distribution of asylum seekers is already revealing the division between "Westerners" and "Easterners", pointing out one of the key reasons why quotas should not be a way out of the migration crisis for the EU and its member states. However, there is a clear demand from the majority of respondents to try to solve demographic problems through an increase in the birth rate and the support of families instead of immigration. These positions are particularly popular in the post-socialist and V4 countries, but, apart from Luxembourg, they also form a majority opinion in Western member states.

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[10] EC 2020b.

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Muslim refugees in the process of state and society building – Turkish examples from the 19–20th century

Péter Kövecsi-Oláh

Abstract

Turkey has a long history of accepting and managing refugees and immigrants in its territory. This is reflected by the fact that the country has hosted a large number of immigrants relative to its total population, over the past centuries. In a way, this process is special since those arriving in Anatolia (and Thrace) were predominantly Muslim and/or of a Turkish ethnic background, but, in many cases, came from a completely different cultural milieu. Two conditions should be emphasised with regards to successful integration. On the one hand, the Turkish concept of nation state, and, on the other hand, the Turkish imperial consciousness rooted in the Ottoman traditions that looks at itself as a civilisation-creating factor. These ethnic groups – in particular, peoples of the Balkan and Russian Tatars – played and still play a key role in the development of the Turkish concept of nation state. The imperial consciousness fed by the successes of the Ottoman past partly explains the behaviour of the Turkish state regarding today's migratory processes that affect Europe.

Keywords: Turkey, refugees, nation building, migration, Balkan, Caucasus, Tatars

Introduction

The dilemmas emerging in today's Europe relating to Muslims are often presented as a Christian-Muslim issue, or sometimes as a secular-Muslim issue. In this study, we put this approach aside and attempt to examine, in view of the limitations on scope, how different Muslim ethnic groups got on when they had to start a new life for various reasons, in a majority society with similar religious affiliations, but sometimes described by a significantly different cultural environment. We pay particular attention to how political leadership viewed the arrival of Balkan Muslims, Crimean and Volga Tatars, or even Ahiska Turks or Azerbaijanis in the first decades of the Turkish Republic.

Peoples from the Balkan

These days, mentioning the words "Balkan" and "migration" in the same sentence makes everyone think of the large numbers of different ethnic groups settling in territories west of the River Leitha, right after the breakup of Yugoslavia, and a process that has been ongoing since then. Though this statement holds true, maybe it is not pointless to pay some words to an emigration wave of similar volume, i.e. where masses of Balkan Muslims left their motherland behind to find a new home across Asia Minor. The newly arrived masses included, what we would call today, economic immigrants ("göç-göçmen", "hicret" or "muhaceret") and also those leaving for political or economic and social reasons ("mülteci" or "sığınmacı").

Although the process had already started in parallel with the revival of nation state building efforts (note that the Serbian statehood started its successful fight against the Ottoman imperial rule around 1806), true mass migrations were boosted by the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878. The Balkan wars (1912–1913) and World War I were the developments which finally put this issue in a new dimension. The trend kept going on even once the Turkish Republic was established, since some researches argue that nearly 1.2 million people moved from the Balkan region to Turkey between 1923 and 1960. The majority came from Greece and Bulgaria (approx. 780 thousand), but the number of those settling from Yugoslavia and North Macedonia also reached 270 thousand. The remaining part of those arriving (roughly 120 thousand people) left Romania.[1]

Another approach argues that the number of people fleeing Greek territories from 1912 reaches 2 million along with those resettled under the Turkish-Greek population exchange signed in 1923 (this group is often called "mübadil").[2] Even if we consider this number exaggerated – justifiably to some extent –, Greece was certainly the largest sending country at that time. The mentioned Turkish-Greek population exchange ordered nearly 1.2 million Orthodox (Rum) people to leave Turkey, and approximately 0.5 million Muslim-Turks were brought in "in exchange". As their special characteristic, they considered religion their number one identity factor. This explains why the so-called Orthodox Christian Karamanli community was also forced to leave despite the fact that they identified themselves as Turkish.

The most recent research argues that roughly 2.5 million people left the Balkans and settled in Turkey between 1878 and the early 2010's. In practice, this means

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[1] Hatipler 2018, pp 427–429.
[2] Lozanmubadilleri 2020.

that, currently, approximately one in every five Turkish families believes they have at least one ascending line with Balkan roots.[3]

Also, we have to mention that the majority of the mass concerned strived to live as close to their motherland as possible, thus mainly settling in either the European part of Turkey (in geographical terms) or in the region of the Aegean Sea and Istanbul, i.e. in more developed parts of the country. In addition to Istanbul, the cities home to the largest communities with Balkan ascendants in the country today are İzmir, Bursa, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Aydın, Balıkesir and Edirne.

This argument is more valid for Romania, as the mass of roughly 120 thousand people did not make it even to Istanbul, and rather settled west of the city, mostly in Edirne, Rodosto and Kırklareli. Moreover, the population movement essentially came to a halt by 1949 with the lowering of the Iron Curtain.

In turn, in the case of Bulgaria, we can talk about multiple waves. Following the signing of the Turkish-Bulgarian settlement agreement in 1925, by 1949 nearly 220 thousand people had moved to Turkey. Then in 1950–1951, over 18 months, owing to the acrimonious situation involving the Bulgarian government, a further 153 thousand people left their homeland under pressure from Sofia. This wave was followed by the bilateral agreement Bulgaria and Turkey entered in the late 1960's in a changed geopolitical environment, ordering a further 116 thousand people to emigrate from the communist country. The largest, fourth wave also occurred in the shadow of significant global political changes. With the last days of the Soviet hegemony approaching in Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian authorities had expelled approximately 310 thousand people from the country by the end of 1989. Thus, we can conclude that a total estimated number of 800 thousand people were resettled from Turkey to Bulgaria or the other way around between 1923 and 1989.

Similarly, emigration of Muslims in large numbers from Yugoslavia to Turkey mainly took place after World War II, in particular after 1955. 95% of the roughly 305 thousand people had the chance to freely decide where to live in the country. From 1992 to 1995, a further 20 thousand people – mainly Bosnians – settled in Turkey due to the Yugoslavian war. They did not reach the "heart" of Anatolia either, as they started a new life mostly in Istanbul, concentrated in specific districts of the city (Pendik, Bayrampaşa).

As for recent developments, 17 thousand Kosovans settled in the country of Asia Minor after 1999, followed by a further 10 thousand North Macedonians after 2001.

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[3] Özlem 2011.

Relating to the above statistics, homogenisation efforts aimed at creating a nation state flared up from time to time with varying intensity in the mentioned period. In Yugoslavia, this was often coupled with the confiscation of property and Slavisation from as early as the 1930's, turning into an Albanisation in the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after 1945. This was enabled by the Surname Act, under which, from 1946, the suffix "jevich" had to be changed to "jevi", making it possible to keep record of Macedonian Turks as part of the Albanian minority. In weakening the positions of Muslims in the society, pogroms were also organised in addition to bureaucratic practices (such as the exclusion of Muslims from the class of civil servants).

By the 20th century, Muslims who had appeared in the Balkans after the Ottoman extension of the 14th century (mostly Turkish-speaking people, though many Balkan Slavs were Islamised as well) had already had a history of five hundred years in many places. Five hundred years in the Balkans – or we could also mention Central Europe – is such a long period that it can practically make an ethnic group indigenous in their place of residence. One can think of the Kun or Jasz people in Hungary, or the Saxons in Transylvania. These ethnic groups became an integral part of the majority culture over five hundred years even if they kept their traditions and language in specific cases.

Accordingly, the accelerating emigration of Balkan Muslims in the 19th century still has lasting effects, and the descendants keep their ancestors' homeland in their thoughts. Those with Balkan origins have established more than 200 associations, institutions and cultural clubs, and have become fully integrated into the Turkish society.

State considerations behind settlement and resettlement

When talking about immigration from the Balkans, beyond the above historical and social reasons, we should also briefly assess what the receiving state had to offer its new citizens. In 1923, in an economical sense, , as a country having been involved in war for more than a decade, Turkey had no chance to provide any social services to its "kins" ("soydaş"). The so-called Resettlement Act, which came into effect on 24 June 1934, however, attempted to attract those to the country who were departing from Bulgaria and Romania and somehow fitted into the category "of Turkish origin" or "connected to Turkish culture". At the same

time, the Act separately addressed the category of "anarchists, agents and nomadic gypsies", whom it strived to keep out of the country.[4]

At that time, resettlement was also supported politically by the government. Interior minister Şükrü Kaya worded the following opinion regarding the people coming from Bulgaria, in one of the most popular daily newspapers, *Cumhuriyet* (released on 17 July 1935):

"There remains no doubt that the Bulgarians will attack us at the right moment to get their hands on Thrace... That is why we have to strengthen Thrace in every possible respect. The government decided to settle the several hundred thousand refugees fleeing to Turkey in Thrace and East Anatolia. At the same time, the Bulgarians' hunger for land and Thrace right before their eyes made this nice area the number one issue. So, this is why... Thrace comes first! Yes, we should settle the Turks who come to us to the front, in Thrace…"[5]

The security aspects, however, did not only concern Thrace, since the other key destination region was East Anatolia. The Elazığ-Muş and Diyarbakır-Erzurum lines lie in a strategic location, crossed by the East-West and North-South routes.[6]

Turkey, as a young state dealing with country building, put great emphasis on ensuring that their society would warmly welcome their "brothers".

In autumn 1934, Turkish citizens were able to read the following thoughts in the newspaper 'Yeşilyurt' in Thrace: "From among foreign hands, many come to the motherland. These people will cultivate large lands of our beloved Thrace, enriching and thriving our homeland. Today, they come with small toddlers, the elderly and tired mothers, they are all exhausted, and sometimes seek help from us, their brothers. It is our duty to give them, as our brothers, a helping hand. We encourage all citizens to continuously make an effort and do everything possible to give back this brotherly love we receive."

Under the planned resettlement, those arriving were provided not only with a place to live, but also material assistance for conducting agricultural activities (through state banks). The previously mentioned Settlement Act was also intended to set up a legal framework for this. Moreover, adopting a law was not only necessary for the planned resettlements in 1934, but was also justified by the fact that these people arrived in communities of different ethnic composition and sociological

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[4] Duman 2009, p 478.

[5] *Ibid*, p 480.

[6] *Ibid.*

background in the western and eastern parts of the country.[7] The Kurdish population, which has built its own society in a tribal system traditionally, was rather sceptical about the centralisation efforts of Ankara in the East Anatolia region. The active appearance of the state in the region questioned the system in which the "landlord" ("aga") arranged for the everyday life of a whole community – up to tens of thousands –, from going to work to jurisdiction. Accordingly, beyond addressing the situation of "settlers", the law in question could be interpreted as Ankara's attempt to expand its rule to areas where the state previously – in the Ottoman era, for quite some time – had turned a blind eye to the special status of the local Kurdhish elite.

The above examples well demonstrate how politics seeing potential (workforce) in the newcomers utilised population movements for its own purposes. However, from the perspective of actual people who were behind the statistics and subject to the mentioned agreements, most recent research does not necessarily see success stories in the population exchanges and movements concerning hundreds of thousands of people. Still, according to the Turkish nationalist historical narrative, this phenomenon continues to carry an essentially positive message.

In contrast, the sociological approach rather underlines the trauma caused as a result of changing their place of residence. As Hirschon stresses, for example, people being resettled from Ottoman areas to Greece meant a great loss, as their first-generation still preserved the Ottoman identity that highly valued diversity.[8] Özbay emphasises that the groups of people settled across Anatolia included many orphans and youngsters with only one parent left due to the war. In such cases, the community, naturally, strived to pass on its own values and beliefs. Many of them went to a military school, and, in exchange for a secure career – lacking other options –, a much more homogeneity-centred culture concept came to the forefront of identity.[9]

Staying with the Greek-Turkish population exchange, the memo prepared by an outside observer, US diplomat Raymond Hare, from 1930, reveals an interesting insight. According to Hare, "from the population exchange, Greece benefitted in economic terms, but lost politically. In turn, Turkey benefitted politically, but rather lost in economic terms."[10]

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[7] İçduygu – Erder – Gençkaya 2014, p 115.
[8] Cited by *ibid*, p 108.
[9] *Ibid*, p 109.
[10] Cited by *ibid* p. 109.

Muslims in Russia

It is a historical cliché that the Soviet Union played an important role in the birth of modern Turkey. Without going into detail, we will just briefly mention that Mustafa Kemal, leader of the Turkish war of independence, entered into a treaty of amity in the spring of 1920 with Moscow, which was also in the middle of a fight for life and death. The treaty determined the Caucasian (Armenian-Turkish and Soviet-Turkish) borders, then the Soviets started to supply gold and weapons to the Ankara government. By 1920, however, many Russian Turks (Azerbaijanis, Volga and Crimean Tatars, Bashkirs, etc.) had already found a new homeland in the Ottoman empire, and were struggling with flourishing Russian nationalism, in particular owing to their own nationalism. Although the group in question was much smaller in number compared to the Balkan refugees, their historical impact was perhaps more significant.

The group of Russian (Volga and Crimean) Tatars was the community which was actually the driving force behind the appearance of the Turkish national issue on the agenda. This was mostly explained by the wealthy and influential civic class serving as the basis of this process, which was able to adopt the most recent ideological ideas from the Russian intellectuals, and which was able to bring together and organise the Muslim community in Russia.

Of the territories controlled by the tsar, approximately 10-11% were populated by Muslims in the early 20th century. And 90% of this population belonged to either of the Turkish ethnic groups.[11] Based on a figure from 1897 – if we want to express this share in absolute numbers –, we can talk about roughly 13.6 million "Turks".[12] The issue of the Muslim minority in Russia practically overlapped with the issue of Turks in Russia. For comparison, this number, more or less, corresponded to the total population of the Turkish Republic at the time of its proclamation.[13] However, we should mention here that no specific numbers can be cited in connection with the settlement of the community concerned in Turkey. Yet, we can conclude that the largest part of this group was (and still is) made up of the so-called Qarapapaqs, a specific group of Azerbaijanis, who are the closest to Anatolian Turks both geographically and linguistically. Scientific literature

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[11] Zenkovsky 1960, p 9.
[12] Landau 1995, p 7.
[13] The first official population census of the republic was held in 1927. At that time, as many as 13.5 million people were registered in the territory of the country.

estimates their number at somewhere between 80 and 200 thousand today, and they mostly live in the eastern periphery of the country.[14]

Returning to the territories ruled by the tsar, the Turkish ethnic groups living there formed a relatively homogenous bloc. And the fears among the millions of Turks in Russia grew stronger day by day. In order to assimilate foreign people, Russian politics intentionally used both orthodoxy and Russian nationalism, and strived to disguise these efforts under Pan-Slavism and Christianity.

The so-called Ilminsky system set up in 1860 offered the first real chance for the state to homogenise the country, which development later re-appeared stronger in the Pan-Slavic ideas of Alexander III.[15] Education and religion were the key dimensions. These two issues are closely related to one another. The tsar's efforts basically aimed to ensure some kind of autonomy in religious issues – which was quite extensive in the empire – in order to win the support of the Tatar clergy. The Crimean Muslim Religious Council was established for this purpose in 1831, with a comprehensive control of power over Muslim religious life. They acted on legal issues under Islamic law, and had a direct influence on selecting mullahs, hodjas and imams.[16] Nevertheless, they were not interested in creating modern education, as the appearance of new types of schools also reduced their power.

A paradox situation emerged in which Muslim religious leaders – originally tasked with ensuring the rights and survival of their community – became the most enthusiast supporters of the Russification policy that aimed to preserve the positional advantage against the Tatars by preserving the obsolete educational system.

The problem was recognised by Şehabeddin Mercani. He was the first to notice that, without learning Russian and other Western European languages, the Tatar society would not be able to catch up, and without the knowledge of modern languages the Turkish-speaking minority in Russia would not have any chance of learning the modern European ideologies, ideas.[17] Pan-Turkism as a fundamental political idea originates from here. As such, we can talk about a defensive mechanism, but its impact reached even the Ottoman areas. To put it simply, we can say that the fundamentals of modern nationalism were not born in today's Turkey, but in Russia instead.

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[14] Bezanis 1992, p 11., Encyclopedia of Islam (Karapapaklar).
[15] Georgeon 1996, p 13.
[16] Fisher 1978, pp 94–109.
[17] Ibid.

Blurring the lines between the concepts of Turanism ("Turancılık") and Pan-Turkism ("Türkçülük") – both intentionally and unconsciously – started as early as the beginning of this period. This is primarily explained by the same meaning attached to the two concepts – in particular by the 1920's –, that is the unification of people of different Turkish origins.[18] There is a consensus in the literature that the mixing process was significantly facilitated by a journalist named Tekin Alp from Saloniki. In its irredentist publication entitled "Türkler bu muharebede ne kazanabilir?" (What can the Turks win in this clash?),[19] he was the first to report on the phenomenon of Pan-Turkism to the European public (as it was soon translated into several European languages).

We have to mention two of the most influential thinkers who played a key role in spreading Turkish nationalism – and thus, naturally, Pan-Turkism. They are İsmail Gaspıralı (1851–1914) and Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935). Gaspıralı is mostly known for the education reform, which he developed to raise the level of literacy of the Tatar youth to that of the Russian average. The reform – which was born in Bakhchysarai, the quasi-capital of the Crimea – was designed to eliminate the old madrasa system.

He tried to expand the system – which was based on Quranic studies that were widely spread in the Muslim world at that time – by adding mathematics, history and geography classes beyond the Russian language, and integrating them into the curriculum.[20] Gaspıralı's other important initiative was the journal entitled Tercüman, launched in 1883.[21] The journal was first issued exactly a hundred years after the annexation of Crimea by the Russians.[22] It aimed to strengthen the cultural identity of the Turks in Russia by developing a common language that could be understood by every Turk. The motto of the thus born Tercüman later became the motto of the entire Pan-Turkish movement: "Unity in language, acts and thoughts."[23]

Yusuf Akçura also played a key role in shaping the Turkish national identity, and later in defending and maintaining the concept of the nation state. His most significant work is entitled Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset, with which he brought Pan-Turkism into political publicity, being the first to appoint the unification of different Turkish groups as

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[18] Poulton 1997, p 131.
[19] The original name of Tekin Alp was Moise Cohen (1883–1961). Title in English: "What can the Turks win in this clash?" In: Landau 1995, p 34.
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] **Ibid**.
[22] Fisher 1978, pp 94–109.
[23] "Dilde birlik, işte birlik, fikirde birlik."

the most effective way to save the Ottoman Empire (if all external and internal conditions were met). With this piece written in 1904, he actually created "Turkism" as a political concept that first defines the Turks as a cultural, linguistic and historical unit. Both mentioned thinkers – in particular Akçura – form an integral part of the process as a result of which Turkey defines itself as a nation state.

As a consequence of the above, the German (Hungarian) propaganda also used the encouragement of the Russian Turks' autonomy efforts during World War I. By March 1920, however, this policy became unsustainable, in particular due to the fact that the Kemal administration could not expect support from either great power, as British, French and Italian troops were deployed in the country. But, at the same time, when Kemal decisively refrained from embracing the issue of Turks in Russia as well as using them as a tool against the Soviet leadership, he admitted that Moscow could view the situation of Turks living in its territory purely as a home affair. The issue of Turkish groups stuck beyond the new borders was removed from the agenda by the new Turkish leadership having stabilised its position by 1923, in order to reach a calmness in foreign policy so domestic reforms could be implemented.

Nonetheless, two developments are worth mentioning. First, the Turkish government admitted the Turkish ethnic groups fleeing from Russian and Caucasian regions, the so-called Ahiska Turks ("ahıska" in Turkish). In 1933, approximately two thousand Ahiska Turks found a new homeland in the country of Asia Minor. Second, the government, which engaged in a definitely secular politics at home, called the Turkish communities living beyond its borders primarily Muslim, and not Turkish.

Moreover, publications spreading Pan-Turkish propaganda among Turkish ethnic groups living under Iranian or Caucasian Soviet authority that were produced in printing houses in Turkey had to be banned in some cases. Beyond the Soviet-Turkish or Iranian-Turkish relations, the issue also emerged in Polish-Turkish relations. This was explained by the fact that the newspaper "Yeni Kafkasya", which was established by Caucasian refugees as part of Poland's anti-Soviet propaganda, was provided with Polish funding (among others).[24]

And though the debate on the Turks in Russia, as well as the Russian connections of Turkish communists, flared up in the Russian Pravda and the Turkish Milliyet from time to time, the Soviet-Turkish cooperation established in 1920 (from 1925, a treaty of amity) proved to be lasting, as it still represents one of the pillars

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[24] Demirici 2020, p 65.

of bilateral relations to date.[25] Beyond the benefits offered by the migration of Turkish groups from Russia to Turkey, the process also implied a political risk for Ankara. 1931 can be deemed a watershed year, when the Kemal administration broke off all ties with Turanist groups from the Soviet areas (among others).[26] Some people concerned – including Zeli Velidi Togay, academician with excellent Hungarian connections – moved to the West. Those who accepted the realities and the minimum expectations of politics kept their positions (like Yusuf Akçura).

Beyond the above examples, another important aspect is worth mentioning in connection with the birth of the modern Turkish Republic. Namely, the egalitarian policy pursued by Turkey after 1923, explained by the painful and living memories of the Ottoman past. As far as our topic is concerned, this practically meant that the state strived to create an identity which could be accepted by all. And, as part of this – despite some critics from the West –, the state considered the whole Muslim population as Turkish. People of other religions – Jews, Armenians and Rums – were only referred to as official minorities (quasi on the ruins of the millet system).[27] However, as experience from the Ottoman times made the then elite think that minorities posed a potential threat to state unity, it strived to reduce their independence and autonomy as well as to ascertain their loyalty to the secular state. This policy proved to be more or less successful. On the one hand, the majority of non-Muslims staying in the country saw (and still see) their own safety guaranteed in the secular state, and, on the other hand, the Alevi community – making up 15–20% of the population according to specific estimates – became a pillar of the Atatürk model in many places.

Summary and conclusions

Overall, we can argue that the modern Turkish state is strongly connected to refugees, or even economic immigrants, living in its immediate neighbourhood or farther, in terms of both its ideological and social structure. Though it is true that the people in question showed similarities with regard to their language and culture (i.e. religion), they moved to a completely different environment compared to their previous political ideas or social conditions in which they had lived before. Integration proved to be challenging for the Turks coming from Russian lands, but the average Macedonian Turks – who moved to areas populated by Kurds (and previously Armenians), with state support – also struggled. The Turkish example

[25] Demirci 2020, p 63.
[26] Bezanis 1992, p ii.
[27] Güllü 2018, p 287.

shows, among other things, that resettlements or mass population movements can easily lead to tension in society (at least, in the short run) even if the state sees potential benefits in the process, as was the case with people from the Balkans. However, at the same time, the processes and examples addressed herein go back to historical periods when humans were pictured and perceived completely differently from today. Human life as a universal value – be it faith arising from "creation" or simply workforce – was judged differently compared to how we see it today. As a result, translating actions from the past into the present may seem obvious in many cases, but it can easily mislead even well-intentioned historians.

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Interview with International Jurist José Luis Bazán Ph.D., on Christian persecution in Africa

23 September 2020

1. How do you see the persecution of Christians in the 21st century? Do you think it is true that Christians are the most persecuted minorities on our Globe as Opendoors states?

Facts and narratives are quite different things. The persecution of Christians as a worldwide phenomenon is an irrefutable truth and an undeniable factual reality. However, facts and realities can be hidden or pre-selected, distorted, watered down… through the creation of "prefabricated" narratives that betray the factual reality. And this is what, unfortunately, happens with the narrative of the "persecution of Christians" as described in the Western world, in particular. Most of the time "persecuted Christians" is a non-existing topic in Western public opinion: the dominant media either do not report it or do it but veiling the reality: e.g., the conflict in the Middle Belt of Nigeria is described as an "intercommunal conflict" between herdsmen and farmers for natural resources, in a context of climate change. However, most of the times herdsmen (who are Muslims) are the aggressors, while farmers (who are Christians) are the victims. Islamic terrorist herdsmen invade the lands of farmers (who are the legitimate owners) and destroy them, burn their houses, villages and churches, kill their religious leaders, rape women and girls… Both groups, herdsmen and farmers, are unfairly placed in a symmetric position: both are considered "victims" (of climate change, poverty, etc.) under a false narrative that is misleading, and, even, immoral. Islamic terrorism exists represented by radicalized herdsmen, which is denied by the mainstream media and policy-makers, including international organisations' leaders.

On the other hand, regarding the expression "minorities", I would like to make a couple of comments: it is true that persecuted Christians are, sometimes, a minority group (as it happens, e.g., in the Middle East) from the sociological point of view. But majority groups can also be persecuted: in their own countries. This may sound strange to Western ears, but this is also factual. A radicalized minority can persecute a peaceful majority in its own homeland. Although not at the level of persecution, but of intolerance and discrimination, we see this in Western societies:

in countries where the majority of citizens declare themselves Christians, their own laicist governments and media stereotype and associate them with negative connotations, adopt beligerant legislation that breaches their fundamental rights (such as the right to conscientious objection to abortion or euthanasia; or denies their parental rights in their children's education). Social harassment, hate speech and crimes are also carried out against Christians in traditionally and culturally Christian countries: e.g., in France. In accordance with the figures of its Minister of Home Affairs, in 2019, there were 1,052 Anti-Christian acts, 687 Anti-Semitic actions, and 154 Anti-Muslim acts. Why are all these figures not spread and well known by European public opinion?

2. How do you see the general status of Christianity in Africa? Do you think it will be the next driving force for Christianity?

Christianity in Africa is healthy, vibrant, committed and… growing. A Pew Research Center study made it clear that, generally speaking, Africa is the most religious continent in the world: 98% of Ethiopians, 88% of Nigerians, 86% of Ugandans and 75% of South-Africans say that religion is *very important* in their lives. On the other hand, we find poor levels of religiosity in Europe (10% in UK, Germany and Sweden; 11% in France; 22% in Spain, with Greece being one of the highest, with 56%).

African Christians, generally speaking, are also highly committed to their religion. By way of comparison, we see that the percentage of Christians who say that their religion is *very important* in their lives in Europe goes from 9% in Denmark to 59% in Greece (UK: 11%; Germany and France: 12%; Italy: 23%; Spain: 30%; and Poland: 32%). The US is remarkably more committed, as 68% of Christians consider their religion very important. Contrary to Europe, we find much higher percentages in Africa: e.g., in South Africa (79%), Nigeria (82%), Ghana (89%) or Ethiopia (98%).

However, war, violence, poverty, corruption and other evils poison African countries and affect their peoples, including Christians, who, in their millions, suffer enormously due to these injustices. Moreover, Africa is also the scene of an increasing Christian persecution, mostly, by Islamic terrorist groups, making martyrdom a daily reality for African Christian communities. It is not unusual in some parts of Africa to be killed just for going to mass, following a procession or living in a Christian

neighborhood. It is clear that internal and external powers work towards imposing their agenda of Islamization, in particular in the Sub Saharan Africa.

On the other hand, African Christianity is already a source of richness and a model for other Christians worldwide: their sense of community and appreciation of family and life, the joy of living and celebrating, their capacity to permeate religion in all aspects of daily life, the intensity of their commitment - which enables them to be a witness for Christ even at the cost of their own blood -, their fidelity to the truth of God and the human being, their resilience and their capability to discover the meaning and value of life despite difficulties and suffering… The world, and in particular, Western countries, need to learn from the example of the Church in Africa, from their faithful pastors. Africa is "exporting" faith, priests and religious people to other continents: this reality will also make the African perspective more visible in the Church in the recipient countries. Africa is certainly a driving force in the Church, and it will be even more in the future as, demographically, its percentage will increase, and its spiritual strength is great.

3. You are also dealing with the dark side of the life of Christians in Africa: persecution. How do you see it?

When the Church and their faithful fulfill their mission and vocation, we must expect opposition and persecution by earthly powers, by those interested in dominating and subjugating societies, peoples, families and individuals. The way of persecution may change: as Pope Francis mentioned, a kind of "white collar persecution" might exist, that may entail social isolation, media harassment or stereotyping, the misuse of legal actions to surrender the dissenter, a lack of professional opportunities, discrimination at work, discrediting personal reputation and honor, the impossibility of or restrictions to practice one's religion in the public sphere, etc. The irony is that the persecutors usually take the flag of human rights and rule of law twisting them beyond rationality and common sense in order to exclude dissenters, trying, even, to put them in jail applying the rule of (an unjust) law. For example, a UN "expert" publicly stated that any ban on abortion implies torture, or at least, an inhuman and degrading treatment of women who are willing to commit abortion. If defending the life of vulnerable human beings is a serious crime deserving prison in a democratic country, what kind of human rights and democracy are we talking about? The sad reality is that under the "human rights" headline we find powerful

actors instrumentalising the human dignity rationale for their own profit, expelling dissenters from society. The same applies to political correctness and the misuse of hate speech to promote censorship and facilitate the adoption of certain policies without political or social opposition.

Besides this type of persecution, we find the "classical" (if we can say so), bloody and physically violent persecution (killings, rapes, destruction of homes, coercion, forced conversion, human trafficking….) against Christians, which is increasing. Pope Francis has clearly stated that "the Church has more martyrs now than during the first centuries." This is neither an overstatement nor an exaggeration. All credible international reports show the very same reality: Christians in many African countries are suffering a bloody persecution, that, in some cases, meets the requirement of genocide.

But what is the international community doing to stop the genocide of Christians in several parts of the world, such as Iraq, Syria or Nigeria? Even the word "genocide" is avoided by governments and policy makers as they are aware that once a process is labeled as genocidal, there is an international legal obligation to stop it under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. There is no objection to speak (and rightly so) about the genocide of Yazidi in Iraq, of Muslim Uighurs in China or the Muslim Rohingya in Myanmar. But when Christians are suffering from genocidal actions, very few voices appear in the international community asking for action to protect them.

Double standards have become the norm in confrontational and polarized political struggles. E.g., for some, "Black Life Matters" seems to have certain exceptions: it does not matter if the unborn babies are black (in Africa or elsewhere), or "Black Life" does not matter if they are not living in Western countries (where, by the way, black and other minorities are simply used as a political tool). Which of those political movements go to the street to fight for the Black Life of Christian Africans persecuted in their own countries?

4. Do you think that the persecution of Christians in Africa is mainly the consequence of social-economic issues (resource competition, ethnic tensions), or is religious ideology (Jihadism) also an important factor?

A correct analysis of a particular situation requires processing accurate and sufficient relevant information: all major factors and variables should be considered and

given their proper space and dimension. Cultural, social and political context (including language) may influence the analysis, too in a way that could reduce its accuracy and credibility. Some years ago, in the "Brussels political bubble", the "R" word (meaning "Religion") was something to be avoided in any statement, report or document. Things have changed: the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, tried to present the potential role of religion in a more positive way, in preventing and solving conflicts. But still, in many corners in and out of Europe, religion is seen more as "the problem" than a solution to conflicts.

Still, the problematic view on religion is predominant, and there is a tendency to put it aside or downgrade its role in societies. For example, the way some policy-makers (and governments) have adopted an "international religious freedom policy" was through the creation of a new narrative (again, the term appears) on religious freedom, which are also used as a tool for other political agendas (e.g., women's "empowerment", including the so-called "reproductive health and rights" that certainly include intentional abortion). In this regard, the *Report on freedom of religion or belief and gender equality* (27 February 2020) by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief is a scandalous document in which, instead of protecting and promoting religious freedom (as foreseen in his mandate), he undermines religious freedom by lobbying for an inexistent "right to abortion" and actively expanding the so-called "LGBT rights" at the cost of religious freedom. This is a real danger for the integrity of a fundamental human right, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

This narrative is misleading and has very little to do with the protection and promotion of religious freedom and other fundamental rights. African women (as other women in the world) suffer this ideological neo-colonization by some Western countries (and some international organisations) that try to impose their liberal agendas upon them, linking their ideological programmes to social and economic emancipation of women and girls. The liberal Western narrative about Africa is that there are too many Africans and that they have to "control their population" (meaning, spreading abortion and contraception) either voluntarily or by pressing them. And of course, that their immense resources should be exploited mainly by Western companies. The social-economic answer is, in this perspective, the main variable that explains why Africa is in trouble, why many States have failed, and why violence takes so much protagonism in their societies.

While accepting the role of social-economic factors (as well as others, such as lack of water or other resources) in creating a negative context leading to conflict and violence, as well as the tribal dimension that is present in African societies, the persecution of Christians can't be explained only by those reasons. An interesting UNDP report entitled *Journey to extremism in Africa* (2017) shows that the "religious ideas of the group" appears to be the primary motivation to join the extremists (40%), followed by "being part of something bigger than myself" (16%), "believed by religious leader" and "employment opportunities" (both, 13%), and "joining family or friends" (10%); however, the "ethnic principles of the group" represents only 5% of the motivation. The rest of motives are below 5%, including "political ideas of the group" (4%), "adventure" (3%), "service provision by the organization" (3%), "other" (3%), "believed by my teacher" (2%), "political marginalization" (1%) and "social isolation" (1%). The social-economic factor to join an extremist group in Africa represents a very low percentage in the motivation of the recruited people.

An overwhelming majority of extremist groups in Africa are jihadist groups, that is to say, Islamic terrorists that see Christians (and others that don't share their political goals) as enemies to be destroyed and eliminated, along with their culture and heritage. And they act accordingly, attacking Christian communities systematically, destroying their villages, their churches, and killing and kidnapping their religious leaders. These Jihadist organizations in Africa include a considerable number of groups, most of them with external support and finance, such as: the Al-Qaida affiliated terror groups al-Shabab and Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (or JNIM), the Islamic State affiliate in West Africa (known as IS in the Greater Sahara or ISGS), Boko Haram, TWJWA (also known as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, MUJAO), Al-Murabitun, Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) groups, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) – also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)-Sinai Province – Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the jihadist herdsmen in Nigeria and the new jihadist cells in Mozambique (Cabo Verde Province). To fight the persecution of Christians, we need to protect and defend them, their physical integrity, their livelihoods, their villages, their temples, public buildings and infrastructure: we can't allow terrorists to achieve their goals provoking a massive exodus of Christians from their homelands, as we have seen in the Middle East. This can't happen in Africa. We can't allow this to happen in that crucial continent. Pressure should be applied upon the responsible governments, including the recourse to international criminal justice.

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5. Which are the main hotspots of Christian persecution in Africa?

The 2020 World Watch List, an Open Doors' annual ranking of the 50 countries where Christians face the most extreme persecution, shows the worrying situation of Christians in African countries: Somalia is the 3rd country in the world where Christians suffer the most intense forms of persecution, followed by Libya (4th), Eritrea (6th), Sudan (7th), Nigeria (12th), Egypt (16th), Algeria (17th), Mauritania (24th), Central African Republic (25th), Morocco (26th), Burkina Faso (28th), Mali (29th), Tunisia (34th); Ethiopia (39th), Kenya (44th), Cameroon (48th) and Niger (50th). This means that out of the 50 most dangerous countries for Christians, 17 are African countries. However, this does not mean that in the rest of the African countries Christians live without intolerance, discrimination or even persecution.

6. What was your most shocking experience in this field?

It is difficult to select one story from the many that, sadly, African Christians have suffered. What is surprising to me is how frequently they don't consider themselves to be "persecuted" victims but take it as a normal part of life that violence exists, that death is around them, and that maybe one day (tomorrow or the day after) they will be the victims. Another astonishing reality is the brutality of terrorists, killing whole families, parents and little children, the cruelty of their actions with pregnant women or the elderly. And not less shocking is the lack of response of certain public authorities to terrorism, that, in some cases, can not be attributed to the shortage of human or material means, but to an omission which, in the worst cases, can be interpreted as colluding with the aggressors, or just sharing their political goals.

7. How can ordinary Christians help their African brothers and sisters?

For many, to say that prayer and fasting are key tools in the spiritual fight against terrorism may sound naïve, if not stupid or even mad. But this is pure Christianism. This is our core belief: that hearts may be changed by the Holy Spirit; that a terrorist can be converted into an actor for peace and reconciliation, and that any of us can contribute to that process, even from a long distance, when we are in the Church or at home, or even walking on the street. Mgr Oliver Dashe

Doeme is Bishop of Maiduguri (North East of Nigeria), an area devastated by the terrorism of Boko Haram. He, himself explained that in 2014, when he was in his chapel before the Blessed Sacrament, praying the rosary, all of a sudden the Lord appeared. In the vision, the prelate said, Jesus didn't say anything at first, but extended a sword toward him, and he in turn reached out for it. "As soon as I received the sword, it turned into a rosary," the bishop said, adding that Jesus then told him three times: "Boko Haram is gone."

But faith does not prevent action; on the contrary, our sense of duty towards our Christian brothers imposes the obligation on us to do more to meet their needs, in a creative way, both in the Churches and in society. We, Christians, are also citizens, and we must exercise our rights and freedoms: to express our agreements and disagreements with political and social actors; to demand an immediate action from our authorities to provide protection for Christians elsewhere, and the use of international force to be the voice of voiceless persecuted ones; to ask them to provide humanitarian aid and international protection to persecuted Christians. Christians can also organize groups and networks to show their respective societies the reality of persecution of Christians through the testimonies of victims, events that may include photographic exhibitions, debates at Universities, letters to editors of newspapers, campaigns among families in Christian schools, in order to establish dedicated NGOs, translate reports into local languages, etc. And of course, to bring this point to the electoral campaign, looking for political compromise of the candidates.

Pope Francis: Let Us Dream: The path to a Better Future.
Simon & Schuster, 2020. (160 pages)
Review by Márk Vargha

The Covid-19 pandemic has been determining the everyday life of most people on the planet for a year now, and the archbishop of Buenos Aires was inaugurated as pope under the name Francis eight years ago. In the discourse centred around the pandemic, a number of globally reputed scholars, influential company managers and famous politicians expressed their views on the possible root causes and consequences of the crisis. In other words: where did mankind go wrong, and what should it do differently after the crisis is gone? The book authored by the head of the Catholic Church and scheduled for release right before last Christmas fits into this pattern. He discloses his edited conversations conducted with journalist Austen Ivereigh, former press secretary and PR director of the archbishop of Westminster, with Ivereigh's epilogue. In the book titled "Let us dream", the topic of migration is also mentioned, thus we can learn the Pope's opinion formulated on the issue by him directly, which we hereby attempt to place into a framework by using several other sources.

Liberation theology

Jorge Mario Bergoglio, the archbishop of Buenos Aires was elected as the 266th pope of the Roman Catholic Church on 13 March 2013. Besides being the first pope to take the name Francis, he is the first in other respects as well: the first Jesuit and American on the throne of Saint Peter, but no one else has made it to the papal office from the Southern Hemisphere before either. As regard to the person and activity of Francis, South America plays a significant role, since this is the region where the so-called liberation theology emerged in the second half of the 1960's. The so-called base communities were the antecedents of this theological approach that had been formed in the previous decade to be a platform for experiencing brotherhood in small groups. This was the period when local Catholicism discovered that faith could be used to liberate the poor, as a kind of revolutionary power. Nevertheless, he did not come to this realisation "by himself". Instead, this approach originates from the activity of theologians teaching theology

at faculties in western universities, who adapted these ideas to South America where a number of the bishops and believers accepted them. The impact of left-wing ideology – in particular, Marxism – on this approach is indisputable, which resulted in its approximation to the enforcement of Soviet interests: Ion Mihai Pacepa, a recently deceased general – who served with the infamous Roman intelligence service, the Securitate, and then defected to the US – argues that the KGB played a part in spreading it. And one of its most known advocates was Ernesto Cardenal, a Nicaraguan Catholic priest who served as a member of the Sandinist government. Working as the minister of culture from 1979 to 1987, Cardenal had an overtly hostile relationship with John Paul II due to his views.

In contrast to Marxism, the liberation theology puts the emphasis on the personal relationship between man and other people instead of the relationship between man and the world. In addition to solidarity, subsidiarity also forms an essential part of it: poor people are not only passive subjects of liberation, but rather its active actors.

The approach was criticised by several theologians and the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in the 1980's (on two occasions). The latter body argued, among other things, that changing the society will not make people themselves better; instead of an armed fight, a passive resistance is the better way to go; and finally, according to the Congregation, creating a specific social model is the task of politicians, and not priests. Pope Francis makes no explicit reference in his book that his ideas would be based on this approach. In the epilogue, however, his conversation partner clearly indicates the significance of liberation theology – more precisely, its Argentinian version – that permeates the whole book. According to him, Francis is convinced that real change will not come from above, it will come from the peripheries where Christ lives. The rich thinking tradition of the Argentinian Church lies behind this conviction, which is known as the Theology of Peoples.

Structure of the book

The three parts of the book are framed by the Prologue and the Epilogue. The first entitled "Time to see" was compiled from the pope's audio-recorded answers to Ivereigh's questions. Seeing means the perception of reality, then, within reality, the realisation of the misery faced by those living on the periphery of society. The

second part entitled "Time to choose" is the result of a looser, more spontaneous, but at the same time deeper ("master-student" like) communication between Francis and Ivereigh (similar to the third part). He highlights various powers that affect man nowadays, and classifies them into two categories: those to be followed ("come from God") and those to be rejected. The third part entitled "Time to act" intends to present how we should act on the basis of the foregoing, more precisely, what we should do differently from what we have done until now. This part answers the following questions: What does it mean to be a people? What do people mean to me? What does the dignity of the people mean? What is solidarity? What is wrong with the unchained market orientation? What should we think about human trafficking and abortion? Why should populism be rejected? Why are people's movements important (such as the Cartonero in South America)? What can we learn from these movements? Then he mentions three topics under separate subtitles: Earth (i.e. environmental protection), Housing and Work.

Migration – and many other things

The topic of migration is touched upon in the third part, in two respects. First, in connection with the harsh criticism of human trafficking, when Pope Francis clearly favours the acceptance of people arriving, referring to today's population movement as a right, and relying on the victim position of everyone arriving – be they economic immigrants or refugees. According to Francis, the dignity of our peoples requires corridors for the migrants and refugees so they can move from regions where life threatening conditions prevail to more peaceful places, without any fear. The pope argues that deterring immigrants by letting hundreds of refugees die during perilous journeys by sea or walking through the desert is unacceptable. Francis highlightes that the Lord will hold us all accountable for each and every such death.

In our opinion, the pope approaches the problem of integrating the people who arrive in developed states superficially. He only calls to assist integration, and fails to address the basic problem that most developed societies have their needs satisfied by poorly paid immigrants. Instead, he criticises some specific existing consequences of the basic problem that cannot be applied to the majority societies – or the media which play an obvious role in informing the public – en bloc. According to Francis migrants are used as scapegoats, they are painted in

a negative light, and they are denied the right to safe and decent work. The pope only briefly makes a more complex approach, he asserts that governments should act carefully in assessing their reception and integration capacities.

The other topic touched upon by the pope in connection with migration is national populism. Indeed, he calls the efforts of national populism aimed at protecting "Christian civilisation" (quotation marks from the original – MRI) in Christian majority countries from some alleged enemies, like Islam, a phantasmagoria. Ignoring the complexity of the concept of populism in political science, the pope gives a rather simplistic explanation. According to him, the loss of the relationship with God and the universal sense of brotherhood fed the sense of isolation and the fear of the future. As a result, non-religious and superficially religious people vote for the populists to protect their religious identity, fully ignoring that fear and hatred are incompatible with the gospels. Finally, the ideas following the abovementioned thoughts are hard to interpret otherwise than the promotion of receipt without thorough distinction and impact assessment. According to Francis, the essence of Christianity is God's love for all people and our love for our neighbours, especially those in need. He argues that by rejecting a struggling immigrant – no matter what their faith is – in the fear that we dilute the "Christian" (quotation marks from the original – MRI) culture, then we present Christianity and culture in a grotesquely false manner. The pope concludes that migration is a threat to Christianity only in the minds of those who benefit from voicing such threat. Failing to define "struggling immigrant" in detail leaves a large room for free interpretation, which the actors favouring reception may exploit worldwide to exert pressure not only on the followers of the Catholic Church, but also the political powers, groups and parties that identify themselves as Christian democrats and compete for the votes of the former group.

Summary

Though "Let us dream" is an important piece due to the global prestige of the office held by the author, we should underline that this set of statements lacks any authoritative power. Accordingly, the members of the church organisation and the believers would be wrong if they viewed the content as "sayings" of an undeniable authority. There is no doubt, however, that the pope unintentionally – some say, intentionally – became an opinion leader of the international left

based on the ideas of liberation theology over his 8-year reign. As such, the book is an influential intellectual work in a political (migration policy) aspect. Still, two comments are necessary here.

First, regarding Pope Francis as the advocate of migration is a gross simplification. Using his experiences as a descendant of Italian immigrants, and certainly not independent from the impact of political-ideological changes in the society that once accepted his family, the head of the church focusses on the individual, i.e. the migrant in need, without analysing the phenomenon of immigration in a comprehensive manner. Regardless of how the Geneva Convention orders to assess the situation of the person arriving, he or she represents a concrete type of the needy individual living on the periphery to whom believers must turn with unconditional love. Second, the apparently unsophisticated attitude of Francis to the topic (as demonstrated above) is not the one and only opinion in the church. The church itself and its "elite" are both heterogeneous: many prelates take a critical approach to migration. For instance, the recently retired Guinean cardinal Robert Sarah associated migration with modern slavery and barbarian invasion. Analysing the weight and influence of church dignitaries that have other opinions, however, would obviously go beyond the limits of this review.

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For this review, we used the entries of the Hungarian Catholic Lexicon, and consulted Catholic Church historian Márton Csernus-Ortutay.

Strategies of Resilience – Conference on Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation
Report by Kristóf György Veres

The Migration Research Institute (MRI) organised an international conference on the nexus between migration and climate change on May 13–14, 2021. Climate change is one of the biggest challenges in the history of mankind; it influences almost all aspects of our life. Therefore, it is not accidental that one of the oldest human activities, migration is also affected by this phenomenon. However, the exact nature of this influence is highly contested, as well as its consequences on different societies and nations. Instead of trying to provide definite answers, the aim of *Strategies of Resilience – Conference on Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation* was to provide space for decision makers, scholars and experts to exchange their views on the complex relations between climate change and migration, and to discuss their experiences and predictions.

Will climate change contribute to mass migration and fuel armed conflicts? Can adaptation and capacity building strategies solve the problem? How can we measure the scope and depth of the ecological transformation? Do we possess the technology, which can mitigate or even reverse the process, or are we still waiting for the silver bullet solution, which can save our civilization? To tackle these questions the organisers of the conference assembled a stellar cast from all around the globe.

In her keynote address, Vanessa Nakate, a climate activist from Uganda, and founder of the Rise up Climate Movement highlighted that in her country climate-change is still taught as vague and distant problem of future generations. This attitude persists despite of the fact that more and more erratic weather and severe droughts are already affecting Ugandans' every-day lives. Kanta Kumari Rigaud, a lead environmental specialist at the World Bank stressed that it is of paramount importance in Africa to increase resilience against the repercussions of climate-change. She pointed out that the World Bank has been financing a number of projects in Ethiopia to restore arable lands and improve the efficiency of water management while at the same time paying a close attention to the preservation of bio-diversity.

Calum T. M. Nicholson, former researcher of the British Parliament highlighted that it seems impossible to separate migrants who leave their homes because of climate change from those who do so as a result of other societal, economical or cultural reasons. Consequently 'climate migration' is a problematic term from an empirical standpoint. Anneliese Depoux, director of The Virchow-Villermé Center for Public Health mapped out how climate-change affects public health. There are direct health-hazards including severe heat waves and erratic weather. However there are a number of secondary effects that are frequently overlooked. First, climate-change alters the prevalence and geographical distribution of contagious diseases that spread through water. Second, the disturbances in water-supply may cause crop-yields to drop, entire harvests to fail and consequently increase poverty and food-shortages.

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